Nina ter Laan

DISSONANT VOICES

Islam-inspired Music in Morocco and the Politics of Religious Sentiments



DISSONANT VOICES

This research project was funded by the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO) for the research program 'Islam and the Performing Arts in Europe and the Middle East' and co-financed by the Department of Religious Studies at the Radboud University.

Colofon

Cover design and lay-out: Via Bertha
Cover photo: Sufi performers at the Fes Festival of Sufi Culture in 2010, by Nina ter Laan.
Printed by: CPI Koninklijke Wöhrmann

Dissonant Voices
Islam-inspired Music in Morocco and
the Politics of Religious Sentiments

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op 19 december 2016
om 16.30 precies

door

Nina ter Laan
geboren op 12 februari 1979
te Hefshuizen

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Preface

The first time I set foot in Morocco I was twenty years old. It was the summer of 1999, I had just finished my first year in cultural anthropology. That summer, a friend and I decided to travel through southern Spain by train. Once in Andalusia, we found out that our Eurail passes were also valid in Morocco. I remember vividly how this immense feeling of curiosity pulled me to the other shore of the Mediterranean. I had always associated Morocco with immigrants and their offspring and negative media coverage in the Dutch press; I was very eager to see the country where these people came from. After I convinced my friend, we took the ferry to Tangiers and started a short but very exciting trip. I remember we saw female smugglers on the train from Tangiers to Rabat and witnessed the national grief in the streets of Fes after King Hassan II died. I would have never guessed then that I would return at least more than fifteen times to Morocco and spent a total amount of more than two years altogether in the country, learning its language(s), studying its diverse cultures and complex politics, talking to all kinds of people, and walking through its cities and admiring the desert. My love and fascination for Morocco, which was born when I embarked on that ferry trip to Tangiers, will always be a part of my life. This book is an expression of that love.

Acknowledgments

While writing this thesis, I sometimes asked myself how I could possibly do justice to all the people involved in the realization of this research. I have been working for seven years on this extensive project. As it became more and more integrated with my life and identity over the years, it now is strange to witness how such a process, which enabled me to learn many valuable lessons, is transforming into a material object, a book, which can be held, touched, and read. I offer this finished document as a gift to those who helped me achieve. I start this book by a humble attempt to express my feelings of deep gratitude to some of you.

During this PhD trajectory I was very fortunate to be working in a supportive academic environment. At the Radboud University I had the privilege to have two inspirational, kindhearted, and dedicated supervisors by my side. Karin van Nieuwkerk en Kees Versteegh, I am fundamentally indebted for your insights, guidance, and advice. You gave me the opportunity to start this research, as well as the trust and freedom to develop my own research ideas. Your accurate feedback, critical and stimulating questions, and optimism have enabled me to develop and finish this project and grow as a scholar.

I also thank my colleagues of the department of Islam Studies for their interest and helpful advice. A special thanks to my PhD-colleagues at the Department: Anneke Schulenberg, Rachida Talal, Sahar Noor, and Annemarie van Geel, not only for commenting on early drafts of chapters, but in particular for your friendship.

Outside of the department there were other academic colleagues who have provided meaningful support. I thank my old teacher in cultural anthropology Henk Driessen, for our inspiring conversations during lunch walks. I also want to thank my then fellow doctoral students working in the field of anthropology, Sophie Bolt, Meike Heessels, Janneke Peelen, Rahil Roodsaz, and Iris Sportel for their support and stimulating remarks during our regular meetings.

At Leiden University, I was surrounded by some wonderful colleagues and students of the Departments of Cultural Anthropology as well as of Middle-Eastern Studies. You have given me the opportunity to learn the joy and skills of teaching, which caused delays in my PhD-trajectory, but was beneficial to it as

well. At Utrecht University, where I recently started as a postdoctoral researcher, I was assisted by Nella van den Brandt with the revision of my summary.

In Morocco, I was supported by the Dutch Institute for Higher Education in Scientific Research (NIMAR). I am grateful to the staff and the people I met there: Jan Hoogland, Yelins Mahtat, Cynthia Plette, Choumissa Sadki, Farid El Azouzzi, Lenie Brouwer, Sietske de Boer, Koenraad Bogaert, Pablo Irizarri-van Suchtelen. I am also indebted to some of the researchers at the Centre Jacques Berque in Rabat, especially Nazarena Lanza, Aziz Hlaoua, and Cédric Bayloc, who have proven themselves to be very inspirational Morocco specialists. I am especially grateful for the personal and professional contributions of my fellow Morocco researchers: Merel Kahmann, Norah Karrouche, and Kendra Salois.

This project has also greatly benefited from the personal support of many people in Morocco. I am especially grateful to Ellen van de Bovenkamp, Jessica Carlisle, Marike Minnema, Rkia and Afulay, your friendship and intellect were and still are a source of inspiration and relaxation. Moha and the family Ouhssain, you have given me so much. Thank you.

Much of this research would not have been possible without the people who have helped me gain access to the field of Islam-inspired music. Especially Zakaria Agadid, your graceful assistance was crucial in gaining access to the *anashid*-music scene of Casablanca. I am also very thankful for the hospitality of many who welcomed me to stay in their homes: Hugo Stekelenburg, family Bensaaid, family El Mokhtari, and Abdelsalam Younes and his family, who helped me navigate the sometimes overwhelmingly large festival settings in Fes.

Also I owe my gratitude to Soraya Renjaan, Bouchra Yahya, Anass Habib, Jan Hoogland, Remko and Maxime ter Laan, Anne-Louise Roosen, Abdesammad Ait Dada, and Mohamed Gharbaoui for their thorough transcription and translation assistance.

I am grateful for the love and support of my dear friends: Sander Leeuwenburgh and Danielle Slootjes, Regula and Rick Deurloo, Eva Merkx, Jurgen van Hal en Marieke van Londen, Tom Willems, Marit Hopman, and Marjolein Teunissen. Thank you for your continued interest in my thesis, and confidence that I could finish it. In Utrecht I was lucky to be surrounded by a warm and fun group of music lovers. Arjen van Gend, Jelle Boomstra, Jack Buckley, Michiel van Engelen, Kees Brussel, Mayumi Malotaux, and Elke Praagman kept me entertained and helped me put things in perspective. More importantly they made sure I did not only study music, but that I also created it. Göksel Yilmaz, I am grateful for your heartwarming support and down-to-earth observations regarding academic jargon. Anass Habib, since our first interview in Fes, you have become a friend close to my home and heart. Alexander Gutterman, this project has benefitted in many ways from our transatlantic connection.

I want to address as special word to my two paranymphs. Marieke Slootman, in you I found an academic soulmate. Your loving support as well as your sharp analytical mind is a true inspiration and have been very important in the final stages of this thesis. Herman Buurman, since fifteen years our friendship has been essential. Now surrounded by Lune, Luuk and Flo, I want to thank all of you. The unconditional love, care, and wisdom you share with me goes beyond words. This thesis has also benefited greatly from the support of your parents, Ans and Herman Buurman (sr.), who let me stay on their quiet farm to write.

I would also like to acknowledge my family. Thanks to my father's side of the family, I feel deeply connected to the Islamic world. The growth of this connection into a life of art and scholarship is a result of the inspiration of my mother's side of the family, who uniformly encouraged me in these pursuits, especially my late grandmother Anneke, my aunt Tjoep ter Laan, and my aunt and uncle Miek and Evert Wijtema. Above all I want to thank my mother for her love and support and particularly for her encouragement to follow my heart in my career choice.

Lastly, I want to thank the interlocutors who have participated in my research. This project could never have been completed without your corporation. My thanks goes especially out to Ismail Balouche, Rachid Gholam, Hicham Karim, and Yassine Habibi. Unfortunately, many of who have helped me cannot be named. Nevertheless, my deep gratitude goes out to each and every one of you, for allowing me to attend your concerts, opening up to me about your spiritual experiences, political opinions, personal struggles, and letting me into your homes. Thank you so much, I will never forget it.

Note on transliteration

There are different scientific transcription systems to present Arabic in Latin script. For the sake of readability, I have opted for a simplified version of the transliteration system used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES). Throughout the text of this dissertation Arabic words are cited in their standard form, following the transcription in English-language publications; no diacritics are used, but ʿ(ʿayn-ع) and ʾ (hamza) are distinguished. The q represents the qaf (ق), kh (خ) represents the voiceless velar as in shaykh, gh the voiced velar, th and dh the interdentals. In some cases the current Moroccan transcription, which is based on French transliteration, is added between brackets. Words and expressions in Moroccan dialect (*darija*) are indicated with 'D.' Moroccan proper names and place names retain their usual transcription, which follows French conventions.

Introduction

If the Orient is the land of the prophets, Morocco is the land of numerous saints whose teachings led them to the outer reaches of the Maghreb, and even to the Middle East. These saints are the cornerstone of Moroccan Sufism, (…) [which] provides to many a refuge from the galloping globalization of the world today. From the north to the south, and from the east to the west of the kingdom, the spirit of Sufi masters soothes the soul of Moroccans and comforts foreign visitors who have come in search of a word, a whisper, a light,…and a soul.[1]

Defining the field of the research

In November 2009, I was on my way to Morocco for a first brief exploratory fieldtrip as part of my PhD research on what then still was a broad and undefined topic: contemporary forms of Muslim entertainment in Morocco. During my flight to Casablanca, I stumbled upon this piece of text in the airline in-flight magazine of *Royal Air Maroc*. The text was part of an article entitled 'Morocco: the land of Sufism' and described the annual Festival of World Sacred Music in the city of Fes, one of the settings I planned to visit during my ethnographic fieldwork the next year.

The mythical and romanticized atmosphere invoked around Sufism in the text is not only meant to attract foreigners but also exemplifies a recent national narrative created around Sufism in Morocco. This narrative serves to promote an image of an Islamic heritage that is peaceful and good (Shannon 2011: 270), and builds on longstanding colonial representations of Islam and Muslim societies as the cultural Other, onto whom prejudices and exotic fantasies are projected (Driessen 1997: 15; Said 1978). These colonial representations, partly reflected in anthropological accounts of the period, are the precursors of contemporary Western stereotypes of Muslims and Islam. Examples are the

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[1] Si l'Orient est qualifié de terre de prophètes, le Maroc est une terre ayant enfanté de nombreux saints que leurs prêches ont conduit aux frontières du Maghreb, jusqu'au Moyen-Orient même. Ses saints sont le socle du soufisme marocain qui se présente pour beaucoup comme un refuge face à la mondialisation galopante du monde actuel. Du nord au sud de l'ouest à l'est du Royaume, le souffle des maîtres soufis apaise l'âme des Marocains et réconforte beaucoup de visiteurs étrangers venus à la recherche d'un mot, d'un souffle, d'une lumière,…d'un esprit (Source: Royal Air Maroc Magazine, November-December 2009, No 158, pp. 32. Translated from French to English by author).

portrayal of Muslims as religious fanatics threatening the liberal secular values of the West (Deeb 2006: 4), or the binary opposition between a 'moderate, friendly' versus a 'radical, dangerous' Islam (Mamdani 2002; 2005: 102; Soares & Osella 2009: 52).[2]

Since 9/11, discourses about Islamic 'moderation' and 'extremism' have become increasingly prevalent frameworks within mainstream media, international politics, as well as in academia, through which Muslims and Islam are comprehended (Mamdani 2002). Such a characterization reflects an assumption that Islam in itself needs moderation to become acceptable. However, it would seem rather strange to speak about 'moderate and radical Christians,' or 'moderate and radical Buddhists' with a similar self-evidence. In those cases it is much more common to use words such as 'liberal' and 'orthodox,' instead of 'radical' and 'moderate.'

Over the years critical studies have appeared that focus on the production and reification of 'moderate' versus 'radical' discourses concerning Islam and Muslims (Asad 1986, 2003; Mahmood 2006a, 2006b; Mamdani 2002, 2004; Ong 2002; Soares & Osella 2009; Stampnitzky 2011, 2013). The majority of these studies, however, concentrate on the construction of these discourses in Western contexts. Little attention has been given to the construction of such views in Muslim majority countries, as in the text of the article in the Moroccan in-flight magazine. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the US-launched 'War on Terror,' many Muslim majority countries started to promote an image of an Islamic heritage that is peaceful and encourages interfaith dialogue. Within this discourse, Sufism has been presented as the friendly face of Islam, and a present-day antidote against Muslim 'extremism'[3] in for example Syria, Turkey, Egypt, and Mali (Shannon 2011: 270-271; Soares 2013; van Bruinessen 2009; Winegar 2008a: 666).

Morocco is one of the Muslim majority countries that portray their nation as the birthplace of a 'moderate' Islamic heritage. Over the last decade, the Moroccan state has brought into play a patriotic discourse concerning a 'moderate' Islam, which concentrates on values such as tolerance and modernity. Within this discourse, the state has actively encouraged a renewed attention for Sufism, which is presented as a key component of the national cultural heritage and religious identity of Moroccan citizens, as well as a counterweight against the rise of various Islamic movements in the country.

In this highly politicized context, music has become one of the tools through which discourses on national and religious identities are represented and (re)

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[2] In Chapter Two, I will elaborate the link between oppositional categories of a 'radical' versus a 'moderate' Islam and the colonial distinctions made between orthodox and popular Islamic religion.

[3] http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sufism-an-alternative-to-extremism, accessed on 15 July 2015.

formulated. This has had a considerable impact on the field of music production in Morocco. In the pursuit of promulgating an image of tolerance, modernity and 'moderation,' the Moroccan state has increasingly been supporting particular musical activities, especially those featuring internationally renowned artists, local young performers of Western music genres, as well as concerts and festivals for 'sacred' or 'spiritual' music. Due to the recent state-driven revival of Sufism, performers of Sufi ritual music or local artists building on a Sufi-inspired repertoire, increasingly feature in national media like radio and television programs, as well as in state-supported music festivals.

Music is not only used by the state to promote a certain vision of Islam. A variety of actors use music to formulate their own vision about the role Islam should have in public and personal life. Yet, cultural activities initiated by Islamic movements are hardly ever broadcasted on state media. Instead, Islamic movements are frequently depicted as religious 'fanatics' holding hostile views towards music, art, and entertainment in general. Presenting their cultural activities in national media would run counter to this conception. Thus, where certain musical practices are perceived as connected to Muslim 'moderation,' other musical forms, or lack of them, are being judged as belonging to 'radical' tendencies. This indicates that the staging (or not-staging) of certain musical forms in national media somehow relates to the construction of discourses about Islamic identities, such as the binary opposition of a 'radical' vs. a 'moderate' Islam (Frishkopf 2009; Swedenburg 2004).

The interplay between state politics about Islamic identities and the production, staging, and performance of music in Morocco is central to this thesis. I specifically concentrate on Islam-inspired music, for this is the field of music where the impact of political discourses about Islam in Morocco is the most profound and visible. I use the term 'Islam-inspired music' to refer to what Michael Frishkopf proposes to call 'aesthetic sonic practices,' which have the aim to convey messages about Islam (2011: 118). Both the messages, and the ways and contexts in which these messages are communicated have my attention. I am primarily interested in the experiences and motives of the vocal performers of Islam-inspired music and how they use their sonic practices to connect to the divine as well as engage with political discourses about Islam. Therefore this thesis investigates how the experiences and practices of vocal performers of Islam-inspired music interact with political discourses about Islam in Moroccan society.

Defining the central concepts

In what follows I will give an outline of the concepts central to this thesis – religion and Islam, politics, and music – from an anthropological perspective. These concepts will be further analyzed in my theoretical framework, which I present in Chapter One. Next, I present my research objectives and research question, and I explain my specific research scope against the background of existing studies. I then discuss the methods of research I used to gather the information for this study. Finally, I give an outline of the structure of this dissertation.

Religion and Islam

Although for a long time Western intellectuals have predicted that with processes of modernization, religion will gradually disappear from the public sphere, current developments and studies show that the relevance of faith and rituals is far from declining (Driessen 1997: 19; Meyer 2006: 4). To understand the appeal and the relevance of religion, I will focus on Muslim religiosity in Morocco from an anthropological perspective. Unlike theologians, legal scholars, or historians, who mainly focus on the analysis and interpretation of canonical texts and the doctrines of religious professionals, anthropologists rely less on what is written in religious texts, but rather focus on an ethnographic description and interpretation of 'lived religion,' that is, what its religious practitioners do and say in a specific context and how they experience, express, and shape their religion in everyday life (McGuire 2008).

According to Geertz, religion fulfills two functions in society. On the one hand, it provides people with a model *of* the world, as it offers an explanation for the human existence, which makes life intelligible and acceptable. Religion thus both provides and legitimizes a certain worldview. On the other hand, it is a model *for* the world as it gives a set of guidelines for people how to behave and how to deal with reality (Geertz 1993: 93,94; Buitelaar 2009: 18; Driessen 1997: 23). Religion thus also provides and legitimizes a prevailing ethos (Sleebe 1994: 17).

Based on Geertz's definition of religion and my own field observations, there are four interrelated dimensions which I think are important in approaching religion. The first dimension sees religion as a separate intellectual system of beliefs, values, and world views, consisting of narratives, histories and symbols, which seeks to explain the human existence. The second dimension looks at religion as a social-political system. Religions are embedded in society and interwoven with social and political identities and relations. Moreover, religion can also serve as a basis for the production, legitimization and contestation of certain group identities, social ties and political systems, or serve as a guide in the formulation of certain laws (Buitelaar 2009: 18). The third dimension looks

at religion as a social-cultural practice involving activities like visiting holy places, leading a certain lifestyle, doing social work, fasting, conducting rituals, prayer, observing religious duties.

What Geertz's notion of religion and these three dimensions lack is the idea of religion as a sensory experience, a fourth dimension. German theologian Gustav Mensching describes religion as an 'experienceable encounter of man with the sacred' (in Seitschek 2006: 2000). Religion, after all, can also be perceptible, visible, and audible, as well as providing a framework of emotions (Davies 2011; Schielke 2010: 10). Music is a particularly suitable tool to inform and express religiosity because of its capacity to evoke emotions and influence the senses (cf. de Witte 2011; Hirschkind 2006; Meyer 2009). Yet, although music is an important means in many religions and spiritual practices to connect with the sacred, ethnographical descriptions of musical practices in relation to religion as a sensory experience are few and far between (Bohlman, Blumhofer & Chow 2006; Guzy 2013; Laack 2015; Pinn 2003; Rommen 2007).

This thesis will analyze music as an important factor in the production of religious sentiments and the stimulation of spiritual feelings. Building on theoretical perspectives of anthropology of emotions and the senses, I will theorize music as a tool that can mediate religious experiences and generate religious sentiments, because of its capacity to influence the body and the senses (DeChaine 2002). This dissertation contributes to studies on religion which take bodily and sensory formation as a crucial area of research, by focusing on Islam-inspired musical practices.

Like many religions, Islam includes rituals such as pilgrimage (*hajj*), prayer (*salat*), and fasting (*sawm*) (the third dimension), as well as a set of scriptures with religious representations and prescriptions (the first dimension), which Muslims consider authoritative, providing a model *of* and *for* the world. Of course, these regulations are applied in different ways to various cultural, political and personal contexts (the second dimension), resulting in a broad diversity of practices, interpretations and experiences (Buitelaar 2006: 19). In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in a critical approach of a so-called 'anthropology of Islam,' arguing against essentialist approaches of what Islam 'is.' Instead several scholars formulated alternative theoretical approaches to the diversity in Islam and the perspectives of practitioners of Islam on their own religious life (Asad 1986; Bowen 2012; Eickelman 1987; El-Zein 1977; Schielke 2010).

Asad's proposition to see 'Islam as a discursive tradition, seeking to instruct practitioners about the correct form and purpose of a given practice' (Asad 1986: 14) has gained much popularity (and criticism) among anthropologists (Anjum 2007). In this view: 'Islam is constantly being reshaped to fit an ever changing world' (Lukens-Bull 1999: 6). My own interest concerns 'lived' religion, what

religious practitioners say and do and how these statements and practices relate to broader contexts. This interest connects to Schielke's theoretical concern about an overemphasis on piety and ethics, and his call to see Islam not only as a discursive tradition directed at the cultivation of piety, but as 'a grand scheme,' a 'guideline of life providing meaning and direction to everyday concerns and experiences' (Schielke 2010: 14). Schielke stresses that such a grand scheme is embedded within those same everyday concerns, as well as related to other 'grand schemes' that provide meaning and direction to everyday life. Such a perspective discerns moral regimes and religious rules, but also leaves room for the ambiguities, contradictions, ambivalences and tensions between religion and daily life (ibid.).[4]

Following Schielke, I will focus on how religious rules and moral systems are interpreted, debated, and applied to Islam-inspired music. I will also address the artists' experiences and narratives about their own musical practices and those of others, in relation to their specific socio-cultural and political contexts. This implies a focus on the general Islamic beliefs, values, and world views, as well as a sensitivity to local experiences and the ambiguous ways in which these are expressed and shaped. My focus specifically goes out to how Muslim subjectivities are expressed and shaped through music.

Music & Islam

The term 'music' generally refers to 'aesthetic sound' such as rhythms, melodies, songs, tones, sounds, instruments, and singing (Frishkopf 2011: 115). But music is also a social activity (Blacking 1973; Small 1998). British ethnomusicologist and social anthropologist John Blacking stated that 'every known human society has what trained musicologists would recognize as "music"'(1995: 224). Music is thus more than sound, it is a form of communication and plays a central role in many aspects of daily life. People all over the world make music, attribute meaning to music, and listen to music for different purposes and within various contexts. Music can both inspire and mobilize people. An anthropological approach to music shares much common ground with ethnomusicology. Ethnomusicologist Timothy Rice defines ethnomusicology as a discipline which aims 'to study music from all parts of the world as a social process in its cultural context' (Rice 2007: 18). This approach tries to understand how and in which context music is produced, used, performed and what the effects of music are, and how they are caused. It also seeks to discern what music means to its practitioners and audiences, and how those meanings are conveyed.

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[4] This notion of 'Islam as a grand scheme' that provides both meaning and direction to everyday concern and experiences, strongly resonates with Geertz's notion of religion; as a model *of* and *for* the world.

From a socio-cultural perspective, music can also be looked at as a way to express and construct both individual and group identities, discourses, world-views, and experiences. Musical taste can be an indicator of class, age, cultural background, attitudes, and values. Music can thus serve as a tool with which we present ourselves and our opinions to others (MacDonald, Hargreaves & Miell 2002: 1). Therefore, music can serve as a site where identity discourses are displayed, constructed, reinforced, and contested (MacClancy 1997; Nooshin 2009). The meaning music acquires is informed by socio-cultural dynamics and thus context-dependent. Therefore, in analyzing the attributed meanings to Islam-inspired music, I will take into consideration, the background of the listener who receives the music, the background of the artists, and also the broader contexts in which the music is performed and facilitated.

Throughout the Islamic world music holds an important place in everyday life and popular culture. Muslims have expressed their religious beliefs through different art forms since the dawn of Islam (Al-Faruqi & Al-Faruqi 1986; Shatanawi 2009). Yet, there is a persistent idea that Islam is hostile to music. In many publications, the emphasis – either implicit or explicit – on the controversial nature of music as a concept within Islam is reiterated (Burckhardt Qureshi 1997: 263; Al-Faruqi & Al-Faruqi 1986). This perception of an incompatibility of music with Islamic faith can be explained by the reserved attitudes towards music by scholars of Islamic jurisprudence, orthodox Islamic groups and conservatives (Shiloah 1997: 144). The underlying reason of this attitude is grounded in the belief of a potentially seductive and dangerous power attributed to music. Music is thought to have an effect on body and soul, which can lead the believer to potentially sinful situations. It stimulates the 'animal passions' through which one lowers oneself to thoughts, feelings and behavior considered immoral, like drinking alcohol, prostitution, or dancing with members of the opposite sex. Such acts are believed to divert the faithful from their religious duties (ibid.: 146).[5]

There are no explicit verses in the Qur'an prohibiting music. Most scholars base their rulings on interpretations of the *hadith* (descriptions of teachings, deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). These sources do not condemn music, but express criticism towards behavior evoked by, or tied to, certain forms of music. As these theological scriptures can be interpreted in various ways, a broad range of opinions about the permissibility of music exists. Over the centuries Islamic scholars ('*ulama*'), have been involved in complex debates about whether performing and listening to music is acceptable according to

[5] In his study on the marginalization of musicians in the Islamic world, Farmer states that 'Islamic doctrines on music condemn the secular singer for detracting attention from the words of the Prophet, whereas the instrumentalist is portrayed as the *muezzin* of the devil, calling on the people to worship him' (in Van de Port 1999: 294).

Islam, but they never reached a unanimous agreement on the subject (Burckhardt Qureshi 1997: 263). Discussions revolve around the religious prohibition of certain musical instruments, the lawfulness of the performer, the performance-setting and the audience.

The theological debates about the status of music within Islam, have led to various practical recommendations on whether and how music should be performed, on the level of rhythms, lyrics, performance settings and instruments used. As a result, different Islamic schools of jurisprudence[6] highlight various positions adopted within the Muslim community in relation to musical practices. These positions vary from puritan interpretations of Islam, which condemn dance, stirring rhythms, and the use of melodic instruments, to Islamic mystical traditions, where musical rituals form an essential element in the invocation of trance in order to establish religious experiences and reach a proximity to a divine reality.[7]

The ambiguous concept and scholarly debates about music and Islam have not prevented the emergence of a vast array of artistic production expressing Muslim religiosity. This raises the question of whether the emphasis on the theological aspects of music's controversial status in Islam is relevant as a point of departure to understand the musical practices and the ideas employed by Muslim artists. Theological norms, debates and recommendations by religious scholars provide useful information to comprehend the religious-ideological constructs of music and the moral ambiguity surrounding music, but provide little insight in the lived practices and perceptions of making and listening to 'music' by Muslims. After all, the issue of ambivalence resides not only in the theological discussions that are carried over centuries, but also in the practices employed. My aim is not to give a complete description or overview of all the theological debates and religious sources referred to by Islamic scholars in debates about music's permissibility. The scholarly debates will be mentioned, but only when artists refer to these debates and religious sources, when they talk and judge their own music, or that of others.

Part of the difficulty surrounding music and Islam lies within the terminology. Generally speaking, the term 'music' is not typically applied to Islamic practices (Frishkopf 2011). However, aesthetic sound, such as melodic vocal practices, do form an important element in Islamic traditions of worship. Such sounds and

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[6] Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) is the human understanding and observance (laid down in laws and regulations in all areas of life) of what Muslims believe to be divine law (*shariʿa*), as revealed in the holy scriptures.Within Islam there are different interpretations (*ijtihad*) of the *shariʿa* by Islamic scholars (*ʿulamaʾ*), laid down in rulings (*fatwas*). Within *sunni* Islam there are four schools of jurisprudence (El-Shamsy, Encyclopaedia of Islam, three, 2015, accessed 9 September 2015).

[7] However, these musical rituals are subject to regulations as well, for instance, which musical instruments are allowed or not.

aural patterns, like the recitation of the Qur'an (*tajwid*), or the call to prayer (*adhan*) to the Western cultural ear might resemble music. In Islam however, these melodic sounds do not fall into the category of music (Frishkopf 2011: 115; Hossein Nasr 1997: 220). Sonic practices within Islam function according to different codes and categorizations compared to Western musical traditions (Waugh 2005: 121). The Arabic term *ghina'* (originally meaning singing) is presented in the literature as coming closest to the designation of music-making and performance as it is known in Western cultures, but this term is associated mainly with profane music (Shiloah 1997: 144). *Ghina'* is often used to refer to 'aesthetic sound' in relation to sung poetry with the use of melodic instruments (Stokes 2002: 176). However, *ghina'* or 'music' is not a broadly accepted framework to express religious feelings. Sonic practices, which are meant to invoke religious experiences are more likely to be referred to as *inshad dini* (religious chants or hymns). The Arabic word *inshad* can be translated as chanting, reciting, or melodic vocalizing and traditionally refers to vocal hymns without the use of melodic instruments. Within this category, distinct terms describe specific vocal practices such as *madih* (songs of praise for the Prophet), *sama'* (Sufi practice of spiritual audition as well as forms of chanting of Sufi poetry to reinforce ecstasy and induce mystical trance), and *dhikr* (a practice of reciting the names of God). To describe aesthetic sound in Islam with the Western term 'music' is thus problematic. Yet, not all Muslims reject the word 'music' to describe sonic ritual performance (Frishkopf 2013). As Cross claims, 'musics are only musics in their own cultural context' (Cross 2003: 19). When I use the term 'music' in this thesis, I refer to sonic practices or aesthetic sound. Since my aim is to provide insight into the perceptions and practices of the performers of Islam-inspired music, I will use, whenever possible, the labels and definitions my respondents give to their sonic practices. I will study the reasons why they employ certain labels, under what circumstances and how.

Religion and politics in Islam

Practices, ideas, and experiences of Islam-inspired musical forms are also influenced by national and international political developments. In the present study, I focus on an anthropological perspective on politics. Such a perspective pays attention to the operation of power on all levels of society, and the ways in which these power relations are expressed, shaped and contested, both at the level of the state and formal politics, and especially in the arena of politics of everyday life. This last aspect is what Soares and Osella (2009) call 'micropolitics.' From this perspective of 'micropolitics' I am interested specifically in the interaction between music and politics. Rice mentions politics in relation to music when he notes: '(…) musical practice can reflect larger social, political, and religious "shifts" in the self-understanding of (…) groups' (Rice 2007: 7). Existing political

discourses can thus inform the meaning attributed to musical practices, but music can also be used as a tool by various actors to influence political discourses on a certain issue. This entanglement of cultural production and political ideology is also referred to with the term 'cultural politics' and understands culture as an arena in which political values and meanings are created and contested (Glick-Schiller 1997).

The relationship between Islam and politics has mainly been studied from a political science perspective and less from a social-cultural or religious perspective (Belal 2011: 9). Central in the discussion about the relationship between politics and Islam as it unfolds in the domain of political sciences is the term 'political Islam' or 'Islamism.' Political Islam is often explained as a political ideology, rather than a religion, whose adherents are driven by political motivations, instead of religious morals or piety (Ayoob 2008: 2; Roy 2006: 58). Similarly, Islamism is described and analyzed as a movement of activist groups using Islam for political purposes, with the goal to establish an Islamic society (Denoeux 2002: 62; Hirschkind 1997; Lauzière 2005: 241; Roy 2002: 29; Zeghal 2008: xv). 'Islamism,' however, is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, which covers a wide array of individuals, groups, and organizations (Volpi 2010: 2). Both political Islam and Islamism are contested terms, as these labels are often imposed on Muslims by others (Burgat, Rousillion & Roy 2001). Moreover, defining 'political Islam' implies the existence of a 'non-political Islam,' revolving only around religion.

There exists a large variety of views on the relationship between religion and politics throughout and outside the Muslim world (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 56). Prominent in the study of Islam and politics is the assumption of the indivisibility of the realms of religion and state, also referred to with the notion *din wa dawla* (religion and state). This notion describes Islam as an all-encompassing religion, which provides a model for both transcendental and 'this-wordly' aspects of life, such as social justice, politics, science, economics, and arts (Charney 1978: 79). It is assumed that in Islam these aspects are not considered to be separate from, but an integral part of, Islamic theological reflection. Yet, this does not mean that there exists no distinction between these two fields in the Islamic world, but that such a distinction does not correspond to a Western idea of a separation between church and state.

Charles Hirschkind is one of the scholars who argues that the relationship between the political domain and the religious sphere in Islam should not be equated to the Western analytical categories of church and state (Hirschkind 1997). Aziz al-Azmeh even opposes the assumption of a fusion of religion and politics in Islam. Instead of presenting secularism as the antithesis of Islam he questions the dichotomy itself (Al-Azmeh in Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 55). Following Asad (1993), Hirschkind claims that secularization should not be

employed as a neutral and universal framework for analysis, but should instead be critically studied as a notion which has developed in a Western context:[8] 'Greater recognition must be given to the way Western concepts (…) reflect specific historical developments, and cannot be applied as a set of universal categories or natural domains' (Hirschkind 1997: 14). To define Islamism as the use of Islam to attain political purposes is thus based on a premise of (Western) secularization as an analytical concept (Fadil & Bracke 2008: 3; Hirschkind 1997).

In the present study, I will not use the terms 'political Islam' and 'Islamism' unless they are referred to in the literature or used by my interlocutors. Instead, I will refer to 'Islamic activism' or 'Islamic movements' (Soares & Osella 2009: 58). The term 'Islamic activism' includes not only activities aimed at the establishment of an Islamic society, or protesting against the state, but can also refer to persons, organizations, and activities that promote social goals, such as advocating civic virtue, like publishing, providing medical care or charity, community service, social justice, education, preaching and other missionary activities, as well as activities aimed at claiming a space for self-realization (De Koning, Becker, Roex & Aarns 2014: 10; Hirschkind 1997). In this light, the production of morally suitable entertainment can also be considered to be a form of Muslim activism, developed to benefit the Muslim community and enhance the realization of a virtuous self.

To gain insight into the discourses and practices through which politics and Islam are connected to each other within the Muslim world, the relationship between Islam and politics needs to be studied within specific contexts. There are many studies that discuss Islam and politics; however, as I already mentioned, these are mostly written from a political science perspective, while only few opt for an in-depth ethnographic description of experiences from within (Aboullouz 2008, 2012; Geertz 1973; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; Yafout 2012). More studies are needed that take concrete experiences and practices as a point of departure. My own contribution follows an ethnographic approach to Islam and politics through the lens of music. It shows the interaction between broader macro-politics and micro-politics by focusing on the production, staging and performance of Islam-inspired music in Morocco within the context of Islamic activist movements and state structures.

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[8] In the 'Western world,' political debates are also situated within moral boundaries often based on Christian principles.

A new Muslim cultural sphere

Over the last twenty years, since the Islamic Awakening (*as-sahwa al-islamiyya*),[9] a contemporary Islamic revival has developed, outside of the arena of formal politics and Islamic ideologies, but rather focusing on objectives such as personal salvation and self-improvement. This has led to the unfolding of a market directed at providing tools, knowledge, and merchandise on how to organize an ethically sustained life-style, such as US type Muslim television talk shows, and the veiling fashion industry (Pink 2009). Patrick Haenni has described these developments as the emergence of a 'market Islam' (Haenni 2005). This 'market Islam' also gave rise to the development of the creation of Islamically suitable entertainment as an ethical alternative to 'immoral' pleasures in life.

Over the last decades, an interesting field of research has emerged focusing on these new developments of Islam-inspired forms of entertainment in both Muslim minority and majority countries (Alagha 2011, 2012; Barendregt 2008, 2011a,b, 2012; Frishkopf 2000, 2009, 2011; Jouili 2012, 2014; LeVine 2008; Rasmussen 2010; Stokes 1992; van Nieuwkerk 2008, 2011, 2013). These studies describe how orthodox Muslims and Islamic groups that used to hold rather puritanical attitudes toward art and music, have started to embrace art as a way to express their religiosity, convey religious messages, and offer a moral alternative for what they deem inappropriate forms of art and entertainment. These pious art forms seek to encourage Islamic ethics and simultaneously play into developments of new media and trends. They often draw from a hybrid mix of Western popular culture and entertainment, with Middle Eastern styles of performance and instrumentation, as well as Islamic cultural symbols from different regions in the Islamic world. These Islam-inspired art forms have come to prominence in Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and among Muslim communities in Europe and the United States, and range from a capella vocal traditions without musical instruments, called *anashid*, to Islamic hip-hop, 'clean' soaps, stand-up comedy and music videos (van Nieuwkerk 2008: 172). The expressions are accommodated by transnational connections between Muslim communities and their diasporas, as well as by powerful media conglomerates. The studies mentioned above situate these developments in what has been called a 'post-Islamist cultural sphere' (Bayat 2005; van Nieuwkerk 2011: 10-16, 2013: 198-205).

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[9] The 'Islamic Awakening' refers to an Islamic revival movement, which emerged in Saudi Arabia in the middle of the twentieth century. This movement aimed to return to the fundaments of Islam and combined religious views of Wahhabism and the social and political ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The movement was also inspired by prominent Muslim intellectuals connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Muhammad Qutb and Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid. According to Stéphane Lacroix, adherents of the *sahwa al-islamiyya* consider 'Islam (…) a total system that should govern every detail of daily life, (…) [and] adopted a very strict code of conduct that they considered an emanation of the Islamic norm' (Lacroix 2011: 60).

However popular, these artistic productions are also contested within and outside religious circles, by several actors within the public and within governments. Although the aim of most pious art is to encourage and increase piety and devotion within the global community of believers (*umma*), the ways in which Islam and art are combined evoke broader debates about the religious value of the artistic products as well as about the place of art and religion in the public sphere.

Aesthetic sonic practices form a considerable part of these newly Islam-inspired art forms. Conservative Muslims seek to create and enjoy musical productions which abide by and propagate Islamic morals. In recent years Muslim performers have successfully entered nearly every genre of popular music. Throughout the Muslim world, Islam-inspired music has developed and crystallized across a diversity of musical genres and subgenres. A vast array of artists have emerged who practice a variety of sonic expressions of religious feelings and ideas, ranging from Islamic hymns (*anashid*) performed within family settings to music videos accompanying rap music about the love for the Prophet.

Research scope and field of study

Various socio-cultural studies have appeared in the area of musical practices and Islam (Alagha 2012; Barendregt 2011, 2012; Bohlman 1987; Al-Faruqi 1980, 1985; Frishkopf 2000, 2009, 2011; Harnish & Rasmussen 2011; Kapchan 2007; LeVine 2009; Nooshin 2009; Rasmussen 2010; Shiloah 1995, 1997; Shannon 2004, 2011; Stokes 1992, 2002; Waugh 2005). Most studies focusing on Islam-inspired musical forms treat the subject principally from the perspective of listening practices or audience reception (Ghazzah 2008; Hirschkind 2006). Little attention has been paid to those actors and processes that are involved in the production, staging, and performance of these types of sonic practices such as instrumentalists, festival organizers, managers, studio owners, and political actors. Therefore, I rather concentrate on the production side of Islam-inspired music, taking the practices and experiences of the performers as the central perspective. Less attention will be paid to the audience and the reception of the music.

Because of the centrality of the voice in most Islam-inspired music, and the relatively restricted use of musical instruments in Islam-inspired music, my focus lies on vocal performers who profile themselves as Muslims. They use their music to convey messages about Islam, and to express their own distinctive views of the world. I examine the way vocal performers promote their perspectives on religion through the production, performance and staging of their musical practices, and employ their religious and political identities when they engage with different sets of stages.

For several reasons I have chosen Morocco as the setting of my research on Islam-inspired music and politics. First of all, Morocco makes a unique case in the region when it comes to state politics. Moroccan state politics diverge from other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy and its state structure is built explicitly around a religious identity, as the King is both head of state and of state religion. Religious leadership is thus integrated in the monarchy. This connection is legitimized through the King's claimed descent of the Prophet. The King's religious and political authority is being threatened by emerging Islamic movements, questioning his religious authority. They try to enter civil society and engage with the political process, thus competing with the state over the definition and role of Islam in the public sphere (Zeghal 2008: xxii).

Secondly, in Morocco, music is one of the most prominent fields of performing arts through which religiosity is expressed. Practices of Islam-inspired music are longstanding and diverse in Morocco. Even ordinary popular music often contains references to religious or spiritual elements. The combination of religion and musical performances is deeply rooted in Moroccan traditions and embedded in everyday life. The contemporary Moroccan field of Islam-inspired music is quite diffuse, but has at least two important influences. The first is the influence of musical rituals from the Sufi brotherhoods. These brotherhoods practice a mystical form of Islam in which the use of dance, music and melodic vocalization takes an important place in achieving proximity to the Divine (Crapanzano 1973; El-Asri & Vuillemenot 2010; Kapchan 2007; Maréchal & Dassetto 2014; Waugh 2005). Ritual musical practices from the Sufi brotherhoods have different repertoires but generally can be divided into chants (with or without instruments) dedicated to God (*dhikr*), songs of praise dedicated to the prophet (*madih*) and religious poetry (*sama'*). A second important factor in the contemporary field of Islam-inspired music in Morocco is the Islamic reform movement which has its roots in the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood, and later the Islamic Revival. When these influences reached Morocco, this music consisted of percussion and voice and strongly relied on Oriental melodic harmonies and rhythms.

Thirdly, in the last couple of years, there have been heated debates around public musical performances in relation to Islamic values and public morality (Graiouid & Belghazi 2013). A study conducted by El-Ayadi, Rachik & Tozy (2007), based on a 2006 survey over religious values and practices among youngsters in Morocco, reflects a growing interest of devout young Muslims in pious entertainment and music. A brief passage in the study is dedicated to music in relation to religiosity. The researchers found that 33.6% of their respondents listen regularly to music, 49% sometimes and 17.3% never listen to music. Of this last group, only a very small minority of 3.3% do not listen to music at all

because of religious reasons. They believe that listening to music is illicit (*haram*). The survey also addresses genre preferences. 57.56 % of the youngsters interviewed, indicated they prefer to listen to *shaʿbi* music, 36.5 preferred music from the Orient (*sharqi*), 13.4 % likes to listen to Western music and 5,6 % listens to *raï*. 14.3 % of the respondents indicated they listen to religious music (*samaʿ* and *madih*). The researchers stated that this last group is on a 'religious quest' but outside the canonical ritual practices. They describe this taste in religious music as a compromise between the religious and profane (El-Ayadi et al. 2007: 78).

Lastly, Morocco provides an interesting case because little has been written about Islam-inspired forms of art and entertainment within the context of the Moroccan piety movement. Most available studies regarding Islam-inspired art forms within the piety movement in the Muslim world focus on Egypt (Frishkopf 2000; van Nieuwkerk 2008, 2013; Winegar 2006, 2008b), Southeast Asia (Barendregt 2006, 2011; Rasmussen 2010) and Turkey (Stokes 1992). The publications that did appear about Islam-inspired music in Morocco predominantly focus on Sufi-oriented music (Crapanzano 1981; Kapchan 2007; Schuyler 1985; Waugh 2005; Witulski 2009, 2014). Until now, nothing to my knowledge has been published about the development and contemporary practices of Islam-inspired music within the context of Muslim reform and piety movements in Morocco.

As my research proceeded I found there are two main domains for Islam-inspired music that are both opposed and partially overlap. These two domains are central to this thesis and will be further explained in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. There is a domain of performers and cultural religious musical activities, approved and supported by state structures. These activities concern a large variety of musical forms, which are often labeled as 'sacred,' 'Sufi' or 'spiritual,' and presented in a discourse of 'moderation.' Musical performances take place at state sponsored stages, such as in national radio and television broadcastings and music festivals. The other domain is a small cultural niche for religious entertainment provided for conservatives and people affiliated to Islamic movements. This domain of Islam-inspired music largely falls outside state structures, and enjoys less publicity. In this scene *anashid* are the central genre of devotional music. The performers of this vocal tradition are referred to as *munshidin* (for male performers) or *munshidat* (for female performers), meaning 'those who recite.' This term might be somewhat confusing since not only performers of *anashid*, but also vocalists in Sufi orders, call themselves *munshid* (Waugh 2005), even though they operate in a very different segment of the Moroccan music industry than the Sufi vocalists performing at state stages for sacred music. *Munshidin* and *munshidat* performing *anashid*, mainly operate in ensembles, called *majmuʿa* 'group' (D. *mujmuʿa*), but they can also perform solo. The music is usually performed in domestic settings, like family celebra-

tions, and at semi-public venues such as university campuses or youth community houses.

These two domains of Islam-inspired music are not mutually exclusive, and each domain knows a great internal variety as well. The distinction is also discursive; it reflects the competition between Islamic movements and official state perspectives over the place of religion in the Moroccan public sphere. The Islamic movements and the state have both developed new kinds of cultural politics and capitalize on music for their own ends. On the one hand, state actors reinforce Morocco's official stance on religion through cultural politics promoting certain kinds of music over others, with the aim to tone down 'extremist' tendencies. Artistic expressions are allowed as long as they do not threaten the national version of Islam, the national integrity and the persona of the King and his family. Islamic movements, on the other hand, are increasingly involved in debates on freedom of artistic expressions, and morality in the public domain. They criticize art forms deemed 'immoral,' such as movies featuring drug abuse, and kissing, as was the case with the film *Marock* in 2006, or certain music genres, like heavy metal (LeVine 2008). Islamic movements are frequently depicted in Moroccan society and politics as 'radical Muslims' who are hostile towards music. Nonetheless, they themselves use musical practices as part of their activities to promote Islam and Islamic values within Moroccan society. Many of the vocal performers operating within the context of Islamic activism, which will be described in Chapter Five, belong to one of these Islamic organizations. These competing visions and the political interests involved, have an impact on performers and their musical practices. I am interested in how the interplay of official and un-official discourses about Islamic identities influences performers and performances of Islam-inspired music. I will compare the musical activities of Muslim artists within and across these two musical domains. Both share ostensibly religious and spiritual themes, although their styles and audiences are very different. In Chapter Four and Five I will also examine their backgrounds, their ideals, their visions on music, and the ways they use musical practices in conveying their messages. I will also address their relation to the Moroccan state and their audiences.

Research objectives and questions

The aim of this study is to understand how the performance and dissemination of Islam-inspired music connect to political discourses in Morocco. The following question guides this study:

> How do vocal performers of Islam-inspired music in the production, staging, and performance of Islam-inspired music interact with political discourses about Islam in Morocco?

In order to unravel this question, three interconnected perspectives will be employed throughout this thesis: the infrastructures through which Islam-inspired music in Morocco comes into being, the musical practices employed, and the perspectives of the performers. The infrastructures through which the production and staging of Islam-inspired music takes place will be described in order to give insight into the broader religious and political landscape of Morocco, as well as to explain how these landscapes affect the production and staging of Islam-inspired music. Secondly, the ways the performers move within these infrastructures and their performance practices will be analyzed. What aesthetic practices do the artists employ in the performance of their music, and why? How are these practices politically relevant? Thirdly, the perspectives of the performers will be explored. What meanings do the artists assign to their own performances and to those of others? What different ideas do the artists hold vis-à-vis the Moroccan state? And lastly, how do the artists interact with particular political discourses through their religious musical practices?

Research methods

The central focus in this present study is on the artists' experiences, narratives, and the meanings produced around music, politics, and Islam in Morocco in relation to broader socio-cultural and political dynamics. This requires a long term, holistic, qualitative field based approach. The fieldwork for the present study was carried out in various locations in Morocco over a period of 13 months between November 2009 and March 2012. The settings where I conducted my research were all situated in urban areas of the central and Atlantic region of the country in and around the cities of Rabat, Casablanca, Fes, and Meknes. I also spent one month in the area near the city of Nador.

My fieldwork in Morocco started with a brief explorative and preparatory fieldtrip of one month in November 2009, to orientate myself and assess the field of Islam-inspired entertainment in Morocco. I learned, as was to be expected, that this field was quite broad. Therefore I decided to concentrate on the field of music, as this turned out to be the most prominent form of performing arts in Morocco in which religious messages are incorporated.

The actual fieldwork was divided into two periods of six months each. During the first period from April 2010 until October 2010, I largely concentrated on vocalists working on, or in the vicinity of, stages sponsored by government structures. Most of these artists performed Sufi-inspired musical forms. The festival season in Morocco starts in late spring and lasts until the summer months. The larger part of this period of my field research consisted of visiting music festivals and attending concerts as much as I could. I spent my time attending festivals for spiritual/ sacred/ Sufi music, interviewing artists, organizers, supporting staff and spoke to members of the audience. In the meantime I

kept track of articles and news on the politics of the Moroccan state regarding music and religion. In the second half of my first period of fieldwork, I stayed for a month in the region of Nador to focus on Berber performers of *anashid*.[10]

Near the end of this first fieldwork period I heard about the existence of Islamic music ensembles who in some way were close to an Islamic movement, either through direct membership or through their audience or host for whom they perform. It was only later in my fieldwork that I discovered these ensembles because their music is rarely broadcasted on national TV or Radio. They turned out, however, to be very popular among urban religious conservative circles. These groups mostly perform *anashid* and operate in domestic settings at family celebrations, but also at universities, meetings of Islamic movements, cultural centers or youth community houses (*dar shabab*). As there was no study or publication on this domain of Islam-inspired music, I decided to devote the second period of my fieldwork to this particular music scene. From September 2011 until March 2012, I concentrated on male and female vocal performers belonging to this particular domain of Islam-inspired music.

During my fieldwork I used various qualitative research methods to gather data in the field. The majority of the research is based on ethnographic fieldwork within different settings among a variety of male and female vocal performers of Islam-inspired music, with whom I conducted semi-structured, in-depth and informal interviews, and carried out participant and structured observations during their musical activities. In total I conducted 25 personal in-depth and four informal interviews with 23 male vocal performers, of whom I attended 23 concerts. Of some of the artists I did not attend any concerts, and of others I attended several concerts. As there were considerably fewer female performers in my research population, I only conducted four in-depth interviews with four female vocal performers, and engaged in informal conversations on six occasions with these four women. I also conducted ten group interviews with music ensembles (seven male, three female). Much of the data I also acquired through open informal conversations or 'small talk' with vocal performers (Driessen & Jansen 2013). Apart from vocal performers, I also carried out contextual conversations and spoke to music producers, studio owners, band managers, instrumentalists, leaders of Muslim student organizations, family members of some

[10] In the second half of my first period of fieldwork, I stayed for a month in the region of Nador to focus on some of the performers I met at a festival for Islamic music in Brussels in 2009. They perform *anashid* in Tarifit, a variant of Tamazight (Berber language) from the Rif. I was very interested in this specific group after my Master research on representations of Berber identity in contemporary Moroccan painting (Ter Laan 2003), but also because of an interesting present-day connection between Berber identity, language and Islamic orthodoxy, which deserves further exploration. Most publications about Berber identity and languages are approached from the perspective of Berber activism (Karrouche 2013; Pouessel 2010; Silverstein 2012). However, this aspect is beyond the central scope of the present study. I will deal with this topic in a future research project.

of the artists, some members of the audience, festival organizers, lyric writers, as well as various actors, from the political field, civil society and journalists.

Besides interviewing, I also engaged in participant and structured observation of musical activities like concerts, rehearsals, jam sessions, studio recordings, singing classes, and festivals. During my fieldwork I attended a total of 42 live concerts, of which seventeen by male ensembles, thirteen by solo male vocal performers, and four by female ensembles (of some artists I attended multiple concerts). Many observations took place at festivals, domestic settings (family celebrations, such as weddings, but also jam sessions among artists), neighborhood youth community centers (*dar shabab*), universities and high schools. But I also engaged in non-musical activities, like attending Qur'an recitation classes for women, participating in singing classes, and visiting some university campuses. A couple of artists allowed me to follow their musical life quite intensively for a longer period of time, having me over at family visits, family dinners and road trips to concerts, and letting me help them out preparing their concerts. During such activities I had many informal conversations with the artists.

In my field research I also made use of media. First of all by keeping up with news items regarding music, cultural politics and Islam in the local press. Secondly I also followed my respondents in their musical activities by using social media, like Facebook and YouTube to keep track of musical events and discussions among artists, to learn about their latest concerts, videos, and to keep in contact with them during and after my fieldwork period. Data were also gathered from the literature, and translated song lyrics.

For the recording of the participatory activities I made use of field notes, and (if permission was given by my interlocutors) photography, sound recordings and films. To record the interviews I asked all my respondents for permission to make audio recordings of the interviews. In those cases where people refused to be recorded, I made notes during or after the interviews.

In the analysis and interpretation of my empirical data I have tried to stay close to the perceptions, labels, and categories used by the respondents themselves. Therefore I used an approach of qualitative data collection and analysis based on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Instead of gathering and analyzing empirical material stemming from preset categories, the researcher working from the principle of grounded theory rather works inductively, looking to discover structures and patterns through comparison and open coding of the empirical material. These codes, organized into concepts and categories, can form the basis for developing theories. A grounded theory approach thus includes both an inductive and a deductive process of analysis.

In the analysis of my data I have not entirely followed the process of grounded theory, but I did use certain aspects. I entered the field in November 2009 with

an open focus on performing arts and started with wide angle observations (Spradley 1980). I then selected the domain of music as my main research topic. Then I tried to explore what is happening in that field and what subdomains are relevant and interesting to study. During and in between the fieldwork periods I tried to discover patterns and structures in the data and adjusted my questions according to what turned out to be relevant matters in the field. In the analysis of my qualitative material I used the software program Atlas TI, to code the material.

The well-known downside of qualitative research is that it does not allow one to generalize. Therefore I want to emphasize that the statements I make in this thesis regarding my topic only apply to my specific research setting, and the respondents I have spoken with. Because of the richness of interviews, informal conversations and observations, I selected cases that most strongly illustrate the arguments developed in this study. As a result, my research does not represent the entire situation regarding Islam-inspired music in Morocco, but should be read as, what Geertz has called 'broad-stroke interpretations [only] particular, intimate findings can produce'(1968: vii).

In order to describe Islam-inspired music from the perspective of the performers it is crucial to gain access to them and build and maintain relations based on trust. Gaining access to the performers was sometimes quite challenging in several ways. There were no data sets available, which could have given me an overview of vocal performers of Islam-inspired music. The data and figures provided to me by the Ministry of Culture in Morocco were dated, incomplete, biased and thus unreliable. Therefore, for the sampling of my research group I used snowball sampling techniques. This sampling technique is often used when populations are difficult to find and contact. Snowball sampling engages initial informants who are asked, from their own networks, to identify other possible participants, who might be able to contribute to the study (Russell Bernard 1995: 97).

In order to gain access to performers of Islam-inspired music I began by making some initial contacts by visiting several concerts of vocal performers of Islam-inspired music from Morocco in the Netherlands and Belgium, at the start of my research. There I met and spoke to a couple of Moroccan performers of *anashid*, as well as the festival organizer, who introduced me to their networks in Morocco, and gave me contact details of artists they knew. Throughout the research I built on the networks of my respondents, but simultaneously continued to approach new stakeholders through visiting new concerts and festivals.

Reflections

A cultural anthropologist is his or her own research instrument. A reflective stance is thus necessary to give transparency and reliability to the ethnography. In what follows I will reflect on the methods used, the data gathered, my own position and the effect of my presence in the field, as well as the ethical considerations taken into account.

The distinctive characteristics, infrastructures, and accessibility of the two musical domains brought forth different kinds of data and dilemmas. It was not hard to gain access to the state-sponsored festivals, as many of the concerts were free, and oriented towards foreigners and tourists. Having a press pass helped me to attend the concerts, and take a look back stage. The high amount of concerts during these festivals gave me much opportunity to observe, photograph, and film many concerts. Yet, it was difficult to interview the artists. Many of them have reached a certain level of fame and are busy performing, preparing their performance, or carrying out interviews with journalists. It was difficult to get their attention in the heat of the moment, as an interview with an anthropologist does not bring them the same attention and prestige as an interview with an international broadcasting channel, like TV5 or CNN. Because of the busy schedules of the artists during the festivals, as well as their preference for well-known and established media platforms, I could not conduct many in-depth interviews during these festivals. The conversations I had with the artists and supporting staff were rather brief and hasty. I resolved this by asking their contact details in order to meet with them later. Outside the festival setting I was able to conduct a few valuable in-depth interviews.

Conversely, in the musical domain of the *anashid* artists, I conducted many interviews but attended a relatively small number of concerts. The relative small amount of observations of musical performances can partly be explained by the concealed character of this music scene, which is removed from the state-supported stages. Also the male dominance of this specific domain of pious music reduced the opportunities for me to attend and observe performances. As a woman it was hard to gain access to the settings of performance of this music scene because not only were the performers almost all men, but also the settings where they played were men-only celebrations, where, most of the time, I was not allowed to enter. It wasn't until I found two gatekeepers through my existing networks in Morocco who put me in contact with several key informants within the Islamic activist networks, that I was able to gain access to vocal performers working in this setting. From that moment on, through snowball sampling, it was possible to acquire contacts and conduct interviews with the vocal performers within this scene. The opportunities to attend concerts however remained low. Sometimes I was admitted to exclusively male concerts, although only when I hid from view.

One would think that the solution for me would lie in getting access to the female domain of this music scene. Yet, it turned out even harder to gain access to female performers of *anashid* (called *munshidat*). In my research group female performers are by far outnumbered by the male performers I worked with. This can be explained by several reasons. First of all, because there are fewer female performers of Islam-inspired music than male performers. Secondly, many women did not want to expose themselves as performers, because of the common association of women of 'loose morals' (Courchesne 2014; van Nieuwkerk 1995). In Moroccan society, women are more vulnerable and liable to jeopardize their public reputation than men. This all made it very difficult for me to contact them and even when I succeeded, many were reluctant to speak to me. Mostly they gave me phone numbers of male relatives to speak to me about their music, who often turned out to know nothing of the music. Moreover, most female vocal performers of Islam-inspired music were quite hesitant to meet with me in public. In Morocco most public places like cafés and restaurants are perceived as a male domain. It is not proper for women to sit at a cafe (Mernissi 1987). The best place was to meet them at their homes, but this was not my invitation to make. As a solution I met with women in family-friendly public settings, such as ice cream parlors, fast food restaurants, and coffee shops at railway stations. Nevertheless through snowball sampling I slowly began to earn their trust and managed to speak to some *munshidat* and attend several concerts. Compared to my research of the state-supported domain for Islam inspired music, the study of the Moroccan *anashid* scene brought more data from interviews, but less from observations. This will be reflected in Chapter Four and Five, where I present my material on the state-supported stages for Islam-inspired music, and the Moroccan *anashid* scene.

This study stands both in a broader historical tradition and a recent development of increasing attention and funding for (Western) studies on Islam. At the same time, critical reflections on the representation of the Orient and Muslims have been longstanding as well, and I attach much value to apply this tradition to the present study. To prevent the people in this research from being objectified, I have employed a narrative writing style, which foregrounds the accounts of the interlocutors as much as possible. Some of the quotes I used have been edited to improve the comprehensibility and readability.

Another complicating factor regarding representation in this research is language. I conducted my interviews in French, or in a mix of French and Moroccan Arabic, *darija*. I attended quite a few language classes in *darija*, and at the end of my research I was able to carry out casual daily conversations, and conduct simple interviews in *darija*, but I have never become fully proficient in the language. I can read Arabic script, but do not master Classical Arabic nor Modern Standard Arabic. Another important language in Morocco is French,

which I speak fluently, and most of my respondents do speak French. However, this language also resonates colonial power relations, as it is the language of the ex-colonial occupier and the French educated Moroccan elite. Moreover, many of my interlocutors believed it to be better to discuss an Islamic topic in the language of Islam, Arabic. Therefore many of my respondents preferred to give interviews in *darija* or Modern Standard Arabic, as they felt they were able to express themselves better in this language. I sometimes improvised myself between French and *darija*, or brought someone to translate, but most often I asked them to bring someone to translate they felt comfortable with, so that the presence of an unknown interpreter would not negatively influence the responses given by the interviewee. Some of the interviews held in *darija* were later translated again by an interpreter from audio recordings. Additionally, this thesis is written in English, meaning that the respondents who have contributed to this research are represented in a language which the majority of my research group is not able to read.

It turned out that music is a good entry to speak about Islam and politics, but nevertheless, my questions about Islam-inspired musical activities for research purposes, were also met with mistrust. The political sensitivity of studying the connection between Islam and politics in Morocco, as well as the affiliation of some of my respondents to an illegitimate Islamic organization, made me very much aware of my accountability as a researcher and the necessity of carefully handling the data gathered in the field, and protecting the relationship with my respondents. The hostile attitude of the Moroccan state towards Islamic movements and activism, and the ensuing close monitoring, arrests, and prosecution of members of Islamic movements by the authorities, might explain the initial mistrust and suspicion I met regarding my research and presence in the *anashid* scene. Some of the interlocutors operating in the Moroccan *anashid* scene demonstrated a great deal of mistrust. They told me that they, as well as my research, were being monitored by an enigmatic organization for national security and intelligence, called DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire). I tried to remain as discrete and unobtrusive as possible, however as a non-Muslim, Dutch unaccompanied female researcher studying Islam and music, I could not pass unobserved. My presence invoked various reactions among my respondents, ranging from taken-for-granted but unasked-for privileges that come with being European, to suspicion and mistrust, to a protective fatherly attitude in my male respondents, to passionate and creative efforts to convert me to Islam.

My relation with the respondents in some cases also became complex because many artists who had not reached a certain amount of fame (yet), or experienced a lack of opportunities in their careers in Morocco, often saw me as a useful springboard for an international career and a network in the Netherlands, and

projected many hopes and expectations for an (artistic) future in Europe on me. I was aware that in some cases this was an incentive for my interlocutors to participate in my research. Although this thesis could serve as a podium for the musical activities of some artists, nevertheless I have decided to use pseudonyms for the majority of the interlocutors in this dissertation, instead of their real names in order to protect the respondents. Those artists who appear in this dissertation with their real names, do so at their own explicit request. In those cases I use their full names, instead of only a first-name. In a few cases, when I cite them on particularly sensitive topics, I present them with an alternative first-name. Some names of cities or towns are left out, or are deliberately kept undefined also to protect the people who have helped contribute to this research.

Outline of this dissertation

This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter One provides the theoretical backdrop of this dissertation. The concepts of music and religion are connected through a theoretical framework, which analyzes both concepts via anthropological notions of power and politics. I argue for an analytical framework that brings together an approach of music as a symbolic vehicle of political ideologies with theoretical perspectives of affect and the senses, to understand the interaction between Islam-inspired music and political power.

The second chapter starts with background information about the religious and political landscapes of Morocco from an historical perspective. This is needed to explain how the complex entanglement of these landscapes affect the present arena for the production, staging and performance of Islam-inspired music.

In the third chapter I show how music recently has become an important instrument for the construction and reformulation of a national consciousness tying into a sense of 'moderate' Islam. The events of 9/11 and the Casablanca attacks in 2003 have led Moroccan society to interrogate its values and reformulate its national identity. In response, the Moroccan state and monarchy implemented political reforms but also actively establish and support stages for national and international contemporary and traditional music. These stages, and in particular music festivals, serve as important platforms for the symbolic construction and display of narratives about Islam and Moroccan national identity. I argue that the state-supported music festivals form an important instrument for the ritualization of state power, securing the dominance and the legitimacy of the monarchy in the international community, the national political system and the Moroccan public sphere.

In Chapter Four and Five I present the empirical data on the practices and perspectives of vocal performers of Islam-inspired music. Despite the hegemonic control of the Moroccan monarchy and state on musical meaning, musicians try

to exert influence as well. Chapter Four focuses on performers of Sufi music working on platforms for spiritual music approved and supported by Moroccan state structures. I focus on two platforms for the staging of musical rituals from Moroccan Sufi orders: the Festival of World Sacred Music and the Festival of Sufi Culture. The performance of Sufi music in these two state sponsored festivals are surrounded by narratives which link specific elements of the Moroccan patrimony to a notion of Muslim 'moderation.' Variously positioned actors and commercial and political forces are involved in these festivals, influencing the role and practices of the Sufi performers, and their rituals. Yet, the performers on these stages are not passive victims of these larger developments. The relocation and translation is a constant negotiation process between different actors in which the Sufi performers are actively involved as well. They use these stages to promote their specific brotherhood, spread messages of Islam, and gain a livelihood. Moreover they actively foster practices and mindsets, which allows them to retain symbolic control over the religious meaning of their rituals.

Chapter Five focuses on the domain of *anashid*. This domain of Islam-inspired music largely falls outside state structures and enjoys less publicity. In contrast to performances of Sufi music, the contexts in which *anashid* is produced and performed concerns mainly domestic settings and semi-public spaces. This chapter starts with a description of *anashid* in the Muslim world and specifically in Morocco, from an historical angle. Then the contemporary Moroccan *anashid* scene will be addressed by focusing on the background, careers, and objectives of the artists, as well as the settings and practices of their performances. The artists use music and specific performance techniques as a tool to both generate, but also to control the powerful emotions within the listener. Through various techniques of performance, they seek to manage the potential emotional impact of the music and structure experiences of the divine (Meyer 2006: 21). Despite debates on the permissibility of music in Islam among vocalists, audiences and religious scholars, the performers employ musical practices to produce religious sentiments, with the aim to redirect and reorient their listeners' sensibilities towards Islam. In the final part of the chapter I discuss how this cultivation of religious sentiments through Islam-inspired music also has political relevance, as the artists not only seek to reconfigure the moral disposition of their listeners, but also to achieve an ethical transformation in society at large.

Chapter Six compares the practices and the perspectives of the artists performing in the two musical domains I have described in Chapter Four and Five. While the cultural and political representations of the cultural infrastructure for Islam-inspired music in Morocco suggest a separation in actors, styles, infrastructure and audiences labeled as either Sufi or *anashid*, artists and their practices did not always reflect this categorization. In this last chapter I describe the ways in which the artists engage with and move across the two

music scenes, and also shed light on differences and commonalities between the artists. I argue that the fact that artists do not always adhere to the boundaries of the two musical domains, reveals that the music domains are mostly a discursive frame from which musicians build their musical identities, rather than a reality lived. The self-presentation, and musical practices of the artists dissonate with a binary system of representation of two musical domains which are meant to represent a 'Sufi' 'moderate' Islam and an *anashid* 'radical' Islam.

The conclusion of this dissertation connects and discusses the main findings of this study, highlighting how the performance and production of contemporary Moroccan Islam-inspired music is a key arena for the construction and challenging of ideas about Islam and citizenship. First of all because the production, performance, and staging of Islam-inspired music is informed by political discourses about Islam and vice versa. Secondly, since music is regarded by various stakeholders as a powerful vehicle for ideological messages because of its capacity to evoke religious sentiments. These sentiments can serve as the basis for ethical engagement and political thought. Music here is part of discursive constructions regarding a 'moderate' versus a 'radical' Islam. The concomitant and apparently oppositional categories of Sufi music and *anashid* music are performed, displayed, and constructed in different dissonant constellations.



1 Music, power, and the senses

'With music you can renew the soul, and change the world'[11]

[11] Interview with Moroccan *munshid*. Rabat, 1 January 2012.

Introduction

When I was interviewing people during my fieldwork, various notions concerning music came to the fore. Most of my interlocutors saw music as a vehicle to communicate feelings and convey messages and values, but the vehicle itself is perceived as powerful too. One of the prevailing notions was of music as a source of power. Variously positioned actors all referred to an inherent force in music, capable of moving the body, evoking powerful emotions, touching the heart and soul. Whether they were musicians, state-actors, or religious scholars, they all assigned transcendental capacities to music. This power of music was often described in terms of stirring the senses and its moral and social effects. In the context of my research I want to understand why and how my interlocutors construct music as powerful, as well as how it is used as an instrument to enact and contest power relations. To capture this dual working of music as both a source and an instrument of power, this chapter analyzes music and religion through anthropological notions of power and politics. It also serves as a theoretical framework to analyze the empirical data I present in chapters Four, Five, and Six.

In her edited volume *Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia* (2009), the British Iranian-ethnomusicologist Laudan Nooshin addresses the relation between music and power by asking whether power can be considered an intrinsic quality of music itself, or whether the focus of study should rather be on the uses to which music is put (Nooshin 2009: 15). With this question, Nooshin provides an interesting way of categorizing the numerous approaches to music and power. She takes different notions of power as a central point of reference. This is what she calls the 'power-music nexus.' This chapter will use Nooshin's 'power-music nexus' as a starting-point to analyze and structure the discussion of music and power. It will also serve as a basis through which I will formulate a conceptual model for the analysis of the interaction between Islam-inspired musical practices and political discourses in the Moroccan context.

The emotional, spiritual, and physical reactions brought about by music as well as the political ends to which music is put, have preoccupied many scholars and led to a vast body of literature from various academic disciplines dealing with the complex and diffuse ways in which power permeates music (Averill 1997; Bohlman 1996, 1997; Erlman 1996; Kapchan 2007; Meelberg 2009; Racy 2003; Randall 2005; Stokes 2010; Tan, Pfordresher & Harré 2010). Approaches to music and power can roughly be divided into two ways of thinking about the operation of power through music. In line with Nooshin's music-power nexus, I define these two ways of thinking as the 'instrumental approach' and the 'intrinsic approach.' The 'instrumental approach' links musical practices to power from broader social and cultural perspectives, and works from the premise

that music's power is foremost a socio-cultural construct, and its meaning context-dependent. This instrumental approach sees music predominantly as an instrument to acquire positions of power and has mainly been developed within social science and the humanities. Disciplines like cultural anthropology and ethnomusicology stress the importance of the socio-cultural contexts in which musical practices acquire meaning, like rituals and the construction of social identities (Small 1998; Stokes 1997; van de Port 1999). Studies in this area have largely focused on how music is used to create collective identities (Frith 1996; Rice 2007; Turino 2008: 190) and is used for political ends through theories of power and symbolic representation.

By contrast, the 'intrinsic approach' refers to perspectives that conceptualize music *as* power. The power of music here is primarily defined as an intrinsic quality of music, which resides in the music itself and has the capacity to elicit emotions and bodily responses of the listeners (Kapchan 2007; Meelberg 2009). Studies in this field stem from neuro-psychological research exploring people's physical and emotional reactions to music by focusing on how music affects our brain (Becker 2004; Huron 2006; Nakamura, Sadato, Oohashi, Nishina, Fuwamoto & Yonekura 1999; Peretz & Coltheart 2003; Salimpoor, Benovoy, Larcher, Dagher & Zatorre 2011; Tan et al. 2010; Thaut 2005).

Instrumental and intrinsic approaches to power and music are however incomplete. Intrinsic approaches to music leave out the social context, while the instrumental cultural analysis of music has been less interested in music's power or the aesthetic experiences of music by itself (Hennion 2003: 81). In order to understand why and how my interlocutors experience music as a source of power, and in what manner they use music to influence relations of power, we need a conceptual model, that addresses both music's affective power and its embedding in socio-cultural power structures. In this chapter I will lay out such a conceptual model, which builds on both instrumental and intrinsic approaches to music's power. First, I will explore general notions of power relevant for this dissertation, followed by a discussion of theories of power in relation to music. Secondly, I will explore instrumental and intrinsic approaches to music and power. The chapter then advances towards a combination of these two perspectives on music and power, leading to the proposed theoretical lens of this study.

Power

To understand how and why music facilitates power, we first need to explore 'power' as a key concept. In cultural anthropology, the nature, distribution, and balance of power has been extensively described in a vast body of literature building on theories stemming from both the social sciences and the humanities (Bourdieu 1977; Cheater 1999; Driessen 1992; Elias 1976; Foucault & Faubion 2000; Hall 1997; Lukes 2005; Scott 1985, 1990; Wolf 1999). Building on classical

Marxist theory, social scientific approaches to power in its many forms started out with a twofold and centralized definition of power as dominance and control over others, and as located in a place or possessed by a person or a selected group. Within this definition power was described and analyzed in oppositional categories such as 'domination and subordination,' 'powerful and powerless,' 'oppressor and oppressed.' Weber *defined power* as the ability of a person, or a group of people, to carry out their will, even against the opposition of others (Brennan 1997; Walliman, Tatsis & Zito 1977; Weber 1925: 8; Weber, van Braam & Blok 1972). He linked power with concepts of control, authority, and rule (Sadan 1997: 35; Weber 1925: 122). His notion of power underscores its centralization in institutions and sees power mostly as a factor of domination (Ultee, Arts & Flap 1996). Yet, this notion is not very useful when it comes to capturing the rather diffuse ways in which power operates through music. To understand the working of music's power on the political, social, and affective levels we need a concept of power that also leaves room for complexities and ambiguity.

After Weber, various scholars have moved away from a binary notion of power and replaced it with concepts of power as an aspect of social relations (Elias 1976; Foucault & Faubion 2000; Lukes 2005; Scott 1985, 1990; Wolf 1999). Norbert Elias' notion of power was influential in this matter, since unlike Marx or Weber, he did not define power as something one can possess, but as an inherent aspect of all human relations and actions (Elias 1976). Similarly, Foucault argued that everyone is involved in the workings of power, either through its exercise, through obedience, or through resistance. In addition, he rejected the idea of power as being predominantly an instrument of coercion, consisting of practices of repression and constraint. To him power was not only something which forces us to act against our will, but also something which is socially produced and embodied in the most subtle taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life practices, such as dress-codes, types of knowledge and classifications, architecture, and language (Abu-Lughod 1990: 42). In her book *Politics of Piety*, anthropologist Saba Mahmood very aptly cites Foucault's notion of power as being productive and omnipresent:

> Power, according to Foucault, cannot be understood solely on the model of domination, as something possessed and employed by individual or sovereign agents over others, with a singular intentionality, structure, or location that presides over its rationality and execution. Rather, power is to be understood as a strategic relation of force that permeates life and is productive of new forms of desires, objects, relations, and discourses (Mahmood 2005: 17).

According to Foucault power is never a one-way passage between oppressor and oppressed, power does not equal dominance, but dominance is a specific relation

of power, which like all relations of power is socially produced and takes shape in everyday practices.

Foucault developed the concept of 'discourse' in order to reveal how power permeates all social relations, beliefs, and practices (Foucault 1972). The term 'discourse' stems from the field of semantics, where it refers to written or spoken communication, like a speech, a statement or a lecture. Foucault reformulated the term. He was not so much interested in what was said, but rather in the supporting structures which allowed pronouncements to be said and kept them in place (Mills 2003: 54). These structures determine our perception and are defined by power relations. They give legitimacy to existing power relations and authority (Hall 1997: 49).[12]

Foucault's notion of power is certainly relevant for a study on the role of music in the experience and expression of power relations, since he addresses the operation of power through macro-structures, like social institutions and political organizations, but also through micro-structures, such as subjective experiences on the level of the senses and the body, and the interaction between these macro and micro structures (Foucault 1975, 1985, 1988). Yet, his analysis of power is quite abstract, which makes it difficult to apply to the concrete practices and realities as experienced by the vocal performers of Islam-inspired music.

Pierre Bourdieu developed a more practical notion of power, drawing from his ethnographic fieldwork in Algeria to illustrate his theoretical propositions (Bourdieu 1977). While Foucault's notion of power is discursive, Bourdieu developed the concept of symbolic power, which refers to the tacit processes through which relations of power are culturally and symbolically created and legitimized (Jenkins 1992: 104). 'Symbolic power,' as Bourdieu puts it, is 'invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it' (Bourdieu 1994; 164), it 'is power of constructing reality' (ibid.: 166). Bourdieu's notion of symbolic power is based on the concepts of 'fields' and 'capital' (Bourdieu 1977, 1986, 1994). Whereas economic capital refers to the control of economic resources, such as cash or assets, Bourdieu extends the notion of 'capital' to symbolic systems of value and meaning. He pictures modern society as a set of 'fields': specific socio-cultural environments with their own set of rules, practices, social structures and cultural codes. Many varieties of fields exist, such as academic, artistic, religious, or political fields. One learns how to occupy or gain a specific position within a certain 'field' through the accumu-

[12] The term 'discourse' is used in different ways across different disciplines. In this dissertation I use the notion of 'discourse' as defined and developed by Foucault in his early work (Archeology of Knowledge 1972).

lation and display of symbolic capital, by adopting and cultivating symbolic repertoires that are meaningful to a specific field, like ways of thinking, acting, speaking, judging, dressing, choosing life styles, but also with regard to the body and its demeanor, which embody and symbolize the ethos of the group (Bourdieu 1993: 105; Moore 2008: 105; Driessen & Zwaan 1992: 8). These field-related sets of behavior and beliefs are perceived by the participants as habitual, self-evident, natural and 'common sense' ways of being. This unconscious system of dispositions tied to the organization of a particular field is what Bourdieu calls 'habitus' (Bourdieu 1977, 1984). According to Minson, Bourdieu speaks of power as symbolic and reproductive because people with a similar habitus reflect and perpetuate the field and its related power relations and ideologies through signs and symbols indicating the social or class habitus of a group (Minson 1993: 31 in Mahmood 2005: 26). These symbolic repertoires of particular fields and persons are tied to ideologies and positions of power. People also compete to acquire the type of symbolic capital needed to inhabit a particular field successfully. Therefore fields are also spaces of conflict and of competition (Bourdieu 1984, 1994).

Resistance

Bourdieu's notion of power as symbolic and reproductive is particularly useful for the apprehension of music as an instrument in gaining, perpetuating, and legitimating positions of power and authority. It is however less suited as a means to investigate how individuals resist these power relations. Resistance is an important concept to explore how musical practices not only affirm but also contest certain power relations. As I have mentioned in the preceding section, Foucault, in his analysis of power, sees resistance not as outside or opposed to power, but as an intrinsic part of power (Mills 2003: 40). As he puts it: 'Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power' (Foucault 1990: 95).

In order to analyze the ways in which music can be used to contest systems of power, I will apply James Scott's notion of 'everyday resistance.' His work focuses on both overtly and tacitly ways in which people with little influence employ everyday comportment as a means to challenge systems of repression. In his book *Weapons of the Weak* (1985) he describes how Malay peasants use subtle everyday methods, such as gossip, jokes, non-compliance, and deception, as ways to resist their marginalization in large-scale capitalist agriculture (ibid.: 29). He points out that studies of resistance predominantly focused on overt and violent means of protest and ignored everyday forms of resistance: '(…) social science is (…) focused at the official or formal relations between the powerful and the weak. This is the case even for much of the study of conflict, when that conflict has become highly institutionalized' (ibid.: 13). Instead, Scott

discusses how subtle and indirect ways of resistance constitute the common methods used by subordinated groups to challenge hegemonic systems.

Scott uses the distinctive concepts of 'hidden- and public transcripts.' 'Public transcripts' pertain to 'the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate' (Scott 1990: 2). 'Hidden transcripts' refer to discourse that takes place 'offstage,' beyond direct observation by powerholders (ibid.: 4). This concerns narratives and actions that are incompatible with the 'public transcript' of ruling elites and which are expressed in subtle everyday acts, such as ways of speaking, gossiping or jokes.[13] Scott is specifically interested to 'know how the hidden transcripts of various actors are formed, the conditions under which circumstances they do or do not find public expression, and what relations they bear to the public transcripts' (1985: 14).

Just like Scott, Lila Abu-Lughod, whose work focuses on gender issues in the Middle East, proposes to move beyond the focus on resistance as overt opposition to systems of oppression and domination. She calls for attention to the complex and often contradictory workings of social power in the local and everyday forms that resistance can take (Abu-Lughod 1990: 50). Abu-Lughod emphasizes that forms of resistance do not only take place in relation to systems of oppression, but that small acts and behaviors, too, can produce a range of outlooks, that engage with different structures and levels of power and authority: 'We should learn to read in various local and everyday resistances the existence of a range of specific strategies and structures of power' (ibid.: 53).

Although Abu-Lughod and Scott draw from different fields of studies, both offer comparable perspectives on resistance that are useful to analyze musical practices as forms of resistance. In relation to my research, I will argue that the choices musicians make about such matters as dress, body postures, what themes are referred to, which song lyrics are sung, and the kind of venue where the performance takes place, can be seen as aspects of transcripts (either hidden or public) connected to larger ideological constructs.

Related to the subject of music, power, and resistance, Nooshin (2009) likewise states that challenging existing systems of authority through music do not only consist in overt messages expressed in song lyrics, but also in symbolic values music can convey. These are almost never direct:

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[13] Although Scott, to my knowledge, never mentioned Michel de Certeau's work in his writings, his notion of public and hidden transcripts strongly resonates with Michel de Certeau's notion of 'the wig' (*la perruque*). In *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984), De Certeau was concerned with the question what practices people use on the micro level of everyday life to subvert domination. He finds the answer to this in his concept of 'the tactic,' with which he refers to subversive acts. He uses the metaphor of 'the wig' to describe a tactic of resistance individuals use to carve out a semi-independent domain of practice within the constraints imposed on them by the powerful (De Certeau 1984).

> [Music's] semantic fluidity (…) allows it to be used in ways which challenge the status quo and which are often hard to control. [As] music's semantic ambiguity allow[s] it to simultaneously convey different meanings (Nooshin 2009: 16).

Timothy Rice's argument adds to this when he states that music can play into different meanings at the same time. The simultaneous enactment of rhythm, melody, meter, timbre, lyrics, and instruments can articulate multiple meanings at the same time (Rice 2001: 33). But also the setting in which music is performed, the language in which a song is sung, the persons singing it, as well as the clothes and bodily postures and movements of the singer, are aspects that contribute to the construction of meanings assigned to a musical performance, and the identities performed. It is precisely this ambiguity and indeterminate character of music, Martin Stokes highlights, that underscores music's undermining potential. He notes that: 'Whilst metaphors of power transfer easily into brick or stone (…) sound is more difficult stuff to handle' (Stokes 1994: 32). According to Stokes, the production of meaning through music is complex, since '[t]exts and musical messages [can] themselves contain inner voices, contradicting or subverting the overt messages' (Stokes 1992: 14). In the case of my research, the implicit subversive meaning of some kinds of music – intentional or unintentional – can explain the interest variously positioned actors take to control the Moroccan musical field.

Thus, in addition to being an instrument in the perpetuation and legitimation of power relations, music can also function as a tool of resistance, whether openly or tacitly, intentionally, or unintentionally. Scott's notion of hidden and public transcripts helps to interpret and analyze music as a possible form of tacit subversion or compliance to various structures of authority.

Agency

Abu-Lughod's perspective on resistance, and Scott's notion of hidden and public transcripts take the concept of resistance away from binary thinking about power in terms of domination and subordination, by showing both the overt and subtle forms through which power can operate. A concept adjacent to the discussion of resistance as an analytical category to understand the workings of power, is 'agency.' Agency is a highly contested term on which anthropologists have written extensively. There are two major strands of thinking on agency to be discerned. First, there is the agency-as-resistance model, closely related to Giddens' structuration theory (1984), in which agency is understood as 'the capacity of individuals to act independently and make their own free choices within the structures that limit or influence the opportunities individuals have'

(Ahearn 2001: 117).[14] Second, there is the agency-as-self-cultivation model in which corporeal manners are assumed to develop and shape the self (Asad 2003; Mahmood 2001a, 2001b, 2005; Durkee 2007).

The theories of power I have addressed in the last section, hold different perspectives with respect to the role of agents within social structures. Foucault, for instance, does not explicitly address agency in his work, but he does use the term 'subjectivation' which he understands as 'the way a human being turns himself into a subject' (Foucault 1983: 208). According to Foucault, subjectivities are formed through externally enforced processes and discursive structures, like the disciplinary techniques of surveillance the state uses to supervise society (in Rabinow 1984: 18). But subjectivities are also formed internally, through methods individuals employ, like bodily activities, cognitive education, and various exercises of moral and political disciplining, to (trans)form themselves consciously into subjects. These practices directed at forming the self are what Foucault calls 'techniques of the self':

> "Techniques of the self," which is to say, the procedures, (…) suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge (Foucault 1997: 87). [15]

As appears in the quote, the methods through which a person reaches or attempts to reach a valued state, and the outside influences shaping his or her ability to do so are interdependent (Salois 2013: 26, n6). This two-sidedness of Foucault's notion of subject-formation is what Judith Butler refers to as 'the paradox of subjectivation': 'the subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms' (Butler 1993: 15). Foucault emphasizes that the individual agent who wishes to transform its own position, is not free, but a product of 'regimes' and 'discourses' that can also be inscribed on the body (Butler 1989, 1993; Mahmood 2005: 17; Mills 2003: 98,104,106; Rice 2007: 28). The room in which individuals have to maneuver according to Foucault's analysis of power is rather limited.

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[14] The agency-structure model revolves around whether, how and to what extent, people either determine their own life courses, or are determined by the social structures in which they exist, such as family structures, politics, social class, gender religion or race. I here use a description of the term 'agency' as it emerged within Anthony Giddens' structuration theory (Giddens 1984). Central to Giddens' structuration theory is the idea that 'people's actions are shaped (in both constraining and enabling ways) by the social structures that those actions serve to reinforce or reconfigure' (Ahearn 2001: 117).

[15] The notion of 'techniques of the self' strongly resonates French anthropologist Marcel Mauss's notion of 'techniques of the body' (Mauss 1973), by which he describes the highly developed body actions that manifest aspects of a given culture, class or gender.

Bourdieu, too, pays attention to the role of individual agents and their power to maneuver within social structures. He addresses agency by studying the ways social actors try to influence their own position in a particular field by displaying and accumulating symbolic capital. This agency is also quite limited, however, since the possible actions of an individual are bounded by the habitus and the rules and codes of a specific field.

Although Foucault's and Bourdieu's ideas regarding the extent to which individuals can exert agency are limited, their examinations of power formed the basis for a renewed theoretical inquiry into the concept of agency. Until recently, agency was generally understood and used in terms of freedom, individual autonomy, empowerment, and emancipation, with a strong emphasis on resistance to dominant power structures (Asad 2003: 73; Mahmood 2005: 154; Rose 1997). Over the last ten years however, scholars like Talal Asad (2003), and Saba Mahmood (2005), have criticized this dominant agency-as-resistance paradigm. Their critique concerns the use of the notion of agency in social sciences and the humanities as a neutral analytic concept, while the underlying assumptions on which the concept is based, are grounded in a Western understanding of human agency, i.e. the wish for individual autonomy and the possibility to realize one's own interests against traditions, oppression, and norms (Mahmood 2005: 6). They argue that as different cultural contexts bring forth different wishes and desires, aspired by historically situated subjects, a liberal-secular understanding of agency blinds us for other modes of agency that go beyond resistance and subordination (Mahmood 2001a: 223).[16]

Mahmood and Asad suggest an understanding of agency beyond resistance, less focused on individual will and motivation, and with more regard to different bodily practices. In *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (2005), Mahmood explores the religious practices of members of a women's mosque movement in Egypt. She analyzes how women exercise agency through practices that 'invoke patriarchal norms about women's submission to male authority' (Frank 2006: 284, 285). In her work Mahmood argues that agency should not only be understood in terms of resistance to norms and oppressive power structures, but also in terms of the variety of ways in which we adhere to them (Mahmood 2005: 15; Weir 2013: 326). She stresses the importance of a contextualized notion of agency which draws attention to 'other modalities of agency whose meaning and effect are not captured within the logic of subversion'

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[16] Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood were not the first scholars to argued for a contextualized understanding of agency. Laura Ahearn (2001) and Wimal Dissanayake (1996) also emphasized a contextualized notion of agency. In the introduction of *Narratives of Agency* (1996), Dissanayake for example notes: 'Our emphasis should be on the historical and cultural conditions that facilitate the discursive production of agency, and on useful ways of framing the question of agency so that we would be in a better position to understand the cultures that we study'(1996: ix).

(Mahmood 2005: 154). Following Foucault, she relates practices and techniques of subject formation to embodied capacities and strategies of self expression (Mahmood 2005: 6). These embodied capacities entail the training of certain bodily movements and practices such as gestures, actions, and speech with the purpose to establish and model inward dispositions, such as feelings, sensibilities, aspirations, thoughts, and desires (Asad in interview with Mahmood 1996; Mahmood 2005: 31). The belief that certain outward forms can produce effects in the inward inclinations of the subject, is what Mahmood calls 'the coordination between inner states and outward conduct' (ibid.).

The importance Mahmood assigns to embodied capacities, shows a resemblance with the centrality Bourdieu gives to the body. In his theory of practice, Bourdieu uses the term 'hexis' to refer to how the body signifies the unconscious dispositions of the habitus (Jenkins 1992: 75-76). Mahmood also focuses on outward bodily acts, but not as inherent expressions emanating from the habitus (Mahmood 2005: 27). Where Bourdieu sees embodied practices as an indicator of the habitus, Mahmood is rather interested in how bodily practices are developed and used to affect inner capacities from which the world is acted upon (Weir 2013: 328). A person can thus take up embodied practices, such as prayer or fasting, in order to develop and construct his or her moral life and self (Winchester 2008: 1754). The contexts in which these moral selves are constructed are crucial to understand the agency that these capacities furnish.[17]

To discern such contextualized forms of self-cultivated agency, Mahmood calls for a closer analysis of specific conducts and practices in relation to the intended subjectivities formed and the capacities needed to do so: 'It is only through an analysis of the specific shape and character of ethical practices that one can apprehend the kind of ethical subject that is formed' (Mahmood 2005: 29). Her call to pay close attention to the actions and intentions of individuals, reminds us to identify modalities of agency which fall outside the liberal-secular paradigm.

Although Mahmood's call for a contextualized model of agency refers to the level of persons, her insights support a useful approach to the study of music as a tool for subject-formation. The idea that external influences can cultivate inward dispositions to help construct an aspired sense of self, can be applied to musical aesthetics and ethical self-fashioning. As music can evoke emotions and

[17] Here Mahmood strongly relies on Asad. For Asad subjectivities are created through bodily practices (Asad 1993: 131). In his ideas of the role of the body in the formation of subjectivities, Asad builds –like Foucault- on the work of Marcel Mauss: 'In Mauss's view, the human body was not to be regarded simply as the passive recipient of "cultural imprints" that can be imposed on the body by repetitive discipline –still less as the active source of "natural expressions" clothed in local history and culture- but as the self-developable means by which the subject achieves a range of human objects - from styles of physical movement (for example, walking), through modes of emotional being (for example, composure), to kinds of spiritual experience (for example, mystical states)' (Asad 2003: 251-252).

bodily responses in the listener, ways of engaging with music, can be an important means to affect one's inner dispositions. Especially within Islam, where music is surrounded by moral ambiguity, musical practices are closely related to ethical behavior and morality.

Many of my respondents consciously engage with music as a site through which moral virtues can be awakened or jeopardized, but also as a tool to develop the right inward dispositions, needed to inhabit and enact the norms of an aspired pious lifestyle. During my research, artists' ideas about what music can and should, or should not, do to a person's moral stance, were often linked to musical preferences, as well as ways of performing and responding to music. As Timothy Rice states that: 'musical practice (…) may create particular kinds of selves and self-understandings that function well within specific social and cultural circumstances' (Rice 2007: 29). In line with Timothy Rice, I will approach music as a site for creating, inhabiting, or resisting particular kinds of selves, having the capacity to give agency to groups and individuals (Gell 1998; Hennion 2003; Layton 2003). After having outlined my approach to music and agency I will now turn to the question of whether to approach music as a source of power or as an instrument of power.

The relation between music, power, and religion

In this section, I will discuss how theoretical approaches of aesthetics and power can contribute to an understanding of how and why music facilitates power. The theories of power I have described above have, to a large extent, contributed to studies of how power works through music. In theoretical explorations of aesthetics and power, some studies have highlighted artistic expressions as a vehicle of symbolic meaning and an expression of power relations (the instrumental approach). Other studies have emphasized the affective powers and aesthetic experiences of art itself (the intrinsic approach). This section addresses both perspectives. First, I will address the 'instrumental approach,' by focusing on studies that conceptualize art as a symbolic vehicle for the expression and shaping of power relations through the concept of 'representation.' I will show some examples of how these ideas have been applied to the field of music. Second, I will address the 'intrinsic approach,' by discussing studies that consider music a source of power through theories of 'affect' and 'the senses.'

Instrumental approaches to music and power

Several studies have described how art and cultural productions can be powerful instruments to reinforce certain ideologies and legitimize the position of a ruling elite. They describe art as a tool to influence ideas, mobilize people and encourage action (Fabian 1996; MacClancy 1997: 5; Randall 2005; Svašek 1996). These studies largely build on theories of representation and symbolic meaning.

These theories see representation as a mode of signification, based on rhetoric and semiotics. This means that art and cultural forms are seen as symbolic vehicles of meaning that stand in an arbitrary relation to their referents in the outside world (Geertz 1976; Meyer 2006: 19). Stuart Hall defines representation as: 'an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It does involve the use of language, of signs and images which stand for or represent things' (1997: 15). Hall connects representation to power: 'Power, it seems, has to be understood (…) in broader cultural or symbolic terms, including the power to represent someone or something in a certain way -within a certain "regime of representation"' (Hall 1997: 259).

The idea that meaning is symbolically conveyed and constructed through the usage of representational systems has influenced several socio-cultural studies of aesthetics. Gramsci and Bourdieu for example saw art as symbolic expressions of underlying power structures. Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci conceived of cultural production as being instrumental to power. He developed the analytical concept of 'cultural hegemony.' With this concept he depicts how ideologies legitimizing systems of dominance, are expressed in cultural representations. According to Gramsci, architecture, movies and national ceremonies are symbolic tools through which the ruling classes reinforce and naturalize their power and authority over other groups, and ensure subaltern groups to accept their domination (Jackson Lears 1985).

Bourdieu who also applied his social theory of practice to the field of art and cultural production resonates Gramsci's approach. He argues that cultural productions and preferences play a key role in the symbolic creation and legitimization of power relations and positions of authority. Bourdieu demonstrates how power relations between classes are constructed, reproduced, and perpetuated through the consumption and evaluation of culture and art. According to him, art is not an object with an autonomous value, which can be understood on its own. Rather, artistic works are situated within the social conditions of their production and circulation, and gain value within a contextualized and politicized practice (Bourdieu 1993, 1994). The rules of the 'field' make us appreciate or dislike artworks according to our 'habitus.' In contrast to Gramsi and Bourdieu, Jeremy MacClancy in his book *Contesting Art* (1997) argues that art not only serves as a tool to confirm systems of dominance, but also enables groups to resist ideologies and imposed living conditions and ways of thinking. He uses the term 'aesthetic strategies' to refer to the struggle for political power and cultural hegemony carried through art.

The role art can play in shaping political meaning has been described with the concept of 'cultural politics.' This concept points to the intertwinement of cultural productions and political ideologies. It understands culture as an arena where social, economic, and political values and meanings are created, expressed

and contested.[18] Cultural politics can pertain to state cultural policies but also to oppositional groups. Lily describes the political instrumentalization of musical practices by various actors in Singapore: 'Music is used by the ruling elite to perpetuate certain ideologies that favors towards the nation. On the other hand, music is also a form of cultural resistance against state policies and some social cultural norms' (1995: 447- 448).

For the case of Morocco, Aomar Boum (2007), Elaine Combs-Schilling (1999) and Tony Langlois (2009) have illuminated the discursive relationship between cultural forms and governmental legitimization. Combs-Schilling describes how the authority of the Moroccan monarchy is legitimated through the staging of cultural performances, in which the monarch and the Moroccan population actively participate and which place the monarchy at the centre of popular experience and consciousness (Combs-Schilling 1999: 179). Boum describes and analyzes how after years of marginalization of Berber identities by the Moroccan state, the recent incorporation of Berber culture in official representations of national culture functions to reformulate national identity as democratic and inclusive to diversity (See also Cynthia Becker 2009).

These examples illustrate that state cultural politics can have a great impact on what types of culture are officially approved and promoted and which are not. Although 'the state'[19] is not always directly involved in the performance and production of culture and music, state policies can play an important role in the determination of cultural and musical meanings. Such policies along with political discourses, can shape frameworks, which promote certain visions, ideologies, and systems of authority. The impact of these policies on music becomes clear when certain styles of music come to bear particular ideological associations. Some music styles for example are claimed as national patrimony and symbols of the nation (Averill 1997; Boum 2007, 2012; Kong 1995), while other musical practices represent forms of political opposition (Nooshin 2009: 20).

Intrinsic approaches to music and power

The theories and studies on the relationship between art, music and power through modes of representation, are very relevant to demonstrate music's effectiveness as a tool in the articulation and contestation of power relations (Langlois 2009: 207). However, they are insufficient to explain how affective states produced by aesthetic forms and music, are implicated in the play of power.

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[18] Definition drawn from http://culturalpolitics.net, accessed on March 24th, 2012.

[19] The notion of 'the state' will be further elaborated in Chapter Two.

Inspired by the sensory turn in anthropology starting in the 1980s (Classen 1997; Feld 1982; Stoller 1989), a number of authors in the social sciences and humanities have recently started to criticize the focus on theories of representation in the analyses of aesthetic forms. They advocate for a perspective, which also takes into account the role of the senses and emotions evoked by aesthetic forms in order to understand how social worlds are shaped (Bacci & Melcher 2011; Classen 1998; Gray 2013; Howes & Classen 2014; Meyer 2006, 2009; de Witte 2011). Judith Butler, for instance, criticized the representational model of language in which language is seen as a tool for power rather than a source of power (1997: 2). In his anthropological study of art's agency Alfred Gell (1998) does not view art objects in terms of their aesthetic value in a particular cultural context, nor does he analyze them as symbols to be decoded, by the recipients or producers. Instead, to understand why art influences its viewers, he defined art objects as social agents, active and with a purpose (van Eck 2010; Gell 1998; Ter Keurs 2011: 8-9).

Likewise, French sociologist Antoine Hennion criticizes Bourdieu's perspective on culture as 'a façade disguising social mechanisms of differentiation, artistic objects being "only" means to naturalize the social nature of tastes' (2003: 81-82). Birgit Meyer also sustains this critical stance on the representational understanding of aesthetics for not taking the intrinsic power of signs and symbols into consideration. She describes a recent scholarly 'move beyond a representational stance that privileges the symbolic above other modes of experience, [which] (...) tends to neglect the reality effects of cultural forms' (Meyer 2009: 6-7). As Meyer observes, there is a shift taking place from the study of aesthetic experiences in terms of representation, toward 'more visceral and material approaches of cultural forms' (ibid.: 7). Mahmood's, Asad's, and Hirschkind's approaches to agency and relations of power in terms of sensory experiences, feelings, and the cultivation of sensibilities, take a prominent role in this shift (Asad 1993; Hirschkind 2001, 2006; Mahmood 2001a, 2005).[20]

A considerable number of anthropological studies focusing on the intrinsic power of music investigates the role of music in inducing trance. Early anthropological and ethnomusicological studies focused on the therapeutic workings of music as in healing rituals and ceremonies of trance and spirit possession. These studies assign a central place to music in the induction of trance with the purpose to communicate with spirits and to heal patients. Examples are studies on rituals of exorcism among the Moroccan Gnawa, the ceremonies of *zar* in Egypt and

[20] The shift also connects to early anthropological studies on music in the invocation of emotions and the senses. In 1921, Marcel Mauss already addressed the collective and social nature of emotions in a study of emotions in funeral rites of aborigines in central Australia. One of the ritual practices involved was rhythmic chanting. According to Mauss, the rhythm, movements and repetitive chanting of words and slogans facilitated the obligatory expression of collective sentiments.

Sudan, [21] *stambeli* rituals in Tunesia (Jankowsky 2010),[22] and Haitian voodoo use of music and dance to induce communication with the spirits (Fleurant 1996; Wilcken 1991).

In 1985, Gilbert Rouget published a standard textbook on music and trance. In this book he developed a universalistic structuralist typology of trance in order to explain the power of music through rituals. He concluded, however, that there is no universal law that can explain the relations between music and trance; they vary greatly and depend on the system of meaning of their cultural context (Rouget 1985). Studies explaining the relationship between trance and music in universalistic terms, stand in contrast to the studies that concentrate on music and trance within specific contexts. Vincent Crapanzano's (1973) ethnopsychiatric accounts of trance among the Hamadsha Sufi brotherhood in Morocco is an example of this. The writings of Deborah Kapchan (2007) and Tony Langlois (1998) about the Moroccan Gnawa, also emphasize the importance of the specific cosmology in which music becomes powerful for inducing trance. Deborah Kapchan's writing about the trance-inducing music of the Gnawa, points to the facilitating role of music to invoke spirits. She hypothesizes that the music itself does not heal, but produces affective states that are crucial elements in the induction of trance. Jankowsky underlines the mediating role of *stambeli* musicians in Tunisia in the healing process of the patient, as well as their role as intermediaries between the physical world and supernatural domains (2010).

Although these studies of trance and healing rituals address the power of music in relation to the body and the senses, the musicians I worked with do not make music in order to heal a patient. Some Islam-inspired music does aim to induce states of trance through music, but with the purpose to connect to the divine and communicate religious messages, albeit not in a context of possession and exorcism. Yet, the affective states produced through music do play a key role in the transmission of feelings accompanying these religious messages. In order to capture the feelings and sensory experiences described by my interlocutors, as well as the power attributed to those experiences, I will explore these affective states that can be produced through music. By going into the affective power of music, the religious experiences ascribed to it, and how these two elements can link to politics, I will present my proposed theoretical lens of this dissertation.

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[21] *Zar* is the possession cult widely spread in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. For literature on *zar* rituals see amongst others, the works of Janice Boddy (1989) and Gerda Sengers (2007).

[22] Like *gnawa*, *stambeli* is a healing trance music created by the descendants of sub-Saharan slaves brought to Tunisia. Since Tunisia was part of the Ottoman empire, the term Stambeli, is often associated with Istanbul. However, it is more likely that Stambeli derives from *sambeli*, a sub-Saharan term for spirit possession. For literature on *stambeli* see Richard C. Jankowsky (2010).

Music, the senses, and the affective turn in anthropology

Within anthropology, emotions and the senses have for a long time been relegated to the realm of individual physiological or psychological experiences. Yet, over the past years researchers in the humanities and social sciences have started to demonstrate how sensory experience and the expression, experience, judgment, and invocation of emotions occur within culturally specific contexts, which are tied to power and social structures (Gouk & Hills 2005; Lutz & Abu-Lughod 1990; Lutz & White 1986; Rosaldo 1984). This recent attention for emotions and the senses as discursive fields has also been called 'the affective turn' (Clough & Halley 2007).

The term 'affect' has been described differently by various anthropologists, psychologists, and philosophers (Brenneis 1987; Deleuze & Guattari 2003; Massumi 2002; Mauss 2002 [1902]), and is often primarily explained as a pre-emotional bodily sensation triggered by an external object or experience, which can be responded to and interpreted, emotionally and culturally.

Affect is also seen as a crucial part of musical experience. Music, however, is more than a mere form of sonic reverberation. It is also a medium, which on the one hand can express emotions, while on the other hand evoking, communicating, and reinforcing emotions. One of the reasons music is often experienced as an emotionally powerful force is because of its affect, the impact it can have on the senses of the listeners. Most of us have experienced the influence music can have on our body. Music can make the hair stand up at the back of your neck, and send shivers down your spine. These bodily responses to music are called 'affect.' An approach of affect as 'an autonomous reaction of an observer's body when confronted with a particular perception' (Meelberg 2009: 324), however implies that music can evoke affect but does not evoke emotion in itself (Meelberg 2009). Emotions, such as joy, sadness, or revulsion, experienced by the listener to music, are thus not affect, but the emotional interpretations of or responses to affect.

The application of affect theory to musical experiences may help us to understand the functioning of music and its effects on the body and emotions from a neuro-physiological point of view, but affect theory lacks socio-cultural contextualization. Bodily responses as well as emotional experiences evoked by music are part of, not separate to, the meanings attributed to musical experiences, and these responses are structured by socio-cultural contexts (Rosaldo 1984).[23] Likewise, but more broadly, Birgit Meyer recently called for an approach that pays attention to the entanglement of a person's cognitive, visceral, and emotional appraisal in the sense making of affective situations (Meyer 2016: 299 n16, 300 n17).

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[23] See Veit Erlmann's work (2004) on culture, sound, and hearing.

The new field of theory on affect and of sensory experiences offers much potential to analyze music's symbolic, discursive, political, religious, and moral dimensions (Hennion 2002; Meelberg 2009; Turino 2008; Nooshin 2009). My study intends to contribute to this emerging field of theory. What is interesting for my research is how religious and spiritual powers are assigned to this musical affect.

Music, religion, and morality

Various respondents in my research assigned power to music in religious terms –as either morally beneficial or dangerous. According to them, music's power can, on the one hand evoke spiritual feelings and, on the other hand, seduce and distract believers from their religious duties. Numerous cultures and societies have acknowledged the power of music to influence the body, emotions, mental states, and human action in religious terms.[24] Within various religious and spiritual traditions, the emotional and physical responses people can have to music, are not so much considered responses to sounds, but intrinsic qualities of these particular sounds. Music is believed to have the direct capacity to engage both the body and soul of the listener. Even the mere exposure to certain sounds and tones could affect this person's essence. The highly affective states of being that music can induce explains a cautious attitude towards music from a religious perspective, as not all reactions to music are considered positive. Music can elicit religious feelings, but can also be a threatening force to personal piety and public morals. Therefore, in various cultures, different styles and genres of music are attributed different moral values. The visceral modes music can evoke within listeners, can grant power to music and to the contexts in which it is performed, rendering both music, its performers, and the settings either spiritually beneficial or socially or morally threatening (Racy 2003).

In this distinction of virtuous and dangerous effects of music in terms of morality, there is an underlying assumption. Music possesses a power that requires control for the well-being of society and the individual. When the affective power of music is considered dangerous to the social order and societal values, it can in some cases evoke a 'moral panic' (Cohen 1972). Especially in those cases when certain music styles, rhythms, melodies, or lyrics are associated with the 'lower passions,' music is believed to have a bad influence on morality,

[24] The ancient Greeks already ascribed power to music. It could not only alter moods, but also a person's very essence, called *ethos* (Wang 2004: 89). During the Middle Ages the Church believed demons could house in specific notes. Blues and jazz music was at first denounced by mainstream music companies and culturally conservative Americans as being 'the devil's music.' Likewise, heavy metal music is still considered by some to be a vessel for the devil. Metal artists and bands like Judas Priest and shock rocker Marilyn Manson have been held responsible for the suicide of teenagers who had been listening to their music (Dunn, MacFayden & Wise 2005). There are of course also beliefs that listening to music can be beneficial to one's health and mind and can canalize frustrations or negative emotions.

leading to calls for restrictions and control. It is this moral ambiguity surrounding music, that provides the background for theological and legal debates about whether music is allowed in Islam.[25] Racy very aptly addresses this ambiguous stance toward music within the Islamic world:

> Throughout Islamic history, religious chanting which is not considered 'music' as such has evoked profound spiritual feelings within members of the religious community. Similarly, secular music has been recognized for its unmistakable transformative powers and, at times, feared and condemned for its sensuous connotations and its potential for generating emotional excesses and disagreeable behaviors (Racy 2003: 4).

The religious rulings of appropriate ways to make and listen to music reflect the ambiguous perspectives on the relation between music and Muslim faith. Charles Hirschkind mentions the different positions in Islam:[26]

> Those who have opposed the audition of music point to its dangerous ability to arouse unruly passions, stimulate sensual pleasures, and distract one from thoughts of God, while others have seen it as a means to move the heart to greater piety and closeness to God (Hirschkind 2006: 35).

As Hirschkind states, music may also be used to reach closeness to the divine and to enact religious feelings. This connects to the insights expressed by Birgit Meyer when she addresses the role of aesthetic and sensory experiences in the formation of religious subjectivities and communities. In her inaugural lecture she introduced the notion of 'sensational forms' in relation to religious mediation (Meyer 2006: 9). She explains that sensational forms make the sensory involvement with and access to the transcendental possible:

> Sensational forms, (...), are relatively fixed, authorized modes of invoking, and organizing access to the transcendental, thereby creating and sustaining links between religious practitioners in the context of particular religious organizations. Sensational forms are transmitted and shared, they involve religious practitioners in particular practices of worship and play a central role in forming religious subjects. (...) [T]he notion of 'sensational forms' can also be applied to the ways in which material religious objects – such as images, books, or buildings – address and

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[25] For that matter, debates about music and morality are not only confined to Islamic discourse, but also known within Christianity. See for example the work of Timothy Rommen on gospel music in Trinidad (2007).

[26] These different positions do not only exist within theological debates, but also in musical practices among artists and audiences (see Chapters Three and Four).

> involve beholders. Thus, reciting a holy book as the Qurʾan, praying in front of an icon, or dancing around the manifestation of a spirit are also sensational forms through which religious practitioners are made to experience the presence and power of the transcendental (Meyer 2006: 9).

In this research I see Islam-inspired music as a sensational form, which can mediate religious experiences, as various respondents believe music can establish a connection to the divine and see the effects of music on the body and mind as evidence of a divine presence.

In their ability to make the transcendental sensible, Meyer argues, these sensational forms play a key role in constructing religious subjects and communities as 'experiences of the transcendental and the ways in which they are invoked in the here and now underpin individual and collective identities'(ibid.). The role of sensational forms in the construction of religious subjectivities and communities is described by Meyer with the term 'aesthetic formation.' According to Meyer, aesthetic dimensions of religion are central in generating shared sensory experiences, which are not to be seen as mere expressions of a community's beliefs and identity (as in Benedict Anderson's notion of the 'imagined community') but as actively involved in an on-going process of making religious subjectivities and communities.

> "aesthetic formation" captures very well the formative impact of a shared aesthetics through which subjects are shaped by tuning their senses, inducing experiences, molding their bodies, and making sense (…) (Meyer 2009: 7).

I will apply Meyer's notion of sensational forms and aesthetic formation in my conceptual model of music and power, not only to understand how Islam-inspired musical practices mediate religious experiences, but also how the sensory shaping of religious subjectivities intersect with political dimensions.

Politics of the senses

To understand how Islam-inspired musical practices in Morocco interacts with politics in terms of sensory forms of power, I will draw in particular on Saba Mahmood's and Charles Hirschkind's work on the relation between politics, ethics, and the senses. Saba Mahmood (2005) links the domains of politics and ethics by showing how political discourses are intrinsically connected to affective practices of ethical self-cultivation:

> (…) political projects are not only the result of coalitional organizing, ideological mobilization, and critical deliberation. They are predicated upon affective, ethical, and sensible capacities that are often ignored as consequential to the analysis of

> politics. Departing from one's accustomed political stance and adopting a new one requires more than an ideational, judgmental, or conceptual shift. It necessitates a whole series of affective and sensible reorientations, some of which are undertaken systematically and others of which are acquired through social and cultural exposure and imbibing (Mahmood 2005: xiii).

These 'affective and sensible reorientations' addressed by Mahmood, are in line with Hirschkind's argument that through the affective power of Islamic cassette sermons, new sensibilities and affective states can be created, which form the basis for political engagement and thought congruent with those ethical listening practices (2006: 25). To explain his argument he uses the notion of 'counterpublic.'[27] Hirschkind describes the counterpublic as 'a domain of discourse and practice in which sensibilities are cultivated that stand in a disjunctive relationship to the public sphere of the nation and its media instruments' (Hirschkind 2006: 117). The counterpublic can thus be seen as a parallel public discourse, where perspectives, practices, and belongings evolve alongside the nation-state's general domains of mainstream public discourse, while simultaneously transcending the boundaries of these arenas (Karagueuzian & Badine 2013: 304; Salois 2013: 24).

I will use Mahmood's linkage of politics to ethics and sensibilities, Hirschkind's notion of the counterpublic and affect, but also Meyer's notion of aesthetic formation to provide insight in the interaction between Islam-inspired musical practices, the cultivation of ethical sensibilities, and broader political discourses about Islam in Morocco. This perspective enables me to analyze music not as a mere expression or vehicle of identities of groups or individuals, but also as a bodily practice and a sensational form mediating religious experiences and actively shaping religious and political subjectivities and communities, while simultaneously allowing me to analyze musical behavior in relation to broader public debates about Islam in Moroccan society.

In response to Saba Mahmood's call for a close examination of pious conduct (2005: 188), I will take into account the various ways in which Moroccan vocal performers of Islam-inspired music describe, carry out, and experience their musical practices (Hennion 2003: 82), as well as the contexts through which these experience are structured and become meaningful. The ethnographic accounts of musical practices and personal narratives of the performers, thus stand central in my exploration of the ways in which Islam-inspired music in Morocco relates to larger public debates.

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[27] The concept of 'counterpublic' was first suggested by Nancy Fraser (1992). She describes the counterpublic as a separate discursive arena for the formulation of identity and discussion of common concerns through processes of deliberation. Charles Hirschkind reformulated the term.

Selected theoretical lens

The dynamics between the intrinsic and instrumental nature of the power-music nexus form the theoretical backbone of this dissertation. To understand how music is used as an instrument to enact and contest power relations, as well as why my interlocutors think of music as a source of (divine) power in itself, I argue for the combination of what I have called the 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' approach to music and power.

There are many dimensions of meaning involved in the performance of music. These meanings are invoked through the senses and the body, as well as through symbolic systems of representation. Seeing musical forms as indexes of identities contributes to understanding how meanings are symbolically constructed and assigned to music. However, music does not only function as a symbolic vehicle for the dissemination of ideological messages. Music also possesses the inherent ability of engaging the senses, which 'make it a particularly suitable channel for power' (Nooshin 2009: 15). A combination of both the sensory elements proper to music, and the symbolic meanings conveyed through music plays a key role in why music is constructed as powerful in my research.

Moreover, music is is always performed, staged, and listened to within a particular socio-cultural context with its own rules, codes and conventions. I will delineate the power of music by the sensibilities it evokes within the listener, the meanings it symbolically represents, as well as by the contexts in which it occurs and the relations it establishes. The instrumental approach to music, stressing the specific social, political, economic, and institutional structures in which music is produced and circulated, enables me to understand the political instrumentalization of the musical practices that will be described in chapter Two, Three and Four. The theoretical perspectives on the body, affect, and sensational forms as sites for the cultivation of sensibilities and the formation of subjects (Asad 2003; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005: 139; Meyer 2006, 2009), are useful for the analysis of my material on the cultivation of religious sentiments through Islam-inspired music and its political implications I will present in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

In the following chapter, I will explain the musical developments in Morocco against a political-historical perspective, by providing background information about Morocco's intertwined religious, political, and musical landscapes. This chapter forms the backdrop against which the interaction between contemporary Islam-inspired musical practices and politics will be analyzed.

2 Religious and political power in Morocco

Sultans collected anti-Sufis around them as they collected Sufis, anti-legists as they collected legists, reformers as they collected anti-reformers, playing them off against one another and attempting to keep them all centered on his, the Sultan's, person as the First Muslim of the country (Geertz 1968: 72).



Allah, al-Watan, al-Malik *(God, Fatherland, King), Morocco's national slogan on a mountain in the Bay of Agadir.*

Introduction

According to Morocco's official country slogan, there are three elements one should believe in as a Moroccan citizen: *Allah*, *al-Watan*, *al-Malik*: God, Fatherland, King. These three elements form the touchstones of Moroccan national identity, and allude to the complex entwinement of Islamic religion, nationalism, and political power (the monarchy). The interconnection of these elements is the result of a long and complex historical process. This chapter aims to provide background information about Morocco's religious and political landscapes from a historical angle. This is needed to understand how the intertwinement of Morocco's political and religious landscapes affect the infrastructure for the production, staging, and performance of Islam-inspired music. I first describe the general features of the religious Moroccan landscape and analyze the notion of 'Moroccan Islam.' Then I address the political landscape in Morocco, in which I describe the central elements of Moroccan state power and the development of Islamic activist movements. I demonstrate how the fields of religious and political power interconnect with each other from a historical perspective and find expression and justification in aesthetic forms and symbolic repertoirs.

Morocco's religious landscape

In the 7th century Islam was introduced by Arab conquerors to what is now known as Morocco. At that time, the local inhabitants held Christian, Jewish and animistic beliefs. Idris I, who claimed to be a descendant of the Prophet and who fled from Damascus and took refuge in North Africa, established the first Arab dynasty, named after him, the Idrissid dynasty (r. 686-917) (Eickelman 1976: 18). This dynasty contributed to the early Islamization of Morocco. Initially, Islam developed primarily in an urban setting with the city of Fes as its most important religious and intellectual center (Reysoo 1991: 45).[28] Later on, the Islamic doctrine and practice was spread from the towns into the countryside among animistic Amazigh (Berber)-speaking tribes[29] through Sufi brotherhoods, as they established Sufi lodges in the secluded rural areas in the 13th century.

Moroccan Islam

Despite Morocco's Islamization, Jewish, Christian, and animistic elements persisted, especially in the rural and mountainous areas of the Amazigh speaking tribal areas.[30] This resulted in a syncretistic mingling of Islamic orthodoxy, such as beliefs in the oneness of God, the holy Qurʾan, the angels and Satan, with Sufi-mysticism and animistic elements, such as spirit possession and exorcism, the avoidance of the evil eye, the usage of amulets and sorcery, and the veneration of saints (Geertz 1968: 72). This amalgam deeply influenced Islamic religiosity in Morocco.

Scholars who studied Islam in Morocco often refer to this religious syncretism as 'Moroccan Islam' (Buitelaar 2009; Eickelman 1976; Geertz 1968; Gellner 1969; Munson 1993; Rachik 2009). Such a notion of 'Moroccan Islam' is, however, complex and contested. In the first place, most Muslims renounce this idea of a 'Moroccan Islam.' According to the Islamic scriptures there is only one Islam, and Moroccan Muslims would perceive themselves as adherents of this one Islam, not of a 'Moroccan Islam' (Eickelman 1976: 10). Second, the notion of

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[28] Fes was founded by Idriss I, but became the capital city of the dynasty under his son Idris II (Obdeijn, De Mas & Hermans 2002: 42; Waterbury 1970: 27).

[29] The term Amazigh (pl. Imazighen), is a term referring to the original inhabitants of North Africa, also known as 'Berbers.' The word comes from the Tamazight language and can be translated as 'free man' (Haddadou 1994: 120). Most Imazighen prefer to refer to themselves as 'Amazigh,' as opposed to the word 'Berber,' with which they are often referred to by outsiders. They denounce this term because of its negative connotation and association with the word 'Barbarian.' There exist many names for various Amazigh groups. These names usually refer to the regional sub-groups and the countless tribes in which Imazighen are divided (Ter Laan 2003). The languages of the Imazighen are generally categorized according to the three regions in Morocco where most Amazigh people live, the Rif, the Middle Atlas, and the Sous region. Each region possesses its own linguistic specific variations (Tarifit, Tamazight and Tashelhit).

[30] John Waterbury writes that despite the settling of the Sufi brotherhoods in the rural areas to spread the 'right' Islam, these Sufi brotherhoods became enmeshed in the local cultural and power structures (1970: 26).

a 'Moroccan Islam,' as is used by scholars to describe the belief systems, religious practices, and perceptions of Muslims in Morocco, is not a neutral concept but grounded in colonial discourses on Islam.

Generally, during colonialism, European observers saw Islam as an irrational and backward religion (Schielke 2007: 336). But during the French and Spanish protectorate in Morocco (1912-1956), the colonizers (especially the French) showed appreciation for local cultural customs and political forms, as well as for Islam. As part of their colonial strategy to divide in order to rule, the French stimulated certain social groups, their cultural practices, and legal systems as well as their religious beliefs and gave them preferential treatment above others (Burke III 1977, 2014; Eickelman 1976: 21; Slyomovics 2005: 37).[31] During the protectorate, French and Spanish ethnologists and legal scholars created a dominant discourse about Moroccan society, culture, as well as religion. A wide diversity of religious practices, such as belief systems among Amazigh tribes, Sufi mysticism, saint veneration, and the notion of *baraka* (divine blessing), were thus brought together under the label of 'Moroccan Islam.' Such studies and terms were often set up to benefit and legitimize colonial policies. One of the results was that Sufi-mysticism and the belief systems of the Amazigh tribes were supported and Sufi brotherhoods and Amazigh tribes were granted all kinds of privileges in return for their recognition of the rule of the protectorate (Burke III 2014; Nicholas 2014: 391). At the same time the French discouraged puritanical reformist currents, as these were adopted by the Moroccan independence movement.

Discourses about Islam, which emerged and were used under colonial rule have contributed significantly to contemporary distinctions between a so called 'orthodox' and a 'popular' or folk Islam (Munson 1993). The term 'Moroccan Islam' and its concomitant distinction between 'orthodox' and 'popular Islam' are still used in much anthropological literature as heuristic categories to describe the Moroccan religious landscape, as well as in nationalistic discourses on Islam, and in Moroccan daily life (Daadaoui 2011; Gellner 1969; Rachik 2009; Silverstein 2012: 350). This distinction is often described along the lines of class, ethnicity, and rural/ urban oppositions. In his studies on Muslims in Morocco, Ernest Gellner, for instance, associates popular Islam with the 'heterodox' religious practices of illiterate Muslims from the rural areas, while he relates the puritan scripturalist Islam to the urban literate bourgeoisie (Gelner 1969: 7-8). Muslim orthodoxy is embodied by religious scholars (*'ulama'*, sing. *'alim*), whereas Sufi-mysticism and saint veneration exemplify 'popular' Islam.

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[31] For more information about the adaptation of local customs to French juridical systems see Hoffman, 2010.

Clifford Geertz speaks against connecting differences between the rural, poor, and illiterate, versus the urban, literate elite to a distinction between 'popular' and 'orthodox:'

> Islam in Barbary[32] was – and to a fair extent still is – basically the Islam of saint worship and moral severity, magical power and aggressive piety, and this was for all practical purposes as true in the alleys of Fes and Marrakech as in the expanses of the Atlas or the Sahara (Geertz 1968: 8-9).

As this citation shows, Geertz rather emphasizes the interconnectedness, coexistence and mutual influence of rural and urban life in Morocco through processes of trade, pilgrimage, and migration and the impact it had on Islamic religiosity in Morocco.

Henry Munson also critically addresses the distinction between a popular and orthodox Islam. He points out that this distinction only emerged in the late 19th century with anti-colonial reformist calls for a return to the scriptures (1993: 83). According to him, a distinction between orthodox and popular Islam might indicate a tension within Islamic theology, but it does not cover its social manifestations in the daily lives of Muslims (ibid.). Likewise, Paul Silverstein argues that the distinction between orthodox and popular Islam is mainly an ideological categorization concealing a 'messy reality of shared religious beliefs and practice' (Silverstein 2012: 333).

It is not my intention here to completely negate a differentiation between popular religious forms and orthodoxy. However, I do want to emphasize that Islam as it is received, understood and practiced by Muslims, knows many variations and compromises with everyday life reality, which are hard to classify in an orthodox/ popular binary distinction. Yet, it is important to critically assess such categorizations and to study the larger ideological frames in which these distinctions are constructed, used and sustained. Moreover, Moroccans themselves, increasingly refer to a 'Moroccan Islam' and a distinction between *l'islam orthodoxe* and *l'islam populaire*, both in nationalistic discourses and in an everyday context. Therefore, it is valuable to address those elements which have historically been presented, and still are seen, as the distinctive features of 'Moroccan Islam:' Sufism, saint veneration, and Islamic scripturalism.

Sufism

Sufism is generally described as Islamic mysticism, which seeks a variety of spiritual experiences through religious practices aiming to reach closeness to

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[32] 'Barbary' was, according to Dale Eickelman, '[t]he standard colonial term for North Africa prior to and after the Islamic conquest' (Eickelman 1976: 23).

God (Bruinessen & Howell 2007; Langlois 2009; Schimmel 1975). The term denotes a highly diverse and complex assembly of monastic orders called *turuq* (sing. *tariqa*) that exist throughout the Muslim world. Each *tariqa* (literally 'path' or 'way') is characterized by different ideas and ways of veneration and holds its own claim to a line of spiritual masters going back to the Prophet. Sufi orders have a spiritual leader (alive or dead) called shaykh or *murshid* who provides guidance to the disciples of the order, known as *fuqara* (sing. *faqir*) or *murid* (meaning, 'striving one').[33] The shaykh is sometimes considered to be a protégé of God, and the disciples have an interdependent relationship with him (Hammoudi 1997; Zeghal 2008: xxiii). Adherents gather in a *zawiya* (pl. *zawaya*), a religious lodge or sanctuary where (sometimes) the shaykh resides, and that serves as a place for prayers and for those seeking to follow the mystic's pious path. It can also function as a retreat for a mystic and a free shelter for travelers (Belghazi 2006: 102). In a *zawiya*, disciples honor local saints, meet with the master, and participate in collective prayers, rituals and ceremonies 'necessary to progress in the stages of the mystic way' (Eickelman 1976: 24).

Turuq can differ greatly from each other in doctrinal matters and ritual practices. Some *turuq* have strong orthodox tendencies (like the Tijaniyya and Nasiriyya)[34] while others are more syncretistic and deal with the supernatural through various trance inducing rites, like the Hammadsha or the ʿIssawa brotherhoods (Crapanzano 1981). It has to be noted however that 'Sufism' is a contested term as it is a label mainly used by outsiders. Many so-called 'Sufis' rather identify themselves with the specific *tariqa* they belong to.

Saint veneration

The presence, belief in, and veneration of local saints called marabouts is what many authors have advanced as one of the central aspects of 'Moroccan Islam' (Eickelman 1976; Geertz 1969; Gellner 1968; Hammoudi 1997; Reysoo 1991).[35] The term marabout is a French remodeling of the Moroccan word *mrabet*.[36] It refers to persons and their direct kin, living or dead, who are considered to stand

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[33] The word *faqir* (sing, pl. *fuqara*) means, 'poor person,' or 'the poor.' This term was used to designate the disciples of a brotherhood, probably because they had to abandon their worldly lives and material possessions, and lived by contributions from the mother *zawiya* or from inhabitants of the region. See Bel (1938), and also Eickelman (1976).

[34] The Tijaniyya *tariqa* is a Sufi order with roots in Morocco and a large following in Western Africa. Shaykh Ahmed Tijani founded the order at the end of the 18th century, and is buried in Fes. His tomb is an object of large annual pilgrimages. See also Nazarena Lanza (2012). The Nasariyya *tariqa* is a Moroccan Sufi order founded in the 17th century with its center in Tamegrout in South-East Morocco. Both orders do not allow musical practices during specific rituals such as a specific trance called *hadra*.

[35] Maraboutism is not restricted to Morocco, but is known throughout North Africa (Eickelman 1976; Merad 1967: 58).

[36] *Mrabet* derives from the Classical Arabic word *murabit* meaning 'positioned,' 'stationed' or 'garrisoned' since the marabout resides in a *zawiya* or a *qubba* (dome-shaped shrine for a saint).

close to God, and act as intermediaries between Allah and the faithful. Marabouts naturally possess and are able to pass on *baraka*, divine grace or spiritual blessing that can be passed on to others permanently or temporarily, by descent or by contact (Driessen 1994: 98; Eickelman 1976: 26; Hammoudi 1997; Reysoo 1991: 46; Schuyler 1985: 114). According to Dale Eickelman: 'being a marabout can be based on a claimed descent from the Prophet, religious scholarship (*ʿilm*), mystic insight, and the possession of uncanny powers' (1976: 26). Marabouts could thus be Sufi shaykhs, local holy men, acclaimed descendents of the Prophet (called *shurafaʾ*, D. *shorfa*), or ordinary people renowned for their piety or remarkable deeds. Several, or all of these qualities could overlap in one person.

A complex of activities, rituals, practices, and beliefs are connected to maraboutism. Fenneke Reysoo (1991) describes the veneration of marabouts. After their death these saints become objects of worship. They are enshrined in white washed dome-shaped tombs called *qubba*, where people gather for the benefits of *baraka*. The tombs can become important centers for pilgrimage, called *ziyara*. Also annual festivals, called *mawasim* (sing. *mawsim*, D. *musim*), are held to celebrate and honor a local saint (Eickelman 1976: 7). These *mawasim* could last several days or even weeks. Deborah Kapchan notes that during these *mawasim* big markets were often held at the same time and place (2008: 470).

Maraboutism is also characterized by a patron-client relationship, where marabouts perform religious services for their clientele in exchange for protection (Eickelman 1976: 226; Hammoudi 1997; Schuyler 1985: 115; Waterbury 1970: 27). Such services could entail healing of illnesses or infertility, or resolving financial problems through the preparation of charms, and the exorcism of evil spirits. Next to their religious roles, marabouts held considerable political power. They often symbolized the unity of a region, city or tribe, headed or inspired different brotherhoods, acted as mediators in local disputes and tribal feuds, and spread the Islam of the sultan in the secluded territories outside the sultanate's central power, known as *bled al-sibah* (Schuyler 1985: 115; Waterbury 1970).

Scripturalism

The third main feature of 'Moroccan Islam' frequently brought forward, is Muslim scripturalism (the literal adherence to the Islamic scriptures) (Geertz 1968; Munson 1984; Gellner 1969). According to scripturalist interpretations 'true' Islam is unmediated, and can only be found in the holy Islamic scriptures (*hadith* and the Qurʾan). Scripturalist attitudes existed well before the advent of Islamic activist movements of the twentieth and twenty-first century. Throughout Moroccan history, scholars of Islam, sultans and intellectual elites have criticized practices related to Sufism and maraboutism, such as the veneration of saints, or the visiting of graves, as heretic innovations (*bidaʿ*) and charla-

tanism (Eickelman 1976). Henry Munson notes that there were already reformist tendencies in the 11th century during the Almoravid dynasty and in the 12th century during the Almohad dynasty (Munson 1993: 84). Munson (1993), Schuyler (1985), and Waterbury (1972) describe the rural 'low-level Qurʾanic scholars' or scribes who served as religious notables or scholars outside their own communities, also called *tolba*[37] in *darija*, (sing. *taleb*) or *fuqahaʾ* (sing. *faqih*, D. *fqih*), and wandered from one *zawiya* to the other. These *tolba* were a major force in the spread of orthodox Islam and the Arabic language throughout the region (Waterbury 1972). They often agitated against practices tied to Sufism such as saint veneration, dance and music, but were not against Sufism, as they were often part of a *zawiya* themselves.

At the turn of the 18th century, scripturalist perspectives emanated from the leading conservative Qarawiyin university in Fes. Munson mentions the 18th century Alawi Sultan Sidi Muhammad bin 'Abdallah and his son Mulay Sulayman as 'the forerunners of twentieth-century reformism (Munson 1984)' Both rulers advocated a strict application of Islamic law and called for an elimination of 'popular' Islamic practices such as saint veneration and Sufi practices that involved music, dancing, and the mixing of men and women (Munson 1993: 85). However, like the *tolba*, they never called for the abolition of the Sufi brotherhoods as such, since they often belonged to one themselves (ibid.).

The Salafiyya movement

Between the late 19th century and early 20th century, movements of Islamic revival and reform were introduced to Morocco by pilgrims returning from Mecca. They were influenced by the conservative Wahhabi doctrine dominating Saudi Arabia,[38] as well as by Moroccan intellectuals who during their studies in Egypt had become inspired by the reformist ideas of enlightened thinkers from the Al-Nahda period (Buitelaar 2009: 105; Zeghal 2008: 16).[39]

In the early 18th century, the Salafiyya movement emerged in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, and Syria, from where the body of thought spread to other parts of the Muslim world (Munson 1993: 97; Zeghal 2008: 15). This movement seeks

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[37] These *tolba* often combined these ideas with traditional practices of less orthodox character, such as preparation of charms, and controlling the spirit world with a variety of magical techniques (Schuyler 1985: 116).

[38] Founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Wahhabism is one of the most conservative currents in Islam which emerged in Saudi Arabia in the 16th century on the Arabian Peninsula and became powerful under its alliance with King Ibn Saud. Wahhabism calls for a return to the Prophetic tradition and rejects all additions to the practice of Islam that had been adopted after the Prophet's lifetime. Retrieved from: Oxford Islamic Studies online, url: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.proxy.ubn.ru.nl/article/opr/t243/e364?_hi=0&_pos=2#match, accessed 22 July 2013.

[39] The term Al-Nahda, meaning 'rebirth' or 'awakening' in Arabic refers to a cultural renaissance of Arabic literature and thought, often seen as a modernizing intellectual reform, which started in the late 19th and early 20th century in Egypt (Tomiche 2012).

to return to an Islam of the period of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, and the succeeding two generations of Muslims, referred to as *al-salaf al-salih*, 'the righteous ancestors.' Salafi-oriented Muslims look to these generations as models for conduct and worship. They also call for the direct reading of the texts of the Qurʾan and the Sunnah, and condemn practices connected to Sufism and maraboutism, such as the cult of saints, the visiting of graves and the intercession between humans and God, calling them 'heretical innovations' (*bidaʿ*), or idolatry (*shirk*), which is forbidden in the Qurʾan (Zeghal 2008: 15,16).

According to Jonathan Brown, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, (founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928), emanated from the same wave of Islamic reformism and revivalism as modern Salafism (2011: 5). Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafiyya movement are often interpreted as a response to the European colonial rule of Muslim countries (Schielke 2007). To resist the negative attitude towards Islam by the colonizers who predominantly saw Islam as an irrational and backward religion, Muslim intellectuals reformulated an 'authentic' and intellectual Islam to compete with European norms and values, as well as to serve as a moral guide for the development of an independent nation. The movement sought to purge Islam from 'heretical innovations,' associated with popular forms of Islam and with Western cultural influences (Munson 1993: 78). Yet, concepts stemming from the European intellectual traditions such as 'the nation,' 'progress,' or 'modernity' were employed in the reformulation of such an Islam (Schielke 2006: 114, 116). Both movements were thus inspired by Muslim scripturalism, as well as Western-inspired nationalism (Schielke 2006: 118).

The puritanical revivalist ideas resonated strongly among a small but influential group of Moroccan intellectuals and bourgeois elites, mostly from Fes, who had a religious education and opposed colonial intervention (Eickelman 1976: 195, 227; Geertz 1968: 65; Munson 1993: 79, 86; Zeghal 2005: 15).[40] John Waterbury noted that the French support of Sufism and syncretistic belief systems as well as the collaboration of Sufi brotherhoods and Amazigh tribes with the protectorate, reinforced the link between 'the purification of the Muslim community and the expulsion of the foreign intruder' (1970: 45). Consequently, like in other parts of the Muslim world, Salafism in Morocco instigated a reformist nationalist movement which voiced anti-colonial sentiments. Moreover, the national independence movement capitalized on Salafism because Islam was considered an essential component of the Moroccan identity.

The development of a nationalist independence movement strongly influenced by Islamic reformism also contributed to a further deepening of the

[40] Although small in number, they managed to wield considerable influence since they were based in influential religious centers and had close connections to the urban bourgeoisie (Eickelman 1976: 227).

ideologically imbued distinction between a pro-colonial 'popular' and a nationalist authentic 'orthodox Islam.' As Dale Eickelman notes: 'Salafi Muslims argued that the Qurʾan and the traditions of the Prophet were the only true bases of Islam, thus sharply distinguishing what they considered "true" Islam from the popular Sufism of (...) religious brotherhoods and of maraboutism' (1976: 227).

The theological debates evoked by the Salafiyya in Morocco were used by various political actors who highlighted Salafism according to their own agendas. The call to a return to the Prophetic tradition initially stirred the interest of an urban elite, but also received the support of the Islamic scholars (*ʿulama*) as well as the monarchy. In the 1930s they conveniently used the Salafi ideology to counter certain dissident *zawaya* and shaykhs on the one hand, while presenting themselves as nationalist actors on the other hand (Eickelman 1976: 157, 215; Zeghal 2008: 18). In the period before independence, the Salafiyya movement, the *ʿulama'*, the urban bourgeoisie, and the monarchy were thus all involved in the definition of a Moroccan, Muslim, and Arab nation (Zeghal 2008: 24).[41] In the post-independence period Sufism lost its popularity due to the collaboration with the French, Salafism became an official doctrine of the Moroccan state (Addi 2009: 331), which encouraged Islamic reformism, especially in the fight against the opposition of the socialist secular left, as we will see later on in this chapter and in Chapter Five.

Morocco's political landscape

The notion of 'Moroccan Islam' also appears in official state discourses about Islam. The Moroccan state and particularly the monarchy aspires to keep certain principles central to a conception of 'Moroccan Islam,' for instance being Sunni and not tolerating religious organizations that assign religious authority to a spiritual leader other than the King (Reysoo 1991: 43). Nevertheless, both official state discourses about Islam and the monarchy draw strongly from the symbolic repertoire of 'popular' Islam such as the mysticism of Sufism and maraboutism.

The monarchy

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the King is both the head of state and religious leader (Geertz 1968; Munson 1993; Waterbury 1970). This is the result of a long tradition of combining political and religious leadership in the person of the sultan since the Saʿdi dynasty (r.1554-1659). Since independence it resides in the King, who is assigned the title of *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful) (Driessen 1994: 96). The monarchy has successfully used the

[41] This nationalist movement became embodied by the Istiqlal party and its leader, Muhammad Allal al-Fasi, which led Morocco to independence (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 46).

paradigm of sainthood to legitimize and embody its religious and political power (ibid.). The major source of his religious legitimacy is his claimed genealogical descent of the Prophet. He belongs to the Alawite dynasty, which, since 1666, has ruled Morocco for almost four centuries, and whose members claim direct descent from the Prophet through the *shorfa* lineage (Buitelaar 2002; Driessen 1994; Eickelman 1976; Obdeijn et al. 2002). As the descendant of the Prophet, the King also possesses divine blessing, known as *baraka*. These elements together have elevated the monarch to a saint-like person.[42] It makes him the supreme leader of the country who is placed above the constitution, and legislative and executive power. The sacredness and inviolability of the King is secured in the constitution.[43] Through this construction, the monarchy has a historical monopoly over both the religious and the political domain, which puts Islam right at the centre of the political structure and state legitimacy. It is through the religious status of the King and the monarchy that political institutions are legitimized.

Makhzen

Anyone who wishing to understand the complexity of Moroccan state power and its entanglements with religion and the monarchy, will come across the term *makhzen*, a traditional patrimonial form of power tied to a complex socio-political system of alliances between elites, government officials, and royal advisers (Layachi 1998; Waterbury 1970). To understand the heterogeneous meanings of *makhzen* I will briefly take a closer look at its origins and historical development, as well as its contextual meanings and usage.

Makhzen is a historical term that can be traced back to well before the colonial period. The word *makhzen* originally means 'treasury' or 'warehouse' stemming from the Arabic root *khazana*, which means 'to store.' The term was connected to the 16th century institution where tax-revenues were collected before they were brought to the treasury of the *umma* (Daadaoui 2011: 42). Before the French protectorate, Morocco was divided into a centre-periphery structure, known as *bled al-makhzen* (D. land of government) and *bled al-siba* (D. land of dissent).[44] The *bled al-makhzen* was the politico-geographical area that fell under the authority of the sultan. The sultan's government consisted of an administrative and military apparatus dedicated to the collection of taxes in exchange for the protection of its allies (Waterbury 1970: 17). The way these taxes were collected

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[42] Geertz even speaks of the King as the chief-*marabout*, and of the monarchy as a maraboutic kingship (Geertz 1968: 75).

[43] Article 19 of the constitution represents the King as *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful) and until the Arab uprisings in 2011, article 23 of the constitution declared that 'the person of the King shall be sacred and inviolable.

[44] In Arabic, the term *bilad as-siba* means 'relinquished, free, abandoned country.'

is described by John Waterbury as a violent process of subduing dissident tribes to expand the power and wealth of the sultan (ibidem). The *bayʿa* (the swearing of allegiance to the sultan) determined the frontier between the military control and taxing powers of the sultan and the areas which refused to recognize the authority of the *bled al-makhzen* (ibid.: 19). The areas which fell outside the rule of central power were called *bled al-siba*, meaning 'loose country.'

The Sufi brotherhoods were instrumental in propagating the political and religious power of the sultan in these remote areas (Maghraoui 2009b: 198). Although the authority of the sultan was not recognized in the *bled al-siba*, his role as spiritual leader was represented through the numerous Sufi brotherhoods, who had established Sufi lodges in the tribal and rural areas of the mountains, the plains, and the Sahara. Through the Sufi brotherhoods, the sultanate was able to integrate pockets of the *bled al-sibah* into the authority of the *bled al-makhzen*. The Sufi orders, in return, benefited amply from the benevolence of the sultan, in exchange for their alliance (Daadaoui 2011: 49).

During the protectorate the French introduced a mode of colonial governance based on a British model (Burke III 2014: 109), while preserving the local political traditions of Morocco. Unlike other North African countries, Morocco was not a colony but a protectorate under French and Spanish rule. This meant that while it kept its sovereignty under the sultan, who remained on the throne, Morocco lost its independence all the same. During the protectorate, the French employed a dualistic model to govern the country. On the one hand, they left the local power structures intact to gain control over the country through local officials, such as *qa ̆ids*,[45] *pasha*s, and local elites, but also Amazigh tribes and Sufi brotherhoods, which exercised considerable control over the *bled al-siba*. On the other hand, the protectorate implemented a centralized state apparatus with a modern bureaucracy and administration. This resulted in a juxtaposition of two opposed systems which brought forth two circles of power, the traditional authoritarian system of the *makhzen* and the modern French style of governance with its administrative institutions (ibid.: 54-55). In this way, they succeeded in uniting the kingdom by integrating the *bled al-siba* and the *bled al-makhzen* under central rule, during a period which euphemistically is called the 'pacification' (1912-1936). Actually, this was a very violent period in which French officers led Moroccan troops across the land, subduing revolts (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 124, 127).

Since Morocco gained independence from the Spanish and French protectorate in 1956, the Moroccan political system has, next to the monarchy, a multi-party system with a parliament and a prime-minister. At the top stands

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[45] *Qa ̆id* is an Arabic word meaning 'commander.' In Morocco the term refers to tribal governors. See also Edmund Burke III (1977).

the monarchy whose symbolic power is represented by the King as the head of state and religious power (Hammoudi 1997: 13; Layachi 1998: 31). The informal and extensive traditional patrimonial power networks of the *makhzen* co-exist with the modern state institutions such as the parliament and the administration. The parliament and the people surrounding the King are largely based on clientelism, in which gifts, privileges and influential positions are given for political loyalty (Buitelaar 2006: 106; Hammoudi 1997; Layachi 1998: 30; Obdeijn et al. 2002: 161). The democratic level of the government is debatable, since it is appointed by the king 'who controls the course of political life and can exclude opposition parties at will through the use of force, ad hoc legal decisions, or fixing elections' (Zeghal 2008: 155). The government consists mostly of co-opted traditional parties and conservative political elites, which form the clientele of the monarchy and the backbone of the Moroccan state (Layachi 1998: 42; Waterbury 1970). Accordingly, the real power does not lie with the government but with the *makhzen*.

As a result oppositional groups can only exist and operate outside of the power center of the *makhzen* (Cohen & Jaïdi 2006). As Layachi has pointed out: 'The *makhzen* does not allow for the organization of autonomous entities within its political territory because that would erode its control over politics and social reproduction' (Layachi 1989: 31). The development of such oppositional groups and movements is even more limited since most of these groups prefer to seek, inherent to the maraboutic mechanism, 'closeness' to the power of the *makhzen* (Eickelman 1976). The long-standing tradition of incorporating enemies and their symbols into its power-center in order to strengthen the power of the monarchy, while weakening oppositional forces has, as we will see throughout this study, been able to adapt itself to the new realities of contemporary Morocco.

The tax collecting system dating back to the 12th century, generated a feudal social-political organization structure, composed of the army, bureaucracy, Islamic scholars, ruling elites, and Sufi brotherhoods. It maintained and expanded the authority of the sultan, and has grown into the current centralized form of authority, which combines traditional and modern forms of governance. The sultan, and now the King, tends to manipulate groups, people, and political parties, playing them off against each other, and creating alliances at the same time, in order to strengthen his own position (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 161).

The notion of *makhzen* is not only a form of power embedded in the historical and socio-political structures of Morocco, but it is also present in perceptions of individuals, and expressed in cultural narratives. It pervades social relations and cultural notions that covers various social-cultural meanings and popular connotations. In everyday life, *makhzen* is synonym with central power. When Moroccans mention the word *makhzen*, it may refer to the monarchy or a system of state bureaucracy. But a Moroccan citizen can also point to the Moroccan flag,

a picture of the King, a police officer, a state official, or a government-building and call these *makhzen*. But *makhzen* can also point to a political culture, a social establishment, and in a general sense to the apparatus of state violence, authority and domination (Munson 1993; Slyomovics 2005). *Makhzen* is thus a conception of power that pervades the entire Moroccan society, regulating political, and social relations, as well as cultural structures and narratives (Hammoudi 1997; Munson 1993: 145).

Islamic activist movements

Another important element in the political landscape of Morocco, that holds an ambivalent relation to the state is 'Islamism,' or as I will call it, Islamic (activist) movements. Islamic movements in Morocco have developed less substantially than in other countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Due to the religious claim of the monarchy and its concomitant domination over the political field, Islamic movements in Morocco did not play an oppositional role towards a secular state, as was the case in countries such as Algeria, Syria or Egypt (Wegner & Pellicer 2010: 26; Zeghal 2008: 160,161). Rather, they were either strategic allies or competitors of the monarchy over the definition of Islam and its role in Moroccan society and politics.

After independence, the Salafism which inspired the ideology of the nationalist movement and the ensuing Istiqlal party, was soon incorporated by the *makhzen*. In the 1960s, new Islamic activist groups and associations started to emerge, which were initially all supported by King Hassan II and his government. The support of Islamic movements by the Moroccan state was meant to reinforce the resistance against the growing popularity of secular leftist movements, which were considered the principal source of opposition to the monarchy at the time (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 171; Zeghal 2008: 61).[46] Albeit for different reasons, both the Islamic movements and the Moroccan state thus challenged the ideology of the secular left, which they considered 'hostile to Islam.' Under the influence of the Iranian revolution, Islamic movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s, started to disagree and compete more and more with the Moroccan state over the definition and place of Islam in the public sphere (Zeghal 2008: xiii; Munson 1993: 149). They criticized the pro-Western attitude of Hassan II and his support of 'American imperialism,' the Moroccan state corruption, and leftist revolutionary movements, and called for an Islamic revolution (Munson 1993: 159; Zeghal 2008: 73).

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[46] Howe notes that in his support of Islamic movements, Hassan II specifically sought an alliance with Saudi Arabia, and denounced Egyptian and Algerian Islamism, which was strongly based on socialist models and were hostile to the King's rulings (Howe 2005: 126).

To understand the role of Islamic movements in Morocco's contemporary political landscape, we will need to take a closer look at the historical development of the major Islamic movements of Morocco, which continue to play an important role in the contemporary political landscape of Morocco. I will begin to describe the emergence of the Shabiba Islamiyya (Islamic Youth) and then the Jamaʿat al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence Association/ JBA), in the period around the 1970s and 1980s.

Established in 1969, the Shabiba Islamiyya is considered the first Islamic movement in Morocco.[47] It is also the predecessor of the current Moroccan Islamic political party, the PJD (Party of Justice and Development) and the religious organization Al-Tawhid wal-Islah (Movement of Unity and Reform/ MUR), which forms PJD's social and religious backbone. In the 1970s, the Shabiba Islamiyya emerged as a jihadist social revolutionary movement, which drew from both the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideology of the Moroccan nationalist Salafiyya (Belal 2011: 116; Darif 2010: 35). Dissappointed by the Istiqlal movement, which after independence had allied itself with the monarchical state and was increasingly accused of clientelism and corruption, the Shabiba Islamiyya aimed to renew the idea of a pure Muslim society, which also had been popular among the nationalist movement near the end of the protectorate (Belal 2011: 111-112). The Shabiba Islamiyya, which was divided into a civil and a radical branch, sometimes violently fought the radicalized secular left in the early 1970s (Munson 1988: 340-42; Shahin 1995: 41-42). This struggle primarily took place at high schools (*lycées*) and university campuses. In 1975 its leader, Abdelkarim Muti, fled Morocco, because he had been sentenced to death for the murder of the leftist leader Omar Benjelloun. After the departure of Muti, the network of militant Islamic activists of the Shabiba Islamiyya broke up in off-shoots with less critical stances towards the Moroccan state and the palace (Munson 1993: 116; Zeghal 2008: 162).

The Jamaʿat al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan, one of today's most significant – but illegal – Moroccan Islamic activist organizations was established in 1987 by the charismatic leader Abdessalam Yassine. Unlike the legal Islamic political party, PJD, it does not participate in the political field because it refuses to acknowledge the religious legitimacy of the King. In contrast to the disapproval of Sufism by most 20th century Islamic reform movements, the ʿAdl wal-Ihsan frequently alludes to Sufism. The organization stresses political commitment as well as spiritual development and makes use of rituals, symbolic, and organizational structures

[47] This movement was established in 1969 but only officially authorized in 1972. In 1996, the movement changed its name to Al-Tawhid wal-Islah (Unity and Reform) and sought to create a legal political party, which under the name of Parti de la Justice et Developement (PJD) takes part in the national elections since 1998 (Zeghal 2008: 161, 174, 177-178), and since November 2011 it is the country's leading political party.

that are similar to those of a Sufi brotherhood (Zeghal 2008: 98,120,125).[48] There was a strong cult of veneration around the organization's leader who is approached as a spiritual guide, and referred to as shaykh or *murshid*.[49] The affinity with Sufism can be explained by the fact that Yassine had been a loyal supporter of the Butshishiyya Sufi brotherhood for more than six years (1965-1971). However, during his membership he became inspired by the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his views about Islam gradually became more political. He rejected Western culture and the contemporary dominant Islamic practices in Morocco, and called upon Muslims to return to 'true' Islam. He also exhorted his followers to develop and propagate a new oppositional form of Islam (Aksikas 2009: 96). This led to tension with the Sufi order. After the death of its leader shaykh Abbas, and unable to realize his political ideals within the confines of the *zawiya*, Yassine left the Sufi order in 1972 to further politicize his Sufi understanding and practice of Islam (Munson 1993: 163; Zeghal 2008: 88).

His ideas also put him at odds with the pro-Western regime of Hassan II. Yassine strongly opposed the religious claim of the monarchy and the Westernization of the Moroccan elites, and called for the establishment of an Islamic society free of Western influence, led by a ruler chosen by God (Munson 1993: 170). After the failed military coups of 1971 and 1972 against the monarchy, he wrote an open letter to Hassan II in 1974. In this letter he criticized authoritarian rule and the personal religiosity of the King. In response, Yassine was locked up in a psychiatric hospital for three and a half years (ibid.: 171). After his release in 1979, he started building an Islamic political organization, which he named the Usrat al-Jamaʿ (Family of the Group) in 1981 (Belal 2006: 167). Riding the wave of the Iranian revolution, the organization, popular with Moroccan youth, labourers, and students, started to deliver highly political speeches, frequently suppressed by the authorities. Despite its tense relationship with the Moroccan authorities, which continues until today,[50] the Usrat al-Jamaʿ successfully attracted further support, the greater part consisting of high school- and university students and educated unemployed (*chômeurs diplomés*). In 1987 it was renamed the Jamaʿat al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan (Munson 1993: 173).

Both the Jamaʿat al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan and the Shabiba Islamiyya, and its later offshoots (the PJD and Al-Tawhid wal-Islah) held a strong footing at high schools and universities, which were the principal places where they recruited their members and spread their ideologies (Darif 2010: 41). After independence, political organizations had made their way in the higher educational institutions

[48] Shaykh Yassine passed away on December 13th, 2012, at the age of 84 (Schemm 2012).

[49] *Murshid* is an Arabic word, meaning 'guide' or 'teacher.'

[50] In 1983, after he had written another letter, Yassine was jailed again for two years and later put under restriction. In 1990 the JBA was formally prohibited (Zeghal 2008: 120).

and offered facilities to students in exchange for their membership (Belal 2011: 114). In the 1970s, high schools and university campuses had become cradles for political debates, leading to frequent and sometimes violent clashes (Zeghal 2008: xi). In the 1970s, secular leftist movements were increasingly contained, while Islamic organizations emerged. First of all, in order to restrain the growing influence of leftist movements, the state suppressed student protests and banned large student associations. The national student union, the *Union nationale des étudiants marocains* (UNEM), which held close links to leftist movements,[51] was abolished in 1973 (Darif 2010: 41). As a result, political parties retreated from the university campuses. Secondly, departments for Islamic sciences and Arabic language studies were established by the Moroccan government, attracting many religiously oriented students. These events altogether led to a political vacuum at the university campuses, which was filled by Islamic activist groups (Zeghal 2008: 170).[52] From the 1980s onwards, these groups started to gain more influence and tried to impose their rules at campuses, such as the segregation of the sexes, the collective performance of prayer, and the blocking of artistic activities (Munson 1993:116; Zeghal 2008: 162).[53] By the 1990s, Islamic movements almost completely dominated the campuses and faculties of national universities.

In the 1990s, Islamic movements in Morocco established themselves further in society. Not only had they come to dominate the campuses and faculties of national universities, but they also started to crystallize into solid networks on community levels (Zeghal 2008: 128). These encompassed diverse settings and organizations, like universities and high schools, youth community houses (*dyur shabab*), scouting clubs, summer camps, as well as various associations where cultural and charitable activities were organized. Various Islamic NGO's and grassroots organizations were established, organizing meetings and activities aimed at providing all kinds of support for the poor. The social work they did filled the void of social services neglected by the Moroccan state, and provided the Islamic movements with much popularity. As a result of their popularity, the Moroccan political regime partially included Islamic movements into the

[51] Founded in 1956, the *Union nationale des étudiants marocains* was an acknowledged student union that stood up for the rights of students with a close connection to the USFP (*Union sociale des forces populaires*) (Bouzidi 2001; Zeghal 2008:162).

[52] Islamic activist groups seized control of the organizational structure of the UNEM, which despite its (second) ban in 1981, continued to stay in function informally. Their growing dominance on the university campuses resulted in some violent clashes with leftist student movements in the beginning of the 1990s. Eventually, Islamic activist students completely took over the organizational structure of the UNEM and continued to operate under its banner, despite its abolishment. This goes particularly for the members of the Al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan, who until today dominate the university campuses (Fieldnotes 25 November 2009; Bouzidi 2001).

[53] Especially the ʿAdl wal-Ihsan is known for imposing a militant response on the university's campuses against leftist groups.

political arena. The Islamic association Al-Tawhid wal-Islah succeeded in entering the electoral arena and became a legal political party under the name of the PJD in 2002 (Zeghal 2008: 157-158). Yassine's organization remained excluded from the political arena as it continued to refuse recognizing the religious status of the monarchy. The monarchy thus divided the oppositional Islamic parties, by means of exclusion and inclusion, as well as by '[a] strategy of segmenting [Islamic oppositional movements] between 'radicals' and 'moderates' (ibid.: 159).

Aesthetic expressions of religious and political power in Morocco

In this chapter I have laid out the intertwinement of Morocco's religious and political landscapes from a historical perspective. I have demonstrated that the fields of religious and political power in Morocco are complexly woven together. This entanglement finds expression and justification in various aesthetic representations and symbolic repertoires.

According to Henk Driessen, every political system knows a connection between power, symbol and ritual, where rituals are not merely a decoration of power, but *are* power (Driessen 1994: 93). His statement builds on Clifford Geertz's claim that a state is a ritual construction, which is instrumental in the symbolic construction and reproduction of power of a ruling elite and dominant ideologies (Geertz 1983). State rituals in Morocco are filled with symbolic vocabularies that visualize, objectify, legitimize, and naturalize power relations as well as affirm the ties between people and political power. Both the government and the monarchy use an elaborate idiom of rituals, prestigious ceremonies, and various cultural representations, that articulate the legitimacy of the political institutions of the Moroccan state (Driessen 1994: 97; Combs-Schilling 1999; Hammoudi 1997).

As state power in Morocco is legitimized in religious terms through the monarchy, the King as the commander of the faithful stands at the center of a symbolic idiom of ceremonies and rituals. On the one hand, we can distinguish ritual practices and cultural representations revolving around the monarchy and the King, such as the *bayʿa* (the annual ceremony in which members of parliament, high officials, and ministers express their allegiance to the King), the feast of the throne, the distribution of royal gifts, and the kissing of the hand of the King. On the other hand there are the public performances of Islamic rituals in which the King assumes a pivotal role and articulates his connection to the Prophet (by emphasizing his lineage to the Prophet and his title of *amir al-muʾminin*), such as the feast of sacrifice (*ʿid al-kabir*), the birthday of the Prophet (*ʿid al-mawlid*), or when the king chairs the first lecture of the holy month of Ramadan given by selected clerics and religious scholars. Such ritual performances intend to position the monarchy as the guardian and symbol of

both religious and political authority, in which the monarch is represented as the supreme representative of Islam and the symbol of the nation (Driessen 1994; Geertz 1983; Hammoudi 1997; Waterbury 1970).

The centrality of the monarchy in religious and political life is also expressed in contemporary idioms and popular modes of representation, such as the prestigious modernist building project of the Hassan II mosque in Casablanca (Combs-Schilling 1999; Driessen 1994: 97; Howe 2005: 51), as well as the elaborate and omnipresent personality cult of the King, which is continuously re-adapted to the spirit of the time. In public spaces all over the country, community centers, *téléboutiques*, café's, restaurants, and streets, pictures of the King, both Hassan II and Mohammed VI, are displayed (Benchemsi 2006). These pictures feature the king in various situations and costumes (drinking tea, praying, making phone-calls, surfing, posing in a swimsuit next to a pool, or standing on a jet ski) and accentuate his many qualities (Combs-Schilling 1999; Mulderig 2012; Munson 1993). Moreover, everything the King does in public is repeatedly covered on the government-controlled national television, radio and newspapers (Combs-Schilling 1989: 227; Munson 1993: 122).

The display of such cultural representations in the public sphere shows us how, as an instrument of legitimization, the *makhzen* is an influential factor in defining symbols and rituals of national unity and identity (Layachi 1989: 30). Within these ritual forms, music is an important means in which religious and political power can be manifested, mediated, and legitimized. Morocco's musical landscape and its relationship to political and religious power will be the topic of the next chapter.

3 Morocco's musical landscape

Introduction

In this chapter I will describe the diverse musical expressions of Morocco, relevant to this thesis, in relation to the historical, cultural, and political backgrounds against which these musical forms have developed. In the first part of this chapter I discuss and present the different musical genres into which various musical expressions have been categorized. In the second part I analyze how these musical forms have been used and shaped in a political context since the protectorate until under the current King, Mohammed VI, as well as how the recent profusion of state-run stages for musical performances is instrumental in the manifestation, legitimization, and reproduction of this power.

Musical categories and power relations

Morocco exhibits a large diversity of musical traditions, which have been spread and mixed over time and space. Various spheres of influence have been important for the development of these musical traditions. Because of the geographical position of the country, it has been subject to many different economic, cultural and political influences. With Europe to the north, Africa to the south, and the Middle East to the east, Morocco lies at the crossroads of several international trading routes. Over the centuries various populations and cultures have passed through or settled in Morocco. Moroccan music reflects the cultures and groups which have passed through the country, and echoes its present and past history and its social and political relations. The diversity and complexity of musical practices and traditions reflect this socio-cultural amalgam.

The wide diversity of musical traditions in Morocco has been described and classified into sets of musical genres and styles by scholars of music, anthropologists, ethnomusicologists, and local and colonial ethnographers (Aydoun 2014, 2009; Chottin 1939; Kapchan 2007; Lortat-Jacob 1994; Ragoug 2008; Schuyler 2000, 2002).[54] Different criteria have been used to classify this broad musical range in terms of music genres. However, these criteria for the classification of genres and subdivisions are often grounded in relations of power. Alexis Chottin (1939), a musicologist who published important work on music in Morocco under the auspices of the French protectorate's *Service des arts indigènes*, based his analysis of musical genres on a distinction between Amazigh and Arab music (Baldassarre 2003: 80). Yet, the distinction between Arab and Amazigh culture, as if they were two separate population groups living in one country, is in itself a problematic colonial construction (Crawford & Hoffman 2000; van Gemert 1998; Silverstein 2012). Ahmed Aydoun in turn describes the Moroccan musical practices within a larger division of 'artistic traditional music' and 'popular

[54] During the French Protectorate (1912-1956) French and other European scholars made an effort to document Morocco's musical traditions (Shannon 2007: 321).

music' (Aydoun 2014). This division however, which is also made by Mahmoud Guettat (1980), not only reflects colonial discourses but also reflects class differentiation. It is even more difficult to pin down a genre as 'religious' or 'secular.' Music addressing religious topics can hide erotic or political messages, and songs about wine or a woman's body can allude to a longing to merge with the divine. The highly diverse stances various groups in Moroccan society take towards Islam and music or towards specific musical genres make it even more complicated to identify genres.

As Martin Stokes has noted, musical genres are divisions which have an ideological function, and 'these divisions have to be seen in terms of the institutions and individuals who maintain them' (Stokes 1992: 4). This is certainly true for music in Morocco. Genre divisions do not only and naturally arise from musicological qualities, but from the meanings assigned to these qualities, like class distinction, regional identity, religion, nationalism, attributed social and moral values, tribal relationships, and differences between urban and rural cultures. In Morocco, these are all elements that affect the differentiation between and within musical genres and the ways local actors practice and assign meaning to them.

Musical typology

My interviewees frequently referred to various musical genres to describe their own musical practices and designate the practices of others. In their descriptions it became apparent that the boundaries between musical genres in Morocco are diffuse and overlap. They also consist of different subgroups and numerous variations in style depending on the region. I do not aim here to focus in detail on the entire range and sub-variations of each of these genres, but I want to give a concise and informative overview of the general traits of the musical genres that were mentioned by my interviewees in terms of their history, musical aspects, and style of performance, as well as the moral-religious and ideological connotations ascribed to them. In line with an anthropological approach, I will describe the genres mainly in terms of the categories mentioned by my interviewees. This will give insight in how they evaluate the music and associated values. The musical genres I will discuss are: *gnawa*, Andalusian music, *melhun*, *raï*, Sufi music, *shaʿbi* and *sharqi* (Oriental music), Amazigh music, and *anashid*.

Gnawa music

Gnawa music is powerful trance music of the Gnawa population, which is commonly connected to the descendants of African slaves captured by the Arabs during the 17th century in Guinea, Mali, and Sudan and brought across the Sahara by trade and to serve the sultans in Morocco (Aydoun 2014; Fuson 2009; Jankowsky 2010; Kapchan 2007; Witulski 2009). Though many of the influ-

ences that formed this music can be traced to sub-Saharan West-Africa, its traditional practice is concentrated in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (Jankowsky 2010).[55] The well-preserved heritage of the Gnawa combines African Islamic spiritual religious songs, rhythms, ritual poetry, music and dancing. Instruments typically connected to *gnawa* music are the double-headed drum called *tbal*, a low base, three-stringed rectangular lute with a hollowed out wooden body, with a camel skin membrane attached to the front, and a round unspiked long neck, called *guenbri* (D. *gimbri* or *hajhuj*), and metal castanets called *qraqeb* in *darija* (Witulski 2009: 53). *Gnawa* music is traditionally played at ritual ceremonies involving trance, ecstatic dance and spirit possession, which personify supernatural entities but also Muslim saints. These ritual ceremonies are called *lila*s (D. nights), which are communal nights of celebration, dedicated to prayer and healing, and guided by a Gnawa *maʿlem* (D. master musician/teacher) and his group of musicians and dancers. The music played at these ceremonies is intended to induce a state of trance (called *jedba* D.), to evoke and identify spirits (*jnun*), to exorcize demons, and to heal the possessed (Kapchan 2007). Regarding the moral-religious connotations of this music genre Witulski notes that 'religious debates surrounding the groups centers on the nature of these spirits. This theological concern, along with the introduction of sub-Saharan ritual and song, has excluded the group from "acceptable" Islamic practice' (Witulski 2009: 7). Since the 1960s *gnaw*a music has become increasingly popular among Moroccan and international audiences, and Gnawa musicians perform worldwide with performers of Western music genres (Claisse 2003; Fuson 2009; Kapchan 2007; Witulski 2009). Since 1999 there is an annual international music festival for *gnawa* music held in the port town of Essaouira, which has largely contributed to the international fame of this music genre (Boubia 2008; Howe 2005; Kapchan 2007; Witulski 2009).

Andalusian music

Andalusian music has its roots in the courtly poetic and musical traditions of medieval Islamic Spain known throughout the Maghreb. The name refers to *al-Andalus*, the Arabic name for the Iberian Peninsula through the 8th-15th

[55] In *gnawa* music, West African rhythms, lyrics and harmonies are clearly discernible.This trance music also occurs in similar forms in Algeria (where it is called *bussaʿdiya*), and in Tunisia (under the name of *stambeli*). See also Jankowsky (2010).

centuries, when it was dominated by Muslims (Obdeijn et al. 2002: 436).[56] In Morocco, the music is also known as *al-musiqa al-andalusiyya* or *al-ala*, (literally meaning 'instrument') (Aydoun 2014: 24).[57] It is valued as part of a larger Andalusian heritage, including poetry, literature, and architecture, which came with the refugees after the Reconquista of Spain in 1492 (Aydoun 2014; Guettat 1980: 441; Shannon 2007: 321). This heritage features strongly in the collective historical memory of a glorious Islamic past many Moroccans have.

In Andalusian music, voice and instruments play an equally important role. The typical Andalusian orchestra uses different chord instruments such as *rabab* (fiddle), *'ud* (lute), *kamenja* (European-style violin played vertically), *qanun* (zither), but also percussion instruments like *darabuka* (goblet-shaped drum), and *ta'rija* (tambourine) are used. The words are mostly sung in Classical Arabic. The lyrics are drawn from medieval Andalusian poetry, called *muwashshahat* (pl.). In Morocco, Andalusian singers and musicians are traditionally men, who perform the music while dressed in official Moroccan costume (Fes hat, white *jellaba* and white or yellow pointy leather shoes called *babush*s (D. *babouche*s).

Although commercially the position of Andalusian music is marginal, the music enjoys a high social status among the higher conservative classes, is considered appropriate music to listen to, and is officially propagated and sponsored by the Ministry of Culture and communication. *Al-ala* has the status of national art music and is typically associated with national cultural heritage (*turath*), the monarchy, and aristocratic ancestry. The music is often performed on state occasions, on national radio and television, at state festivities in the royal palace, at family celebrations of the bourgeoisie, and festivals dedicated to the musical genre (Shannon 2007: 329; Schuyler 2002).

Melhun

A second Moroccan musical genre which stems from the Arabo-Andalusian heritage, although less prestigious than *al-ala*, is *melhun* (D.) (Aydoun 2014; Schuyler 2002). *Melhun* is a kind of popular religious music and an old form of dialect sung poetry whose origins lie in the Tafilalt-region in south-eastern

[56] For 500 years, the Moors ruled the region known as Andalusia - a melting pot of Spanish, Amazigh, Arab, and Jewish influences. After the recapturing of Islamic Spain by the Spanish (Reconquista) in 1492, when the Arabs were driven out of Spain during the 16th century, many Muslims fled to Northern Africa. The music was dispersed across Morocco, especially in the cities where the Hispanic-Andalusian refugees settled after they had fled from Spain. The music was played at the courts of the Moroccan aristocracy such as in the cities of Meknes, Fes, Rabat, Salé, Tanger, Tétouan, Oujda, and Chefchaouen, where it has developed until today and where the most famous orchestras can still be found (Shannon 2007: 311, 321).

[57] Ahmed Aydoun addresses the different terms of *musiqa andalusiyya* and *al-ala maghribiyya*. He notes that *al-ala* was used in opposition to *sama'* (Sufi poetry performed without instruments). *Al-ala* refers to singing accompanied by instruments while *sama'* refers to singing without instruments (Aydoun 2014: 26). He also refers to Mohamed El Fassi who commented that the term *musiqa andalusiyya* does not do justice to the specific Moroccan contribution to the development of the music genre (ibid.:n8).

Morocco, an area on the edge of the desert (Schuyler 2002: 799).[58] This sung poetry has evolved into a musical tradition using the same modes and instruments as *al-ala*. In contrast to Andalusian music, *melhun* is sung in ancient Moroccan dialect and sometimes in Tamazight. Its themes address all aspects of life, both spiritual and profane. Sometimes it uses evocative language and is very rich in metaphors which gives the lyrics highly ambiguous meanings. Among the themes addressed in *melhun*, we find mystical poetry composed by Sufi men evoking the desire to fuse with a divine essence, but also songs of love, erotic love, nature, morals, alcohol and politics. Each theme can be a possible metaphor for the other. The central instrument in *melhun* is the violin performed in a wide variety of contexts, such as at religious celebrations, or weddings, and in the royal palace. It is also taught in the Moroccan music schools. Whereas Andalusian music is associated with the higher classes of Morocco, *melhun* is listened to by the elite and the working class alike. Its performers and composers come from different social classes (Schuyler 2002: 799-801).

Raï

A popular form of modern music in Morocco is *ray* (D. *raï*). Based on Bedouin folk music and Arab love poetry, *raï* emerged in early 20th century urban Algeria (Oran). From then onwards it developed in the 1950s and 1960s initially as local protest music against the declining economic situation of Algeria as well as the rigid morality. Later, the influence of North-African immigrants in Europe, and the influence of 'world' music, led to international success of the genre (Frith 2007; Gazzah 2008; Howe 2005: 190; Schade-Poulsen 1999; Stokes 2003). *Raï* music attracted many followers in Morocco in the 1990s after the assassination of the famous Algerian *raï* singer Cheb Hasni in 1994 (Langlois 1996; Wilford 2012). Since then, *raï* has blossomed in Morocco. *Raï* music uses vivid dance rhythms and a combination of electric (synthesizers) and traditional instruments. The singers are predominantly men, and the songs are sung in local vernacular. Because of its controversial topics (social criticism, sexuality, emigration, and the glorification of drugs and alcohol), the use of bad language, and the performance settings with which *raï* music is associated, such as 'cabaret' night-clubs (synonym for brothels in the public imagination), the music is generally considered provocative and amoral, and associated with Westernization. The music is also frequently played in wedding celebrations and open-air concerts. Despite the popularity of the music genre, it is unlikely people would publicly acknowledge they like to listen to *raï* music, because of its association with immorality.

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[58] The Tafilalt region is home to both Amazigh and Arab groups, and to the ruling ʿAlawi dynasty (Schuyler 2002: 496).

Shaʿbi

Shaʿbi in Arabic means 'popular' or 'of the people.' In a musical context the term refers to a combination of rural and urban festive folk music, which is one of the most widespread popular music genres of the country. Mohammed Aydoun describes Moroccan *shaʿbi* music as a popular urban folk genre, with strong dance rhythms and 'little intellectual lyrics,' revolving around a festive and convivial atmosphere of dance, singing and being together with friends and family (Aydoun 2014: 141-142; Gazzah 2008: 89).

Shaʿbi music has its roots in the *ʿayta*. The *ʿayta* is a rural music genre of sung poetry from the Moroccan Atlantic plains and originated in the 12th century (Ciucci 2012). The word *ʿayta* is a derivation of the verb *ʿayyat*, which in Moroccan vernacular means 'to scream or to call' (Aydoun 2014; Ciucci 2012). The *ʿayta* is a kind of lament, in which the singer invokes God and the saints, his or her parents, lover or other actors and entities. The traditional themes of the *ʿayta* are love, pleasure and beauty, but it could also be used to address politics or personal struggles in life.

Like *raï*, *shaʿbi* evolved in the 1980s, with the advent of audio cassettes, into a popular form of modern music, using traditional as well as electric instrumentation. The music is performed by both men and women. The musical genre has developed mainly in the cities, but is also influenced by rural and Amazigh elements. It is a music genre that is typically associated with the poorer working classes. With the development of the market of audio cassettes and music shows on television, new musicians and singers emerged in the Moroccan music scene. Famous Moroccan *shaʿbi* singers are Najat ʿAtabou, Abdelʿaziz Stati, and Abdallah Daouidi.

Like *raï*, *shaʿbi* music is often criticized by more conservative segments of Moroccan society, because of the central role of dancing, and the (sometimes) accompanying sexually charged dance performance by female dancers and singers called *shikhat* (D.). But also because of the contexts in which the music is played, like bars where alcohol is served and mixed dancing takes place, and sometimes prostitution occurs (Ciucci 2012; Gazzah 2008; Soum-Pouyalet 2007).

Amazigh music

Music from the various Tamazight speaking inhabitants in Morocco exhibits many styles, forms, and practices, both traditional and contemporary. This wide range of musical variations reflects the diverse cultures, languages, and social structures of the Amazigh populations in Morocco, which vary from region to region, and from tribe to tribe. However, there are a couple of general characteristics that these musical practices have in common. Traditionally, Amazigh music is linked to poetry and dance and is performed with the participation of the

entire community on various occasions during the year such as at weddings, religious ceremonies and rituals, and agricultural festivities. It is performed, especially in coincidence with the agricultural and religious calendars (Boum 2007: 226). The two best known forms of such communal celebrations are *ahidus* and *ahwash* which are performed outdoors. [59] Their basic pattern is that of a circle or lines consisting of alternating men and women singing repetitive couplets accompanied by drums (Belghazi 2006: 101). The themes addressed are religion, social criticism, social relations, and nature (Rovsing Olsen 2002).

Because of the ancient origins of the Amazigh populations in Morocco, many Moroccan musical genres traditionally have Amazigh roots, like *shaʿbi*, the *ʿayta*, and *melhun*. In the post-independence era, Amazigh music has often been promoted by the Ministry of Culture as folklore which resulted in a proliferation of professional *ahidus* groups and traditional singers (Boum 2007). The emergence of Amazigh activism in the 1960s, the emergence of world music, and the emigration of Amazigh speaking people to Europe made Amazigh pop musicians like Mohamed Rouicha, Saghru Band, Mellal, Lounes Matoub, Idir, and many others, internationally popular. Amazigh music is generally accepted as part of Moroccan traditional heritage, although the presence of pre-Islamic rituals and mixed dancing is sometimes denounced by Islamic conservative groups in Moroccan society.

Sufi music

As we will see throughout this dissertation musical practices stemming from the Sufi brotherhoods have formed an important basis for many historical and current Moroccan music styles. Within Sufism, sonic practices form one of the ritual techniques, employed by disciples to induce a state of trance (*hal*),[60] with the purpose to reach closeness to God, or invoke the presence of God, the Prophet, the angels, and sometimes saints and spirits (Crapanzano 1981). This marks the climax of the ceremony. Depending on the brotherhood, the ritual sonic practices can consist of chants, hymns, and recitations which frequently accompany bodily practices such as rhythmical controlled breathing, and coordinated movements. Some orders also use a system of symbols, colors, smells, ritual actions, powerful words, prayers and magic (and sometimes even alcohol

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[59] *Ahidus* and *ahwash* refer to the two types of collective dances of different regional Amazigh tribes which includes, rhythmical dances, poetry, and music. These dances are performed to celebrate communal events and exhibit a complex and rich symbolic system referring to territory, lineage, cosmology, relation to natural elements, love, legends etc. (Aydoun 2009: 82-83).

[60] *Hal* (pl. *ahwal*) in Moroccan Arabic means 'state' or 'condition.' Within Sufism *al-hal* refers to a transcendent state originating from God, which is attained during *dhikr* sessions and brings divine blessing to its bearer (Kapchan 2007: 26, 42; Dominguez Diaz 2010: 273). There are different kinds of states (*ahwal*), which can be experienced, each with their own specific name and emotional and sensory effects.

or drugs) to evoke a state of trance and activate the divine presence (*hadra*).[61] In conservative Sufi orders no instruments are used, other orders employ a range of instrumentation. Such musical practices serve to reach closeness to God.

One of the most important ritual sonic practice of brotherhoods is a special liturgy called *dhikr*. *Dhikr*, literally meaning 'remembrance,' is the recitation of the 99 names of Allah. It is regarded by Sufis as the primary means of engagement with the spiritual realm, and fundamental to religious life (Waugh 2005: 6). Next to recitation, a *dhikr* ceremony can include chants, dance, burning of incense, meditation, exclamations of blessings, ecstasy, and trance, but in no case melodic instruments are allowed. A second central Sufi musical ritual is the singing of and listening to *samaʿ*. *Samaʿ* is religious poetry composed by Sufi saints that can be sung individually or collectively, with or without musical instruments. The term *samaʿ* is derived from the Arabic verb *samiʿa*, which means 'to listen,' and in a Sufi context refers to a specific kind of spiritual, attentive listening, which 'is active and transformative' (Kapchan 2007: 43). *Samaʿ* can be performed with melodic instruments, rhythms, and musical harmony structures.

The confines of a *zawiya* or a mosque are generally considered to be the most appropriate place to release the full powers of *samaʿ* or *dhikr*. But the ritual sonic practices can also be performed outside the Sufi lodge, like in exorcism rituals, healing and therapeutic rituals, weddings, births, circumcisions, and in public celebrations like religious festivals, processions, or pilgrimages. There are specific Sufi orders which use their music in therapeutic sessions and exorcism rituals and are known to occur in the public appearances, such as the Hammadsha, Gnawa[62] and ʿIssawa congregations (Kapchan 2007; Crapanzano 1981).

The popularity of Sufi music among Moroccan audiences has varied greatly throughout the last century. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the post-independence era, the popularity of Sufi orders declined significantly, due to accusations of collaboration with the French during the protectorate, and the emergence of Islamic reformist movements in Morocco. Sufi music regained popularity in the 1980s, reaching a completely different audience on the newly emerging stages for world music. Over the last decade Sufism and Sufi music have undergone a national revival, mostly because of the cultural and religious reforms of Mohammed VI, which will be addressed later on in this chapter and in Chapter Three and Four.

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[61] *Hadra* in Moroccan Arabic means 'presence.' *Hadra* is a specific kind of ecstatic trance which evokes the presence of God (Kapchan 2007: 42). Ritual musical practices or repeated gestures can bring about such a state of spiritual communion with God (ibid., 63).

[62] The Gnawa are not Sufi, although they have a *zawiya*, and hold similar practices (Kapchan 2007).

Sharqi

Another important musical genre is *sharqi* or Middle Eastern music. In Arabic *sharqi* means 'Eastern,' or 'from the East.' When people in Morocco mention *sharqi*, they generally refer to music from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. The term *sharqi* covers a very broad range of various types of music from a wide geographical area, and is therefore hard to pin down, as different countries and regions in the Middle East use different rhythms and musical styles.

Surprisingly little has been written on the genre. Miriam Gazzah, in her study of Moroccan music and identity among Dutch-Moroccan youngsters, briefly addresses the musical genre (2008: 95-96). She makes a useful distinction between 'popular' and 'classical' *sharqi*, which I will use here as well. Both classical *sharqi* and popular *sharqi* draw from traditional folk rhythmic musical styles that are used to accompany Oriental dance (*raqs sharqi*). Classical *sharqi* predominantly refers to orchestra music, which emerged at the beginning of the 20th century under the influence of the upcoming Egyptian film industry and British colonialism. This classical *sharqi* builds both on various Oriental musical genres such as the *muwashshah*, and the *baladi* (Egyptian folk music), as well as on European musical forms. The music is played at concert halls with grand orchestras and large audiences. Instruments typically used in the orchestras are string instruments like the *qanun* (a large zither), the *'ud* (a pear-shaped stringed instrument similar to a lute), violins, cellos, but also wind instruments such as the *nay* (flute), and various percussion instruments. The performances are lengthy and can last hours. Orchestra members typically wear dark-colored suits and ties and accompany a male or female solo vocalist. The music is based on *maqam* (a system of melodic modes used in traditional Arab music). Topics addressed can be romantic love, political and social issues, or spiritual themes. Famous performers are Farid al-Atrach, Abdel Halim Hafez, Fairuz, Umm Kalthum, Mohamed Abdelwaheb and Sabah Fakhri. Classical *sharqi* is also known as classical Arab music or *tarab* (Danielson 1997; Racy 2003). Although performers of classical *sharqi* come from different countries, Egypt is considered the mother of classical Arab music. Aired through national radio broadcasts, it became a symbol of Pan-Arab nationalism in Morocco in the 1950s and 1960s, as in other countries in the Middle East. Just like Andalusian music, in Morocco classical *sharqi* is considered high art from a superior era of Arab culture, which can be seen as an equivalent of Western European classical music. From the 1970s onwards, tapes of classical *sharqi* artists were brought in from the Middle East to Morocco, and the music gained even more popularity in the country.

Popular *sharqi* music developed in the 1980s using Westernized music formats, electric instruments, and music videos to appeal to younger generations. It can be seen as the 'pop music of the Middle East' (Gazzah 2008: 96).

Popular *sharqi* music, like classical *sharqi* music, draws on folkloric music, but was probably developed through its use in night clubs, where the music was performed to accompany belly dancing (Van Nieuwkerk 1995). The music combines Western pop-melodies and rhythms with elements of different Arab regional styles. The instruments used consist largely of guitar, base, synthesizers, drum computers, and other electronic instruments. Song themes generally focus on romantic topics, such as longing, melancholy, and love.

Popular *sharqi* is much in demand among young audiences in Morocco. The music and videos are diffused through satellite TV channels and some artists perform at international festivals organized in Morocco. The artists, lyrics, and video clips are often subject of controversy, as these are in particular considered sexually provocative and at odds with Islamic morals. Female artists are criticized for their provocative dancing moves and scantily dressed appearances.

Anashid

Another musical genre coming from the Orient that has significantly influenced the Moroccan musical landscape is *anashid*. *Anashid* is a longstanding vocal tradition that is widespread throughout the Muslim world. *Anashid* has shared roots with Sufi musical practices. The word *anashid*, which is the plural form of the Arabic word *inshad* or *unshuda*,[63] refers to the raising of one's voice (Barendregt 2011b: 235), and can loosely be translated as 'chanting' or 'reciting' of poetry with or without instrumental accompaniment. The genre traditionally consists only of percussion and voice, without musical instruments, and typically addresses Islamic beliefs, but it can also reflect worldly issues. *Anashid* are sometimes compared to hymns or psalms recited in churches (Razzaqi 2011: 272).

Anashid performers can work both solo and in groups. There are professional as well as amateur groups, though the criteria seem to be debatable. The groups are called *majmuʿa* (D. *mujmuʿa*) or *fraqi* and the singers are called *munshidin* (plur.) or, in the case of women, *munshidat* (plur.). These groups generally consist of four to seven persons. They normally use amplified sound systems, and predominantly wear dark-colored suits and matching ties, or in the case of women, matching costumes and *hijab*s.[64] A typical musical performance features a *munshid* assisted by a small or larger chorus. The chorus sings in unison and accompanies the *munshid*. Players of instruments often double as a choir.

Over the last thirty years the genre, thanks to new communication technologies and media, has experienced adjustments and modifications notably on the

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[63] Although *anashid* is the plural form of *inshad*, I will here use *anashid* as a singular form, as in this context the term refers to a musical genre.

[64] *Hijab* is the Muslim practice of covering the head, neck and chest mostly by women.

level of music, lyrics, but also on the level of settings and performance. The genre now covers a wide variety of musical styles and is also performed with instrumental arrangements. Under the influence of some solo performers *anashid* reached enormous popularity throughout the Muslim world. Performers such as Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens), Maher Zain and Sami Yusuf, but also Asian *anashid* bands, have brought Islamic music into the mainstream commercial music market (Barendregt 2008, 2011a, 2011b). Nowadays, *anashid* has become an overarching term for a wide variety of musical styles, instruments, and rhythms propagating Islamic virtues.

Various types of *anashid* have reached popularity in Morocco among a pious young audience and conservative and Islamic activist segments. Although, *anashid* is much in demand, public performance of *anashid* in public venues and festivals is rare in Morocco, because of its association with 'political Islam.' As a result, most *anashid* groups in Morocco perform in domestic settings during celebrations such as weddings, circumcisions, or birth parties. Some successful Moroccan *anashid* performers have developed their careers outside Morocco, for instance in Algeria, Turkey, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The music is considered Islamically appropriate and suitable for children to learn about music and Muslim values. Musically the genre is not much appreciated in the national media, despite efforts of *anashid* vocalists to promote Islamic music and artists. In contrast to Andalusian music or other musical genres considered fundamental to the Moroccan heritage (*turath*), *anashid* are not credited with artistic importance. They are considered un-Moroccan and as deriving from the Middle East and the Gulf. Nevertheless, some Moroccan *anashid* performers did manage to gain a broad fan base, and some singers have even reached (international) celebrity status. I will return to this genre in Chapter Five.

Globalized or fusion music

As I have stated at the beginning of this section, it is difficult to distinguish musical genres as autonomous entities. Each genre exhibits a great internal variety and can overlap with other genres. The description I have just given, thus remains tentative. The mutual influence of genres is all the more demonstrated by the recent developments the Moroccan musical landscape has experienced in response to globalization. Global flows and transnational connections have resulted in the blending of cultural productions in images, films, texts, language use, fashion, music, and media from different cultural worlds. Through transnational networks between Moroccan migrant communities and their homeland, modern means of communication (such as cassettes, radio, transnational satellite channels, and the internet) Moroccans have been introduced to new music styles, (both from the West and the Orient) as well as electric instruments

and modern techniques of sound engineering. This has resulted in new modes of connecting, sharing, expressing, and disseminating music.

This transnational exchange of culture, information, and commodities interacts with local contexts and has also been incorporated in Moroccan music. Accordingly many Moroccan musical sounds have been mixed with *sharqi* rhythms or hip-hop beats, which has led to hybrid music forms, also referred to with the French term *fusion*. The ways in which this takes place will be addressed further below.

Music and cultural politics in (post-) colonial Morocco

In order to understand the categorization of music in Morocco in its historical, cultural, and political contexts we need to take into consideration the country's colonial and post-colonial cultural politics. Both colonization and decolonization had a major influence on musical expressions in Morocco and clarify the categorizations made by my interlocutors today.

The French protectorate not only affected the political structure of Morocco but also influenced its cultural and artistic expressions. During the protectorate France and Spain acted as 'protectors' of Morocco to make sure the Moroccans would make a safe transition towards modernity without losing 'their traditional authenticity and culture' (Amine & Carlson 2012; Eickelman 2002: 331; Nicholas 2014). General Lyautey, the protectorate's first Resident-General, was an ardent admirer of Moroccan local traditions and cultural expressions. He employed a specific cultural strategy as part of the French 'native policy.' In contrast to the French assimilation approach in the neighboring colony of Algeria, and which practically destroyed the cultural heritage, this policy aimed at the preservation and revitalization of Morocco's indigenous arts and crafts. As part of the 'native policy,' the cultural strategy presented France as the savior of a pristine culture unable to value and maintain its own heritage while facing modernization. This affected, for instance, the city planning in which the *medina*s (D.), the ancient walled cities, were not destroyed but kept intact, while next to them new cities along French infrastructural models (*villes nouvelles*) were built (Eickelman 2002).

The protectorate's administration created and stimulated an industry for traditional Moroccan crafts and arts. In museums and art-schools local crafts were collected, reproduced, and displayed, sometimes even together with their makers, often in modified designs adopted to European taste (Girard 2006; Nicholas 2014). With respect to music, officers of the *Services des arts indigènes* started inquiries, and a laboratory of Moroccan music was created. Descriptions of musical practices of Morocco focused primarily on ethnic differences. This matched the political interests of the protectorate, which tried to keep Amazigh and Arab populations apart culturally (Girard 2006; Baldassarre 2003: 80). Concerts of Moroccan folk music and dance were organized regularly, and the

music was recorded on gramophone records and broadcasted along with European music (Baldassare 2003: 80).

Next to the stimulation of artistic practices as folklore and artisanal tradition by the French and Moroccan elites, European formats of artistic expressions like easel painting, theatre and opera, were introduced to Morocco (Irbouh 2005; ter Laan 2003: 28). Khalid Amine and Marvin Carlson note how European style theatres and concert halls were introduced in the *villes nouvelles* for the French colonial residents, and how through the French schooling system, and artistic salons, French culture and taste were promulgated (2012: 82-83).

Moreover, while some artistic expressions were encouraged, others were not, such as the *ʿayta*, and the songs and dances of the *shikhat*, which were regarded as immoral by the French and relegated to bars and cafés (Chottin 1939; Ciucci 2012; Soum-Pouyalet 2007). Also local forms of comical theatre like the *bsat* (D.)[65] and the *halqa* (D.)[66] tradition in Morocco were, unlike folklore, replaced by French theatrical forms, and from 1944 even entirely forbidden (Amine & Carlson 2012: 112), since they were seen as a potential platform for shaping public opinion, and resisting colonial intervention (ibid.: 82-83).[67]

The encouragement of certain cultural practices to the detriment of others has led to the degradation of some artistic expressions like specific musical genres, dances, and theater forms that were considered indecent or politically dangerous. What is more, colonial France's 'protection' of Moroccan culture and religion led to a segregation between the French and Moroccan communities. The preservation of the *medinas* and construction of French towns next to them, kept Moroccans in a separate cultural, social, and religious space, leading to segregated French and Moroccan worlds.

The period right after independence was characterized by a search for national identity. After the French protectorate (1912-1956), Morocco sought an alliance with the Arab world and an Arabo-Islamic nationalist ideology expanded. This ideology was voiced and propagated as part of the Moroccan national identity by the nationalist independence party, the Istiqlal. The articulation of a unified Islamic Arabic identity of the new Moroccan nation was reflected in the implementation of postcolonial cultural policies, which served the protection and consolidation of a national cultural identity (Baldassare 2003: 83). These policies were implemented by an administrative department, part of the Ministry of

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[65] *Bsat* is a traditional form of Moroccan folk theatre in which different troupes would present concerns to the sultan, using archetypal characters (Amine 2009; Chakravarty Box 2005; El-Khairat 2013).

[66] A *helqa* (meaning 'circle' in *darija*), is a form of traditional Moroccan theatre where spectators form a circle around the performer(s) in a public space and sometimes participate in the event (Amine 2009; Chakravarty Box 2005: 31).

[67] Amine & Carlson here note that especially the theatres and poetry performances led by Allal al-Fassi were prohibited (2012: 82-83).

Internal Affairs, which was founded in 1968.[68] This department conducted research and occasionally organized concerts and cultural events, and sometimes festivals (Touzani 2003: 24).[69] These activities propagated the ideas of the founding members of Moroccan nationalism, who encouraged Arab-Muslim culture and sidestepped popular local cultural expressions (especially coming from Amazigh culture and Sufism), and Western influences, which were favored during the protectorate (Baldassare 2003: 84). Musically, a movement building on the idealized Arabo-Andalusian heritage can be identified through the official propagation of *melhun* and Andalusian music (Shannon 2007; Baldassare 2003: 84). These music styles, using the classical Arabic language and retaining a conventional music style became symbols of the national musical heritage and were preserved in the National Music Conservatory (Baldassare 2003: 83). Second, there were patriotic songs (*ughniyya wataniyya*) (Boum 2013: 166). These songs, which were learned at school, dominated national ceremonies and official celebrations (Boum 2012: 22-23). Thirdly, the political orientation towards Egypt and the Arab world in general was reflected in the broadcasting of Egyptian artists such as Umm Kalthum, Muhammad Abdelwahab, and Abdel Halim Hafez on the Moroccan national radio (Baldassare 2003: 84). The melodramatic modern song styles influenced by the Egyptian film industry had already been introduced to Morocco in the 1940s.

Within this musical range hardly any space was given to traditional Moroccan popular music, such as the *ʿayta* or *gnawa* music. The music propagated by the Ministry of Culture had to represent the new nation and dissociated itself from both local musical traditions (although these stood much closer to the everyday life rituals and celebrations of Moroccan citizens) and from Western influences, that were considered a reminder of the colonial presence. Traditional popular music and dance, for instance from Amazigh culture, were sometimes disseminated, but only within a context of tourism and national folklore (Baldassare 2003: 84; Boum 2007: 215). It was with the arrival of the television that, along with the highly esteemed elitist Andalusian music genres, lighter music styles, closer to the larger Moroccan public, developed. These styles using Moroccan dialect (*darija*), built on traditional musical forms like the *ʿayta*.

During the reign of King Hassan II (1961-1999), the audiovisual landscape was controlled by the state, and the written press was in the hands of political parties and the palace. The Moroccan state exercised heavy censorship of television, cinema, radio channels, and printed media (Gayle Carter 2009; Boum 2012; Hidass 2007). The government-approved entertainment was brought to

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[68] In the beginning of postcolonial Morocco, the administrative structures of the protectorate continued to define 'Moroccan culture' as arts and crafts, and was promoted mainly in the context of tourism.

[69] This was also mentioned in an interview with a state official of the Ministry of Culture. Rabat, 8 September 2010.

all areas of the country through media institutions which fell under the administrative, financial, and editorial authority of the state (Hidass 2007).

Music during the years of lead

Outside of the state-controlled media landscape, which was largely oriented towards Egypt and Lebanon (Boum 2007), an alternative artistic movement emerged in the 1960s. This movement also aimed to redefine its national identity, but by returning to traditional popular Moroccan artistic expressions. Painters, intellectuals, actors, and later musicians started to draw on Moroccan popular traditional culture, which during the protectorate had been relegated to folklore and Orientalist representations, and was designated by the new Arabic nationalist establishment as backward peasant culture (ter Laan 2003: 28-29). As a result, musical groups emerged in the 1960s that based their repertoires on Moroccan musical traditions, such as religious poetry from the Sufi brotherhoods, and traditional rhythms and melodies rearranged to new compositions. They used traditional instruments from Morocco's musical heritage and sang songs in Moroccan *darija* instead of the state-imposed official *fusha* (Modern Standard Arabic). These young musicians wished to distinguish themselves from the musical traditions of their parents, as well as from the music broadcasted through the state-controlled media.

This musical countermovement was influenced by the hippie movement and led by a Moroccan music group called Nass al-Ghiwane, which was soon followed by similar music groups like Jil Jilala and Lamchabab. Nass al-Ghiwane reached immense popularity in the 1960s and 1970s. The group was created by four young men, all from Casablanca's poor suburb, Hay Mohammadi. They opposed the privileging of Arab culture in state-run cultural activities, by drawing heavily on Moroccan popular musical traditions such as Amazigh music, *gnawa*, *melhun* and ritual music from the Sufi brotherhoods. In Ahmed El-Maʿanouni's 1981 documentary *Trance*, (*al-Hal*) one of the artists of Nass al-Ghiwane, Aziz Tahiri explains:

> The popular artists of the 1950s and 1940s, they were all connected to the music from the Middle East (*sharqi*), like Mohamed Abdelwaheb, Farid al-Atrach, Umm Kalthum, Fairuz, Abdel Halim. And me? I was exactly like them. I performed that genre even a couple of times for the radio in Casablanca. But Boujmaʿa (another artist of the band) said to me: "Are you out of your mind? Do you want to become like those singers and choirs, which have been doing the same stuff for over more than twenty years? They will keep doing the same thing for another twenty years, and then *you* come along, doing the same thing,.. again?" So he [Boujmaʿa] took me to see Taieb Sadiqi, a theater maker who was leading a group of folk (*shaʿbi*) artists at the time. They did village theatre like the *helqa* [traditional form of Moroccan

The music group Nass al-Ghiwane on one of their LP album covers © Cléopatre 1976.

> theater] and the *bsat* theater tradition, including Moroccan folksongs. Then he [Sadiqi] told me: "You are Moroccan, you have to look for your own roots. First of all you have to sing folk poetry and then create your own rhythms."[70]

As the quote illustrates, this alternative Moroccan music from the 1960s went against the grain of the cultural taste of the conservative establishment as well as against the cultural expressions of Moroccan national identity prescribed by the state. These musicians blew a new wind through the musical landscape of Morocco, while articulating old Moroccan musical traditions. Performing music, which drew from local music traditions of for instance the Sufi brotherhoods, the Amazigh tribes, and the Gnawa, became a form of cultural resistance in the 1960s and 1970s.

The new Moroccan pop musical culture emerged at a period of intense political and social unrest (1956-1973), in which the political stage was dominated by a confrontation between the King and the nationalist movement (Istiqlal). In the first constitution of the country (December 1962), Morocco became a parliamentary democracy, but the King did not intend to hand over much of his power to the Istiqlal. Obdeijn et al. describe that it did not take long before the power of the *makhzen* set in again. Soon, political parties were played

[70] Excerpt from an interview with Aziz Tahiri in the documentary *al-Hal* (Trance) by Ahmed El Maʿanouni, 1981. Translation by author.

off against each other and corruption and nepotism dominated political life once more (2002: 160). Resistance came from members of the army who staged two military coups in 1971 and 1972, which Hassan II miraculously survived. What followed was a period known as the 'Years of Lead' (Perrault 1990; Slyomovics 2005).[71] As Morocco was a willing ally of the West during the Cold War, leftist ideologies such as Marxism, were violently suppressed and Islamic activist movements were encouraged as a counterweight. Especially in high schools and universities violent clashes occurred between students, who were strongly attracted to radical ideologies (both leftist and Islamic activist).

The music of Nass al-Ghiwane became a symbolic tool of a generation hoping for change (Boum 2013: 166). Their lyrics, which were very ambiguously formulated (mainly because they used old poetry from *melhun*), were often interpreted by the public as criticism of the oppression by the ruling regime. As a result, their music was suspected by the state to be a vehicle for shaping dangerous opinions for the political establishment (Baldassare 2003: 89). Despite difficulties with the state and the explicit censorship exerted over artists and politicians in the 1970s, Nass al-Ghiwane, but also Jil Jilala and Lamchabab managed to become enormously popular and perform publicly. The influences of these popular bands were reinforced by the emergence of the audio-cassette tape, which changed the recording market profoundly.

The tone set by Nass al-Ghiwane and other groups was, however, not to be pursued. They were forced to abandon issues of social injustice and poverty, which led to the band's decline (Baldassare 2003: 89). Moreover, Moroccan state cultural policies tried to take control of the revived interest in Moroccan musical traditions by initiating a festival of traditional popular arts in Marrakech in the 1970s, and stimulate repertoires of folk musicians such as Abdelhadi Belkhyat and Najat Aatabou who represented the Moroccan song (*ughniyya maghribiyya*). Such artists were allowed on national TV and radio broadcasts, which during the last two decades of Hassan II's rule only featured official state-approved artists (Mekouar 2010).

Political reform, musical transitions

In the 1980s and 1990s, violent riots and movements of civil dissent appeared with increasing frequency (Bogaert 2011: 111; Catusse 2008). However, since the middle of the 1990s signs of reform appeared in Morocco. Urged by human rights organizations and the international community, which wanted to stop the human rights abuse, King Hassan II initiated a range of reforms concerning civil liberties, as well as improvements for the Amazigh population (Storm 2007: 122), and promised more reforms. These reforms eventually led to the

[71] For personal accounts on the period see: de Boer 2002, Marzouki 2000, Oufkir 1999.

gouvernement d'alternance, the government of change, which was installed in 1998. Although the reforms of the 1990s did not lead to any transfer of power away from the palace, they did have a positive effect on the relationship between the state and the Moroccan population: freedom of the press and women's rights were increased, the number of cases of torture declined, and pro-democratic civil society groups were formed (Monjib 2011). The end of the reign of Hassan II was thus characterized by a political opening and careful liberalization. After a long and fierce fight of the Moroccan state against leftist movements, socialists were included in the political system, symbolized by the appointment of the socialist Abderrahmane Youssoufi as Prime-Minister.

This period was accompanied by Western influences on local music styles. Due to the pro-Western stance of Morocco in the Gulf war, the emigration of large portions of Moroccans to Europe, and the growth of satellite and digital media, Western-oriented music styles started to influence the music scene of urban Morocco. Such new media challenged the state's hegemonic powers and control over the arenas of contention. The amateur video-clip, for instance, started to compete with official television and radio stations (Boum 2013: 162).

Despite the restrictions of the government, hip-hop, rap, rock, and metal artists emerged and created a small 'underground' niche within a music scene which was at the time dominated by *raï* and *shaʿbi* music (Boum 2013: 170; Langlois 1996; Salois 2013). Some cultural services of embassies, like the French cultural institute and other European cultural services provided a platform for artists from this small niche through the organization of film screenings or concerts (Vermeeren 2009: 224). But these were elitist cultural spaces for a privileged audience. Some of these cultural initiatives were gradually taken over by Moroccan political initiatives. As a result a couple of festivals emerged under the influence of the *gouvernment d'alternance*. The Fes Festival of World Sacred Music was founded in 1994. In 1995 the popular music festival of Rabat: *Mawazine rythmes du monde* followed, presenting mainly international musicians. Since 1997, the Festival of Gnawa and World Musics in the port town of Essaouira is held. The festivals targeted privileged and international audiences and were all presented as stages for world music. They intended to provide an image of openness and tolerance for the political regime, while portraying the cities as desirable places for marketing investment, cultural consumption, and tourism (Salime 2010: 11).[72]

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[72] Tourism has gained an important role as it is a significant part of the Moroccan economy. In 2010, the Moroccan Ministry of Tourism aims to attract 10 million tourists in 2010, and utilizes the rich cultural diversity in Moroccan society to develop the tourist sector. The importance of the tourist sector for the international music festivals is also reflected in Morocco's festival calendar, which predominantly unfolds during the summer months (Morocco Business News 2010).

A new king

With the death of Hassan II in 1999, the political reins were further loosened. A blossoming of critical publications, documentaries, and cultural expressions emerged, which after years of censorship were allowed to appear in the public domain. Moreover, his son Mohammed VI's rise to the throne initiated an unprecedented restructuring of the public sphere which boosted the national music scene. Three developments have influenced the refiguring of the Moroccan music scene in general: the fight against Islamic activist movements in the aftermath of the events of 9/11, the conviction and release of fourteen heavy metal musicians and fans in 2003, and the Casablanca bombings on 16 May of the same year.

Upon his ascent to the throne, the new monarch distanced himself from the autocratic ruling style of his father. Shortly after he took the throne he addressed the nation via a speech on television, in which he promised to continue on the road of reforms, to fight poverty and corruption, to create jobs, and improve Morocco's human rights record. He also emphasized that Morocco advocates a tolerant and peaceful Islam and stimulates a policy of openness.[73] In 2000, on the occasion of the first anniversary of his enthronement, he announced a far-reaching program of political, legal, economic, and religious reforms to be gradually implemented at various levels of the public sphere in order to pursue the road of modernization and democratization (Bogaert 2011: 110; Boubia 2008: 10; Maghraoui 2009b: 143).[74] Visible action was soon undertaken, including large infrastructural projects, the enactment of a new family code (mudawwana), which granted women more rights, the release of old political prisoners, the creation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER), tasked with researching human rights violations under Hassan II, and the introduction of freedom of press and liberalization of the media landscape. The arrival of the young monarch raised the hopes of many Moroccans who saw his plans as a development towards liberalization and democratization of the Moroccan public sphere. Yet, the red lines of religion, territorial integrity, and monarchy remained intact.

9/11

On 16 September, 2001, after the attacks on the twin towers in New York, King Mohammed VI held a speech at an interfaith memorial ceremony organized at Saint Pierre's Cathedral in Rabat for the victims of the September 11 attacks.[75] The King's speech highlighted Morocco as an advocate of interfaith dialogue,

[73] Source: http://www.lagencedusud.gov.ma/download/discours_trone_1999.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2016.

[74] Source:http://www.lagencedusud.gov.ma/download/premiere_intronisation_2000.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2016.

[75] Source:http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/nea/8277.htm, accessed on 7 July 2016.

tolerance, and Muslim moderation. In the presence of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish leaders he condemned the terrorist attacks and reminded the public of his role as commander of the faithful, and stressed that Morocco has always been a land of peace and tolerance, where Christianity and Judaism have coexisted in harmony with Islam (Belghazi 2006: 101).

The highlighting of religious tolerance and Muslim 'moderation' is also central to the antiterrorism discourses used by the US foreign policy agenda in the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11 (Mahmood 2006a; Salime 2010).[76] This policy fostered a 'moderate' Islam as an antidote against Muslim fundamentalism. The accompanying strategy was, besides the increase of security measures, to seek alliance with Muslim intellectuals and organizations, that promote forms of spiritual engagement conforming to secular-liberal models of religion, as well as targeting Islamic activist organizations as potential supporters of terrorism (Mahmood 2006a: 330; Zemni 2006: 231). Mahmood argues that these policies revolve around 'the propagation and reorganization of particular religious practices and subjectivities to render them compliant with political liberal rule' (Mahmood 2006a: 328-329). Country reports on terrorism issued by the US government State Department, advance Morocco as an important ally against terrorism (Arieff 2011), and has increased aid to Morocco through funding specific programs targeted at counterterrorism and socioeconomic development. These programs involve trainings and education programs to be propagated and shaped by the state, the local media, social groups, and individual actors with the aim of cultivating 'moderate' religious sensibilities among the Moroccan population.

Metalheads

The second development affecting Morocco's contemporary music scene is the arrest of fourteen young heavy metal musicians and their fans, at the beginning of 2003. They were accused of 'Satanism' and sentenced to prison by the Moroccan court in Casablanca. Their music, dress, and possessions, such as reversed crosses and ashtrays in the form of skulls, were interpreted as acts of devil worship, undermining the Islamic faith. The conviction of the musicians unleashed a massive protest that united people from very different backgrounds and ages. Teachers, fans, artists and families of the youngsters as well as journalists and human rights organizations called for their release (LeVine 2008;

[76] Next to military intervention, the US State Department initiated a program named Muslim World Outreach with funds coming from USAID, to reshape Islam in the Muslim world according to Western visions of religion, politics and the public sphere (Mahmood 2006a). Various international US policy agencies such as the RAND-corporation (think-tank) and the Robert John Smith Foundation, were involved in the publication of documents mapping out and advising religious and political actors of countries in the Middle East (Karolia 2011).

Salime 2010). After days of protests, the musicians and fans were set free on request of the King (Vermeeren 2009: 231).

The arrest and conviction of these heavy metal musicians and fans had several effects. Firstly, the public outcry made the authorities aware of the presence of a large group of young Moroccans claiming more space and freedom to express themselves through symbols and styles, outside of the confines of official Moroccan culture. Second, the sentencing of the musicians raised the public concern of the increasing influence of Islamic movements in society and politics. The PJD had gained an important number of seats in the national election the year before, and were making its mark on debates regarding public morality. Thirdly, the arrests brought about a change in the public view on youth music and musicians, and put music and artistic freedom at the centre of debates about national identity and democracy (LeVine 2008; Howe 2005: 195-196; Belghazi 2006; Salime 2010).

The heavy metal artists and fans were part of an underground urban youth scene, mainly situated in Casablanca, which draws inspiration from globalized Western music subcultures, such as heavy metal and hip hop, which emerged in Morocco in the 1990s (Salois 2013). This vibrant music scene became labeled as *nayda*.[77] Due to the arrests of the heavy metal artists, this musical scene gained increasing visibility and public sympathy.

The musicians belonging to this scene are from wealthy or middle class families who had access to French or English education and Western lifestyles (Vermeeren 2009: 230). The music, sung in *darija*, French, and English, deals with issues hardly ever discussed in Moroccan public life such as corruption, poverty, and sexuality. This youth music scene had been cut off from distribution in the national media (Boubia 2008; Caubet 2010b; Salois 2013), which viewed the music as immoral, un-Islamic, and un-Moroccan. Nevertheless, the young artists and fans were able to carefully create a space for their musical expressions and tastes.[78] The emergence of a small number of music festivals in the midst of the 1990s, especially the open air and free Gnawa festival in Essaouira and the festival of Rabat, attracted these youngsters and provided them with a public space where they could display their sub-cultural symbols and dress. However, in order to perform, they depended on alternative spaces. The *Festival L'Boulvard de Jeunes Musiciens*, did provide such a platform and became a hub for the musicians and fans. This festival started out small-scale with a few concerts in small spaces

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[77] *Nayda* in *darija* means 'liveliness,' 'it's moving,' or 'being awake.' It derives from the verb *n-nod*, meaning getting up or waking up (Boum 2012; Caubet 2010a). The term *nayda* was first adopted by the liberal French weekly *Tel Quel* in 2006. They put the expression on the cover announcing the center article about the youngsters carrying this music scene. *Tel Quel* 231 (June 2006).

[78] *Nayda* is sometimes compared to the wave of underground music groups emerging in Morocco in the 1960s, and even to the Spanish *movida* (Caubet 2010a).

in Casablanca for only a couple of hundred people. The emerging festivals created space for the production and consumption of music but also gave an impulse for a broader dynamic of artistic production, such as dance, theater, graffiti, and films as well as language, attire, and funky hair styles (Salime 2010: 12; Salois 2013).

Casablanca bombings

The third development, which can be linked to the refiguring of the contemporary Moroccan music scene is the Casablanca bombings. On 16 May 2003, a few months after the release of the heavy metal musicians, 12 suicide bombers blew themselves up in the city center of Casablanca, killing themselves and 33 others and wounding more than 100 people (Arieff 2012).[79] The attacks were ascribed to young men from Sidi Moumen, a poor suburb of Casablanca. They were connected to two Islamic activist groups, believed to be linked to Al-Qaeda.[80] The bombings were severely condemned by actors from across the political spectrum, and left the country in shock. The next day, thousands of people took to the streets of Casablanca to demonstrate against the bombings and terrorism.[81]

The state's response to the events of 16 May 2003, involved security measures as well as the production of a patriotic discourse of Muslim 'moderation.' I will lay out this two-fold strategy. The government passed strict anti-terrorist legislation and Moroccan security services launched a witch-hunt on people affiliated to Islamic movements and organizations, to bring those responsible to justice, and prevent further attacks. The Moroccan human rights association (AMDH), saw the implementation of the new terrorism law and international cooperation with intelligent services as a brake on the ongoing reforms and the liberalization process initiated under Mohammed VI (Howe 2005: 327-328). Human Rights Watch reported that following the Casablanca bombings between 2000 and 5000 people, labeled 'Islamists,' were arrested and put to trial, during which many of them endured torture and were denied civic rights (Slyomovics 2005: 193-194).[82] Islamic activist organizations were severely stigmatized in the media and much criticized by secularist groups.

Beside the tightening of security measures following the terrorist attacks in Casablanca, there was a surge of societal debates on identity, citizenship and national affiliations characterized by a high level of patriotism (Howe 2005:

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[79] Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca. (2003, May 17). *BBC News*. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3035803.stm, accessed on 30 June 2016.

[80] The two Islamist groups were Sirat al-Mustaqim, which means "the righteous path" in Arabic, and the Salafiyya Jihadiya, a sub-branch of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), which is linked to Al-Qaeda (Salois 2013: 78).

[81] BBC News (25 May 2003). Moroccans march against terror [Press Release]. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2936918.stm, accessed on 30 June 2016.

[82] See also: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/morocco1004.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2016.

326). These debates revolved around the causes of extremism in the country (global Islam, poverty, unemployment, education), as well as a reflection on what Islam should – and should not – be about in Morocco. These debates were carried by awareness raising campaigns, the press, NGO's, secularist and moderate Muslim organizations and framed by speeches and actions of the King. In these debates a discourse took shape stressing a moderate, democratic, a-political, peaceful and tolerant 'Moroccan Islam,' rooted in local Islamic practices and traditions, such as saint veneration, *baraka* and Sufism (Silverstein 2012: 347-348; Zeghal 2008: 253; Zemni & Bogaert 2006). This 'Moroccan Islam' was formulated as opposed to 'political Islam,' which is denounced and presented as a foreign and dangerous Islam, hostile to democracy and free artistic expression and only loyal towards the *umma*, not the nation state.

The binary stance is illustrated in the speech the King gave on national television, right after the attacks:

> This terrorist aggression is against our tolerant and generous faith. Even more so, the commissioners and the executors [of these acts] are wretched criminals who cannot claim to be part of Morocco or authentic Islam, because they ignore the tolerance which characterizes this religion.[83]

The perpetrators and their interpretation of Islam were portrayed as alien and dangerous. Moreover, terrorism was no longer presented as just a matter of societal security, but also as a threat to the identity of Moroccan society, its social cohesion and the ongoing process of democratization.

The mobilization of elements of the Moroccan cultural heritage was one of the ways through which a national discourse of Moroccan Muslim moderation against foreign extremism was constructed. A national antiterrorism campaign under the slogan *Matqish bledi* (*darija* for 'Do not touch my country'), was launched following the Casablanca attacks. This campaign promoted peace and tolerance and the denunciation of extremism in a discourse of cultural and religious patriotism. The symbol of the movement was the hand of Fatima, a traditional emblem of protection to ward off the evil eye (Rogers 2012). The renewed interest in national cultural heritage and the assertion of local Islamic practices and traditions also recurred in the restructuring of the religious field.

Restructuring the religious field

In 2004, in response to the growing concern about 'radical Islam' in Moroccan society, marked by the Casablanca bombings, the King announced the imple-

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[83] Source: http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/discours-de-sm-le-roi-mohammed-vi-suite-aux-attentats-de-casablanca-du-16-mai-2003#, accessed on 7 July 2016.

mentation of a reorganization of religious institutions and spokespersons (Zemni 2006: 238). The plans to restructure and modernize the religious field had already been announced in 2000. Yet, the events of 9/11 and the Casablanca bombings, reinforced the wish to reorganize the religious field and accelerated, framed, and legitimized its implementation. The King announced the implementation of the religious reforms in an official speech on 30 July 2004:

> We are (…) determined to ensure an optimal implementation of the reform of the religious field to reinforce the values of our generous and tolerant religion and preserve the uniqueness of the Maliki rite, through an open *ijtihad*[84] effort adapted to the demands of our time, to protect our youth against destructive external currents. The reform of the religious field should not only be approached from a perspective of complementarity with the educational and cultural fields, it also calls for a reform of the political sphere, the pre-eminent domain of democratic expression of differences of opinion. This is why a clear distinction must be made between religion and politics, given the sacred dogmas conveyed by religion, and must, therefore, be free from any strife or dissension, hence the need to counter any exploitation of religion for political purposes. Indeed, under the constitutional monarchy of Morocco, religion and politics are combined at the level of the person of the King, Commander of the Faithful. We will also ensure, in accordance with the sacred mission with which we are entrusted, that the exercise of politics is carried out in the designated official institutions and spaces. We will also ensure that religious issues are addressed within the Councils of Ulama and other authorized bodies, and that the acts of worship take place in the mosques and other appropriate places of worship, with full respect for freedom of worship, of which we act as the guarantor.[85]

A salient aspect of the speech is that it stresses that the reforms should avoid the use of religion for political ends, and guarantee freedom of religion. This call for the separation of politics and religion is remarkable as the speech also defends the unison of politics and religion in the King in his capacity as Commander of the Faithful. He stresses that the institutions and functions for politics and religion should be controlled and designated by the King. Moreover, the renewal of the religious field is carried out 'in order to protect Morocco from extremism and terrorism and preserve its identity which is marked by balance, moderation,

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[84] *Ijtihad* refers to the independent or original interpretation in Islamic law of problems not precisely covered by the Qur'an.

[85] Excerpt of speech by king Mohammed VI given in March 2004. Source: Maghreb Arabe Presse, url: http://www.map.ma/mapfr/discours/discour-trone-04 (Translated from French by author), accessed on 20 November 2014, no longer available.

and tolerance.'[86] The reforms, implemented by royal decree, are announced with the purpose to arm Moroccan youth against 'exogenous' and 'destructive' currents and to counter 'terrorism' (Zemni 2006: 234).

Coordinated by the Ministry of Interior, which controls state security, the reforms implied a struggle against this 'foreign' Islam through the increasing control of the state on religious expressions in the public sphere. For another thing, 'Moroccan Islam' became the banner of religious tolerance and was reformulated as the new official Islam (Elahmadi 2010). This new official Islam became defined around three themes. First, Malikism. This is one of the major schools (*madhhab*) of religious law (*fiqh*) within Sunni Islam, originating from the 10th century. Malikism leaves room for local traditions and imposes obedience to the sultan (Vermeeren 2009: 191). The Ashʿari theology, which is regarded as a moderate school of thought (Al-Jubouri 2001: 180), is defined as the second pillar of 'Moroccan Islam.' The third one is Sufism.

The reforms comprised an elaborate set of policy measures. Firstly, old governmental religious institutions were renovated. Secondly, new theological councils were created, charged with producing a 'tolerant' and 'authentic' Islam (Silverstein 2012: 347; Zeghal 2008: 258).[87] A national training program targeting religious scholars was initiated. Also, public lectures and conferences were organized to direct the public's understanding of Islam towards a rationale of 'moderation' and 'tolerance.' Further, female preachers, called *murshidat*, were trained (Maghraoui 2009b: 196). Thirdly, the state enlarged the audiovisual landscape through the creation of new television channels and radio stations and websites for government institutions to transmit 'Moroccan religious values' of tolerance (Arieff 2012). Next to transmitting 'Moroccan religious values,' this media policy also serves to counter the influence of satellite and television channels that promote religious perspectives from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, and the influence of illegal sermons circulating on DVD's and the internet. A striking feature was the creation in 2006 of the national religious TV and radio broadcasting channel *Assadissa*,[88] which is entirely dedicated to religious programs. In an interview, one of the producers of *Assadissa* states that

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[86] Excerpt of speech by king Mohammed VI given in March 2004. Source: Maghreb Arabe Presse, url: http://www.map.ma/mapfr/discours/discour-trone-04 (Translated from French by author), accessed on 20 November 2014, no longer available.

[87] The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Habous (religious endowments) was reorganized, the higher consulate of Islamic Scholars (*Rabitat ʿUlamaʾ al-Maghrib)* created in 1960, was modernized and turned into the Mohammedian League of ʿUlamaʾ, and the Dar El Hadith El Hassania (School for the education or religious leaders, created by Hassan II, 1964) incorporated the study of world religions and various culturally rooted practices of Islam in its curriculum (Silverstein 2012: 347).

[88] The name *Assadissa*, which means 'the Sixth' has a symbolic meaning, referring to King Muhammad al-Sadis, Mohammed VI.

the channel's goal is 'to bring true Islam against extremism.'[89] This is affirmed by The National Radio and Television Company (SNRT), which defines on their website the purpose of *Assadissa*, as focusing on faith in Morocco 'based on a commitment to true Moroccan values and religion.'[90] The Ministry also founded in 2010 the 'Mohammed VI Foundation for the Publishing of the Holy Qurʾan.' This foundation controls the distribution and publishing of the Qurʾan in the original Moroccan calligraphy.[91] It also administers local styles of memorization and recitation of Qurʾanic texts, by organizing competitions staged in theaters and national radio and television, as well as the recording of official recitation styles and its dissemination on CD's and mp3's. These official religious products are also distributed to migrant communities outside Morocco.[92] In addition, unregulated mosques were closed, and mosques according to Moroccan architecture (a square minaret is obligatory) were constructed in the impoverished neighborhoods of large cities, as well as in the rural areas. This was to counter the presence of illegal mosques and avoid architecture associated with Wahhabism and the Islam of the Gulf states (Elahmadi 2010: 126).

The reactivation of Sufism in the fight against 'terror'

In the promotion of a culturally particularistic Moroccan Islam associated with peace, tolerance, and universal spirituality, Sufism was put forward as one of the specific features of Moroccan patrimony (Becker 2009). Due to their alleged collaboration with the protectorate and to the encouragement of Islamic reform movements under Hassan II, the popularity of the Sufi brotherhoods had declined significantly. Yet, Sufism was now again promoted as a distinctive element of 'Moroccan Islam.' The monarchy, Moroccan state officials, and the national media put Sufism forward as an a-political, peaceful, and 'moderate' form of Islam, which can serve as a weapon against 'radical Islam' and Islamic activist groups (Muedini 2012: 80).[93] Moreover, Sufis were brought forward as being loyal to the monarchy (Bouasria 2013: 54; 2015).

This emphasis on Sufism is expressed, among other things, in royal donations to Sufi-orders, the encouragement of cultural and religious festivals revolving around Sufism as well as the appointment of Sufi disciples in important political positions (Silverstein 2012: 331). Members of the Butshishiyya brotherhood in particular were assigned important political positions within the religious field.

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89 Unrecorded interview with a producer of *Assadissa*. Rabat, 31 March 2011.

90 http://www.assadissatv.ma

91 August 27th 2010, Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb: «*Amir Al Mouminine inaugure le siège de la Fondation Mohammed VI pour l'édition du Saint Coran et visite l'imprimerie Fédala après sa rénovation, pour un coût global de 87,7 MDH.*»

92 And recently also to West-Africa (Charai 2014).

93 Interview with the Minister of Islamic affairs, Ahmed Tawfiq in *Afkar*, Winter 2006/2007.

Ahmed Tawfiq, for instance, a member of this Sufi order, was installed as Minister of Endowments and Islamic affairs by the King in 2002. Similarly, the theologian Dr. Ahmed Abaddi, who was nominated as the new secretary-general of the Rabita al-Mohamedia of Ulama (the council of religious scholars established by King Mohammed VI), and in charge of the promotion of religious research, also belongs to the Butshishiyya Sufi order. As such, the Butshishiyya Sufi brotherhood has aligned itself closely to the monarchy (Heck 2008: 13). The *zawiya* is also very popular in Europe and North-America (Dominguez Diaz 2010: 67). Moreover, the membership of politicians, intellectuals, lawyers, journalists, and state functionaries to the Sufi order, has given the order an elitist character.[94]

The rehabilitation of the Sufi heritage is accompanied by intellectual endeavors as well. Conferences and lectures are organized around Sufism in which moderate, liberal Muslim intellectuals act as spokespersons. In 2008, the first edition of an annual international conference of Sufism was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, under the patronage of the King, entitled: *Rencontres nationales Sidi Chiker des adeptes de soufisme*, at which representatives of 44 brotherhoods from across the world gathered in Marrakech (Bouasria 2013: 47; Muedini 2015: 80). Sufism has also experienced a cultural promotion. Many musical traditions associated with the Sufi brotherhoods were re-casted through music and the media landscape. *Assadissa*, for instance, dedicates, next to religious talk shows, educational programs and regular Qurʾanic recitations during prayer times, considerable time to the broadcasting of Sufi music. A producer of *Assadissa* told me in an interview that every two hours, traditional Sufi music such as *amdah*, and *samaʿ* is aired, but also contemporary artists with a religious repertoire are invited to perform.[95]

The emphasis on Sufism as one of the central features of the religious reforms echoes, again, the post 9/11 US foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. In think tanks and specific programs targeted at counterterrorism, Sufism became the focus of the form of Islam that can embrace and propagate Western models of religion and support the US government's effort to neutralize 'the Islamists' (Hlaoua 2012; Karolia 2011). This prominence of Sufism in both international antiterrorism policies and national political liberalization processes resonates the support of Sufism by the colonial powers to the detriment of reformist currents during the protectorate.

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[94] In 2010, the French weekly *Actuel Maroc* dedicated a critical article to this *zawiya*, highlighting its alleged proximity to central power and the monarchy. 'Boutchichia, Une Secte à la marocaine?', *Actuel Maroc*, No 37, 2010.

[95] Interview with a producer of *Assadissa*. Rabat, 31 March 2011.

International music festivals

Another important part in the rebranding of Morocco as a more tolerant and open Islamic country, is the investment in international music festivals. In addition to the post-9/11 security measures, an abundance of cultural leisure activities were sponsored and created with support of the Moroccan state. Existing stages for world music and religious entertainment flourished as a result of the increased state support of cultural events, and new stages emerged as well. In this new cultural atmosphere international music festivals have become the most privileged showcases demonstrating and promoting Morocco's national discourse of an 'open' and 'tolerant' Islam, adapted to modern times.

Under the rule of Mohammed VI, festivals have proliferated immensely and have become booming events of the national cultural scene (Boubia 2008). Each year, hundreds of music festivals are held during the summer months in almost every city of Morocco, each with its particular flavor, ranging from traditional music festivals dedicated to *melhun* and Andalusian music, to contemporary music festivals such as Mawazine, Cas'arts, the Fes Festival of Sacred World Music, Moonfest, the Gnawa Festival in Essaouira, and Timitar (Boubia 2008; Salois 2013; Vermeeren 2009: 226). Most of the festivals are open air and free, or have free sections. Some festivals have grown so big that they attract thousands of visitors, tourists, private companies, sponsors, invited artists, and considerable economic investment.[96] Moreover, the festivals receive extensive coverage in the national and international media.

The Moroccan state, and particularly the Palace have become an important stakeholder supporting these international music festivals. First of all, through the festivals the Moroccan state is reinforcing its official stance on religion in the public sphere. Festivals are important platforms for the construction of religious, cultural, and national identities (Kapchan 2007: 471) in accordance with the large-scale reforms of the Moroccan public sphere and antiterrorism policies. The festivals present Morocco as a crossroad of cultural and religious diversity. By staging numerous international stars like Lenny Kravitz, Elton John, or Shakira as well as national hip-hop artists and sometimes religious artists, the festivals display liberal values and portray a rhetoric of multicultural and multi-faith universalism seeking to counter (mis)representations of Islam by 'the West.' Internationally, the festivals serve to break with the image of a conservative closed Islamic country and show a progressive approach to international culture. Nationally, the festivals are meant to cater to the cultural prefer-

[96] In her Master thesis about festivals in Morocco, Amina Boubia mentions the growth of these festivals. In 1998, at the first edition of the 'Festival Gnaoua et musiques du monde,' the festival attracted 20.000 people, 200.000 in 2001, and 450.000 in 2006 (which is more than 10 times the size of the inhabitants of the small coast town close to Marrakech) (Boubia 2008: 8-9).

ences of Moroccan youth, and turn them away from the popular Islamic movements in the country (Kapchan 2008: 467).

Interestingly, most of these high budget international festivals are chiefly supported financially and morally by the Palace rather than by the Ministry of Culture. As official information sources about Moroccan culture and cultural activities are lacking and remain quite opaque (Touzani 2003: 13,16), I could not discover an actual state policy towards culture or an efficient working administrative structure supporting cultural activities. This might be explained by the fact that the Ministry of Culture was only established in 2006, replacing the previous Ministry of Cultural Affairs, which was established in 1974 (ibid.: 14,15).[97] Another reason might be the considerable lack of funding of the Ministry of Culture, whose budget constitutes just 0.28% of the total national budget (Bouquerel & El-Husseiny 2009: 88-89). Moreover, the process of decentralization driven by the palace has cleared various kinds of subsidies for local cultural initiatives. As a consequence, various local organizations like municipalities, local councils, and in some cases local businesses play an increasing role in the organization and support of cultural activities aimed at a local audience, leading to the emergence of local festivals in many towns and villages.

During a couple of interviews I had with state officials of the Ministry of Culture I was told that the festivals that the Ministry of Culture supports, either as an organizer or as a partner, consist mostly of smaller national festivals dedicated to rather conventional musical genres like Andalusian music and *melhun*, and a couple of regional festivals organized by towns and villages. It was repeatedly mentioned that the Ministry attaches much importance to activities that promote music they deem 'truly Moroccan.' This corresponds to the first article of the 2006 decree of the Ministry of Culture, stating that one of the main objectives of the Ministry is 'to promote and preserve (..) Moroccan national cultural heritage, and promote Moroccan cultural heritage, nationally and internationally.'[98] Remarkably, the international festivals were not mentioned as part of their policies and the promotion of Moroccan culture

[97] See also: https://culturaldiplomacyinafrica.wordpress.com/what-is-cultural-diplomacy/north-africa/morocco/morocco-introduction/, accessed on 7 July 2016.

[98] http://www.minculture.gov.ma/fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=27, accessed on 7 July 2016.

abroad falls under the Ministry of Tourism.[99] The actual role of the Ministry of Culture in the organization of the international festivals remained unclear.

The influence of the Palace (and the power of the *makhzen*) over musical entertainment in the public sphere, and especially in the large scale international music festivals is revealed in the sponsoring by state-owned companies such as SNI (*Société nationale d'investissement*), as well as through veiled state sponsoring like private companies with close ties to state funding or state-affiliated networks, like telecom companies *Méditel* and *Maroc Telecom*.[100] Moreover, actors involved in the organization of the festivals are often highly placed state officials with close ties to the palace. For instance, the organization Spirit of Fes, which organizes the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music, emerged from the association 'Fes-Saïss,' an NGO for cultural, social and economical development, presided by Mohammed Kabbaj, who was Mohammed VI's royal counselor and also the governor of Casablanca. Another example is the foundation 'Maroc Cultures' which organizes Mawazine, whose director is Mounir Majidi, the personal secretary of King Mohammed VI.

The monarchy has also imprinted its symbolic marks on the festivals. The terrain where the festivals are held is demarcated with national flags, and the King's pictures are present on the side of the concert stages. Sometimes an important politician or a government official holds a speech in which he refers to the King as the country's spiritual and national leader. The entanglement of the palace and the organizing associations is also highlighted through the involvement of the King's advisors, and numerous members of the government, and state officials (Belghazi 2006: 102). The presence of highly placed guests, international press, and internationally renowned artists indicates the prestigious character and the complex political and economic interests involved.

The liberalization of the cultural sphere, and the promotion of Moroccan culture for an international audience has also led to the official acknowledgement and public manifestation of the *nayda* music scene. After the release of the heavy metal artists and fans, and the Casablanca bombings in 2003, alternative music groups were given access to the government-sponsored music stages and state television, and were covered in the national media. The regime's embrace of this alternative youth music scene served to promote a positive image of Morocco to

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[99] The information in this paragraph is based on one informal conversation, and one unrecorded interview I held with two officers working in the Ministry of Culture in Rabat in September 2010, as well as a section on Morocco from a preparatory report for the European Council published in 2009: "Towards A Strategy for Culture in the Mediterranean Region: Needs and opportunities assessment report in the field of cultural policy and dialogue in the Mediterranean Region" by Fanny Bouquerel and Basma El Husseiny. Retrieved from: http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/european-commission-preparatory-document-towards-strategy-culture-mediterranean-region), accessed on 16 August 2014.

[100] The monarchy has a considerable influence in the Moroccan corporate sector, since it is a major shareholder of many Moroccan companies (See also: Bogaert 2011; Catusse 2008; Graciet & Laurent 2012).

the international community and to cater to the cultural tastes of Moroccan youngsters, giving them an alternative to Islamic 'extremism.'[101]

The blossoming of international music festivals, and the promotion of Sufism has also led to the manifestation of Sufi music on these festival stages. Firstly, contemporary Moroccan youth music groups are increasingly incorporating Sufi musical elements, such as particular rhythms or instruments, mixing it with globalized music styles such as hip-hop or metal. Sometimes they even perform together with Sufi brotherhoods. Secondly, members of the Sufi brotherhoods are increasingly often invited to perform their ritual music on these festival stages. And thirdly, a couple of the annually held international music festivals explicitly concentrate on Sufi or spiritual music, as I will describe in the next chapter.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have presented different Moroccan musical genres and demonstrated how the intertwinement of Morocco's political and religious landscapes have affected musical expressions and classicifations. Over the last thirty years, influences resulting from globalization have increasingly gained visibility in the Moroccan public sphere. The arrests of the heavy metal artists, the events of 9/11, and the Casablanca attacks are recent symptoms of such influences, which in response, have brought Moroccan society together to publicly interrogate its values and reformulate its national identity. In response to these influences, religious and cultural symbols have been reinterpreted to articulate a national belonging which can accommodate new realities (Eickelman 1976: 3). Both heavy metal music, as well as Wahhabi Islam have been defined as un-Moroccan and un-Islamic influences threatening national identity and Muslim faith. But these events have also given rise to debates about national identity and citizenship rights reverting back to historical and cultural identity claims, while simultaneously reaching out to a globalized world.

As part of the global 'war on terror' the King and the Moroccan state have been leading actors in regaining and orchestrating the control over religious life in the Moroccan public sphere by constructing a national 'Moroccan Islam' (Silverstein 2012: 332). The concomittant discourses strongly resonate international counterterrorism policies, as well as colonial dualistic narratives of a 'popular Islam' vs. an 'orthodox Islam' and involve the encouragement and rehabilitation of national traditional heritage. The mobilization of a notion of traditional culture has become a key element in the drive to give visibility and

[101] For interesting descriptions on the co-optation of the *nayda* scene by the Moroccan Palace see Aomar Boum (2012: 22-25) and Kendra R. Salois (2012).

legitimacy to the new political direction of democratization, modernity, and religious tolerance (Rogers 2012).

The Moroccan project of modernization also involves the adaptation of liberal-secular values and the adaptation of Western symbols of prosperity and democracy. Music and (international) festivals in particular serve as important platforms for the construction of narratives about Islam and Moroccan national identity. As mentioned in Chapter One, music is both a symbolic and a sensory form of power when it comes to the expression of identities, the cultivation of sensibilities, and the shaping of subjectivities and relations of power. In the festivals, practices and symbols from Western subcultures as well as from the Moroccan cultural heritage are displayed. In this manner, underground musicians and narratives of alternative youth cultures are drawn into the symbolic vocabulary of state rituals. As Obdeijn et al. note: '[In Morocco] the achievements of the modern world are being adopted, but simultaneously encapsulated and placed in the service of the ancient game of power' (2002: 161). Similarly, the music festivals can be regarded as a stage for the construction and reformulation of a new national consciousness, which embraces Western values while endorsing the Moroccan political power system. This 'game of power' is expressed and engendered through symbols but also through sensory experiences. Music, with its power to draw in the senses, plays an important role in shaping subjectivities, which can form the basis of political engagement. As such, the festivals are not only part of the ritualization of state power, reinforcing the dominance and the legitimacy of the monarchy in the political system and the Moroccan public sphere. They also serve as platform to cultivate sensibilities and shape Muslim subjectivities in accord with these official discourses about 'Moroccan Islam.'

Though it is important to note the Palace's hegemonic control of the political process and its influence on musical meaning, the artists performing on these stages exert influence as well. Their ideas and musical practices will be the topic of the next two chapters in which I will present my empirical data on vocal performers. The next chapter focuses on Sufi performers working on the state-run platforms for spiritual music. Chapter Five will discuss vocal performers practicing Islam-inspired music in ways that fall outside the official cultural representations of the new 'Moroccan Islam.'

4 Between *zawiya* and festival stage

Vocal performers of Sufi music in state-sponsored festivals

'To me, music is a way to attract people to become interested in religion'[102]

[102] Quote from interview with Sufi vocalist Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.

Fieldnotes

19 April, 2010 – It is the third evening of the Fes Festival of Sufi Culture, and a Sufi concert is about to begin. Each evening a group from a different Sufi order performs liturgical hymns and songs of praise (known as *dhikr* and *sama'*) in front of a live audience. Before the start of the concert, the festival director, Faouzi Skali, addresses the international audience who sits on Oriental rugs in the inner courtyard of the fairy-like palace garden of Musée Batha. In front of them sit the disciples of the *tariqa* Qadiriyya Butshishiyya, currently one of the most powerful Sufi orders in Morocco. The disciples come from a branch of the brotherhoods established in Fes. The ten disciples, all men, sit in cross-legged position on the floor of the low stage and are dressed in traditional Moroccan male garment: a white *jellaba* and a red *fez* (red felt hats). They sit in half circle behind microphones. There are no instruments present. Then Skali, wearing a dark suit, starts to introduce the group. He explains that this evening concert will initiate the audience in the rituals performed in the intimacy of a *zawiya*, a Sufi lodge. However, since the context is a festival, the vocalists, in the display of their rituals, are allowed more freedom than in a *zawiya*. He explains that the evening should be seen and experienced as community prayer, not as a performance. Then he moves into the middle of the group, closes his eyes and starts a prayer. Most people in the audience follow his example and start to pray. After the prayer the vocalists start their performance, which lasts almost an hour and a half. The concert starts softly, with a lot of solo vocal improvisations gradually building up toward a culmination of collective loud chanting. The concert ends

Members of the Butshishiyya order performing at the Fes Festival of Sufi Culture, with festival director Faouzi Skali sitting at the center.
© Photo by author, 19 April 2010.

with a *hadra* (a bodily trance, carried out standing), where the disciples stand up and move their bodies repetitively back and forth, while tuning up the volume of the chants, taking the audience with them, ending in an explosion of 'Allah-há!,' 'Allah-há!' Some people in the audience respond emotionally and cry (drawn from field notes made on 19 April 2010).

Introduction

The description of the male disciples of the Butshishiyya, performing parts of ritual sessions at the Fes Festival of Sufi Culture, is drawn from field notes I made during my first six months of ethnographic fieldwork in 2010. During this period I focused mainly on Islam-inspired musical activities supported by the Moroccan state. As I have explained in the previous chapter, in the promotion of 'moderate' Islam, the Moroccan state has for several years been actively promoting Sufism as the banner of 'moderate' Islam, a strategy to counter 'radical' Islam and promote a public image of Morocco as a non-fundamentalist Islamic country (Silverstein 2012: 331). This state-driven attention for Sufism in Morocco, has caused the proliferation of government-sponsored platforms for the performance of Sufi-oriented music.

This chapter analyzes how discourses of 'moderate' Islam are constructed and linked to Sufism in musical performances on two state supported platforms where 'Sufi music' is produced and staged: the Festival of Sufi Culture and the Festival of World Sacred Music. I pay specific attention to the perspectives and experiences of the artists performing on these stages. The chapter starts out with a brief description of the two festivals. I then analyze the prevalent narratives and discourses in which Sufi music is framed and linked to nationalism and 'moderate' Islam. In the last part of the chapter I concentrate on the musical practices in these settings seen from the artists' perspectives. But first I will start with a short explanation of the commercial and political spheres of influence on Sufi music.

Two festivals for Sufi music

The growing popularity of sacred world music among international audiences, and the instrumentalization of Sufism by the Moroccan state against the growth of political Islam (see above), have brought musical rituals of different Moroccan Sufi orders more and more to the stage in concert halls, radio broadcastings, television shows, and international music festivals. The national religious radio and television broadcasting chain Assadissa, the annual Festival of Sufi culture, the Festival of World Sacred Music, and the Festival of Gnawa Music, are prominent examples of this. Within the scope of this chapter I focus on the influence of the political revival of Sufism on musical practices and the artists in the contexts of two important platforms for Sufi performances: the Festival of

World Sacred Music, and the Festival of Sufi Culture. Occasionally I will refer to other stages as well.

The Fes Festival of World Sacred Music

The Festival of World Sacred Music in Fes lasts nine days and is held annually during the first two weeks of June in the city of Fes. It focuses on 'sacred' music from different cultural and religious traditions across the world. The festival was founded in 1994 by Faouzi Skali, a Moroccan intellectual who wrote his doctoral thesis in anthropology on saints and sanctuaries in Fes, and published and lectured widely on Sufism. He is also an important advocate of the recent Sufism revival in Morocco and a member of the Butshishiyya Sufi order. The roots of the festival go back to 1991, when Skali created an event about cinema as a response to the ongoing Gulf war. As he told me in an interview, he wanted to visually counter misrepresentations of Islam offered by Western media covering the Gulf war:

> I had the feeling that this war was also a war of images, the media and so forth. It was also the first time that people used images as a tool in a conflict (…). [But] images can also show beautiful aspects about Muslims, like culture and intellect, [but] it was the opposite, it [the images] was a caricature, and did not correspond to what I knew in reality. Therefore I wanted to create an event (…). I created an event in November 1991. First in Fes during four days about cinema. I invited ten filmmakers from different countries who showed their films. (…) Many images would play a role to understand the complexity and depth, the intelligence and beauty of cultures of the Other, (…). After that, we organized a colloquium in the desert (…) also to respond to 'Desert Storm' (…). After that I wondered how to continue (…) and I thought that (…) there is something more universal than images, it is music. That's when I came up with the idea to create a festival for sacred world music. There also wouldn't be the problem of language which existed with the cinema festival. It took me three years to prepare the first edition of the festival, which was held in 1994.[103]

Skali's idea for a sacred music festival was brought under the wings of the Fes-Saïss Foundation. This organization, which was created in 1986, is an NGO, which is sponsored by the Ministry of Interior and led by an elite of dignitaries, businessmen, politicians and intellectuals from old bourgeois families from Fes (Boubia 2008: 12; Salois 2013: 110; Schuyler 2004: 343). After the success of the festival, the Fes-Saïss Foundation created the Spirit of Fes Foundation, which only focuses on cultural events, and took over the lead in the festival's organi-

[103] Interview with Faouzi Skali, Fes, 20 April 2010.

zation (Boubia 2008: 12). The objective of the Spirit of Fes Foundation is to promote the city of Fes through cultural, social and economic activities.

What started out as a project of countering negative representations of Arabs and Muslims in the media, has grown into a major international music festival with an estimated budget of 1.2 million euro's,[104] attracting an estimated 65.000 visitors every year, and international press coverage. It is also embedded in the tourist infrastructure.[105] The festival consists of several stages and activities spread across the city of Fes. The majority of the concerts are held during the evening. During the day, parallel to the festival, seminars and lectures are organized under the header of *Rencontres de Fes*. These seminars and lectures are organized around an international forum run by Skali called *A Soul for Globalization*. This forum discusses, among other things, social, economical, and political issues such as human development, and environmental issues.

The ticket fees for the evening concerts are considerable, a ticket for an evening concert costs an average 250 dirham (around 25 euro's), and a passepartout for the entire festival 3250 dirham.[106] This reveals that the festival targets a wealthy audience, either European-educated Moroccans from the upper class, or an international audience. Due to heavy criticism of the festival's exclusive and elitist aura, the festival added a free section to the paid segments in 1999.[107] This free section, called *Le Festival dans la Ville* is intended for local Moroccans and the inhabitants of Fes who cannot afford to pay a ticket for the official evening concerts. This free section, is also popularly called *'le festival off*.'[108] When I attended the festival in 2010 and 2012, the *Festival dans la Ville* consisted of three different stages,[109] one stage at the square outside the entrance gate into the medina, Bab Boujloud, one stage at the outskirts of Fes, Ait Skato, and the *Nuits Soufies* (Sufi Nights). The Sufi Nights are free concerts by Moroccan Sufi orders held every evening at the gardens of the palace of Dar Tazi. The program on these three free concert stages is aimed at local audiences and features traditional Moroccan popular music, but also artists with a non-religious repertoire like *shaʿbi* artist Najat Atabou, or rap groups, such as Fes City Clan.

Moroccan Sufi disciples perform at different stages throughout the festival, but the festival's primary setting for the Sufi performances are 'The Sufi Nights.' The so called 'popular' brotherhoods, like the ʿIssawa, Jilala, and Hamadsha,

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[104] Interview with the director of the seminar series *Rencontres de Fes*, Nadia Benjelloun. Fes, 6 June, 2010.

[105] These estimations are derived from statements made by festival organizers, and the festival website. The festival is, among others, sponsored by Accor-Sofitel, Royal Air Maroc and the Ministry of Tourism.

[106] The Moroccan dirham (MAD) is the national currency of Morocco. At the time of my research the exchange rate of 10 MAD was approximately one Euro. A minimum month salary lay around 1800 dirham.

[107] Interview with Zineb Mrabet, Director of *Festival dans la Ville*, Fes, 12 June 2010.

[108] Interview with *Rencontres de Fes* director, Nadia Benjelloun-Olivier (special thanks to Guillaume Weill-Raynal) 6 June 2010, Fes.

[109] By mandate of the municipality of Fes, in 2010, 95% of the concerts held during the festival was free.

also play at the *Festival dans la Ville*, but not so much in the chic venues such as Bab Makina, which are intended for the high-status international artists.

The Fes Festival of Sufi Culture

In contrast to the Festival for World Sacred Music, which primarily focuses on 'sacred' musical practices from various religious and spiritual traditions across the world, the Festival for Sufi Culture specifically aims at the exploration of Sufism as part of Islamic culture. This festival was founded in 2007 by Faouzi Skali after leaving the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music. In an interview, Skali told me he left this festival because he felt uneasy and creatively restrained by the size and structures it had grown into.[110] I also heard rumors that the festival had become too trendy and elitist for some tastes. As an alternative, Skali created the smaller Fes Festival of Sufi Culture, with a focus entirely on Sufism. With the reactivation of Sufism in the Moroccan public sphere and his experience with the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music, Skali immediately secured the patronage of the King for his new festival, which enabled him to attract some important sponsors.

The Fes Festival of Sufi Culture has a similar multicultural, international allure as the Festival of World Sacred Music, international Sufi artists and audiences from Islamic and non-Islamic backgrounds are attracted to it, as well as upper class Moroccans. The performers were Sufi Muslims (both converted and born) from Morocco, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Spain. When I visisted the festival in 2010, the musical performances consisted of either staged religious ceremonies, music concerts, or a mix of sacred and more worldly genres. The invited panelists and speakers at the organized seminars were correspondingly diverse and included French, Moroccan, American, Japanese, and some African nationalities. The international audiences, the exotic location, the intellectual topics discussed, and also the ticket prices, gave the whole setting a somewhat exclusive atmosphere.[111]

Unlike the Festival of World Sacred Music, however, the focus of the artists, speakers, and audiences at the Festival of Sufi Culture is clearly on Sufi spirituality. The festival promotes a public image of a non-fundamentalist Islam, and not so much on general sacred music from various religious traditions. The festival program also featured lectures, forums and panel discussions on various subjects directly or indirectly related to Sufism, ranging from a lecture on mysticism within the poetry of Ibn al-'Arabi to a lecture on nutrition under the banner of 'nourishing one's soul, nourishing one's body.' These seminars were organized by Skali's colloquium *Giving a Soul to Globalization*, which also

[110] Interview with Faouzi Skali, 20 April 2010, Fes.

[111] Field notes taken during the opening of the Festival of Sufi Culture, 17 April 2010, Fes.

organizes the lectures and forums at the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music. In the setting of the Festival of Sufi Culture, the aim of the forum is to explore Sufism as a set of liberal cultural values, which can be applied to all sorts of issues. The emphasis on Sufism became particularly clear during the inaugural séance of the festival where Skali, after a short prayer, stated in his opening speech that 'Morocco is the land of Sufism and that its citizens adhere to a Sufi culture as a religious ideology.'[112]

Constructions of Sufi spirituality in festival settings

The Festival of Sufi Culture and the Festival of World Sacred Music both display Sufi-inspired musical practices on concert stages for a diverse international audience. In the representation of Sufi music, various narratives can be discerned that tie Sufi music to broader discourses of national identity and 'moderate' Islam. This happens through the choice of concert venues, lectures, textual representations in festivals booklets and advertisements, and on-stage performance practices. In what follows, I show how the festivals' display of Sufi musical rituals produces discourses on national identity and moderate Islam through three interconnected and recurring leitmotifs: national heritage, interfaith dialogue, and universal spirituality.

National heritage

The first narrative in which Sufi music is framed as part of Morocco's national heritage. Various descriptions of Sufi performances articulate the rootedness of Sufi traditions in Moroccan national heritage both in terms of time and place. The concert announcement of the Sufi group Ahl Touat, for instance, highlights the historical values of age old mystical traditions performed on stage:

> The *zawiya* of Dar Dmana was founded in the 17th century in Ouazzane by Shaykh Moulay Abdellah Cherif. The disciples, called Ahl Touate, gathered there for prayers, *samaʿ* and a sacred recitation called *hizb touat*. Afterwards, the tradition of the *shorfa* of Ouazzane, descendants of Moulay Abdellah Cherif, perpetuated the reading of *hizb touat* and *samaʿ*, which in the traditions of these Sufis signify mystical and spiritual audition, with the help of music and very expressive images aiming to access a state of grace or ecstasy, to be reached in fullness. Several *zawaya* appeared in the big cities, of which five in Fes and Meknes. This tradition continues currently, thanks to a number of groups who strive to preserve this patrimony by

[112] Quote taken from fieldnotes made during the inaugural lecture given by Faouzi Skali during the fourth edition of the Fes Festival of Sufi Culture. Fes, 17 April 2010.

> performing in the largest festivals dedicated to Sufi culture and to world sacred music on a national and international scale.[113]

This text fragment frames the performance of Sufi ritual music in a festival setting as a disclosure of age old traditions from the past but also as an important element for the preservation and handing down of tradition and patrimony and its survival in the present age.

The centrality of national heritage in the festivals' narratives is also represented through historic places and monuments. Both the Festival of World Sacred Music and the Festival of Sufi Culture are held in the medieval part of the city of Fes, which is locally often referred to as 'the cultural and religious capital of the country' (McGuinness 2009: 27). The labyrinthine old medina is a key setting for lectures and concerts, most of which are situated in old monumental places in Fes el-Bali, which is the oldest part of the medieval Fes medina and a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1981. The main festival venue of the Festival of World Sacred Music is Bab al-Makina, a monumental 19th century Moorish gate in the old part of Fes. But there are also concerts in the courtyards of old palaces like the Dar Batha, an old 19th century palace turned into a museum in 1915, and in the gardens of the 15th century palace Dar Tazi. Old traditional Moroccan houses with inner courtyards, called in *darija*, *ryad*s, tucked away inside the labyrinthine medina, also serve as a stage for smaller concerts. [114]

Sufi spirituality is also framed as part of national heritage in the experience of historic tourist circuits. For example, the Night of the Medina, is an activity in the program of the Festival for World Sacred Music, in which audiences are led through the oldest part of the medina of Fes, to small scale concerts, which take place in old *ryad*s. In the description of the Night of the Medina, in the festival booklet, the medina of Fes is portrayed as the heart of Morocco's patrimony:

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[113] Source: Program Booklet of the ONA foundation July, August and September 2010. translated from French to English by author: La zaouia de Dar Dmana a été fondée par le Cheikh Moulay Abdellah Cherif à Ouazzane au 17ème siècle. Les disciples, nommés Ahl Touate, s'y réunissaient pour les prières, le Samaa et une récitation sacrée dite Hizb Touat. Par la suite, la tradition de Chorfa d'Ouazzane, descendants de Moulay Abdellah Cherif, perpétua la lecture du Hizb Touat et du Samaa (qui dans la tradition de ces soufis signifie l'audition mystique et spirituelle à l'aide de la musique et de tableaux très expressifs dans le but d'accéder à un état de grâce ou d'extase s'achevant dans la plénitude). Plusieurs autres zaouias apparurent dans les grandes villes, dont cinq à Fès et à Meknes. Cette tradition se perpétue actuellement grâce à un certain nombre de troupes qui tiennent a préserver ce patrimoine en se produisant dans les plus grands festivals dédiés à la culture Soufie et aux musiques sacrées du monde à l'échelle nationale et internationale.

[114] The inhabitants of the old medina told me in informal conversations during a concert of Gülay Hacer Toruk that they felt largely excluded from the festival. Although their neighborhoods served as a setting for the staging of the festival, they could not afford the tickets to watch the concerts organized in it (Fieldnotes, 7 June 2010).

> This nocturnal journey, both musical and initiatory, takes us to the heart of the medina of Fes to discover inside the different *ryad*s, the great architectural patrimony originating from Arab-Andalusian civilization. But it will also be an invitation to discover another Orient, the nomadic one of the steppes of Mongolia or Anatolia, the mystical one of the great rivers of Bengal where poetry is recited with softness or with the force of thousand year old Indian water streams. Discover as well, underneath the starry night of the medina, the music of the grand Oriental cities, crossroads of civilizations, Constantinople or Kabul and get lost in the alleys of a city which has become universal. From the *mellah*, the Jewish area of Fes el-Jedid, close to the royal palace, dominated by the small synagogue of Ben Danan, to the heart of the medina with *ryad* Moqri lost at the end of some true winding alleys, the Festival will recreate the atmosphere of ancient caravansaries where travelers used to meet.[115]

In this text, the medina of Fes is depicted as a crossroad of religious and cultural diversity, and also as the center of the Arabo-Andalusian past, which the festival claims to recreate. References to religious diversity and Morocco's Andalusian past also prominently features in another leitmotif, that of interfaith dialogue.

Interfaith dialogue

The second narrative in which Sufi music is framed and connected to national identity and moderate Islam is 'interfaith dialogue.' Both the Festival for Sufi Culture and the Festival of World Sacred Music explicitly promote interfaith dialogue and cultural pluralism as a 'counterweight' against (mis)representations of Islam as a 'radical' political ideology, and more general to act against tensions and polarization between religious groups. The Festival of Sacred Music for instance, encourages an ecumenical dialogue between cultures and religions. Its stated aim is 'to harness the arts and spirituality in the service of human and social development, and the relationship between peoples and cultures.'[116] The Festival for World Sacred Music underlines interfaith dialogue through the programming of international artists and speakers, but also the presence of the

[115] Source: Program booklet FWSM 2010, translation from French to English by author. Ce voyage nocturne, à la fois musical et initiatique, nous entraînera au cœur de la médina de Fès afin de découvrir au sein des différents *ryads*, ce grand patrimoine architectural, ferment de la civilisation arabo-andalouse. Mais il sera aussi une invitation à découvrir un autre Orient, celui nomade des steppes de Mongolie ou des plaines d'Anatolie, celui mystique des grands fleuves du Bengale où la poésie se déclame avec la douceur ou la force des cours d'eau de l'Inde millénaire. Découvrir aussi, sous la nuit étoilée de la médina. La musique des grandes cités orientales, carrefour de civilisations, comme Constantinople ou Kaboul et se perdre dans les ruelles d'une ville devenue universelle. Du *mellah*, quartier juif de Fès el-Jedid à proximité du Palais royal, dominé par la petite synagogue de Ben Danan, jusqu'au cœur de la médina avec le Riyad Moqri perdu du bout de quelques ruelles tortueuses, le Festival recréera l'atmosphère des anciens caravansérails où se croisaient les peuples voyageurs.

[116] Source: http://www.fesfestival.com, accessed on 18 August 2014.

international press, and audiences highlight the value attached to diversity and exchange.

Interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance are presented as values rooted in Morocco's heritage. All over the festival references are made to Morocco as a place where, throughout history diverse religious groups have always joyfully lived together. On the very first page of the festival booklet of the Festival of World Sacred Music, next to a large photo of King Mohammed VI, part of the King's post-9/11 speech is printed, which illustrates the prevalence of the 'interfaith dialogue' discourse:

> Morocco, land of Islam, is proud to have been open, across the ages, to two other religions, Christianity and Judaism, to coexist with Islam in a climate of tolerance recognized by Moroccans as a tradition which continues still and which is inscribed with honor in the annals of history. If this is the situation, it is because Islam is a religion that preaches the common good, justice, equality, security, and peace, just like it recommends communication and mutual understanding among all people, as stated in the word of God: "O mankind, we have created you from male and female and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another." As a result, peace (*assalam*) is attained, a word which is etymologically related to Islam. It is also an attribute of God (…) and a description of paradise (*dar as-salam*, dwelling of peace).[117]

This excerpt, right at the beginning of the festival's booklet sets the interfaith dialogue in a national discourse centered around Islam and the King, as the protector of Islam in Morocco.

Another frequent connection made between interfaith dialogue and the Moroccan patrimony is through frequent references to the medieval Islamic kingdom of Al-Andalus as a period in Moroccan history during which Judaism, Christianity, and Islam peacefully co-existed (Shannon 2007). Various activities organized throughout the festival call attention to this legacy, such as guided tours to the Jewish quarter (*mellah* D.) and the synagogue, or the screening of

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[117] Source Festival Booklet Festival of World Sacred Music 2010, translated from French to English by author. Le Maroc, terre d'Islam, est fier d'avoir été ouvert, à travers les âges, aux deux autres religions, le christianisme et le judaïsme, pour une cohabitation avec l'Islam dans un climat de tolérance consacre par les Marocains comme tradition qui se perpétue encore, et de l'avoir inscrit avec honneur dans les annales de l'histoire. Si telle est la situation, c'est parce que l'Islam est une religion qui prône le droit et le bien, la justice et l'égalité, la sécurité et la quiétude, tout comme il recommande la communication et la connaissance mutuelle entre l'ensemble des humains, conformément a la parole de Dieu: « hommes, nous vous avons crées d'un male et d'une femelle, et nous avons fait de vous des nations et des tribus pour que vous vous entre-connaissiez »(coran). De la sorte, se réalise la paix (assalam), mot étymologiquement en rapport avec Islam. C'est aussi un attribut de Dieu, paix (assalam) et un qualificatif du paradis (dar as-salam, demeure de la paix).

Jacob Bender's documentary film 'Out of Cordoba,' which focuses on the present day value of the co-existence of different religious groups in Moorish Spain.

Universal spirituality

The aspiration of an interfaith dialogue is also highlighted by stressing common elements between different religious traditions, principally by alluding to the existence of a spirituality, accessible to all. This sense of a universal spirituality was constructed in several ways. First of all, the word 'religion,' was hardly ever used in booklets or by the organizers or speakers of the festival. Instead the words 'spirituality,' and 'sacred' were very popular. In an interview with French essayist Guillaume Weill-Reynal, Nadia Benjelloun, the director of the Festival of World Sacred Music's seminar series *Rencontres de Fes*, explains why she prefers to use the word sacred, instead of religious:

> (…) historically, in all the religions throughout the world, religions divide, religions separate, whilst 'the sacred' unites. The sacred, to me (…) stands above religions and thus will unite people of different beliefs, different educations, different origins (…) because we know our small human condition, but it is the sacred which surpasses us. Of course, we are searching for ourselves and thus that which is bigger than us, which some will call Allah, the Christians, God, the Jews, Yaweh, (…)…so, the divine…but I think that the sacred is not only divinity, we have for example this expression of saying "my mother is sacred."[118]

The sacred, as Nadia Benjelloun puts it, is defined as a common denominator and an overarching dimension found in all religions, and even beyond the religious. Deborah Kapchan examines the construction of this universal sense of spirituality, by analyzing how Sufi musical rituals are translated to a staged setting for a largely non-adept audience at the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music. With the notion of 'the promise of sonic translation' she discusses the ways in which non-initiated audiences visiting the festival are promised to experience the deeper meaning of Sufi religious rituals 'across cultural and aesthetic divides' (Kapchan 2008: 480).

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[118] Interview conducted with Nadia Benjelloun by Guillaume Weill-Reynal, translated from French by author: Historiquement, dans toutes les religions, dans le monde entier, les religions divisent, les religions séparent. Alors que le sacré rassemble. Le sacré, c'est ce qui, pour moi – ça n'a pas été dit, d'ailleurs par les fondateurs, mais je me suis beaucoup interrogée sur le sacré qui me tient beaucoup à cœur – et le sacré, c'est ce qui est au dessus des religions. Et donc, c'est ce qui va rassembler les gens de croyances différentes, d'origines différentes, de formations différentes (…). Parce que nous, nous connaissons notre petite condition humaine, mais le sacré, c'est ce qui nous dépasse. Nous sommes à la recherche de nous-mêmes, bien sûr, et puis, de ce qui est plus haut que nous, que certains vont appeler Allah, les Chrétiens Dieu, les juifs Yahvé, les Indiens l'Autre… donc, le Divin… mais je pense que le sacré n'est pas seulement la Divinité. On dit dans le langage courant «ma mère est sacrée», par exemple.

This universal sense of spirituality is brought into connection with national discourses through emphasizing Morocco's historical relation to Sufi heritage. Whereas the term 'sacred' has become a field in which spirituality is defined as both religious and secular, Sufism, and particularly 'Sufi music,' is presented as the Islamic gateway to this universal sense of spirituality. In this third leitmotif, Sufism is presented as a branch within Islam that leads to a universalistic sense of spirituality. This image of Sufism as tied to an overarching spirituality is also put forward in texts of different booklets circulating on the festivals with generalizing texts about expressions of Sufism:

> The different artistic Sufi expressions in Morocco present themselves primarily in the form of recitations of mystical poetry, accompanied by rhythms that carry across time and space.[119]

Or:

> The festival of Sufi Culture not only has the gift to identify a spiritual and artistic heritage of an exceptional wealth, but also to open one's mind to reflect on what could be the benefit of this heritage.[120]

Apart from a branch within Islam that lends to a universalistic idea of spirituality, Sufism is also portrayed as a cultural element typical of Morocco's national heritage. In an interview, the director of the Festival of Sufi Culture, Faouzi Skali, explained to me why his festival puts so much emphasis on Sufism, instead of Islam:

> Because I think people talk a lot about Islam as an ideology, and as a *political* ideology. But people forget that Islam is a civilization, a history, a culture, a society, and that is something people hardly talk about. It seems to me that particularly Sufism is another sort of culture which unites.[121]

Skali here advances 'Sufism' as a positive substitute marker for the term 'Islam' which has come to represent negative associations with violence and politics.

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[119] Source: Leaflet ONA program Villa des Arts 2010, translated from French to English by author: Les différentes expressions artistiques soufies au Maroc se présentent principalement sous forme de récitations de poésies mystiques, accompagnées de rythmes qui transportent à travers le temps et l'espace.

[120] Introductory text of the program booklet of the Festival of Sufi Culture 2010.

[121] Interview with Faouzi Skali, Fes, 20 April 2010. Translated from French by author: «Parce que moi je pense que on parle beaucoup de l'Islam en tant que idéologie et en tant que idéologie politique, mais on oublie que l'Islam c'est une civilisation, c'est une histoire, c'est une culture, c'est une société, et ça c'est quelque chose dont on parle très peu, et il me semble que le Soufisme est surtout une autre sorte de culture qui permet d'associer ».

Sufi spirituality conversely, stands for an image of a non-fundamentalist Islam. His vision corresponds to the Moroccan state's promotion of Sufism being presented as a counterweight to strands of political Islam. Moreover, rather than a specific religion, Sufism is presented by Skali as 'a culture which unites.' For instance, Sufism is frequently presented as a branch of Islam that, in opposition to 'radical' Muslim tendencies, encourages the use of music. Skali mentions the importance of showing the art various of Sufi brotherhoods as a way to (re) connect and revive this culture:

> [Sufism] allows to connect at once matters of art, literature, history, and heritage (…). We need to discuss how to connect to this civilization to this history [in order] to revitalize oneself, to renew ideas and to tackle issues of current affairs. (…) you want to talk about heritage, [but] we are speaking of a living culture. That's what permits spirituality, because spirituality is always alive, it is always the object of an experience, it is not simply knowledge that we put on posters.[122]

In this quote Skali accentuates Sufism as a living heritage and a portal to 'positive' spiritual experiences which allow to confront contemporary difficulties on a personal level, as well as within society. He presents Sufism as part of the heritage and as a set of liberal values, which can be applied to all sorts of issues in the current day and age, rather than a religion. The performance of Sufi rituals on festival stages is thus intended to revive Sufism as part of Morocco's heritage and celebrate its assumed beneficiary relevance in the present day.

The stimulation and celebration of Morocco's Sufi heritage is more than just a revitalization of a religious patrimony. Its reconstruction in the present also serves an economical and political agenda of the Moroccan government. The staged display of Sufi ritual music attracts tourists, media, and sponsors and thus brings an income for the state and the inhabitants of Fes. It also seeks to tone down Islamic currents deemed 'radical.' In the staged display of Sufi musical rituals, narratives of national heritage, interfaith dialogue, and universal spirituality are shaped and enacted in relation to broader political discourses. Values such as tolerance, religious diversity, and peace, are appropriated and legitimized in national discourse by presenting them as attributes found in both Sufism and Moroccan cultural heritage.

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[122] Interview with Faouzi Skali. 20 April 2010, Fes. Translated from French by author: (…) le Soufisme (…) permet d'associer à la fois la question de l'art, de la littérature, de l'histoire et le patrimoine a lui-même (…) il faut parler de se connecter à cette civilisation, à cette histoire pour se ressourcer, pour renouveler un pensée et pour aborder des questions d'actualité. C'est a dire, vous voulez parler d'un patrimoine, on parle d'une culture vivante ça ce qu'il permet la spiritualité, parce que la spiritualité c'est toujours vivante, c'est toujours l'objet d' une expérience, c'est pas simplement un savoir qu'on met dans des placards».

Transformations of Sufi rituals

The ambition to connect different religious faiths through the common denominator of sacredness and spirituality while revitalizing Sufi patrimony is translated into the staging of a wide variety of artists performing musical practices of various religious traditions from all over the world (Kapchan 2008: 469). The staging of Sufi music plays an important role in the revitalization of the Moroccan heritage and the enabling of universal spiritual experiences.

The staging of Sufi rituals onto international music festival stages, its framing in narratives about national heritage and Muslim moderation, and the implication of the ritual music and the performers into dynamics of markets and publicity has caused profound changes in the form and meaning of the rituals on various levels. In this section the effects of the recontextualization of Sufi rituals from *zawiya* to stage will be analyzed. I focus on what these changes entail, and I particularly pay attention to what role the performing artists have in the shaping of the three main leitmotifs about national heritage, interfaith dialogue, and universal spirituality.

Both festivals attract a diverse international audience. In order to establish a universal spiritual experience meaningful to an audience which might be unfamiliar with the musical practices and its religious meaning (Kapchan 2008), rituals which were never really carried out for outsiders, are reframed in a staged setting where spectacle and visual display is the dominant mode of presentation (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 72). In order to reconstruct traditions of the past and invoke a universal spirituality, Sufi ritual music is performed on-stage in such a way as to give the impression of an original context, a *zawiya*. The stages on which the brotherhoods perform are usually decorated with Sufi flags, copper incense burners, traditional candles, Oriental carpets, and the artists are dressed in traditional garments. Even though the experience is made to look as original and authentic as possible to the audience, the rituals performed on stage have been constructed for concert stages and adjusted to Orientalist expectations attributed to the public. The physical limitations of a stage, the presence of an audience, and the technological environment of lighting and sound engineering, as well as the presence of international press, affect the ways in which the rituals are displayed, both on the level of aesthetic performance techniques and of music.

The rituals as disciples perform them for themselves inside a *zawiya*, might be uninteresting for an audience to watch. In a *zawiya*, a *dhikr* session might last a couple of hours and consist of much repetitive and monotonous singing without any musical instruments in its ritual performances (Dominguez Diaz 2010; Shannon 2011: 268).[123] To bridge such a tension between unspectacular

[123] Many Sufi brotherhoods have banned the use of musical instruments from their ritual performances. The Butshishiyya and Tijaniyya are examples of this.

lengthy prayer sessions and festival audience's expectations of a wondrous Sufi concert, the religious ceremonies are compressed to fit one show. In contrast to the long-winding devotional rituals, the time lapse of a concert is limited. Therefore, the progression of stages of ritual ceremonies are adapted, with the trance marking the climax of the performance. Musical rituals are shortened and divided into songs, with a recognizable beginning and an end. The movements of the disciples become choreographed and timed, like the closing of eyes, folding of hands, and the start and end of an ecstatic trance should be rehearsed. Moreover the presence of an audience demands a certain kind of interaction like stage talk, call and answer, encouraging an audience to clap along with the rhythm of the music, or pointing the microphone towards the crowd.

Although both festivals are characterized by diversity on the level of audiences and musical performances, the organizers also seek to 'create something that can be formalized and repeated' (Kapchan 2008: 480). The great variety in the use of music that exists in the actual rituals for every brotherhood, has become subject to standardized displays of Sufi music, which can easily be reproduced and understood by a non-adept audience. The possibilities for the variety of vocal and bodily expressions which exist among the countless Sufi orders are compressed and have become part of a set-list repertoire performed on stage. Moreover, within the festival's discourses, the Islamic religious identity of a Sufi brotherhood is downplayed and standardized in favor of a more generalized sense of Sufi spirituality.

El-Asri and Vuillemenot address the process of standardization of Sufi rituals. They use the term 'world Sufism' to refer to Sufi music as a category within world music (El-Asri & Vuillemenot 2010). In standardized musical representations of 'world Sufism,' musical icons from the Islamic world have emerged who represent 'Sufi music.' Examples are the Al-Kindi Orchestra from Aleppo, led by the Swiss Jonathan Weiss, Youssou n'Dour from Senegal and *qawwali* [124]singer Nusrat Fath Ali Khan from Pakistan. These musicians perform all over the world and set the standard of what Sufism should look and sound like.

Jonathan Shannon argues that the development of Sufism as a musical category in the world music market, led to a certain standardization of a great variety of Sufi chants and rituals, stemming from the countless Sufi orders in the Islamic world. He proposes to refer to this standardized and constructed nature of Sufism as a musical category, performed and created for staged performances with the term 'suficized music,' covering the wide range of practices associated with ritual sounds from Sufi brotherhoods (Shannon 2011). Although originally a strong distinction is made in Sufism (and the Islamic world in general) between the category of 'music' (*ghina'*), associated with entertainment,

[124] *Qawwali* refers to musical Sufi rituals popular in South Asia.

and liturgical music (like *dhikr*, *sama'*, or *madih*),[125] in the market of world music, the ritual sound is sold under the marketing label of 'Sufi music' (ibid.: 259).

Next to spectacularization and standardization, another effect of the re-contextualization of Sufi rituals in staged settings is commodification. Like other music festivals, the festivals dedicated to Sufism and spiritual music face commercial dynamics of markets and publicity. The festivals I visited commodify aesthetic elements of Sufi traditions, as a product of national and international consumption (Kapchan 2008: 471, 480). This goes particularly for Sufi ritual music, but also recurs in advertisements and expensive Orientalist photos of fashion, hotels, and spas in the glossy festival program books.

The commodification of culture is studied in fields of heritage production and - consumption, for instance, in tourism and nation building projects (Greenwood 1977; Urry 1990). It often goes hand in hand with processes of disembedding, standardization, objectivation, and essentialization. The case of music is special here. Like material objects, sound and music can also be decontextualized and displayed. But, unlike ethnographic artifacts and objects, music cannot be framed, put in a display case, or taken home (Kapchan 2007: 215). Music is a performative singular event, which in order to be heard and seen, has to be reproduced and mediated.

When Sufi rituals are performed in staged settings, equal complex processes of relocation, translation and transformation are involved. The recasting of Sufi rituals (in Morocco and abroad) within the formats of national and international music stages and their introduction in structures of commerce and media have been described by a number of scholars. These contributions, however, have barely touched the artists' perspectives on the musical practices in these festival settings. Yet, not only the music and rituals undergo transformations as an effect of the relocation of Sufi performances from a *zawiya* to a stage, it affects the practitioners of the rituals as well. To understand the processes the performers go through as they adapt to staged settings, I now present the perspectives of the artists.

The performers

The public manifestation of Sufi music on the two festival stages draw the artists into larger structures of commerce, press, and politics. Since the creation of the Fes Festival of Sacred World Music in 1994, various Moroccan Sufi brotherhoods have increasingly been participating in the performance of ritual practices on national and international festival stages, as well as on national radio and television programs. These macrostructures implicate the *zawaya* in dynamics of

[125] Sufi chanters (*munshidun*) themselves do not refer to the ritual sounds as 'music' (*ghina'*), nor would they define their vocal practices as 'singing,' rather they would call it reciting (*inshad*).

markets, tourism, publicity, and national cultural politics. This has had a significant impact on some *zawaya*, their disciples, their musical practices and the meaning of those practices. How do these 'artists' respond to these new structures and audiences? What are their perspectives on their own practices? In this chapter's last section, I will focus on the artists who play at the two festivals described above, and the perspectives they hold towards their performance of Sufi ceremonies on state sponsored stages. Four topics will be central here: The trajectories of the artists; their motivations to put on ritual music on public stages; their on-stage practices; and their perspectives on combining music with Islamic messages and on the macro-structures surrounding their public performances, such as commerce, press, and politics.

From disciple to professional artist

The entering of Sufi orders into the mediatized public sphere has brought about a process of 'professionalization' among some disciples.[126] Due to their participation in music festivals and concerts, some disciples have evolved into professional artists with a successful musical career, playing at national and international concert stages and media broadcastings, carrying business cards, setting up websites, directing performances, and also receiving (financial) rewards for the rituals performed on stage.

Disciples who developed as professional staged 'Sufi artists' in festivals and concerts come from different backgrounds and belong to different Sufi orders. Some stem from families that have been affiliated with a certain *tariqa* for a long time, but have little experience with performing in a staged setting for a non-adept audience. Such artists have to get used to conducting the rituals in a staged setting. Some of them told me they had to get used to the use of microphones and to stage fright. Others have undergone long intensive training as a *munshid* from an early age in special *samaʿ* groups. The increasing popularity of Sufism in the world music market and the emerging festivals, have caused more and more *samaʿ* groups to emerge in various *turuq*, where disciples with special vocal talent are selected to perform on stage (Dominguez Diaz 2010: 166-167). For example, several performers of staged Sufi rituals I met, who appear on the festival stages, have been trained in a school for *samaʿ* and *madih* run by the renowned vocalist from Fes, Haj Mohamed Bennis, and linked to one of the *zawaya* in Fes. Bennis's school teaches young boys to become professional vocalists within staged *samaʿ* and *dhikr* performances. His group Firqat Imam Boussari has performed in Canada, California, Qatar, Sudan, Italia, France,

[126] I want to emphasize here that *munshidun*, even if they only do *dhikr* in *zawaya* and mosques, are far from 'amateurs.' When I employ the term 'professionalization' I refer to the professionalization of *munshidun* as staged 'Sufi artists,' participating in public and mediatized stages, such as concerts, television shows, radio emissions, recording companies, and national and international festivals.

Saudi-Arabia, and Jerusalem. Some members of Firqat Imam Boussari left the group in order to start successful international solo careers. There are also artists who were already accustomed to performing outside *zawaya* because they belong to Sufi orders that are known to perform musical rituals during public religious festivities and family celebrations, such as weddings and circumcisions (like the ʿIssawa and the Hamadsha). A group of performers of the ʿIssawa brotherhood in Fes I met after their concert at the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music, explained to me:

> Normally we played at weddings and parties, really in a family setting, but after we were invited to play at festivals and at events organized by the Ministry of Culture we started playing for non-Muslim audiences. [127]

Sufi artists adapt their performances to the structures of a stage and the presence of an international audience. Various actors, actively involved in the restaging of Sufi music, cast themselves as middlemen or teachers. These cultural brokers[128] operate between the disciples, the organization, and simultaneously try to tune into the preferences of an international audience. One of those who help Sufi artists to adapt to these staged settings is Abderahim Amrani. He is the leader of the Hamadsha Sufi brotherhood in Fes, and a prominent performer and actor within musical events revolving around 'Sufi music' in Morocco. Born in Fes, he spent his childhood in Constantine (Algeria), living next to a *zawiya*. Upon his return to Fes, he joined the Sufi order of the Hamadsha at a young age; at the time it was led by his father. Over time he became a skilled musician, and is presently the leader (*muqaddim*) of the Hamadsha order in Fes. He is the manager of eight groups from different Sufi orders whom he trains to be professional performers of staged ritual sessions before a live audience. The first time I met Abderahim was just before the start of a 'Sufi-concert' at the Festival of Sufi Culture in 2010. A friend introduced me to him, but our conversation was short and hasty. The second time I met him was in an equally busy moment, backstage during a concert of a group of ʿIssawa men, performing at the Bab Boujloud square, in front of an impressive crowd. While making dynamic gestures at the group he explained how happy he was with the festive atmosphere (*hafla*) of this particular concert. However, not all of them are used to this setting and they have to be supervised and managed. During a short break he explained to me

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[127] Interview with the ʿIssawa group of Fes. Fes, 7 June 2010.

[128] The term 'cultural broker' originated in the field of anthropology in the mid-1900s, when several anthropologists wrote about people whose role was that of a cultural intermediary, usually between their own society and that of the West. Source: http://culturalbroker.blogspot.com/2008/03/what-is-cultural-broker.html, accessed on 7 July 2016.

how he tries to teach less stage-savvy Sufi disciples to perform in front of a live audience:

> Some groups are not used to be on stage, to be seated behind microphones, [but] they try. And I then say [to them]: "pay attention, and do like this, and do like that." I have to do this because these are local groups, it is very traditional, so I have to give them a sign. Also to tell them that the show is over. Because one hour is one hour, the show cannot be longer. I also explain to them how to deal with the audiences, for example, I explain to them that they repeat the word Allah three times, and then they have to take a little pause so that the audience can reply: "Allah, Allah, Allah."[129]

Not only the way in which the rituals are staged is modified, sometimes the music itself is adjusted as well. As I have shown in Chapter Three, the typical way of doing *samaʿ* is in the *zawiya*, without instruments, but many groups I saw on the festival stages used musical instruments to accompany their repertoire. Sometimes, *samaʿ* is even mixed with profane music genres. For example, the artist Merouane Hajji, also from Fes, performs Sufi-inspired music, both solo and with his band Ikhwan al-Fann (Brothers of Art). This group of young men perform Sufi-inspired music, mixed with different styles of other traditional music like Andalusian music and *melhun*. They combine this amalgam of musical traditions with a multitude of rhythms from different *turuq* like the ʿIssawa or Gnawa but also from Western music genres like jazz. This integration of sacred Sufi chants with profane music styles is referred to as 'new Sufism,' or *tasawwuf jadid*, a form of Sufi music which speaks to contemporary times. There are local brotherhoods playing at local festivals, but also rising Sufi stars, or international pop artists collaborating with local Sufi brotherhoods mixing 'tradition' with 'modernity.'

Some vocalists perform in different ensembles performing under the label of a brotherhood. Ahmed, for example, who is a member of the Sqaliyya brotherhood, also participates as a vocalist in concerts of the Wazaniyya order, as well as in the ensemble Samaa de Fes. He explained his participation in different groups: 'I am interested in different Sufi orders, but it is not a problem to sing here and there, they all have the same goal; (…) building a relationship with God.'[130] Abderrahim Amrani also performs in several groups, with his own group of Hamadsha, but also with other groups like ʿIssawa and Gnawa. Every year he looks for what he believes are 'traditional, original true Sufi groups,' in order to

[129] Unrecorded informal conversation with Abderahim Amrani. Fes, 5 June 2010.
[130] Interview with *munshid* Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.

present their rituals in the parallel festival called Sufi Nights at the gardens of Dar Tazi. He also performs with ensembles and international artists.

Participating in multiple Sufi groups and ensembles also means that an artist must become skilled in different styles of singing and rhythms typical for a specific brotherhood, and learn to master various musical styles, for instance from the *melhun* or Andalusian repertoire. In order to maximize the possibilities of contracts, the vocalists have to be versatile. This means, for example, that they must know as many different Sufi repertoires as possible, either through special schooling or by attending *dhikr* sessions of other *turuq*, or listening to tapes of renowned Sufi vocalists. Some disciples told me they learned to perform different styles of singing *dhikr* and *sama*ʿ through listening to cassettes of internationally renowned singers. Egyptian and Syrian singers (like Sabah Fakhri) in particular are much imitated and a source of inspiration for Moroccan Sufi artists.

Artists' motivations to perform Sufi rituals on festival stages

Performers of staged Sufi rituals have different reasons to perform ritual music from their brotherhoods in staged settings in large international festivals. The artists I interviewed mentioned five important motivations to perform on festival stages: the promotion and preservation of Sufism and their particular brotherhood, conveying messages of Islam to a wide audience, providing audiences with a moral alternative for profane entertainment, to counter negative representations of Islam to the outside world, and financial rewards and artistic prestige.

Preserving and promoting *zawaya*

Most artists I spoke with about their reasons to participate in the festivals mentioned the general promotion of Sufism and emphasized the importance of preserving and protecting their own brotherhood. As I explained in Chapter Two, after Morocco gained independence in 1956, Sufi orders went into a state of decline due to their alleged collaboration with the French during the protectorate. As a consequence, many Moroccan Sufi orders have been struggling to survive. They have seen their brotherhoods decline over the years and some Sufi lodges now lie in ruins or are closed. Many brotherhoods live with the fear that the practices and beliefs of their order eventually will disappear. Some artists indicated to me they feel threatened by 'modernization.' This concern about the continuation of specific *zawaya* and their beliefs and practices, has propelled some Moroccan Sufi brotherhoods to participate to conduct their musical rituals on festival stages.

The display of Sufi ritual music at festival stages serves the purpose of safeguarding ways of singing, repertoires, and body techniques of trance that

are specific for a *tariqa*. For example, Ahmed is actively involved in researching how original music from various Moroccan Sufi brotherhoods must have sounded in the past. Together with a friend, who is a historian, he seeks to find original musical forms to reproduce on stage. Sometimes they even try to correct mistakes they believe were made during the transmission of musical traditions before the existence of recording technologies. About this Sufi heritage he said:

> It is me, it is us, so the [Sufi] heritage, represents me, and I represent it, and I feel it is my responsibility to protect it, keep it and cherish it (…). [In the past] there were no media, nothing to record it, so people transmitted it only through hearing, that's how it [the music] came to us, and you know well that people change (…) so the original [music] has many mistakes, especially in (…) *sama'*; how it is received, the way in which it was taught. It is different from the original, because it was never recorded, it was preserved through people, people who conducted the music, who mastered the music (…). We are interested in the origin, how was the music conducted originally, what were the subjects addressed, and what did the authors wish to say with their poems.[131]

In contrast to Ahmed, there are also artists who rather give publicity to the existence of Sufi culture in general in an innovative way, by adapting to modern trends. They are more interested in recreating and rejuvenating ritual music in a manner that draws the attention of a younger audience. These groups can equally be driven by a concern for the waning of their Sufi order, but they choose to secure its persistence by adapting and altering the repertoire to the (perceived) tastes of a diverse audience. These groups consist mainly of younger artists performing Sufi music. They tend to mix different styles, melodies and rhythms to create a new version of Sufi music, often referring to this style as *tasawwuf jadid* (new Sufism). An example is the Fes-based group Ikhwan al-Fann (Brothers of Art), led by Marouane Hajji. In their music, the lyrics are old (like traditional poems), but the musical arrangements are new. The band leader and main vocalist Marouane Hajji, explained the ambition of the band:

> Our goal is to make a new style of Sufi music, a young style, which stays true to the traditional music but which is new at the same time. We try to make a religious style but one which is young. For example, I use lively rhythms and everybody sings with me, because they know these traditional Sufi songs. This style is religious but at the same time it is rhythmical, it is a new style. Before, these songs were sung without music and instruments and with a very slow rhythm. There is nothing new

[131] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.

> in it. But what we do, there is always something new. We make religious music but with the rhythm of modernity.[132]

This restyling of traditional Sufi music Marouane speaks of, is not an entirely new phenomenon. The Moroccan music groups Jil Jilala and Nass al-Ghiwane, that rose to prominence in the 1970's, took their inspiration from various traditional Moroccan music forms, like the spiritual music of the Moroccan Jilala Sufi congregation. In 2010, Jil Jilala was invited to play at the Fes Festival for Sacred World Music. After their performance, I was briefly allowed to speak to them backstage. Although they performed at Aït Skato, one of the festival venues in the outskirts of Fes featuring predominantly Moroccan pop music like *shaʿbi*, and hip-hop groups, they told me they were delighted to once again advance Sufi music as part of the Moroccan heritage. This time they played together with Dissidenten, a German rock band, with whom they created a fusion of rock, Sufi rhythms and old *melhun* songs. To the band members of Jil Jilala, this fusion is a way for young and older generations to connect to their Moroccan heritage.[133]

Conveying Islamic messages to a wide audience

Apart from the preservation and promotion of particular brotherhoods and Sufism in general, artists also participate in the performance of Sufi musical rituals because of religious motivations. Many Sufi disciples are motivated to perform their religious music in festival settings as they feel these platforms help them to get the Islamic message across to a wider audience. Determined to spread Islam's message, over the last couple of years many *samaʿ* groups have emerged within various *turuq*. Marta Dominguez Diaz, notes how music groups of the Butshishiyya have emerged, whose music was allowed to serve as publicity in order to attract new members to the *tariqa* through Sufi music (Dominguez Diaz 2010: 166). They believe festivals and the press help them to reach more people than if they would stay in their *zawiya*. After a performance for the French radio at the Festival of World Sacred Music, members from the ʿIssawa brotherhood of the *zawiya* of Fes, pointed out something similar to me. The group's leader told me he thinks a regular performance in international music festivals helps to introduce the Islamic religion to a wide audience: 'It is better to get the audience acquainted with the sacred through music, than always stay in a secluded place.'[134] Likewise, a group of male Butshishiyya vocalists told me how delighted they were by the media attention, as they believed it would benefit the outreach of their messages:

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[132] Interview with Marouane Hajji. Fes, 12 June 2010.
[133] Interview with Jil Jilala. Fes, 10 June 2010.
[134] Interview with ʿIssawa group from Fes. Fes, 7 June 2010.

> We are satisfied with the presence of the media and all the people. We love to transmit a message, so that everyone becomes Sufi (…), we try to transmit our message, our Sufi culture from our heart (…). This message is *daʿwa ila Allah* (invitation of God). This is a message for the heart.[135]

The positive attitude towards the festivals and the macrostructures surrounding it, such as the international press is remarkable. It stands in strong contrast to the criticism and dissatisfaction frequently expressed by members of the audience, but also by the inhabitants of the old medina of Fes, about the increasing commercialization and mediatization of the ritual shows, as well as the presence of massive audiences. During the festival I met a number of visitors who felt that the enormous attention by the press and media was interfering with the personal spiritual experiences they had hoped for. Nevertheless, most artists I spoke with, saw these elements as beneficiary for the dissemination of Islam, serving the cause of *daʿwa*, as mentioned by the members of the Butshishiyya in the above quote.

The notion of *daʿwa* was frequently mentioned by my informants when they explained their reasons to play Sufi devotional music on a festival stage. *Daʿwa* is commonly defined as an Islamic equivalent of missionary activities or acts of proselytization. Such missionary activities are seen as a religious duty. This *daʿwa* can be directed to Muslims to renew their faith and educate Muslims about religious beliefs, or toward non-Muslims to draw them into Islam. As one of the members of the Butshishiyya's *samaʿ* group told me:

> The songs we perform, *dhikr* and *samaʿ*, they are full of wisdom. They show the way and how to behave. It is a message which is transmitted from heart to heart, and encourages Muslims to carry out the religious duties. With our performances we try to touch upon the foundation of Islam.[136]

This quote reveals that although the festivals are predominantly aimed at foreigners, the performing artists seek to pass on their religious messages not only to foreigners but also at a Muslim audience.

A decent alternative for profane entertainment

The performance of Sufi music on festival stages was also motivated by an objective to bring 'decent' music to Moroccan audiences, as an alternative to musical performances considered indecent, such as those shown on some TV shows and certain music festivals, like Mawazine. Various performers I spoke to

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[135] Interview with Butshishiyya group of Fes. Fes, 19 April 2010.
[136] Interview with Butshishiyya group of Fes. Fes, 19 April 2010.

mentioned this objective. After a performance of the group Imam Boussari at the Festival of Sufi Culture, I asked its leader, Hajj Mohamed Benniss, about his motivations to assemble young vocalists to perform traditional Sufi-inspired music. He answered me that: 'the ears of young Moroccans need washing, since they listen too much to vulgar music.'[137] Several other vocalists as well as *muqaddims* noted it is important for audiences to hear *dhikr* and *sama'* because this will offer the audience an alternative to improper entertainment. As Ahmed put it: 'Instead of going to see the latest music videos, a bit of *madih*, instead of dancing in a nightclub, it's better to attend a concert of *sama'*.'[138] The purpose of offering young Moroccans virtuous music was also mentioned by Marouane Hajji: 'Audiences are so used to seeing profane concerts, but this offers them something sacred instead.'[139] In addition, he noted that providing an alternative, the music does not always need to have an explicit religious message, but can also be *multazim*, engagé: 'It does not have to be only religious (*dini*), but music with a message (*risala*), a message which is *multazim*.' He explains this difference between religious (*dini*) and engagé (*multazim*):

> [Like] *sama'*, [it] is religious music, because it always addresses God, the Prophet, and his family, so it is religious music. But *multazim* music is different. (...) [Multazim music] can address peace, Palestine, Gaza, or even water, (...) nature in general. This is *multazim* singing, that is to say, they [these songs] have a message.[140]

Thus, the term *multazim* refers to something or someone being committed to ethical norms. As Marouane Hajji explains, *multazim* music does not necessarily has to address Islamic religion explicitly, but is generally accepted within religious frames since the music does not conflict with Islamic norms, and because the lyrics tackle contemporary societal subjects that involve a sense of public morality.

Countering negative representations of Islam

Apart from conveying messages of Islam to a wide audience, and providing audiences with a moral alternative for profane entertainment, many vocalists indicated that they engage in the performance of Sufi rituals in public settings in order to counter negative representations of Islam to the outside world. Many groups I spoke to emphasized tolerance towards different religions and the embrace of all religions. A vocalist of the Butshishiyya group from Fes told me that Sufism actively acts against Islamic 'extremism.' Through performing Sufi

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[137] Unrecorded informal conversation with Hajj Mohamed Beniss. Fes, 22 April 2010.
[138] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April, 2010.
[139] Interview with Marouane Hajji. Fes, 12 June 2010.
[140] Interview with members of Ikhwan al-Fann. Fes, 11 June 2010.

rituals on stage, he believed they constructed a 'moderate Islam,' one he deems is felt from the heart, and which he places in opposition to a 'radical' Islam, which is short of feelings and rigid:

> Because (…) Sufism is the moderate Islam, [it is] the middle between Islam and the extremists of Islam [it is the] intermediary Islam. The core of Islam commands us to be kindhearted to Muslims, Christians, and Jews. So we try to (…) unite everyone, because everyone is born (…) the same, under the protection of God. (…) the Prophet has told us to love everyone, even when the other does not love you, you have to love him.[141]

This is actually a remarkable statement, since, unlike the official discourses employed in lectures and advertisement of the festivals, the artists did not mention Sufism as a counterweight against an idea of 'fundamentalist' Islam very often. The emphasis was rather put on a sense of universal spirituality and religious tolerance, as was expressed by Abderrahim Amrani when he mentions:

> I love all the holy books, the four books, we accept the four books, (…) we believe in all the prophets, Yusuf [that is] Joseph, we believe in them all, it is no problem because the real mother is Eve, and the true father is Adam, we are all people of the earth.

In this interview excerpt Amrani refers to the monotheistic religions of the Book, Islam, Christianity and Judaïsm. Later in the interview he explicitly links Sufism to religious tolerance:

> This genre of spiritual music [Sufi] (…) convey[s] the image of coexistence between religions and it conveys this image of peace and compassion.[142]

Amrani's statements resonate some of the discourses present in the festivals' narratives of interfaith dialogue and universal spirituality, described above, such as religious tolerance and stressing of common elements between different religious traditions.

Financial rewards and artistic prestige

The Sufi orders and individual artists are also motivated to perform at the festivals because they benefit from these festival stages in terms of financial rewards and artistic prestige. The performances on festival stages have brought

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[141] Interview Butshishiyya group of Fes. Fes, 19 April 2010.
[142] Interview with Abderrahim Amrani. Fes, 5 June 2010.

some performers considerable wealth and fame. Some vocalists of *zawaya* have even reached the point that they can make a living out of these public performances. Next to the habitual performances at domestic settings such as weddings, birth parties and circumcisions, as well as the regular concerts performed during Ramadan and the birthday of the Prophet, the festivals secure them with a considerable income during the summer months.

Besides financial benefits, performing at these international festivals also brings the artists prestige, which is a crucial element in building a reputation and gaining access to a wider musical market. Participating in festivals on national and international levels, as well as in domestic celebrations enhances vocalists' reputation and increases their career opportunities, as well as the fees paid. As the leaders of the ʿIssawa and Hamadsha explained in a joint interview to me:

> The demand and height of salaries depend on the classification or the profile of the group and their reputation. There are still groups who are at the beginning, and there are groups which are average. [Initially] it is the wedding parties and the festivals which give them their name. Afterwards they are in demand a lot because they have this reputation.[143]

The amount of the payments thus depends on the classification of the group. A group that has much stage experience and is well known receives more money. In other words, playing at festival stages improves their reputation, and the chances to be asked to perform in big events the next time. The higher the reputation, the higher the financial reward. Some artists have built such a good name that they are invited in selection committees of festivals. Others have taken up leadership of one or several groups as a manager like Abderrahim Amrani did. They have started to organize performances, handle public relations for their groups, and direct performances.

Practices: on-stage and off-stage

In spite of the suggestion of spiritual authenticity, the on-stage practices do not correspond quite to the dynamics of the practices of prayer, meditation, and ecstasy carried out within *zawaya*. Several of my interlocutors told me that not every Sufi order presents all aspects of their ritual sessions on stage. For example, just before going on stage in his white *jellaba* (D. traditional long robe with long sleeves and a hood) and white turban, a *munshid* of the Sqalliyya order told me that what the audiences see is just a selection of certain rites. He made a comparison with a train track: 'There are many stations in our ceremonies, but

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[143] Interview with the *muqaddim*s of the ʿIssawa and Hamadsha of Fes. 5 June, Fes.

on stage there are only a few stations we stop at, others we pass by. For example, the *hadra*, the *hadra* we pass by.'[144] Likewise, the Butshishiyya group from Fes told me the following about how what they show on the stage relates to their ritual activities in the *zawiya*:

> On stage we only show the songs, the *dhikr* and prayer. In the *zawiya* we have a calendar for the rituals (…). Like on Mondays we do the *latif*, on Tuesdays we do the *dhikr* of putting out the light, we close our eyes and try to connect with God. While we invoke the presence of God we whisper, we do *dhikr* within our selves, not using our outer voices, you cannot hear it. On Wednesdays we conduct the *sura* al-Yassine [chapter in Qurʾan], the heart of the Qurʾan, and we remember the birth of the Prophet, and sometimes we chant (*wazifa*). [145] When these songs are found to be good by the shaykh, we do *hadra*. But what you saw tonight was only ten percent of what we normally do.[146]

In the choices made as to whether and how certain ritual music practices should be brought to the stage and what elements should be shown or left out, three main considerations play a role: the power of music, religious scholars, and the protection of audiences and sacred knowledge.

Deliberations about whether Sufi rituals can or cannot be displayed on stage, and if they can, what parts are allowed to be presented to an audience, appear to be grounded in an underlying belief in music as a powerful force that should be handled carefully. The power of ritual music was often described by my interlocutors in terms of the senses, sentiments, and transformative emotions. This is well illustrated when Ahmed's friend describes what happens to him when he hears Ahmed sing:

> When Ahmed sings (…) I become another man, I no longer see the world, I only see Ahmed, and that's it, it is magic, and sometimes I start to cry. It moves [me], the words, the melody, and the rhythm.[147]

As I have explained briefly in Chapter Three, within Sufism certain musical practices are considered a significant pathway to the realization of spiritual transformations in a human being. Certain types of musical practices are believed to facilitate this spiritual realization. Yassine Habibi, who is a member of the *zawiya* Habibiyya in Meknes, and the principal vocalist of a music group

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[144] Informal unrecorded conversation with *munshid* of Sqaliyya *tariqa*. 21 April 2010, Fes.

[145] The term *wazifa* refers to formulae of repetitive recitations during collective *dhikr* sessions, specific for a particular brotherhood. These are often held secret by the disciples (Dominguez Diaz 2010: 28).

[146] Interview with Butshishiyya group of Fes. Fes, 19 April 2010.

[147] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.

called Ruh, explained to me his view on the relationship between music and *ruh* (spirit, soul):

> [*Ruh*], (...) it means the spirit, the soul. Things that come from the soul are naturally pure and they go directly to the souls of others (...). The word *ruh* comes from Islam [it is] what we call the spirit, something from the very inside. For example, when you listen to some *mawwal*, and it makes you cry, it touches your *ruh*, [but] not your heart. (...) it is not the heart but the *ruh*, it is different. (...) [Like] we are living now, we breathe, we talk, this is *ruh*. The Qurʾan says: "They ask you about the *ruh,*" [Qurʾan 17/ 85] which means if people asked the Prophet about *ruh*.[148] And God told him to answer: "Tell them the *ruh* is something special to God." So the soul is something special that God has made inside us. In other words, there is the heart, but the thing that moves the heart is the soul. It is a magic creation of God.[149]

Yassine's description refers to the belief in Sufism that music can be used as a tool which heightens the senses and consciousness of a human being enabling to perceive the presence of God with the heart. According to Sufi conceptions of anatomy, the human being is composed of various elements and sub-elements like the body, the self (*nafs*), the heart (*qalb*) and the soul or spirit (*ruh*). The heart is not considered merely a physical organ, it is also a spiritual organ, which connects the body to the soul. Sensory practices are believed to bring the listener in a certain state and attune the heart to God, enabling a transformation of the soul. These embodied practices can be prayer, *dhikr*, but also listening to certain kinds of music. According to the 12th century Muslim philosopher al-Ghazzali, listening to music can develop the heart, impelling the soul towards spiritual transformation: 'After the sound has reached the ear it is perceived by an inward sense in the heart' (al-Ghazzali as translated by MacDonald 1901: 230, cited in Kapchan 2007: 44). The centrality of the senses, the heart, and the soul recurs in the descriptions by my interlocutors, when they speak about ritual music. As one member of the Butshishiyya group from Fes put it: 'By singing with heart and soul, we create sentiments towards God.'[150]

This belief in music as a power to evoke religious sentiments and a channel to the soul, influences ideas regarding whether, what, and how ritual musical practices can be displayed on festival stages in front of an international audience. For the artists, an important point of reference to engage in staged performances of devotional rituals are the views of religious scholars and shaykhs on this matter.

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[148] Here Yassine Habibi refers to a verse from the Qurʾan, Sura al-Israa 17:85: 'They ask you about "the spirit". Say: "The spirit descends by the command of my Lord, but you have been given only a little knowledge.'

[149] Interview with Yassine Habibi. Meknes, 2 December 2011.

[150] Interview with Butshishiyya group of Fes during the Festival of Sufi Culture. Fes, 19 April 2010.

Although within the festivals' discourses, Sufism is presented as a branch of Islam that embraces the use of music, within Sufism there are restrictions too in the use of music. During the fieldwork among artists of staged Sufi music, it turned out there were many restraints and sensibilities regarding the performance of ritual music in staged settings. In some cases the shaykh of a *tariqa* must first agree that the disciples sing on the radio, television, or festival stages. In interviews and conversations I had with one shaykh and several artists about their motivation to perform rituals on stage, many referred to the opinions of religious scholars (*fuqaha'*).

The performance of ritual music practices, with or without instruments, on festival stages for non-adept audiences is sometimes called into question by various Sufi orders and *fuqaha'*. The largest reservation towards bringing ritual music to public stages mainly revolves around *dhikr*. *Dhikr* is the ritual most disputed in debates on what kind of religious music and vocal practice can or cannot be staged. There are *fuqaha'* who believe that the close relationship with God is built through *dhikr*. Exposing this intimacy in front of an audience is considered utterly inappropriate and disturbs this connection. Ahmed 's friend, the historian, explained to me:

> The *fuqaha'* (Islamic scholars), they prohibit to do this [*dhikr*] on stage. Such rituals need a special place [to be carried out] (...) a reasonable place to study *dhikr* is the *zawiya*, not a concert stage. Everything which has a relation with the soul and God cannot be presented before an audience. [Because] once the relation with God comes into play it's *ruh* (...), [that's when] the soul (...) comes into play. It is a relation between man and God [and it] should not be in front of an audience, because [then] the spirit of the singer will always be with the audience, and not with God.[151]

This quotation advances a view which was also frequently mentioned by the performers in interviews; *dhikr* is a religious obligation, like prayer and fasting, and enhances the building of an intimate relationship between the performer and God. Some of the artists feel that performing *dhikr* on stage, and the adaptations made to it in the process, detracts this relationship with God, and may even jeopardize their own religiosity. A vocalist belonging to the Sqaliyya *tariqa*, but who also frequently performs with other Sufi groups, shared with me his experiences of the difference between performing rituals in his *zawiya* or on a stage:

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[151] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.

> In the *zawiya* it [*dhikr*] is so strong, much stronger than on stage. In front of an audience, you prepare your singing, you have rehearsals, and you look for the best way to present the music and the group to the public. It should be very good and very controlled. In a *zawiya* we do not bother to please an audience. In the *zawiya* I feel different because there is a spiritual atmosphere. Also, in the *zawiya* we sit on the ground, we sit wherever we want (…) we take off our shoes because it [the *zawiya*] is sacred, it is like the mosque, we cannot enter it with shoes (…). But on stage, we are in front of a public, we sit in a line, sometimes on chairs, we use microphones, it is not the same.[152]

Within Sufism, musical rituals have the primary function to construct a relationship with the divine and to reach closeness to Allah, through a state of trance. In the same conversation, Ahmed pointed out that the presence of an audience is a distractive element in his trance. Instead of practicing a long breath, or evoking a trance through meditation and recitals and collective prayers, he is now focused on pleasing an audience eager to witness and share religious experiences.

A second element which is regarded as unwanted by some *turuq*, concerns the divulgation of ritual formulae and ceremonial sequences before a non-adept audience. The confidentiality of the sequence of the litanies, which is considered very important, is referred to by several scholars who worked on Sufi orders and their rituals. Marta Diaz Dominguez's doctoral study on the Butshishiyya congregation in Morocco and Western Europe, mentions the protection of the *tariqa*'s particular litanies, which are considered sacred (Dominguez Diaz 2010: 28, 56, 152-153). Jonathan Shannon has reported a similar tendency among members of Sufi orders in Syria, to shield certain parts of ritual sessions from display on concert stages. He notes:

> The aesthetic and moral dimensions of the choice of repertoire for recording and live performance are not insignificant; the members of the Hilaliyya *zawiya* and other [*zawaya*] (…) conveyed a desire to keep part of the *dhikr* experience, its core, in the *zawiya* and off stage; they were weary of revealing what they thought to be the essence of *dhikr*, including portions in which participants may experience ecstatic emotional states (Shannon 2011: 14).

Deborah Kapchan, too, observed hesitation among Gnawa performers to show all elements of the ritual *lila* on European stages (2007: 157).

The artists' scrutiny of what part of the rituals can be shown and which should be withheld from an audience, was also phrased as a drive to protect the

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[152] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.

audience. When I asked artists what parts of their rituals they thought would, or would not be allowed to be shown on stage, most of them responded that they saw no harm in *sama'* and *madih*, but were hesitant toward *dhikr* and *hadra*. Reasons not to display specific parts of the ritual music were often presented as a protection measure for the audience. As explained above, *dhikr*, is believed to establish a direct relationship with God, causing intense emotions within the audience. As for the *hadra*, Abderrahim Amrani of the Hamadsha in Fes told me that Sufi orders cannot perform all stages of a ritual session. Some *hadra*s are believed to be so powerful, that they could be dangerous to the audience.[153]

Despite these objections, the majority of artists defended the performance of devotional rituals on stage since they believe it helps to get a message about Islam across. Several of them pointed that there are also religious scholars who approve of performing ritual sessions on a stage, as it attracts people to Islam.[154] In that case, the power attributed to music as a force facilitating a direct connection to the divine, is used as a central reason to display rituals on stage for an audience. A group of 'Issawa performers explained to me their considerations in performing *dhikr* on stage:

> Especially when we are in front of an audience we evoke God, there is the *dhikr*, which means the evocation of God, glorification of God. For us it is very good the audience can listen to this, it provides them with another dimension, another approach. They are used to see the profane, and we bring them something sacred. [We should] not stay enclosed in a secluded place, one has to go out and take people along towards this [divine presence].[155]

Different *turuq* thus employ different sets of limitations as what to show on stage or not. Some refuse to do *dhikr* on stage or intense trances, others do not. In the previous section I have shown that long ritual sessions are often compressed to formats that fit a staged setting and the length of a concert. However, the choice of what elements of the rituals are shown, and what is left out is not only defined by the request of festival organizers who demand groups to display the most festive parts of their ritual repertoire. The choice can also be ordained by a shaykh, who builds on advice of *fuqaha'*, as well as the outcome of the artists' own perceptions of restraints and sensibilities regarding the use of ritual music in staged settings. The debates among religious scholars, audiences, and artists on the permissibility of the performance of religious rituals like *dhikr*

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[153] Unrecorded informal conversation with Abderrahim Amrani. Fes, 9 June 2010.
[154] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.
[155] Interview with 'Issawa group of Fes. Fes, 7 June 2010.

in a staged setting, play an important role in the artists' assessment of the festival settings.

Performers' perspectives regarding state cultural politics

Almost all artists were mainly positive in interviews regarding their participation in the festivals. Yet, behind the scenes some of them, nevertheless, showed a certain dissatisfaction and ambivalence towards some aspects of the festivals. These critical observations concerned the state's cultural politics related to the revival of Sufism, a sense of dependency of the Moroccan state, as well as a lack of influence on the performance of their on-stage rituals. In this section these three reservations of artists towards the festivals stages will be explored.

The state run platforms for 'sacred' music are part of the state cultural politics, envisioning a revival of Sufism. These cultural politics offer the brotherhoods with an opportunity to promote themselves. This might explain why critical attitudes towards the state's cultural politics were hardly expressed in interviews. Some artists did mention the cultural politics under King Mohammed VI, but in a rather neutral way, like Ahmed:

> Now with the new politics of his Majesty who is interested in cultural activities. (…) he attaches much importance to the cultural heritage, and makes people acquainted with our patrimony.[156]

Muhand, a guardian of a local *zawiya* in Meknes, and a musical director of several professional Sufi music groups that perform in festivals for sacred and Sufi music, was one of the few artists who expressed an openly critical attitude towards state politics. He believes that the recent support of Sufism under the new policy of Mohammed VI largely serves political relations and that the state is not really interested in the survival of particular brotherhoods: 'The state (*dawla*) is only interested in the festivals, and the protocols.' This is demonstrated, according to Muhand, by the absence of a decent musical education system in Morocco. He feels that if the Moroccan state would truly be interested in Sufi music, it would invest in music education:

> What they call here [in Morocco] conservatories, are actually low level music schools where they only teach Andalusian music (…). I do not understand this. In the 1950s *melhun* music was very popular and it is very Moroccan. Now they only teach Andalusian music in the music centers. [157]

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[156] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.
[157] Interview with Muhand. Fes, 22 March 2011.

Muhand also disagrees with the investments made by the state in international artists, while he sees the Sufi brotherhoods and their heritage decline. He would prefer the government to invest in the Moroccan traditional heritage, instead of flying in extravagantly expensive international artists such as Ben Harper from the United States or Nancy Ajram from Lebanon. Muhand wonders why the Moroccan state would not invest in their own musical heritage: 'Why doesn't the government appoint a *muqaddim* of each *tariqa*, give them a monthly salary and give them a couple of years to construct a professional music group?' Not only Muhand, but several Sufi artists feel devalued compared to the financial offerings made to international celebrities, yet are powerless, as they rely on the fees paid, however small. As Muhand states: 'I really do not care about the political protocol I have to admit, but what can I do, the pay is lousy, but at least they offer us stages on which to perform'[158]

The state-supported platforms for 'sacred' music thus offer the brotherhoods with an opportunity to promote themselves, but at the same time they have grown dependent on these state-sponsored music events. They very much need the income they receive from this for their livelihood. This dependency results from the decline of the Sufi brotherhoods, as well as a competition over the domestic market by *anashid* bands. Muhand told me that in the past, popular Sufi groups frequently played at weddings, birth parties, and circumcision, but that this market has decreased: Less and less people adhere to a Sufi brotherhood, and moreover, families increasingly turn to modern groups for family celebrations. In the cities they hire mainly the *mujmuʿat*. The *mujmuʿat* (D. literally 'groups') Muhand refers to here are the *anashid* groups which have emerged at domestic celebrations in the 1990s in Morocco. I will speak about these groups in the next chapter.

Several artists also sensed a lack of influence on how to present their rituals on stage. Many artists I spoke with are well aware that staged practices do not correspond to the dynamics of the ritual practices of meditation, trance, and prayer carried out in a *zawiya*. In some cases this is intentional to protect the audience, the core of the brotherhood's sacred traditions, or their own religiosity, but in other cases artists feel they have little influence on how they wish to participate in the festivals. Muhand, for example, told me repeatedly how much he seeks to present 'pure Sufi music' to the audience, but feels restricted by the demands of the organization, which insists on a quick pace and entertaining rhythms:

> When you come and do Sufi [music] (…) you have to do something hot [*skhuna* D., fast]. If you do something cold (*bard*, slow), they [the festival organizers] will tell

[158] Interview with Muhand. Fes, 22 March 2011.

> you: "I want something hot!" If you wish to show (…) the Sufi soul *(ruh sufiyya*), and make some money, you have to make sure you pick light (*khfif* D., entertaining) rhythms (*iqaʿat*), and that you put up something entertaining. So here we do not sing calm songs, you understand, (…) we only do something hot.[159]

Such demands by festival organizers ordering groups to display the most festive parts of their ritual repertoire that fosters an exotic atmosphere, show to what degree the Sufi rituals on festival stages are indeed re-framed in a setting where entertainment, spectacle, and consumption is the dominant presentational mode.

Chanters from different Moroccan Sufi orders are expected to put on a spiritual show constructed for a mediatized and staged context. This does not only change the rituals at the level of form and setting, but the meaning and experience of the ritual sessions changes as well. Some artists see this translation of their ritual practices to a stage-adopted version as a loss of spirituality, as Ahmed expressed it earlier on in this chapter. However, in different interviews it turned out that artists do not experience the rituals on stage as completely stripped from religious meaning. Some disciples, for example, perform prayers and purification rituals before going on stage and also during their performances. I observed this at several occasions. Once, a *munshid* and his friend shared with me what ritual practices he and his fellow performers engage in prior to a concert and why:

> Several [of us *munshidin*] take off [our shoes], (…) [makes sure] we are clean, we call this *al-wudu'* (ablutions) in Arabic. (…) This is before the prayer, we wash ourselves with water. We wash our hands, our faces, the feet, we prepare ourselves to conduct the prayer (…) we make sure we are clean in our spirits, bodies, and clothing. (…) [because] it is heavy, the poems we sing, [they] are heavy, so that has to be prepared [properly]. (…) because we say Allah and sacred words, (…) it is sacred.[160]

Next to conducting the ritual ablutions and prayers, performing *dhikr* before a concert was also mentioned as an important aspect in retaining one's religious integrity. Like Ahmed stated:

> If you only perform *samaʿ* on stage, but without doing your *dhikr* or your prayer [beforehand], (…) [if] you do nothing [of these rituals], it's like you are Michael Jackson.[161]

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[159] Interview with Muhand. Fes, 22 March 2011.

[160] Recorded informal conversation with a *munshid* and his friend of the Sharqawiyya order, prior to a concert. Fes, 20 April 2010.

[161] Interview with Ahmed. Fes, 25 April 2010.

Such purifying practices, together with a concern about managing sacred knowledge, and retaining their own religiosity, bring down a potential dichotomy waiting in the wings. Several scholars studying staged Sufi rituals have pointed to the constructed nature of the performances, suggesting that the off-stage rituals in a *zawiya* or a mosque are real and authentic, whereas the staged rituals are merely constructed (El-Asri & Vuillemenot 2010; Condevaux 2009; Shannon 2011). Shannon's concept of 'Suficization' for instance, or El-Asri & Vuillemenot's notion of 'World Sufism,' raises interesting questions about origin and authenticity in relation to what is sacred and what is secular. But, describing the performances of Sufi disciples in festivals as merely 'Suficized' (constructed in a secular setting) seems problematic to me. Although financial incentives are important, I do not believe that to the artists, the rituals have become 'a mere product of commodification and mass consumption in today's global market' (Cook 2001). Such an analysis takes agency away from the artist to determine and co-create the meanings attributed to their staged rituals.

Based on my field results, this contrast between so-called 'real' religious rituals and staged commercial performances turns out to be much more nuanced and complex. The views of artists about their on-stage ritual activities do not coincide with any dichotomous contrast between 'the original' and 'the staged.' By contrast, the careful selection of what ritual parts they (do not) want to share with a festival audience in order to protect consecrated knowledge of their particular brotherhood and their own religiosity, the purifying rituals conducted before and during a concert, and the view of festival stages as a pre-eminent platform to perform *daʿwa*, indicate that their on-stage ritual performances can also be looked at as an extension of religious acts and even a form of resistance against the state's discursive appropriation of Sufism.

Within the parameters of the festivals, the artists create conditions to perform and signify their musical practices on their own terms. This fits into conceptualizations that emphasize the complexities and ambivalences of everyday forms of resistance (Abu-Lughod 1990; Scott 1985, 1990). Especially James Scott's notion of 'hidden' and 'public transcripts' can be applied on the agency the Sufi artists create for themselves here. Scott argues that subaltern groups abide by the actions and narratives of the dominant 'on-stage' (the public transcript of being ruled), but express criticism behind the scenes, in an 'off-stage' context (the hidden transcript). Building further on Scott's notion of transcripts, these artists are not uncontestedly a subaltern group, as they have access to, and perform public transcripts about Islam on, state-sponsored stages. However, the artists are also in an unequal relation of dependency towards the festival organizers and sponsors. Interestingly, their 'hidden-transcript' is not performed 'off-stage,' but literally takes place on-stage. In their musical practices and meaning-giving narratives, they adopt the dominant conventions and styles

of performance of the festivals, in which they manage to achieve subtle acts of subversion. These on-stage performances of hidden transcripts framed within the guise of a public transcript, create spaces through which they are able to retain control over spiritual knowledge, their own religiosity, and the meaning of their musical rituals.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have explored the staging of musical rituals from Moroccan Sufi orders on two state sponsored stages for 'sacred' music: the Festival of World Sacred Music and the Festival of Sufi Culture, both annually held in Fes. I have looked in particular at how these new settings have changed the nature, form, and meaning of the rituals, as well as how various stakeholders, commercial and political forces, and especially the artists, are involved in the staging of Sufi music.

The performances of ritual Sufi music at the Festival of World Sacred Music and the Festival of Sufi Culture are enmeshed in macro-structures of media, commerce, world music, and tourism. These commercial structures in which the Sufi performances are set, are intertwined with the recent state-driven revival of national cultural heritage and Sufism as a symbol for religious tolerance in the fight against 'radical' Islam. These processes are often presented in reinvented narratives on national tradition (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), history, and inter-faith dialogue, echoing French colonial discourses on 'Moroccan Islam.' These elements involve power structures and cultural narratives of what is worth preserving and displaying.

The re-contextualization of musical rituals from *zawaya* to these festival stages has generated profound changes in the forms, function, and meaning of the rituals, as well as in the role of the vocal performers. For one, it has caused a transformation of religious rituals in icons of a 'moderate' Islam, the national patrimony, and brings about a commodification of religious experiences as a product for tourist consumption. These commercial and political structures are nevertheless important agents in the production and support of stages for the display of spiritual music, and offer support and publicity to the declining Moroccan brotherhoods. Simultaneously their performances and religiosity have been appropriated, incorporated, and instrumentalized in the national arena of cultural politics and its concomitant discourses.

Yet, the disciples, who in some cases have grown to be professional artists, are not merely passive victims of these larger structures. They also show agency. These performers use the stage to promote their specific brotherhood, spread the message of Islam, and gain a livelihood. They also determine the display of their rituals by making selections of which ritual practices to show and how to present them in their performance, while trying to maintain the religious value

of their ritual performance in a commercial setting, such as conducting purification rites before and at their concerts.

The message that the festival organizers try to get across is largely supported by the majority of performers who participate in the festivals, particularly, the message of universal spirituality, interfaith dialogue, and 'moderate' Islam, anchored in the national patrimony of Morocco. But they also have their own messages and incentives, and arrange their repertoires to these changing structures of musical practices. Artists adapt, but they also contribute to the changing musical practices. Whether driven by the wish to promote a 'moderate' Islam, to preserve original musical forms, or to attract people to Islam, the display of religious rituals in public settings results in the transformation of these ceremonies, both in form and meaning. The relocation and translation is a constant negotiation process between different actors, in which the artists are actively involved, and in which not only aesthetical and commercial considerations play a role, but also ethical ones.



5 *Anashid* in Morocco

History, practices, and performers

'We sing because we have a goal in life. I think music organizes a person's life, and serves the world, and it helps in the construction of good societies.'[162]

[162] Interview with Hicham Karim. Kénitra, 21 August 2010.

Fieldnotes

14 November, 2011 – It's a cool evening in early November. I am in the house of the Belkacem family who, since a month or so, has been helping me getting introduced to a local network of *anashid* performers connected to the Jamaʿat al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan, the illegitimate Justice and Benevolence Association (JBA). We have just had dinner and are about to leave to see an *anashid* band perform at the celebration for a seven-day-old baby (*subuʿ*). Two weeks ago I had an interview with Mustafa, the bandleader, who invited me to this concert. Mustafa's brother Farid had become father to a baby boy; and invited his brother's band to play at the celebration. Before leaving the house, mother Belkacem helps me to put on a headscarf. 'You are not obliged' says father Belkacem, 'but it would be more, let's say, respectful.' Father Belkacem and Mustafa succeeded getting me into this man-only concert. By wearing a *hijab* I felt I would make my presence somewhat more acceptable and easier for all parties. Mother Belkacem is very excited and expresses her hopes for me becoming a Muslim in the future: 'You look so beautiful with the *hijab*! One day.. God willing (*inshallah*).'

We arrive at the scene in a middle class neighbourhood. On the street, alongside the house of Farid, a big tent has been put up by the caterer who also provides for food and drinks. Earlier that day the women of the family had their celebration there. Now the tent is slowly filling up with men and boys of different ages, taking place at the dressed up tables. In the back of the tent the band builds up its equipment and are testing their microphones: 'One, two, three, Allah,... Allah,... Allah.' We are being seated behind a concrete pole, out of sight of the male guests. If I lean over I can just see the legs of the bandmembers. Father Belkacem helps me out with this problem by taking my camera into the tent, taking pictures, then returning, and explaining to me what is happening. I see nine men wearing grey suits and red ties seated on folding chairs behind microphones. Some of them hold percussion instruments. There are no melodic instruments.

The band starts with a recitation from the Qurʾan. During the third song we have all moved carefully from behind the pole. I can now see the band, and they are standing up. The artists make hand gestures directed at the audience, encouraging them to clap along with the music. After that, one of the singers starts a speech about the revival of Islamic faith (*tajdid al-iman*). Then they perform a song about Amina, the mother of the Prophet, followed by a song about the Prophet's daughter, Fatima. The name of the new-born child, and of his father and uncles are called throughout the songs. Only voice and percussion is used. I can hear ululations of the women inside the house. Now and then, Mustafa sets in a captivating melismatic vocal improvisation (*mawwal*), which is received by sighs and applause by the audience. In between the songs the band members tell jokes and give moral advice concerning the upbringing of children, frequently referring to the holy scriptures.

When the band starts singing some upbeat *anashid* in Tamazight, an older man in a brown *jellaba* stands up and approaches the band. He enthusiastically starts clapping his hands in the air, rhythmically moving his shoulders, lifting his arms, swaying his upper body back and forth. Other people start doing the same thing. Father Belkacem explains that this is actually not intended. People are allowed to react spontaneously to the songs, but only in a controlled manner. The ways to express your feelings of joy should be regulated. The excitement was caused by the band playing upbeat Amazigh folk songs. The host and many of the guests are Imazighen from the South Western Souss region and have invited this particular band because their specialty is *anashid* with influences from Amazigh music and Moroccan popular songs. Then food is being served and the band takes a break. During the break a CD with soft music is played to avoid a silence, and maybe to tone down the excitement a little bit.

During the break I get the chance to speak to a couple of members of the band, who join me near the pole. I noticed that the band did not play the songs in the same order as the set list, which father Belkacem gave me before the concert. Mustafa explains to me that the band does not always follow the exact sequence of the songs on the set list. They rather sense and play into the atmosphere of the celebration. Depending on the reaction of the audience, they can change the sequence of the songs. They were happy that the Amazigh songs were received very enthusiastically by the audience and tell me they will play some more 'popular' Moroccan songs after the break.

After the break the band plays 'Allah Ya Moulana' a well-known Moroccan folk song, which has been reinterpreted by the famous 1960s band Nass al-Ghiwane. When more Amazigh songs follow, there is more dancing going on in a corner at the back of the tent. Some adolescents start to climb and dance on the tables. Farid, the host, is also getting excited and starts to dance. The guests form a circle around him clapping and singing, blessing him with hand gestures. The caterer gets angry telling the people to step down from the tables. Maybe to calm the people, the band starts a tranquil *inshad* about the Prophet 'As-salaʿala Muhammad ya Rabbi,' 'Pray for Muhammad, o lord.'

Before the concert ends we head home. I am startled. I have never seen such a lively *anashid* performance before. Mother Belkacem indicates that this is exactly the point of such *anashid* bands, to show people that Islam and Islamic movements can be fun: 'In Islam, people are allowed to have fun! We are *nayda* (lively, moving, awake) too!' she exclaims, as we walk back home through the night.[163]

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[163] Drawn from fieldnotes, 14 November 2011.

Introduction

Mother Belkacem's reaction to my observation of the concert is significant. In Morocco *anashid* music has a rather dull image and is often subject of public mockery. I remember that during my fieldwork many people responded in disbelief and chuckled when I told them I was studying *anashid* music. This may partly have had to do with the 'un-cool' aura of this music genre, which uses no melodic instruments, but only voice and some light and calm percussion. But even more so, in public discourse *anashid* are often linked to 'Islamism,' which over the last decade (as we have seen in Chapter Three), has been increasingly stigmatized by the Moroccan state.[164] In contrast to the official promotion of Sufi music, *anashid* music has been barred from state-supported stages for musical activities and religious entertainment in Morocco. Yet, although less visible to the public eye, there is a vibrant *anashid* scene in Morocco, which constitutes a growing branch of the country's Islamic musical entertainment. According to one interviewee, hundreds of *anashid* ensembles exist in Casablanca alone.[165] Yet, this niche of Islamic entertainment has hardly ever been studied. Despite the increasing popularity of *anashid* music and its presence in the Moroccan music market, the majority of publications dealing with Islam-inspired music in Morocco focus on music from the Sufi brotherhoods (Curtis 2007; Kapchan 2007; Schuyler 1985; Waugh 2005; Witulsky 2009).

This chapter consists of five sections. The first section gives a description of the historical development of *anashid* in the Muslim world and specifically in Morocco. After that, I focus on the present-day composition of the Moroccan *anashid* scene. The third section concentrates on the artists: their background, the development of their careers, and the objectives they envisage. The section that follows deals with the musical practices employed and the artists' perspectives on them. In the final part of the chapter I discuss the perspectives of the *anashid* artists on the Moroccan state cultural politics.

Anashid in the Muslim world

The word *anashid*, which is the plural form of the Arabic word *inshad* or *unshuda*, refers to the raising of one's voice, and can loosely be translated as 'chanting' or 'reciting' poetry with or without instrumental accompaniment (Barendregt 2011b: 35). A general misunderstanding in literature about *anashid*, is that the

[164] When I spoke with my Moroccan agnostic friends about my research, they often labeled my research group as *intégristes*, or *khwanji*. *Intégristes* is a French term, which in Morocco is used to refer to 'Islamic fundamentalists.' *Khwanji*, literary meaning 'of the brotherhood,' deriving from Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood, is another pejorative label attributed to people associated with Islamism. The labeling of performers of *anashid* with these categories indicates the social stigma that its performers carry. Especially in leftist and nationalist circles there is a stereotypical picture that the performers of Islamic *anashid* are lamentable Muslim fanatics.

[165] Informal conversation with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 11 October 2011.

term is often explained as 'Islamic hymns,' or 'Islamic songs.' However, *anashid* do not always have a religious connotation. During my field research, many of my interlocutors got confused when I asked questions about *anashid*: 'What kind of *anashid* do you mean?' I often got as a response. One of my interviewees, Hassan, a 50 year old musician and connoisseur of music within al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan, and a composer and studio producer of Islamic *anashid*, explained to me: 'Artistically, *anashid* just means a song, a song of which the subject is not necessarily religious; it can also revolve around the fatherland, just as *anashid* can also be military or children's songs.'[166]

Hassan's remark that the term *anashid* refers to 'just a song,' is similar to the description in the lemma on *anashid* in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Amon Shiloa notes:

> The term *nashid*, (...), probably took on its musical connotation at the time when the melodious recitation of poetry in public became fashionable. The term as it appears in literature relating to music, from the 3rd/9th century onward, denotes, in addition to its general sense of singing, various forms associated with scholarly music (Shiloa 2014).[167]

This lemma does not mention any religious characteristics or properties of *anashid*. As Hassan noted, linguistically the term *anashid* primarily refers to a musical tradition of vocal songs that is sung *a capella* and is sometimes accompanied by light percussion instruments. This ties in with the fact that in Classical Arabic the term *anshada* is always used with respect to secular poetry. For Qurʾanic verses, the verb *qara'a* or *aqra'a* is used. It can thus be assumed that the term *anashid* itself is not originally linked to Islamic texts.

There are several accounts about the origins of *anashid*. In academic literature, Islamic *anashid* are often linked to Sufi chants and Classical Arabic religious poetry of the time of the Prophet (Haenni & Tammam 2003; Haenni 2005: 23). Muslim audiences, as well as *anashid* artists, also commonly trace the origins of *anashid* back to the time of the Prophet. Other studies that address the early developments of *anashid* in the Muslim world, locate its history within the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic student activism in Egypt (Haenni & Tammam 2003, 2004; Barendregt 2008: 235; Said 2012; Van Nieuwkerk 2013: 192).

Probably, *anashid* were appropriated by Islamic movements as 'Islamic,' because the musical features corresponded with certain Islamic regulations prohibiting the use of melodic instruments (as explained in the introduction to

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[166] Interview with Hassan. Casablanca, 18 September 2010.

[167] Shiloah, A. (2012). Nashid. In *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from http://referenceworks.brill-lonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nashid-SIM_5813, accessed on 5 January 2014.

the present thesis). According to religious scholars, only singing by men (with 'correct' words) without musical instruments is allowed. The adoption of *anashid* as 'Islamic songs' allowed Islamic movements and groups holding puritan attitudes towards musical entertainment, to combine Islam with music. This 'music' was mainly used as a tool to spread political-religious messages. Islamic activist movements propagated Islam as a socio-political ideology resisting colonization (Barendregt 2011: 235; Haenni 2005: 23; Van Nieuwkerk 2013: 192; Said 2012: 865, 875). In an article on *jihadi anashid*, Behnam Said mentions publications by the Muslim Brotherhood from as early as the 1950s calling for 'Islamic music' to counter imperialist representations of Islam (2012: 870).

According to this information, the term *anashid* may have acquired a religious meaning only when the genre was taken up by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Islamic activist groups at university campuses in the 1950s. This possible explanation was confirmed during my fieldwork as several informants emphasized that *anashid* initially developed against a social-political background (sometimes Marxist), not a religious one, starting out with songs against the colonizer.[168] I have mentioned in Chapter Two that the Muslim Brotherhood had developed a notion of Islamic revival based on a social ideology opposing British occupation and the perceived ongoing political and economic oppression by the West (Barendregt 2011; Lia 1998; Meijer 2009). The urge to counter Western influences was voiced through a call for a return to the traditions of the Prophet. This body of thought was not only articulated verbally but also enacted in a set of everyday bodily practices such as clothing and speech (Maréchal 2008: 16). As such it is likely that *anashid* contributed to the expression and mobilization of these politico-religious ideas.

Although some studies trace *anashid* back to the ritual music of the Sufi brotherhoods, the two musical traditions have a different style, are performed in different contexts and are perceived to differ in meaning and purpose. The ritual music of the Sufi brotherhoods (*turuq*) exclusively addresses God, the Prophet and religious scriptures, and seeks to cultivate a state of trance leading to a proximity with a divine presence. *Anashid* are not performed with the aim to invoke a trance within its performers or listeners, and the lyrics can cover a wide variety of topics like politics, culture, social concerns and economy. Whether Islamic *anashid* share roots with Sufi ritual chants, or only acquired a religious connotation with the adoption of the genre by the Muslim Brotherhood in their fight against colonization, its admission into Islamic activist movements certainly influenced the further development of the genre.

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[168] Unrecorded conversation with an anonymous connoisseur of *anashid*. Rabat, 18 October 2011.

As the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood spread across the Muslim world, so did Islamic *anashid*. The exile of the Muslim Brotherhood to neighboring countries in the 1950s and 1960s, due to the repression by the post-colonial Nasser regime in Egypt, brought Islamic *anashid* to other countries in the Muslim world and also to the Arabian Peninsula.[169] From the early 1970s onward, the genre became mainly known through youth camps and later within the context of Islamic student activism (Barendregt 2011: 235; Said 2012: 867). In the late 1970s, Islamic activist movements became strongly represented in student unions and *anashid* ensembles emerged in the settings of university campuses (Barendregt 2008: 24; Tammam & Haenni 2004: 96). Under the influence of the Islamic revival movement known as al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya or 'Islamic Awakening,' the vocal song genre spread to other countries, first in countries of the Levant, and later across the entire Muslim world. The appearance of audio cassettes and their circulation contributed to the development and popularity of the genre (Kajak 1982, cited in Said 2012: 866).

In the period of the 1970s and 1980s *anashid* were predominantly political-religious in nature. Besides the glorification of Allah and the teachings of the Prophet, *anashid* were also used to comment on social and political problems in the Muslim world (Barendregt 2011: 236). The songs drew inspiration from poems and lyrics from historical Islamic sources, but also from writings by imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who made frequent references to *jihad*, martyrdom and heroism to condemn the repressive practices of the Egyptian state (Barendregt 2011: 236; Haenni 2005: 25; Said 2012; Tammam & Haenni 2004). Karin van Nieuwkerk notes that these songs were also performed at demonstrations, meetings, religious occasions, and celebrations like the birthday of the Prophet and the Islamic New Year (2013: 213).

In line with the puritanism of the Islamic activist movements of the time, *anashid* were sober and simple and were not accompanied by melodic instruments, which were considered *haram* (Tammam & Haenni 2004: 94). In the 1980s *anashid* were predominantly military and nationalist in character and were linked to political struggles of the *umma* such as the Palestinian *intifada*, the war in Afghanistan, and the struggle against post-colonial domination of secular regimes. In this phase, Islamic activist movements gave birth to protest-*anashid* singers, like the Syrian Abu Ratib, and songbooks of *anashid* appeared (Said 2012: 866, 868; Haenni & Tammam 2003, 2004).

From the 1990s onward, musically less restricted *anashid* developed. This development was largely developed by musical events organized in the context

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[169] Benham Said notes that the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood toward music was more relaxed than that of the Saudi Wahhabis or Salafis who feared that any music might evoke emotions that distracted from religious obligations (2012: 870).

of the Palestinian question. Patrick Haenni mentions festivals that were held in support of the first Palestinian *intifada* (1988-1991), where *anashid* groups close to Hamas, started to use instruments in their *anashid* like tambourines, drums, and even synthesizers (Haenni 2005: 26; See also Barendregt 2011: 236). Another influence was the entering of *anashid* bands into the wedding market. As a religious alternative to the regular *shaʿbi* weddings, which are considered sexually provocative, indecent and vulgar, 'Islamic weddings' were introduced. In these Islamic weddings, men and women often participate separately in the festivities, and *anashid* groups perform instead of the customary *shaʿbi* bands (Van Nieuwkerk 2013: 212-213; Tammam & Haenni 2004).

Karin van Nieuwkerk, Patrick Haenni, but also Husam Tammam, who all carried out their research in Egypt, each describe how *anashid* bands were in increasing demand to perform in these Islamic weddings (Haenni 2005; Van Nieuwkerk 2013: 212-223; Tammam & Haenni 2004). In the process, the music and song topics were adjusted to the setting of a wedding. More instruments and rhythms were added to the repertoires to retain a festive atmosphere and lyrics addressing happiness and family life were introduced. In the second half of the 1990s these *anashid* wedding bands were much demanded and gradually professionalized. They started using complete sound installations, charging for performances, and some of them entered the music markets, bringing out albums and audio cassettes, competing with the entertainment industry of the Middle East and Western music (Tammam & Haenni 2004). The increasing influence of the market and the diminishing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on *anashid* led to the development of separate styles of *anashid*. More ornate and depoliticized *anashid* existed next to traditional styles without melodic instruments of songs of praise, mourning songs, and militant hymns.

From the 2000's onwards, *anashid* started to incorporate Western styled globalized popular music genres such as rap, hip-hop, and R&B and became much more accessible for a broader audience. Processes of globalization provided access to a wide range of information (Appadurai 1996). Through satellite television, radio, cassettes, cinemas and amusement arcades, young people were introduced to Western pop music, competing for an audience alongside items of popular culture from Arab countries (Armbrust 2000). In this period new Muslim artistic projects emerged in Asia, Europe, and the United States, drawing from a repertoire of local and global popular culture, conveying messages about Islamic virtues and morality. A new wave of pious art, also dubbed *halal* art, emerged, expressing Islamic messages in cultural formats more compatible to global youth culture and appealing to modern middle class societies both in Europe and the Arab World (Jouilli 2012; LeVine 2008; Haenni & Tammam 2003; Van Nieuwkerk 2011). Examples are Islamic pop music, *halal*-soap series,

clean cinema, Islamic video clips, and the emergence of *anashid* singers with celebrity status embarking on international concert tours.

These artistic developments also gave an impulse to the development of *anashid* in pop style, using all kinds of music instruments, styles, and rhythms. The lyrics were sung in languages spoken in the Muslim countries; in Europe and the US languages of the host countries were used (Barendregt 2011: 235; Knight 2004; Lohlker 2014). The topics addressed in these new style *anashid* were no longer restricted to religious scriptures or political topics but also touched upon broader contemporary social matters like drug abuse, dropping out of school, and family ties. Some examples of leading international artists of this new *anashid* pop style are the Iranian-born British singer and composer Sami Yusuf, the US based Islamic hip-hop styled music group Native Deen, and the Swedish Muslim R&B singer Maher Zain.

The emergence of *halal* art, and the development of *anashid* music in pop style became the target of heavy debates. On the one hand there were religious scholars who outlawed all art and music. On the other hand there were Islamic preachers, mostly in Egypt, who encouraged a so-called *fann hadif*, purposeful art. This term refers to varying forms of art and entertainment within the limits of religious sensibilities, serving as a tool to spread Islam's message, and providing alternatives to the sexually-oriented music video clips aired on many Arab satellite music channels such as *Mazika* and *Melody Hits* (Van Nieuwkerk 2008: 171; Winegar 2008b: 28).[170] The Egyptian television preachers Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and Amr Khaled have been important proponents of this movement. Al-Qaradawi, who created the website Islamonline, issued a *fatwa* about music and singing being permissible on the Al-Jazeera program *al-Shari'a wal-Hayat* (*shari'a* and life). Amr Khaled, who has become somewhat of an idol in the Islamic world and has a great following among young Muslims, delivers sermons in talk shows in which he focuses on the values of self-realization and the reconciliation of Islam with everyday life. In his show *Sunnat al-Hayat* (*the Rules of Life*) he called upon artists to cooperate with him. He also introduced clips from Sami Yusuf in his shows and on his website. Preachers like al-Qaradawi and Amr Khaled have made it fashionable for artists to produce religious music and video clips. According to these preachers, the purpose of *al-fann al-hadif* is to bring 'Muslims closer to God, build the *umma*, raise its cultural level, and counter the threat of immorality and identity loss seen to come from globalization and secularization' (Winegar 2008: 28).

The positive statements on the use of music for religious purposes by satellite preachers changed the dominant vision on art within the Islamic revival, and has led to what has been called an 'Islamic cultural sphere,' the creation of

[170] These clips have been the topic of hot debates about crossing the line of public decency.

'Islamic aesthetics' and 'Islamic markets' (Haenni 2005; Harb 2006; Van Nieuwkerk 2008, 2011, 2013). This development of an Islamic cultural sphere has cleared the way for more variation in *anashid*. Despite earlier disapproval of music on account of its controversial status within Islam, Islamic groups and piety movements gradually started to show an interest in the use of music in *anashid* and generally began to pay more attention to art, culture, and music as tools for proselytization.

The changes in *anashid* reflect broader social and religious developments, which have been analyzed by Asef Bayat as 'a shift from Islamism to post-Islamism' (Bayat 2005). This shift refers to a movement away from political revolutionary ideologies aiming to govern all aspects of society according to Islamic principles, toward a religious discourse that leaves more room for individualized forms of religiosity and self-realization (Haenni 2005; Lauzière 2005; Van Nieuwkerk 2013: 203-205; Roy 2006). Post-Islamist religious discourses strike a lighter tone compared to earlier political Islamist ideologies. Bayat and Haenni, and Haenni and Tammam have labeled these developments 'light' or 'airconditioned' Islam (Bayat & Haenni 2007; Haenni & Tammam 2003). The re-orientation towards a 'lighter' Islam, takes place in a context of neo-liberalism, globalization, market reform, new media, and consumerism (Haenni & Tammam 2003). The emergence and development of *halal* art and the development of more elaborate forms of *anashid* reflect and enact this shift from Islamism to post-Islamism.

Anashid in Morocco

Just like in other Muslim countries, *anashid* in Morocco have become a distinct genre and practice of Islam-inspired music, which has gained popularity among a wide audience. The songs are listened to by a devout middle class and are in demand among young people, either involved in Islamic movements, or organized pious groups. The music is listened to and watched individually or in a family context on national and satellite television, internet, the radio, and performed during family celebrations. The sound of *anashid* music is present in public space to a certain extent. *Anashid* CD's and cassettes are sold in the street at religious stands near mosques, at some CD shops in the old medinas, and at mobile vending charts. The genre is also increasingly presented and diffused via privately-owned satellite channels and new media platforms such as YouTube, websites, and social network sites on the internet. In the following section I present a chronological overview of the emergence and development of *anashid* in Morocco. This is a reconstruction based on personal communications and obser-

vations in the field, and a few textual sources I have found.[171] These accounts are – as is commonly known within oral history – incomplete, ambiguous, sometimes contradictory, and not always coherent.

1980s the emergence of *anashid* on university campuses

The results from my fieldwork show that various aspects have influenced the development of *anashid* in Morocco. During my interviews with actors in the field several storylines concerning the origins of Islamic *anashid* in Morocco came up. Some of the interviewees trace the historical roots of *anashid* back to ritual Sufi chanting, also referred to as *inshad sufi*. Most actors involved in the Moroccan *anashid* scene, however, did not automatically connect their musical practices to the Sufi brotherhoods. They claim that Islamic movements in universities were crucial in the development and promotion of *anashid* in Morocco.

The development of *anashid* in Morocco strongly resembles the progress of the genre in Egypt and the Levant. The genre initially developed in the context of Islamic movements mainly prevalent at university campuses in the larger cities like Casablanca, Rabat, Fes, Meknes and Marrakech. Several of my sources assert that the first ensembles of *anashid* in Morocco emerged at university campuses among members of Islamic movements and students of Islamic studies. This claim is substantiated by political historian Mohamed Tozy, who in his dissertation about Islamism and the monarchy in Morocco, mentions the surfacing of groups performing 'Islamic songs' in the universities in the 1980s. According to Tozy mainly students of Islamic sciences and Arabic language adopted the performance of Islamic songs and recitations (1999: 213-214).

At the campuses, Islamic students provided 'virtuous' music, to accompany student gatherings, cultural activities, meetings, celebrations and protests. Hassan for example witnessed many performances of *anashid* groups at the university campuses in the 1980s. Over dinner with his family he shared with me his memories of campus life when he was a university student. He recounts that in the early 1980s, right after the Iranian revolution and the emergence of Islamism, Moroccan Islamic activist movements organized artistic evenings (*umsiyat*), without music (i.e. melodic instruments), but with *anashid*. Hassan told me that during these events, people repented *en masse* and some of them

[171] During my research regarding the Moroccan *anashid* scene, I conducted a total of 29 interviews. These consisted of eighteen individual interviews with twelve male *anashid* performers, four group interviews with male *anashid* bands, and four individual interviews with female *anashid* performers. I met most of these performers several times and carried many informal conversations before, during, and after their concerts, or whilst visiting their family homes, and/or having coffees together. I also attended seven solo concerts of male *anashid* performers, five group performances of male *anashid* bands, and three group performances of women *anashid* bands. Next to these activities I have attended singing classes of *munshidat*, visited recording studios, attended rehearsals, and jam sessions.

joined Islamic movements. He remembers how during *anashid* concerts, the *akhawat* (sisters) distributed headscarves, and many women put on the *hijab*, repented and became *mu'minat* (female believers) on the spot.[172] Hassan's story illustrates how *anashid* performed at university campuses were more than just a pious form of entertainment. The vocal genre was indeed meant to urge people to repent and turn them to a virtuous lifestyle, but also served as a means to spread an Islamic ideology and recruit new members for Islamic movements.

The *anashid* groups that emerged in the Moroccan universities in the early 1980s, were small, and did not use musical instruments. Their style was calm and solemn, without dancing rhythms or instruments, and with simple melodies and lyrics concerning God, the Prophet, or the suffering of the *umma*. The melodies (*lahn*), harmonies (*maqamat*), rhythms (*iqa'at*), and lyrics (*kalimat*) were largely based on *anashid* from the Middle East. Various interviewees told me that especially in the 1980s, the Oriental-styled *anashid*, served as an example for Moroccan *anashid* and that the artists copied this style to their own musical practices. Just like the post-colonial Moroccan state, Moroccan Islamic movements promoted political ideologies as well as cultural trends from the Middle East (*mashreq*). Moreover, music cassettes brought in from the Middle East influenced the performance styles of *anashid* in Morocco. Cassettes with Oriental music from Egypt and Syria, which at the time had a well-developed entertainment industry, became available at the Moroccan consumer market in the 1970s and contributed largely to the adoption of Oriental styles of singing among Moroccan *anashid* performers. Artists from the Middle East, like the Syrian *anashid* singers Abu Ratib and Abujud, but also performers of worldly music genres and styles like Umm Kalthum, Mohamed Abdelwahab, and Farid al-Atrach (from Egypt), and Sabah Fakhri (from Syria) continue to be major sources of inspiration for Moroccan *munshidin*.

1980s-1990s: professionalization of the genre

In the late 1980s, and the early 1990s, some of the *anashid* bands that emerged in colleges and universities started to use melodic instruments and perform for money. Karima, a 37-year old women from a town near Fes, used to sing in a female *anashid* group before she got married and had her three children. But she still loves to listen to *anashid*. During an interview she speaks about the changes *anashid* have experienced over the years:

> *Anashid*, they have completely changed. At the time there was only *la ilaha illa llah* (there is no God but Allah), *anashid* for *nabawi* activities (activities dedicated to the

[172] Drawn from field notes taken during an unrecorded interview with Hassan. Casablanca, 2 December 2011.

> Prophet), and *anashid* about Palestine. But now, that has all completely changed, the *unshuda* has completely changed. Now one finds an *unshuda* about the woman as a spouse. Like Ahmed Bukhatir ['s song]: "Zawjatiiii" (meaning 'my wife' – she sings). He has this very beautiful song about his wife and "*uhibbuki*" (meaning 'I love you' – she continues singing the words of Bukhatir's song 'Zawjati') (…). There was a time we would not listen to such an *unshuda*…it was forbidden to say "*ma chérie*." (…) On the level of topics, and even on the level of lyrics and compositions, it has completely changed. One can now find *anashid* in English, *anashid* with rhythms of rap. There is now a group (*mujmuʿa*) in America called 'Native Deen' I like them a lot.[173]

Soukaina a 36-year old *munshida* makes the same point as Karima. Soukaina is a seamstress who lives in Rabat and is a *munshida* and the leader of a female *anashid* band called Soumayya. Her origins are from the South-East of Morocco. During an interview in a café at Rabat trainstation, she tells me that in the 1980s *inshad* and *amdah* played at ceremonies all sounded like funeral music. She is very happy that there is Islamic music now which is nice and fun like *shaʿbi*, but with clean words (*kalimat naqiyya*).[174] The changes in *anashid* described by Karima and Soukaina can be explained in relation to broader societal developments within Moroccan society: the emergence of Islamic weddings, the crystallization of Islamic activist movements and 'globalization.'

Islamic weddings

An important factor in the expansion of *anashid* into diverse music styles in Morocco, was its entrance into the wedding scene. In the late 1980s *anashid* groups were increasingly asked to perform at 'Islamic weddings.' Families living a more pious lifestyle were more and more interested in celebrating their weddings in an Islamically suitable way, with female and male guests separated, and appropriate music to accompany their celebrations (El-Ayadi, Rachik & Tozy 2007: 79). Some of my interviewees also indicated that inviting an *anashid* band at one's wedding is much cheaper than having a *shaʿbi* band, because they needed less equipment and use no dancers and hardly any instruments. The first *anashid* groups performing at weddings initially kept on playing their regular austere repertoire. But soon, it became apparent this repertoire was unsuitable for this kind of performance setting. Othmane, a 30-year old vocal performer in an *anashid* band from Casablanca, told me how he was confronted

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[173] Excerpt from interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.

[174] Unrecorded interview with *munshida* Soukaina. Rabat, 27 July 2010.

with the incompatibility of the traditional *anashid* repertoire at a wedding when he was young: [175]

> (…) we had a piece [of a song] which was a little bit sad, which reminds of the encounter with God, and death and the afterlife, death and paradise (…). We asked the audience to turn off the light to have..well, it was just an idea, I don't know why, but we did it and it was our idea (…) and we (…) young as we were, we performed a sad piece during a wedding! It was really silly, but (…) that was how we were then, still young. And like I've said, we performed (…) pieces to convey a message. That was our advice (…) and we didn't think about whether these things fit those occasions. One should not sing sad pieces at weddings, people must feel happiness (…). [But] ai, there were even people who (…) cried (…) yes! At a wedding![176]

The transition of *anashid* to the wedding scene and private celebrations created an awareness among *anashid* performers that their usual repertoires, notwithstanding the pious intention, did not have the desired effect on the audiences. Their usual *anashid* performances evoked an undesirable atmosphere, with audiences who would show signs of sadness or boredom; feelings that are considered inappropriate at weddings. In response, artists started to adapt their repertoires, music, and performance styles to the occasion and setting of their performance. For example, *anashid* that were played at the universities were also played at weddings, but with melodic instruments. Also some artists started to write lyrics especially for weddings in which topics on love, happiness, and family were addressed.

Khadija, a 27-year old woman *munshida* from Casablanca, who lives in Tangiers with her husband and two-year old daughter, brought up the transition of *anashid* to the wedding scene. She is the niece of the Casablanca-based *anashid* connoisseur Hassan. One afternoon, over a coffee in a MacDonalds in Casablanca she gave me her perspective on the changes *anashid* bands went through because of their entry to the wedding scene. She told me that in the past, when there were Wahhabi families there would be *munshidin*, but in *shaʿbi* weddings, there would be music groups, who use melodic instruments and play musical rhythms that make one's body dance. According to Khadija, this music brings people in the mood for dancing with the hips, which is forbidden in Islam because it attracts men. She told me that is the reason that in Islamic weddings there would be no dance and the only instruments present were the *duff* and the *darabuka*.

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[175] *Taqwa* is a concept within Islam and can be translated as God-consciousness or God-fearing piety (Esposito 2003: 314).

[176] Interview with Othmane. Casablanca, 3 November 2011.

Anashid *band performing at a celebration of the birth of a child. © Photo by author, winter 2011.*

The rhythm is slow and the songs address Islamic ethics and refer to God, but the style was without joy and sounded like funerals. Her explanation is that at that time the artistic level was not very high. She is happy that nowadays *anashid* no longer sound dead (*mat*). *Anashid* weddings are still segregated, and the lyrics of the songs are *multazim* (morally committed), but now there are *multazim* weddings but with cheerful rhythms.[177]

The entrance into the wedding scene, not only added a new performance setting to the genre, it was also an incentive for many *anashid* groups to elaborate their repertoires bending in to the wishes of the hosts and the demands of the market. As such, *anashid* groups gradually turned religious singing, reciting, and preaching into a form of entertainment, evolving into true spectacles of religious chants, while occasionally slipping into some Islamic sermons, anecdotes and jokes (cf. Tozy 1999: 213-214). At the same time the politically engaged *anashid* at the university campuses also continued.

The development of a market for pious entertainment thus accommodated more and more performances of *anashid* outside of the structures of Islamic activist organizations. *Anashid* bands not only started playing at weddings, but also at other family occasions, such as birth, circumcisions, and funerals. Additionally, *anashid* bands were created outside Islamic movements that started working in the wedding market as well. More broadly, a diversity of *anashid*

[177] Drawn from notes taken during an unrecorded interview with Khadija. Casablanca, 9 December 2011.

bands proliferated in a growing market for religious entertainment directed to please the audience and extend the market outside Islamic movements. By the 1990s *anashid* had expanded on the level of music, rhythms, style, song-content, and performance settings. Moreover, the increase of Islamic weddings led to a demand of female *anashid* groups since those weddings are segregated. I will come back below to the subject of female *anashid* performers.

The proliferation of Islamic activism in Moroccan society

In response to the developments described above, Islamic movements slowly started to become more flexible in their approach to music and the use of instruments and specific rhythms. This transition was described in several interviews. In anticipation of these developments, Islamic movements recently started to revise their policies towards art and music.

In three interviews it was noted that in the early days artists of the Jamaʿat al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence Association/ JBA) who started to experiment with musical instruments, had initially been reprimanded by the movement's leaders. Hassan, for example was told that even a *duff* was not allowed to have a string (*sabib*, D. *sbib*). He told me that when he joined the JBA in the early 1980s,he used to paint a lot. However in the movement he heard that all forms of art were entirely forbidden: 'I burnt all my paintings. I didn't listen to any kind of music and watched no television. The only thing I did was listen to Qurʾan recitations (*tajwid*).' But somewhere around 1985 someone told Hassan it *was* actually allowed to do art and make music. So in 1986, he started to perform *anashid*, which was allowed by the movement since it was not considered music, and he founded his own *anashid* group. They brought out an album in the same year. The group was composed of five persons and they used the *bendir* and the *darabuka* as percussion instruments, and voice. In 1990 someone introduced him to music (with melodic instruments) and he started making his own compositions. He went to the conservatory in Casablanca where he learned to play melodic instruments himself, like the *ʿud*, the *nay*, and the *saz*.[178] Younes, a 39-year old *munshid* and salesman from Casablanca who is affiliated to the JBA, confirms this recent trend. He recounted that he was once unsuccessful in releasing a CD because JBA's leaders prevented this out of fear for a loss of the movement's credibility with its members. But now, he explains, there is a lot of interest in *anashid* in new music styles. [179]

The development and spread of *anashid* with melodic instruments was also largely influenced by the proliferation and consolidation of Islamic activist organizations in various contexts in Moroccan society. This provided a wider

[178] Unrecorded interview with Hassan. Casablanca, 18 September 2010.
[179] Unrecorded interview with *munshid* Younes. Rabat, 1 January 2012.

range of settings to perform *anashid*. More and more Islamic organizations started to organize competitions, festivals, charity events, and summer youth camps (*colonies de vacances*) across the country where *anashid* formed a fixed part of the artistic activities. According to Hassan, since the early 1990s, the JBA uses the performance of *anashid* to make itself more visible in the public sphere. He himself for instance started to perform in various settings throughout the country with his first *anashid* band.

2000-present: globalization and localization

The gradual introduction of instruments, the broadening of topics, and the introduction of various popular music styles also resulted from processes of globalization influencing local sonic practices in Morocco, especially through media and migration. The encouragement of Islam-inspired art and music by influential television preachers from Egypt form an important point of reference for many vocalists, as do *anashid* artists from abroad who have reached international recognition, such as Maher Zain and Sami Yusuf. The increasing presence and diffusion of *anashid* via global media circuits like privately-owned satellite channels and new media platforms such as YouTube, websites, and social network sites have contributed to the popularity and demand of the music genre, which in turn has led to the emergence of new *anashid* artists in Morocco. Moroccan performers of contemporary *anashid* play into this globalized market for Islamically-correct entertainment while simultaneously referring to Moroccan local music styles. The band I refered to at the beginning of this chapter, which plays Amazigh songs from the Souss region, is an example of this trend. But Ismail Balouche, a 30-year old solo performer of *anashid* from Nador, in the northern Rif region, includes local elements in his *anashid* too. He uses for example *reggada* rhythms, a local folk music style from the Rif, and most of his lyrics are in Tarifit, the local Amazigh language of the Rif area. Next to Tarifit he also uses German, English, and Spanish. His music is very popular among Moroccan migrants in Europe.

The composition of the contemporary Moroccan *anashid* scene

After having considered the historical backdrop against which *anashid* in Morocco have developed, in this section I will outline the structures of production and performance of the contemporary Moroccan *anashid* scene. To work as an *anashid* artist one needs an audience, a stage, a band with musicians, equipment, recording studios, and media platforms through which to diffuse one's music. However, due to its strong association with 'Islamism,' *anashid* are almost never officially encouraged. Therefore *anashid* are produced and performed outside the government-controlled fields of cultural expression, relying on parallel structures to support their dissemination. These 'parallel' musical infrastruc-

tures are quite diverse and opaque, consisting of national and international music producers, commissioning pious families, festivals, competitions, youth centres, private celebrations, managers, Islamic organizations, and various media platforms. I will pay particular attention to the settings of performance, the process of production, and the supporting networks of Islamic movements.

Performance settings

Anashid artists perform at a variety of settings. The majority of concerts take place in domestic settings of family celebrations such as weddings, funerals, birth, and circumcision parties. They are commonly hired by conservative, middle-class families, who wish to celebrate family occasions in accordance with their Islamic lifestyles. Such families reject the customary bands that play at family celebrations where men and women are mixed and dance together and where melodic instruments, such as the fiddle, are used, and female dancers (*shikhat*) sometimes accompany the band (Kapchan 1994; Soum-Pouyalet 2007). These families want to celebrate, but in a manner they consider proper and modest. Hence, *anashid* bands are invited to entertain the guests, to create a festive atmosphere, and provide *hasanat* (religious rewards) for the host. Some of these families can be affiliated to Islamic organizations, although this is not necessarily the case.

Next to the private settings of family homes, *anashid* artists also perform in semi-public settings, such as university campuses (*la fac*), highschools, and cultural associations. A great deal of the *anashid* concerts are held at neighbourhood youth community centers called *dar shabab* (pl. *dyur shabab*). These are located in almost every neighbourhood of Moroccan cities, towns, and villages. They are owned by the state or the local government but used by all sorts of community-based organizations that provide education, classes, and artistic activities to young people of the community. The *dyur shabab* offer quite an important stage for beginning *anashid* artists.[180] *Munshidin* give concerts in a *dar shabab* mostly on the occasion of national religious festivities such as Ramadan, the birthday of the Prophet (*ʿid al-mawlid*), the Feast of Sacrifice (*ʿid al-kabir*), and at general cultural activities or benefits. Such concerts are often organized by Islamic organizations, cultural associations, and local municipalities who book a *dar shabab* and invite these bands to animate the events.

It must be noted however, that although male *anashid* artists perform at a variety of scenes and settings, female performers usually play at family celebrations, especially weddings, whereas men perform in a wider field of action.

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[180] This information was gathered during four visists to various *dar shabab* in Casablanca between December 2011 and March 2012 and two personal communications with two interlocutors. One with *munshida* Khadija: Rabat, 25 January 2012, and an interview with *munshid* Khalid: Casablanca, 29 January 2012.

Production process

Anashid artists who wish to develop themselves professionally have to invest time and money in their artistic activities, such as recording, producing, and promoting their music. In order to do this they need studio producers, editors, and distributors to record, produce, and disseminate their recorded music onto the market. Several arrangements between *munshidin* and producers are possible. Some record companies offer contracts in which they pay the artist a certain percentage of the profit. Samir, a 24-year old unmarried *munshid* from the northern Rif, who like Ismail Balouche sings *anashid* in Tarifit, told me he made a deal with a Nadorian record company in which he received a lump sum of money (about 7000 to 8000 DH) at the start, but in return, the rights of the album were completely owned by the company. If the album becomes very successful, Samir will never see more than the initially agreed upon amount of money. However, if the album turns out to be a flop, it is the editor's loss. Ismail Balouche opted for another strategy. He acquired the skills to record albums himself and gathered people around him to help him produce an album. To record his music he occasionally rents a studio from a friend in Oujda. The advantage of such a construction is that the production process stays under the control of the artist.

Besides money and the control of the production process, artistic freedom is often mentioned as the main source of conflict between artists and producers. Many artists feel that producers mainly act for commercial gain, rather than artistic considerations. For Rachid Gholam retaining one's artistic freedom was the central reason to set up his own production company and studio. Gholam (1972) is a well-known but controversial performer of Islam-inspired music in Morocco. Part of this controversy lies in his affiliation to the JBA. Over the past twenty years he has developed himself into a talented vocal performer and a symbol of the JBA. Due to his membership he claims to be unable to perform in his own country since the 1990s.[181] He also attributes his numerous arrests to his membership of the JBA. Having his own studio gives him the freedom to continue his profession as an artist. This project started out as an initiative to gain some experience in the production of music, and to learn to master the process of recording and distributing an album. Now he uses the company to exclusively produce his own albums. In an interview he tells me why he created his own company:

> (…) to (…) avoid problems that occur between producer and artist, and I felt like concentrating on my own albums (…). I do not want a production company with

[181] This was stated repeatedly by Rachid Gholam during all our meetings: 17 September 2010, 5 May 2011, 13 February 2012, 13 December 2012.

> primarily commercial objectives, to judge the artistic production, and intervene in the artistic realization of the album. I want to create the album according to my own norms and artistic standards. I want the product to be coherent with the message I want to transmit, my artistic message.[182]

Starting one's own studio could solve problems with producers, but the self-directed production of music is also a costly undertaking. Not all artists have the means to set up their own studios, rent a studio or pay a producer. In many cases Islamic movements then offer attractive networks of support.

The artistic networks of Islamic organizations

Some Islamic activist groups and organizations have increasingly taken an interest in investing in artistic activities and the musical training of artists, as they believe these can help to get their messages across, and draw in new members. As a result, Islamic movements offer an interesting network of artists, audiences, musical equipment, producers, recording studios, venues, instruments, teaching facilities, and performance opportunities. The support Islamic movements offer is very attractive to the artists, especially for those who have difficulty to pay record companies, music lessons, and find an audience. For example, *anashid* artists affiliated to an Islamic movement often do not have to provide for their own expensive sound systems. They borrow this equipment from other groups also belonging to the movement, often co-financed by the movements. The solidarity principle in many movements means that one can pay according to one's financial abilities.[183] By contrast, if a band does not belong to an Islamic organization, they have to rent or buy the whole equipment themselves. Islamic movements also facilitate access to a stage and, more importantly, a wide network of clientele. The bands can perform at festivals, competitions, or celebrations organized by the Islamic movement, or perform at festivities and weddings of co-members of their movement. In return, the artists play an important symbolic role for Islamic movements. They help to convey their ideology and messages in an appealing manner.

There are two important Islamic movements I came across during my fieldwork, which are actively involved in the organization and support of *anashid*: the Jamaʿat al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan (JBA) and the Party of Justice and Development's (PJD) religious and social backbone, Al-Tawhid wal-Islah (Movement of Unity and Reform /MUR). In 2008, the MUR founded the *Comité Artistique de MUR*. This is a commission which supports artistic activities that promote Islam and discusses how to establish clarity and vision around artistic matters from an

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[182] Interview with Rachid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.

[183] Personal communication with father Belkacem, 14 November 2011.

Islamic perspective. Another group linked to the MUR, which is active in the support of *anashid* is the *Organisation du Renouveau Estudiantin du Maroc* (OREM). This student association organizes theater festivals, cinema, and concerts of morally committed music (*ghina' multazim*) at festivals and university campuses throughout the country.[184] The JBA also has a well developed network of singers, producers, musical experts, studios, and festivals. There is an aesthetic committee judging the vocalists on artistic quality, purity of voice, spirituality, and political impact during underground festivals. There are even producers and musical experts, some of whom have developed manuals for the correct performance of Islamic music according to the ideology of the JBA.

Although the MUR and the JBA have separate networks, their views on combining art with Islam are very much alike. First of all, both movements encourage music for pedagogical purposes, in the sense that *anashid* are meant to teach and educate the audience about the correct way of leading a Muslim life. The youth department of the MUR for instance, selects artists based on specific criteria. One of these criteria is that the music needs to be a vehicle for an Islamic message (*risala*) in order to get people acquainted with Islam's messages. During one of our meetings, JBA's expert on music and art, Hassan, for example, showed me an unpublished document he wrote, which circulates within the JBA as a guideline for artists. The document describes, amongst other things, how an artist ought to seek objectives according to the ideology of the JBA. One of the main objectives mentioned is that the arts should have a pedagogical purpose. [185]

Secondly, both the JBA as the MUR attribute an important role to music as a means to recruit new members. Within the JBA, music is used as a way to integrate into society and attract adherents. In Hassan's document, an important third point is also brought forward; that music should be used to present a beautiful image of Islam, and invite the audience to Islam (*da'wa*) through performances at universities, cultural centres, and in domestic settings. According to the president of MUR's artistic committee, the national and international media present a bad image of Islamic movements as 'radical.' Through the support of music as part of a wider range of artistic activities, the committee wants to show that the opposite is true.[186] The coordinator of the student's organization for cultural activities within the MUR, explains how they use music to make her movement and Islam appear in a good and modern light:

> Many people think that music is forbidden according to Islam, like the Salafis who only allow *anashid* with children's voices and *duff*. But by promoting and encour-

[184] Interview with Leyla, coordinator within OREM. Rabat, 26 December 2011.
[185] Interview with Hassan. Casablanca, 18 September 2010.
[186] Interview with president of artistic committee MUR. Rabat, 27 February 2012.

> aging music with a purpose (*hadif*) our organization wants to emphasize the modernity of Islam (…). We are not against music but [we] want to use music to convey messages about Islam to show the true Islam, an Islam of opportunities and fun, not of prohibitions and restrictions.[187]

Both JBA and MUR see art as an appropriate tool to promote their movement's vision as moderate, tolerant, and to spread modern Islamic thought. Fourth, what both movements stipulate is that the musical performances should respect and stimulate Islamic renewal (*tajdid*) and Islamic ethics (*akhlaq*),[188] so it can accommodate a morally correct alternative to forms of art and entertainment that are considered 'vulgar.'

Despite the similarities, there are also differences in objectives between the movements. These concern national culture and politics. Next to Muslim ethics, the MUR also promotes Moroccan national culture, whereas the JBA only speaks of national concerns in critical terms. The JBA has a strong emphasis on denouncing social injustice and awaken political awareness, whereas the MUR does not question the Moroccan political system with the central role of the King as the Commander of the Faithful.

Despite the advantages for *anashid* artists in being affiliated to an Islamic movement, this can also be a drawback for them. *Anashid*'s perceived reputation as 'Islamist music' makes producers hesitant to engage with *anashid* artists. Many artists say that producers believe working with *anashid* artists can tarnish the reputation of their business, which is already suffering because of the piracy of CDs and DVDs sold in the *suq*s. Iliyas a 30-year old *munshid* from the northern Rif-region, told me that when he closed a deal with a recording company, the following day the studio owner called him to ask whether he was connected to the JBA. He denied this and indignantly answered them by saying he just sings *anashid* about nature, God, and family ties, but not for the JBA.[189]

The problematic reputation of the music genre being perceived as 'Islamist music,' can explain why, during interviews, some artists kept quite vague about whether they were affiliated to a movement or not. Transparency about their affiliation could harm their relations with producers and audiences, as well as endanger opportunities for their musical careers. Even when they were members of an Islamic movement, some would only tell me during a second or third interview. Sometimes I only picked up on an artist's possible relation to an Islamic activist movement through rumours and gossip.

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[187] Interview with Leyla, coordinator for the *Organisation Renouveau Etudiante Marocaine*. Rabat, 26 December 2011.

[188] Unrecorded interview with the president of MUR's artistic committee. Rabat, 5 February 2012.

[189] Fieldnotes of personal communication with *munshid* Iliyas, 5 August 2010.

To avoid such politically oriented problems at the national level, some artists who publicly acknowledged their membership to the JBA, turn to producers outside Morocco. This is a recent tendency that I observed with several *anashid* artists who, because of a sense of lack of support and perceived prejudices about their music genre, reach out to other countries. Rachid Gholam, who claims to be banned from performing in Morocco due to his public affiliation to the JBA, developed a strong international network of music producers, studios, concert stages, and Islamic organizations in Europe and the Middle East. He records and performs in Turkey, Algeria, France, the Gulf States, Belgium, Germany, and The Netherlands. Ismail Balouche has contacts in Algeria, France, The Netherlands, and Belgium. I also met a couple of artists who are active in Asia.

Besides political problems, financial and artistic reasons also played a role for artists to withdraw from the artistic networks of Islamic movements. For instance, several *munshidin* told me they left the JBA, because the movement obliges musicians to hand over part of the profits earned by a band.[190] Also, the cultural policies of some movements towards music and singing are considered too restrictive or unclear. Several artists affiliated to the JBA described to me the tensions between their own musical activities and the view points of the JBA. The members of an *anashid* band from Berkane told me in an interview they left the JBA entirely because there was no clear policy towards music within the movement:

> It took the JBA too long to make a decision over their viewpoint concerning the religious permissibility of music. For a very long time it was unclear whether using melodic instruments in *anashid* was *halal* or *haram*. That's why we left [the JBA], we wanted to continue making music, and there were others, like Qaradawi who said it was ok.[191]

Because *anashid* became freer outside the structures of the Islamic movements, some bands and artists decided to follow other religious scholars supporting the use of music, as they wanted to move their musical careers forward.

The performers

In this section the focus moves from the organization and contexts in which *anashid* as a musical genre is performed, to the actors themselves.[192] Three questions are central in this section: What are the backgrounds of the vocalists

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[190] Unrecorded interview with an *anashid* band in Berkane, 13 August 2010.
[191] Unrecorded interview with an *anashid* band. Casablanca, 26 June 2010.
[192] During my fieldwork I conducted a total of 27 interviews with *munshidin* and *munshidat*.

performing *anashid* and how and why did they develop their careers as performing *anashid* artists?

Performers of *anashid* in Morocco constitute a highly diverse group of male and female artists with a wide variety of backgrounds and aspirations. There are relatively unknown *anashid* bands that operate in the suburbs at private parties, but also solo artists who have reached celebrity status. The Moroccan *anashid* artists I have interviewed do not constitute a coherent, well-defined group of vocalists. The performers often belong to different overlapping and contrasting social, political and cultural networks. They share markets, repertoires and networks, but can simultaneously work within different musical settings, outside the *anashid* scene as well. Many artists I interviewed were affiliated to an Islamic movement, but this was certainly not always the case. There are also many *anashid* bands and artists who are not affiliated to any movement at all.

Apart from the heterogeneity of *anashid* performers in Morocco, there are also some general features that these performers have in common. First of all, the artists I met were between the age of 25 and 40 at the time of my research. They live in an urban environment such as the suburbs of large cities like Rabat and Casablanca, or in smaller towns, and have had a college or university education. At the time of the meetings and interviews most of the vocalists were either students or held positions as teachers at high-schools. One of them was a mechanic, one was unemployed, and one was salesman. Female singers were either students or housewives.

The performers I present here are all vocalists. Some are vocalists who additionally play a percussion instrument such as the *duff* and *darabuka*, and some players of percussion instruments or melodic instruments, such as a violin, an *ʿud* or an organ, double as a choir member. Players of melodic instruments were sometimes hired by an *anashid* ensemble, because they are quite scarce. These musicians would often play in other bands as well, sometimes of different musical genres. But before focussing further on the musical practices of *anashid* bands, I will first describe what has led these vocalists to adopt *anashid*.

Female *anashid* performers take a distinctive place within this whole. I will return to the position of female *anashid* performers later on in this chapter.

Three trajectories toward *anashid*

The performers I interviewed followed different paths in becoming an *anashid* artist. Some were introduced to *anashid* at a young age, while others started singing *anashid* only at a later point in their lives. Three important trajectories emerged from my interviews, which led these vocalists to start singing *anashid*: families and mosques, Islamic movements, and moral reorientation.

Families and mosques

A recurring theme in the interviews, signaling the start of an artist's development towards *anashid* was 'the discovery of one's voice.' The context in which this discovery took place varies, but most of my respondents indicated that the vocal practices conducted in the mosque led them to the discovery of their voice. These practices varied from memorizing and reciting the Qur'an (*tajwid*) to the pronunciation of supplications (*ibtihalat*), and the call to prayer (*adhan*). It is important to note that these respondents undertook these activities from a young age, and that they were encouraged by their families, whom my interviewees described as *muhafidhin*, meaning pious, religious-conservative. Najib, for example, is a 26-year old sociology student from Casablanca and a vocalist in an *anashid* group based in the arondissement of Hay Mohammadi. He recounts how his devout family encouraged him to read and memorize the Qur'an at the mosque from a young age:

> The family I come from is a conservative family (*muhafidhin*) (...) at home they favored memorizing the Qur'an at a young age. And I went to the neighbourhood's mosque to pray, then you keep on memorizing the Qur'an and imitate the *muqri'un* (readers of the Qur'an).[193]

The vocal practices Najib undertook in the mosque brought him to the realization that he had a good voice. Hicham Karim, a 32-year old internationally known *munshid* from Kenitra recounts a similar development. Like Najib, Hicham started his vocal activities as a young boy at the mosque:

> I have started with the mosques, where we were doing what we call in Arabic "*Ibtihalat*" (supplications). *Ibtihalat* are religious songs about God and the Prophet, peace be upon him. So I have started with these *ibtihalat* in mosques during Ramadan. I have also started with *adhan*, the call to prayer.[194]

Islamic movements

Another crucial element in the move of my repondents toward *anashid* turned out to be Islamic movements. Some of them were introduced to *anashid* in the context of an Islamic movement, either because they grew up in families who were affiliated to them, or at a later age. A setting for *anashid* that kept returning in interviews was children's activities initiated by NGO's and associations connected to Islamic movements. Othmane, for example, a 30-year old *munshid* from Casablanca who sings in a small *anashid* ensemble, grew up within a

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[193] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 Augustus 2010.
[194] Interview with Hicham Karim. Kenitra, 21 August 2010.

religious family that was involved in the JBA. He remembers how he learned to sing *anashid* at age seven, during summer camps organized by the JBA:

> When I was seven years old, I started rehearsing *anashid*. The Jamaʿ organized trips to the beach, you see? Which in Morocco we call "colonies de vacances," ten or fifteen days we would spend together, children up to twelve years old would come. (…) there were also artists. There I met my first music professor. He told me to learn parts of *anashid*, and he gave me candy. Each time I memorized a part of an *anashid*, he gave me ten pieces of candy.[195]

Othmane's teacher at the summer camp was JBA's musical expert Hassan, who during children's activities organized by the JBA, scouted youngsters like Othmane. Hassan encouraged Othmane to enter an *anashid* group of adolescent boys, which traveled to cities across the country to perform *anashid*.[196] In the same manner Khadija, Hassan's niece, was introduced to *anashid* at a young age through contact with the Islamic movement. Her family, which was involved with the JBA, told Khadija she had a beautiful voice and encouraged her to sing *anashid*. During an interview she told me that, one day, when she was five, her aunt took her to the university campus in Casablanca to see an *anashid* band perform. During the concert, she spontaneously started to sing along with a song, and was called onto the stage by the band. Other children were encouraged to come to the stage as well and sing with the band. After the concert she started to participate in a children's *anashid* group that sang and performed Islamic *anashid*.[197]

There are also performers who were introduced to *anashid* in the context of Islamic movements, but outside of their families. Najib's family for instance is religious, but was not involved in an Islamic movement. At the age of eleven, he was learning to recite the Qurʾan at the neighbourhood's mosque, when someone from his neighbourhood invited him to participate in various kinds of children's activities organized by the JBA. At age 13 he entered the movement, where he discovered his voice and learned how to sing *anashid* in a choir. He did not start performing *anashid* publicly until he entered university when he started his first *anashid* group.

Other *munshidin* picked up *anashid* through Islamic organizations, outside their families and without even ever becoming a member of these associations. These are *munshidin* who joined music classes organized by NGOs or associations connected to Islamic movements. Out of lack of musical schooling

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[195] Interview with Othmane. Casablanca, 3 November 2011.
[196] Interview with Othmane. Casablanca, 3 November 2011.
[197] Fieldnotes, unrecorded interview with Khadija. Casablanca, 9 December 2011.

organized by the state, these youngsters participated in music activities organized by Islamic associations. Especially in more remote parts of Morocco, facilities for music education are virtually nonexistent and music lessons are not provided for at public schools.[198] Children who like singing and music thus have no choice but to join music lessons that are organized (often for free) by Islamic associations. An example of this case is *munshid* Samir, from the province of Nador. He did not grow up within an environment of Islamic activism, but was introduced to it because he wanted to learn how to sing:

> When I was a child, when I was studying in *la sixième*,[199] my teacher heard me sing and told me that I have a good voice, and then he took me to an association. It was called an-Nur (The Light) (…). In this association I was singing and we were recording songs. That's when I started to work in the domain [of *anashid*].[200]

Like Samir, Ismail Balouche recounted how at the age of ten, his brother took him to an association (*jamaʿ*) where he heard other children sing. According to him, there were several of such associations in Nador supporting young children in singing *amdah* and *anashid*, both patriotic and religious. It seems likely these music lessons were organized by an Islamic association, as the north-east of Morocco is considerably influenced by Islamism (MacMurray 2001: 172).

Moral reorientation

There is also a category of *anashid* performers who in the past were successful as folk singers of popular wordly music but who re-started their musical careers as performers of Islam-inspired music, following a moral re-orientation. Karima, for instance, told me how she distanced herself from the upbringing of her mother:

> I am totally different from my mother. (…) my mother does not really understand her religion, she does not practice it, she does not wear the veil, she does not pray. She lived for long time in France, so she has a French mentality, she wears a mini-skirt, she is (…) very different. (…) I am a very different kind of Muslim, I hope to be an exemplary Muslim.[201]

Whereas some singers discovered their voice through vocal practices in the mosque, Karima discovered her voice at the *lycée*[202] in Casablanca, where she was

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[198] To read more about the educational system of Morocco see Aomar Boum 2008; Ennaji 2005.

[199] Morocco's education system is based on the French model, where school years are numbered on a decreasing scale. The sixième (6th class) is the first year of secondary education.

[200] Interview with Samir. Nador, 6 August 2010.

[201] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.

[202] The *lycée* is the second, and last, stage of secondary education in the French educational system.

attending singing classes. She especially loved Egyptian songs and used to imitate them at home. At a certain point she participated in an audition on a French radio station. From Morocco, she sang songs by Umm Kalthum and Samira Bensaaid over the telephone. The radiohost was so taken by her voice that he asked her to come to the studio in France to sing live. Karima told me how much her mother wanted her to grab this opportunity, but Karima refused: 'It was not done to sing on the radio as a girl, what would my father and my uncles say? It's *hashuma* (D. shameful).' But her mother kept insisting and eventually Karima gave in. She went to France and sang in the studio, and she won the competition. She was invited to perform at a big concert with famous artists. To the disappointment of her mother, Karima did not go through to become a singer. At age seventeen she took the veil and abandoned the repertoire of Egyptian worldly songs:

> (…) with the veil it was over with the Umm Kalthums, and Abdel Halims (…) it was finished with the Egyptian songs, [so then] I dedicated myself to *anashid*.[203]

Some other *anashid* performers underwent a musical re-orientation as the result of a spiritual crisis or revelation, followed by a period of introspection and musical inactivity. Singers like Abdelhadi Belkhyat, Jadwane, and Rachid Gholam are the best known examples of this category. Gholam for instance, who is the cherished vocalist of the JBA, started his singing career at a young age. He grew up in a poor suburb of Casablanca. At the *lycée* in Casablanca he was already noticed for his exceptional voice. At age thirteen he dropped out of school to work as a *shaʿbi* singer in bars, cabarets, and private celebrations for money. His family was poor and needed the money and thus encouraged him to pursue this path. But at a certain point he became fed up with this particular music scene and experienced, what he called, 'a moral crisis followed by an awakening:' [204]

> It was a divine hand that made me change (…). In 1990 I had an awakening of the heart, which made me say to myself, I need to leave this rotten world and go to a lighter place. And I returned to myself and my aspirations of my heart. It was during a moment I was fasting (*sawm*) and I was given the divine opportunity of encountering myself, of an awakening. It was a moment of total weakness but also of divine strength. (…) After that [phase] I returned to the principles of Islam, and something was born in my heart, how to approach God, how to love God.[205]

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[203] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.
[204] For the subject of repentant artists see Van Nieuwkerk (2003, 2013).
[205] Interview with Rachid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.

This moment of spiritual awakening made Gholam look for a way to bring more spirituality in his life. During his search he gave up music and singing entirely until, after a long quest, he joined the JBA:

> Everything changed in my life. I even stopped singing for a while. (…) the reorientation towards spiritual singing was thanks to shaykh Abdessalam Yassine. He told me the voice is a divine gift and you need to pay this gift back by putting it at the service of divine love and the love of the Prophet (…).[206]

Encouraged by JBA's leader shaykh Abdessalam Yassine, Gholam picked up his musical practices, dedicating himself entirely to Islamic singing. He is now also known as 'the nightingale of al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan.'

The four trajectories given here are important points of reference in the artists' development towards *anashid*. Choosing to develop one's vocal abilities within the music genre of *anashid* is influenced by the performer's surroundings; either through Islamic associations, family members within or outside an Islamic movement, and sometimes as the result of an inner calling or a spiritual awakening. These different elements are not mutual exclusive and often occur in combination with each other. Discovering one's voice, for example, is an important starting point which can occur in families, as well as in mosques and Islamic movements. Moreover, the course of the trajectories is influenced by the performer's position in Moroccan society, which is defined both by gender and class.

Becoming a professional *anashid* artist

Once these men and women have started to sing *anashid,* what happens to them afterwards? What efforts do they make to become actual performing artists, and what are the challenges they face in their career paths?

Munshidin operate both on professional and amateur levels and perform either solo, or as part of a vocal group. While there is a wide variety of talented vocalists, not all of them make it to the top. I only met a couple of *anashid* performers who were able to make a living out of their music. Yet, being considered a professional *anashid* performer is a much aspired status among my male respondents. To become regarded as a professional *munshid*, one needs to have excellent musical skills, stage-experience, good networks and a distinctive artistic style and identity. However, obtaining the status of a professional is not only a matter of acquiring a set of competences, which will allow one to make a living out of making music. It is also and foremost a question of presentation.

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[206] Interview with Rachid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.

Artists who present themselves to the outside world as professionals are more likely to be credited with the much needed prestige and credibility to move their artistic careers forward. For instance, during interviews artists often emphasized that they only want to work with 'professionals,' which implied they considered themselves to be professionals. When there was a conflict or a disagreement, for example concerning the audio equipment during a concert, the organization would be called amateuristic or incompetent. Also, artists would call other *anashid* artists they disliked, 'amateurs.' Being labelled as an amateur by fellow performers is an accusation which can pose a problem if one wants to pursue a career as an *anashid* artist.

However, being a professional does not always increase their status (Van Nieuwkerk 1995). There may be a conflict between professional ambition and the religious credibility of the performer. Music and musicians in many Muslim societies have often been perceived negatively. This, for one thing, is related to Islamic prejudice against music. Music is often associated with activities considered immoral, such as drinking or prostitution (Van Nieuwkerk 1992: 37). Moreover, earning money from performances that revolve around an Islamic message is not always perceived as something respectable. In daily informal conversations with various actors, *anashid* artists were often accused of using religion for financial gain. This motivated some *munshidin* to renounce the label of 'professional.' *Anashid* artists building a musical career are thus walking a delicate fine line between musical ambition and religious credibility. Therefore they need to take proactive measures to professsionalize themselves, while avoiding negative stigmatization.

Musical training

All the artists I have met attributed much importance to a musical training. But training oneself in *anashid* on a professional level, is not self-evident in Morocco. The possibilities for music education are poor, especially for the higher education segment. Musical education is provided for at some *lycées* and many towns and villages have a communal music school for children and adolescents (confusingly called *conservatoires*). In the higher education segment there is only one academy of music in the country, which is located in Casablanca. Just like the rest of the Moroccan public educational system, its organization and curriculum is based on the French schooling system. The music that is taught consists mostly of genres that are considered to be part of the national traditional music genres, like Andalusian music and Western and Oriental classical music.[207]

Because the accessibility and quality of musical education in Morocco is minimal, singers have developed various kinds of alternative strategies to

[207] Unrecorded interview with *munshida* Amina. Rabat, 22 February 2012.

develop their musical and vocal skills. One of the most important ways in which singers try to practice and develop their voices is by listening to, and imitating, the classical singers from the Orient. *Munshid* Ali, a 24-year old former *anashid* singer from Rabat, used to sing in several *anashid* bands during his studies. Although at the moment of the interview he was not part of an *anashid* group, he still had a large network of *munshidin* and shared his own experiences and recollections with me. He also spoke about the methods he applied to develop his own musical skills:

> (…) to improve my competencies I listened to different genres, even Umm Kalthum, even Mohamed Abdelwaheb. These are professionals, these are people who are truly good in their domain.[208]

The famous singers of the classical Oriental song form a source of fascination and inspiration for Moroccan *munshidin*. Almost all *munshidin* I spoke to, mentioned listening to and imitating audio cassettes with music from Syria, Egypt, and Libanon as an important aspect in their musical learning process, and the development of their musical skills.

As Ali mentions above, even though the singers he listened to did not sing religious but wordly songs, the content of these songs, according to him, and other *munshidin* as well, does not contravene Islamic morals. Moreover, for some *munshidin*, the professional qualities of the Oriental artists outweigh the wordly properties of their music style.

Next to listening to successful well-trained singers, the internet provides another source of acquiring skills and knowledge about music and contacts with other musicians. When *munshid* Najib left the school of music, because he had no time left to go there weekly due to his study, internet became an important source of information for the development of his musical knowledge:

> I am still on the internet (…) I'm learning to put into practice *solfeggio* and classical lessons, instruments, I'm practicing my voice. The second thing is theory (…), I'm constantly searching and studying and talking to people. (…). I learned some pieces and on the internet [and] I got in touch with some teachers and learned to make transpositions.[209]

Like Najib, *munshid* Younes was also looking to meet with professional artists on the Internet to learn about music. Additionally, he also organized off-line

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[208] Interview with *munshid* Ali. Rabat, 19 September 2010.
[209] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 August 2010.

get-togethers to meet them and learn from them about different songs, melodies, styles, and lyrics to enhance his musical skills.

Stage experience

Next to gathering information on- and off-line about music and learning by listening, gaining stage-experience is another key element in the development to become a professional *anashid* artist. More stage experience can lead to better opportunities and a wider range of work possibilities. Much of the first performing experience in *anashid* is gained at university campuses and gatherings of Islamic associations. From the university settings, *anashid* bands often switch to performances at private festivities held in domestic settings like funerals, weddings (*ʿarasat*), circumcisions (*ʿaqiqa*), and celebrations for seven-day-old babies (*subuʿ*). Later on, they go to cultural centres, youth centres (*dyur shabab*), and maybe produce a record and give concerts (*umsiyyat*) in concert halls.

The extent of stage experience does not only affect the status of an artist or band within the *anashid* scene, but also the venue where they will be likely to perform next and the prices they can ask. Singing in domestic settings, for instance, is considered a 'small activity' for 'small *munshidin*,' that is, of little importance. This is illustrated by the following interview excerpt, in which I asked the Kenitra-based *munshid* Hicham Karim, when he started to sing professsionally:

> In 2000, I was then 23 years (…). When I was young I didn't sing, except at school, but not professionally. I adored Arab music and wanted to become a professional singer (…), and in 2000 I became a professional. (…) Before that year I did sing, [but] only at people's homes, with families, at the university, or with friends.[210]

Hicham Karim mentions the year 2000 as a turningpoint, because that was the year when he decided he wanted to become a teacher in music and focus his activities towards that goal. The quote reveals Karim's vision on professionalism. For him his professional singing career started when he gave up singing for friends, at family celebrations or in semi-public venues, such as at university campuses. Rachid Gholam who has an internationally successful career as a *munshid*, shows a similar disdain for singing in a domestic setting:

> I do not perform at private celebrations. My art is public, it is an art, which is practiced for a general public. It's not made for little parties, private parties.[211]

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[210] Interview with Hicham Karim. Kenitra, 22 August 2010.

[211] Interview with Rachid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.

Both Gholam and Karim associate professionality with performing in the public domain, and amateurism with the private sphere. The two consider themselves, and are considered by others, professional artists who perform mostly abroad, and have become icons and role models within the Moroccan *anashid* scene.

Most artists who consider themselves professionals or aspire to become one, are solo artists. Generally, solo artists emerge from *anashid* groups as rising stars and complete the top of the envisaged careerpath. Examples of Moroccan solo performers of *anashid* who have gained a celebrity status are Rachid Gholam and Hicham Karim. Some singers who have been trained as professional singers of Arabic-styled music genres give concerts with entire orchestras, of which perhaps the best known example is Rachid Gholam. Going solo is often a choice made out of the ambition to become a professional, but it can also be the result of problems within a band. Going solo gives a singer more independence, especially when he has a higher musical proficiency compared to the other band members. Solo *anashid* artists are also always men. Depending on his success, the solo artist can choose his own ensemble or work with changing ensembles. *Munshid* Younes, for instance, told me that before he became a solo performer of *anashid*, he withdrew from an *anashid* ensemble because, according to him, the difference in levels between the other band members and himself was 'too large.'[212]

Building an audience and developing networks

Another important step in reaching professionalism is being acknowledged as an artist and being able to reach a large audience. Building an audience in the public sphere as an *anashid* singer can be quite challenging in Morocco. During the period of my fieldwork national media hardly offered any platforms for performers of *anashid*. The music programs that were broadcasted on national TV featured artists such as Souiri or Bajdoub, artists focusing on popular folk music from Morocco and Egypt. Other artists in the national media performed musical genres associated with the traditional national heritage (*turath*). However, when in 2005 one of the national televison broadcast chains, 2M organized a *tajwid* contest during the month of Ramadan, Moroccan national television started to become interested in broadcasting shows with Islam-inspired music. This gave *anashid* artists a small opening to reach public visibility. *Munshid* Khalid participated in the first televized *tajwid* contest in 2005. This led to further invitations to other televized music shows.[213]

As the official national media circuits hardly ever display *anashid*, these artists usually employ social media tools such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and My Space to disseminate their music and make their existence known. Although

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[212] Unrecorded interview with *munshid* Younes. Rabat, 1 January 2012.

[213] Interview with *munshid* Khalid. Casablanca, 29 January 2012.

infrequently, *anashid* artists now appear in national media, but if they do they generally star in programs revolving around national folklore and cultural heritage, such as shows concentrating on Moroccan Sufism or Amazigh culture. In their performances the artists need to validate the insignia of 'national traditional culture.' They wear, for example, a white *jellaba*, yellow *babouche*s and a red *fas* (D. *fez*), instead of the dark suits and matching ties that are generally recognized as emblems of 'Islamist music.' Therefore, artists like Rachid Gholam or Hicham Karim would be very unlikely to be invited on national television, first of all because of their (alleged) affiliation with the JBA, and secondly, because their style does not refer to Moroccan patrimony.

Anashid artists never operate alone, but are not very clearly organized in an association or a union either. They rather form a loose network, consisting of interconnected and competing groups and persons. *Munshidin* can occupy different positions within this loose network. An essential element in the attempts of artists to move their career to the next level is to develop a good network of artists and producers and acquire a significant position in it. Good networks are important in increasing one's prestige, but also in acquiring new opportunities to perform. Therefore, many *munshidin* are always seeking to improve their ranking within these networks.

One of the means for upward mobility is 'knowing the right people' and presenting oneself as someone who 'knows the right people.' Whether famous or unknown, amateur or professional, many artists try to position themselves by associating or disassociating themselves with other artists. How this happens and with whom they do or do not associate depends on the context. Hinting at relations with valued persons in the *anashid* scene (whether artists, producers, media figures, or music scholars) is a common practice. In interviews, for instance, some artists presented themselves to me as being close to certain renowned artists, while sometimes the artists in question later on claimed to never have heard of them. As a researcher I became implicated in this process. At the start of almost every interview, one of the first questions I was asked, was 'which artists did you speak to?' Apart from the fact that I may have been considered a useful connection for someone wishing to start an international career in the Netherlands, I think this was also done in order to check whether I was worth talking to. Some artists would even try to veer me off talking to certain musicians they thought were amateurs and thus not worth talking to, as they did not want to end up in the same book together with 'small *anashid* artists.'

Contacts are established in different settings, like concerts, music jam sessions, meetings, universities, the internet, mouth to mouth advertisements, and the selling of CD's. Performances also form important events through which artists can give visibility to themselves. At his house in Casablanca, *munshid*

Khalid, together with his wife, explained to me how the *dyur shabab* are particularly significant venues for *anashid* artists to establish contacts.

> Groups who have just started are the ones who go to the *dar shabab* (…) [they are] important to get to know people, (…) so everyone will know you. They [*dyur shabab*] are important (…) they introduce you to the people, [so] you become known (*maʿruf*) (..). All the artists start in the *dyur shabab* (…) because it is the only way people will see them, know them. Because at the beginning you are unknown, unseen. It is the only way (..) the first way to connect to an audience.[214]

I met Khalid at one of his concerts at a *dar shabab* in Sidi Bernoussi, one of the many lower middleclass suburbs of Casablanca, where I was introduced to him by Khadija. She knew him through her uncle Hassan and her own performances at the same *dar shabab*. She was enthusiastic about him as he performs *anashid* in an Andalusian style. Like Younes and Rachid Gholam, Khalid is also affiliated to the JBA. The *dyur shabab* are thus important environments for beginners of *anashid* to build networks and gain stage experience, but also for this anthropologist to meet performers of *anashid*.

Creating a distinctive artistic profile

The increasing demand of *anashid* music and live performances among pious Moroccan families has enhanced the competition and rivalry among *anashid* artists. In order to be successful as a band or as a solo artist, one needs to develop a recognizable and appealing distinctive artist profile. In this matter it is crucial to be recognizable as a performer of the *anashid* genre. Yet, at the same time it is equally important to distinguish oneself from other *anashid* singers and stand out as an artist with a personal style through one's presentation, music style, and performance practice. As Kendra Salois notes in her dissertation on hiphop artists in Morocco, 'assertive individuality is held in productive tension with continually expanding genre boundaries for musical and personal style' (Salois 2013: 6). Solo *anashid* artists employ various tools to present themselves to the public and in this presentation several elements are prominent. The development of a personal style in connection with the boundaries of the musical genre involves a fair amount of self profiling, PR, and the construction of an appealing and recognizable artist profile.

As I have explained in Chapter Three, *anashid* as a single musical genre accommodates a large variety of styles. Each style has its own way of presentation, singing, movements, and dress. Especially solo artists are searching for their hallmark. Some artists elaborate on existing styles within the genre while others

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[214] Interview with *munshid* Khalid. Casablanca, 29 January 2012.

try to develop their own style. Some Moroccan *munshidin* line up with classical Oriental styles of singing, as Hicham Karim and Rachid Gholam do. Other *munshidin* capitalize on what I will call the 'awakening-style.' Awakening is a celebrated UK-based record company which has brought forth internationally renowned *anashid* artists like Sami Yusuf, Maher Zain, and Hamza Robertson. These artists are presented on album covers, concert posters, and music videos in templates of trendy pop styles. Smoothly produced videos show the artists in the latest fashion, with close ups of contemplative looks, hands on the heart, or in praying position, against the backdrop of mosques, praying people, familial settings or, nature. Abujud and Ismail Balouche are two Moroccan *anashid* performers who draw on this 'awakening' style. Ismail Balouche made his Awakening style compatible with a local sense of Berber identity as he sings *anashid* in Tarifit, one of the varieties of the Amazigh language. The personalized style of solo performers, such as Rachid Gholam or Sami Yusuf, frequently functions like a template for less-known artists. By contrast, *anashid* ensembles playing at weddings tend to be more alike, and rather seek to fit into the accessible format of a standard *anashid* band for family celebrations.

The presentation of a recognizable style within the *anashid* genre strongly depends on the terminology used. The artists underline the religious characteristics of their musical practices, for instance, by referring to their musical practices with a specific religious vocabulary. Their sonic expressions can comprise various music styles, like rap, country, *shaʿbi*, or *reggada*, but still they refer to them as *anashid*. Moreover, most performers of *anashid* prefer to present themselves as *munshid*, rather than *mughanni* (singer),[215] as *munshid* has a strong religious connotation and is a wider term for performers of Islamic songs. The groups carry symbolic holy names such as al-Bishara (good news), al-Nur (The Light), or al-Risala (The Message). This kind of religious terminology is often used to indicate the religiosity of the genre and the artist, and to distinguish the music from wordly music. The labels are often strategically used, as I will discuss in Chapter Six.

Motivations to perform *anashid*

The way artists present themselves during concerts, in publicity, at CD covers, to their audiences and other artists, is closely related to the objectives and motivations of the artists. The interviews I conducted showed a large variety of reasons for performers of *anashid* to adopt the genre of *anashid*. Some *munshidin* hold political objectives or belong to an Islamic movement, others wish to increase their personal piety. Commercial motives can also play a role.

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[215] Interview with Ismail Balouche. Utrecht (the Netherlands), 28 Oktober 2009.

Talent and gender

Many performers of *anashid* I spoke with explained that their motivation of singing *anashid* is informed by their *mawhiba*. The term *mawhiba* (D. *muhiba*) can be translated as 'talent' or 'passion.' The performers wish to respond to this talent, but in accordance with their religious beliefs. Female artists in particular indicated that their choice for *anashid* was motivated by *muhiba*.

Within the scope of my research the majority of *anashid* performers were men. The increase of Islamic weddings did lead to an increasing demand of female *anashid* bands, as those weddings are segregated. Various interlocutors confirmed the existence of many female *anashid* bands. Yet, the response I got from female *anashid* bands was far below the response I got from male singers. When I discussed this discrepancy with my interlocutors, both the men and women indicated that there are fewer female than male *anashid* performers. The smaller number of women involved in the performance of *anashid*, as well as a lower interest of female performers to participate in my research was related by my interlocutors (both male and female) to local gender norms and role expectations in Morocco (Mernissi 1987; Van den Hout 2013: 352). The father of the Belkacem family explained his perspective to me:

> It is (..) a question of time. Men are more available than women. They rehearse a lot. Women don't, they have lots of responsibilities, they are mothers, they cannot leave the house at night. Men find more time. (…) from two pm untill six there are women who work. Men are free after six pm… but if you [he means a woman] come home late it is considered indecent behavior. Not only by the neighbours but her husband cannot accept this either.[216]

This quote resonates with what I have mentioned in the section above about the negative moral connotation of being a professional public entertainer (Van Nieuwkerk 1995; Soum-Pouyalet 2007). Especially for women, singing in public is frowned upon and discouraged as it is associated with shameful behavior. This was an important element for the female performers I spoke to, which made them hesitate to choose an artistic path. The majority of them knew for sure that they had a talent (*muhiba*) for singing, but they were afraid of their *sumʿa*, their public reputation. This explains why Karima refused when her mother insisted that she should participate in a singing contest on the French radio:

> It was not done to sing on the radio as a girl, what would my father and my uncles say? It's *hashuma* (shameful). (…) [But] my mother wanted me to go, she is very open (*munfatiha*). When they invited me to this concert, I refused. I was afraid to

[216] Comment of father Belkacem during my interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.

> take that path, because becoming a singer (*chanteuse*), it's very difficult as a Moroccan woman, and as a girl coming from a modest family. You become known as someone who has left the path (…). I was afraid of my position in society (*sumʿa*). If you become a singer you become something which is not good. You lose your own ethics (*akhlaq)*.

Apart from the risk of coming home late as a woman and the neighbour's gossiping, the few female performers I did speak with told me that in principle, women are not allowed to sing in front of men, because this could lead to sinful behavior and even more, it could cause social chaos (*fitna*), which might undermine the unity of the Muslim community (*umma*) (Mernissi 1987; Courchesne 2014: 59). Some orthodox currents, like Salafism, even believe that the voice of a women is *ʿawra* (intimate parts of the body that should be covered).

As for many Moroccan women who perform *anashid*, *anashid* was the only option for Karima to express her talent (*muhiba*) for singing, while keeping her religiosity and maybe even more important her reputation (*sumʿa*):

> Why I chose *anashid?* Because I wore the veil and with the veil I could not sing in public, but with *anashid* I can keep my *muhiba*, which I told you about. With *anashid* I can express myself within a certain intimate domain, like only for women. That is why I chose Muslim music, or *anashid*.

When Karima decided to wear the veil, she did not want to give up her *muhiba*, and looked for a way to combine her religion with her talent and passion for music. She found this combination in *anashid*.

Anashid music provides better opportunities for women to build their musical careers and to be perceived seriously for their artistic talents. However, different rules apply for male and female performers of *anashid*. For instance Karima told me that:

> It is not [religiously] allowed to sing as a woman in front of men, because a man who hears the voice of a woman can be attracted [by her voice], and fall in love with her (…) it's human nature (…) I could read the Qurʾan [in front of men], but as a singer I cannot [perform in front of men]. Because when I sing, I express myself, I make gestures.

Karima told me that only women who have self-control can perform *anashid*: 'It is necessary that she is disciplined when she sings and knows very well what [the

content] she sings. She can not allow herself to derail.'[217] Father Belkacem adds to this:

> (…) a woman or a girl who goes on stage needs to master what she is going to sing, and what's more, control herself. Sometimes we see during evening concerts on television that a woman forgets she is a woman [laughs]. She forgets about herself, considering the rhythm, and the atmosphere. She could dance and make gestures, which are against religion, (…) gestures that are indecent. But for a true Muslim woman, if she wants to touch the hearts of people, she needs to control herself, she needs to control what she says and control herself. For example, she cannot sing with her body or with her eyes. She needs to control her entire body, [because] the body and the eyes, they influence.[218]

A *munshid*, and especially a *munshida*, should at all times avoid singing in a seductive way. This kind of singing is forbidden in Islam because it is believed it could lead to sinful situations and cause social chaos (*fitna*). The style of singing of a *munshid*(*a*) should be 'correct.' It is thus important that she uses what is called 'a modest voice.' This means that the volume of the singing should not be too loud, and no inciting exclamations should be made, which could cause arousal.

Retaining one's *muhiba* without going astray also motivated male singers to turn to the genre of *anashid*. *Munshid* Younes, from Casablanca, discovered his vocal talent at the age of fifteen. He had practiced his voice by doing *tajwid* in the mosque. But his passion for singing was ignited by the classical singers from the Orient, whom he imitated at home, listening to their cassettes. A public musical career, however was out of the question: 'My father used to say: "*dhikr Allah l-kbir*, Allah's *dhikr* is the best." That's why I turned to *anashid*, it was music which was acceptable.'[219]

In addition, many see their *muhiba* for music as a talent which is given to them by God as part of his divine plan. Therefore they feel a responsibility towards God to use this gift for a religiously committed cause. As Rachid Gholam put it in an interview:

> All my capacities combined, physical, of the heart, [and] cultural have to be in service of the message. And among these capacities, art. Art is a tool, it's not a finality, (…) and I have put this art, this tool, in the service of (…) my message, that I wish to convey to humanity.[220]

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[217] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.
[218] Comment of father Belkacem during my interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.
[219] Unrecorded interview with *munshid* Younes. Rabat, 1 January 2012.
[220] Interview with Rashid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.

For male, but especially for female vocal performers, the genre of *anashid* seems to provide a platform where singers can cherish and develop their *muhiba* without displaying sexuality and losing their social respectability (Courchesne 2014: 58).

Career opportunities and artistic ambition

It is common practice for *anashid* to be performed in return for financial rewards. In their survey on religious values in Morocco, El-Ayadi et al. note that only 10,7% of the families they interviewed invite music groups to perform at family celebrations, against 26,1% who invite exclusively *tolba* who recite the Qurʾan (59,9% opt for a combination) (2007: 79). The researchers suggest that not only religious motivations play a role in the decision of families whether or not to invite a music group. Economic reasons are at play as well, because groups who use music (with melodic instruments) are more expensive than performers who do not use music. Even so, hiring an *anashid* band can be quite expensive. At the time of my research, an *anashid* band generally asked 5000 dirham for a performance, whereas a minimum month salary lay around 1800 dirham. After a couscous meal at her mother's home in Casablanca, *munshida* Khadija showed me a video recording of her own wedding and repeatedly mentioned she had spent a fortune on her *anashid* wedding band.[221]

The financial compensation for *anashid* performances was only brought up by my interlocutors when I asked about it. Most artists thought there was no problem if a band asked money to perform religious songs, since the bandmembers have to make a living as well. However, all of them agreed money can never become the primary motivation, nor can the seeking of career opportunities overshadow the purpose of conveying religious messages. Moreover, the money earned should be put to a good purpose. The times that my interviewees would bring up the matter of money spontaneously was when they would gossip about other *anashid* artists they disliked, calling them money-driven and commercial.

Developing personal piety

Whereas financial rewards could never be the primary objective to perform *anashid* for an audience, spiritual rewards would be a completely acceptable reason for an artist to perform *anashid*. Many artists indicated to me that the performance of *anashid* earns them *hasanat*.

The concept of *hasanat* in Islam refers to the credits one gains for performing pious acts during one's life, resulting in a better chance to enjoy the eternal afterlife in Paradise. Performing *anashid* is seen as a good religious deed, like reading the Qurʾan and praying, which can earn one spiritual points that help

[221] Informal conversation with Khadija. 25 February, Casablanca.

one to enter paradise (*janna*) in the afterlife. This motivates some *munshidin* to perform *anashid* for free. In a café in Nador, Ismail tells me that he sometimes performs for free, like that night at a wedding of a poor family. He calls this *fi sabil Allah* (for the cause of Allah). Although he is not financially compensated for this performance, he is certain God will pay him for his act in the afterlife. Ismail also explains to me how he sees life on earth as an exam: 'Once we have passed the exam we can rest. People who will go to paradise will stay there and have eternal life, people who will go to hell will stay there forever.'[222]

Performing *anashid* thus not only serves as a way to realize one's musical talent and artistic ambition, but also as a means to develop the individual piety of the performer. Some artists even pointed out that the performance of *anashid* enabled them to experience a closeness to the divine. The development of one's own piety can be conceptualized as 'the construction of a moral self' (Mahmood 2005; Winchester 2008). This notion describes how religious practices, like rituals, are not a mere expression of pre-existing moral orientations of the believer, but actively contribute towards its construction. This concept helps to explain that *anashid* performers assign to the performance of *anashid* a central role in the development of their own personal piety.

Daʿwa *through* anashid

Besides performing *anashid* with the purpose of developing their own religiosity, the motivation of many artists to perform *anashid* is to convey the Islamic message (*ar-risala*) to the wider society. What this message is can differ. Some messages urge to observe the five pillars of Islam. But other messages are broader. *Munshid* Khalid, for instance, told me that in his songs he attaches much importance to teaching his audiences how to tell right from wrong and urging them to follow a religiously devout life. Ismail Balouche likewise indicated he wishes to urge those who went off course, to return to the 'straight path.'[223]

The aim of *munshidin* to convey teachings about Islam to the wider society with their music, was often labeled by themselves as *daʿwa*. As I have explained in Chapter Four, *daʿwa* can be seen as an Islamic equivalent of missionary activities or acts of proselytization. These missionary activities are seen as a religious duty. As Charles Hirschkind notes: '*Daʿwa* [is] a duty (…) incumbent upon some or all members of the Islamic community, to actively encourage fellow Muslims in the pursuance of greater piety in all aspects of their lives' (2006: 108-109). This encouragement to (re)turn to Islam can be directed at both fellow Muslims and non-Muslims. That *daʿwa* is perceived as a religious duty, became clear in an interview with the *anashid* group Salsabil. When I asked them why they chose to

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[222] Unrecorded interview with *munshid* Ismail Balouche. Nador, 5 Augustus 2010.
[223] Interview with Ismail Balouche. Utrecht (the Netherlands), 28 October 2009.

perform *anashid* on top of their regular religious duties like prayer and fasting, one band member answered:

> We follow the Prophet, peace be upon him. (…). He said: "Convey on my behalf even one verse." *Da'wa* should be done by everybody, because if we do not do it, Islam will not be spread, and others (non-Muslims) will not know it. Then we will become like a parasite on Islam (…) we have to advice and make people aware so that Allah will reward us with paradise.

Then, a fellow band member added:

> The message of the Prophet, peace be up on him, is for all humanity. He said to Muslims to transmit the message to all humanity, that is why a Muslim needs to do more than just his prayers, since he received the real message, he also has to transmit it to everyone.[224]

Da'wa takes shape in a wide range of activities such as lectures, education, social welfare facilities, but also in music. Most of the *anashid* artists I interviewed indicated that they choose to perform *da'wa* through *anashid* because they believe it to be a very apt vehicle for the transmission of messages of Islam. Especially the accessibility and emotional appeal of music is believed to facilitate drawing in people to the path of Islam. As *munshid* Ali notes:

> 'It's a tool for us to convey a message which cannot be conveyed through conferences or lectures. With a song you can convey several messages, and they will be easily accepted.'[225]

The appeal of music is also brought forward as particularly effective in reaching out to youngsters. According to a bandmember of Salsabil, the band conveys Islamic messages to youngsters and those who do not consult religious scholars:

> With music you can attain the same result but in an artistic way (…). People like music, so since they like music, we have to use it to transmit the message to them.[226]

Accordingly, some *munshidin* also indicated that through the use of Islam-inspired music they wished to offer an alternative for the 'impious' entertainment offered by the (trans) national media.

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[224] Interview with the bandmembers of the *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 11 January 2012.
[225] Interview with *munshid* Ali. Rabat, 19 September 2010.
[226] Interview with members of the *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 11 January 2012.

Besides conveying the teachings of Islamic spirituality, bringing people (back) to an Islamically devout life, and offering 'moral' alternatives to 'immoral' entertainment, another aspect which can be viewed as part of *daʿwa* through *anashid* are messages of social justice and mobilization. Many singers feel that their religion is being misrepresented and ridiculed by (Western) media. An example is a song Ismail Balouche released together with rap artist 2-Gunz from Oujda, with the title *Feyn-kum ya muslimin*? (Where Are You, Oh Muslims?), in which he calls upon Muslims to defend their faith against negative stigmatization by 'the West.' This song was made following the issue of the Danish cartoon depicting the Prophet and has an accompanying music video. The song calls upon Muslims to resist the insulting, repression, and blackening of their religion. It starts with a sample of a howling angry voice with a strong echo added to the audio sample. The voice says:

> You community of believers of Muhammad, your Prophet is being insulted. And what are you doing about it? You are boycotting Nido milk powder and Lurpack butter (Danish products). Is that all you can do? They have declared war and cherished hostility towards us, what now? Who will come forward to support the messenger of God?

In the accompanying videoclip phrases in Arabic script in red against a dark sky with lightning flashes are shown with the texts: 'They have declared war on us,' 'Boycott Danish Products, as a support to the Prophet Muhammad against the evil attack of Denmark and the European Union.' Then hiphop music sets in and edited television fragments are shown. First a fragment of an interview with an orthodox shaykh appears saying: 'It's not only the fact that the insults are directed against the Prophet Muhammad, we believe that such cartoons should not be made of any prophet or messenger.' Then a newsreader of *Al-Jazeera* is shown, saying: 'This is a call to start off a boycott as an answer to the Danish insults towards Muslims.' Then the orthodox shaykh appears again saying: 'God shall damn them.' Then over hiphop beats and a violin, Ismail Balouche sings in Moroccan Arabic:

> Where are you oh Muslims? (*Feyn-kum ya muslimin*). We do not want religion to be touched (*ma-bghina-sh ytqas d-din*).

The words are sung while edited fragments of videos showing burning Danish flags, the abuse of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers, and of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay by American soldiers are shown, as well as fleeing refugees, crying women, wounded children, alternated by pictures of the Qurʾan and a praying Ismail Balouche.

Then 2-Gunz sets in a rap in *darija*:

> They say the voice of Islam is racist, but they forgot that they are the big terrorists. Their governments is like a shop [capitalism]. If you say the morning prayer (*fajr*), they say you are a terrorist. If you read the Qurʾan, they say you are a racist. They spend the money of the entire world. They have an idea in their head, they want to eliminate Islam. Allah is great, there is no God than Allah and Muhammad is His messenger.

Then the reciting of *Allahu akbar* resounds, again with a strong echo added to the audio sample, edited to images of praying people at important places in the Muslim world, such as the dome of the rock in Jerusalem, Mecca, but also the image of the Hassan II mosque in Casablanca is shown. Then Ismail Balouche repeats the same lyrics, and again more violent images are shown.[227] The song is an example of how *munshidin* can use their music to criticize the negative representations of Islam as a hostile religion, and urge their fellow believers to come into action against the systematic stigmatization of Islam.

Performing *daʿwa* through *anashid* thus knows different aspects and nuances. *Munshidin* use *anashid* to both promote and defend Islam. Musical practices are used in order to convey Islamic messages (social and spiritual), attract (new) believers, but also to mobilize people to assert their religion against 'the West.' *Anashid* is also used by Islamic movements to give a positive image of Islamic movements, which in the national media and politics are often connected with radicalism and the repression of artistic production. Through the use of music, Islamic movements want to show they are actually tolerant towards art and culture. Music then is supposed to bring an image of modernity to such movements.

Artists' perspectives on music as a source of divine power

As I have demonstrated in my theoretical chapter, the power of music is manifested through its combination of working the senses and invoking multiple systems of representation. The main reason why performers of *anashid* believe music is such an apt tool to convey messages about Islam is because they attribute a certain power to music. According to them music has the ability to influence people's thoughts, feelings, and ultimately their behavior. This power however is ambivalent, it is believed to have the capacity to establish a connection with a divine reality, but it can also bring a listener into temptation and distract him from religious obligations. In this section I will lay out the ideas performers of *anashid* have about music as a source of divine power in itself.

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[227] Translated from *darija* by author and Mohamed Gharbaoui.

Heart and soul

My interlocutors all showed an awareness of music's power to pervade the consciousness of the listener. This perception of music has also been noted by Charles Hirschkind who, in his study of practices of listening to tape-recorded sermons among contemporary Muslims in Egypt, points to concerns about 'music's ability to bypass the faculty of rational judgment and directly affect the senses of the listener' (Hirschkind 2006: 35). Among the *anashid* artists I interviewed, ideas circulated that music's intrinsic power can be used to awaken a desire to get closer to God, but that this power can also carry a potential danger. This moral ambivalence of music corresponds to Hirschkind's argument when he notes that:

> In general, those who have opposed the audition of music point to its dangerous ability to arouse unruly passions, stimulate sensual pleasures, and distract one from thoughts of God, while those who have advocated the practice (…) have seen in it a means to move the heart to greater piety and closeness to God (Hirschkind 2006: 35).

This moral ambivalence of music is the underlying reason that all performers of *anashid* I interviewed strongly stress that when music is used, it should be directed towards the soul of a human being, and not address one's carnal desires. Hassan for example says: '[Music] should address the soul, the spiritual level, the human level and thoughts and ideas, [by contrast] Satanic music like heavy metal, [is] music which speaks to the body and its animal desires; [this] should be avoided.'[228] In my interviews, the soul but also the heart recurrently came up as a central element in the narratives of musicians when speaking about music's power. Like when *munshid* Najib explains to me his objective in performing *anashid*:

> My goal is to sow the love for our Prophet, peace be upon him, in the hearts of people (…) Hearts that are carried away by the love for the world or (…) money, and forgot our Lord (…). I want these hearts to praise our Lord, peace be upon Him. [In] that way they might repent to God Almighty. That is the objective of *daʿwa*.[229]

Fascinated by the repeated mentioning of the heart by artists, I asked *munshid* Younes, to give his view about the role of the heart in musical practices. According to him, human beings consist of a wordly and a spiritual dimension (*ruh*). God placed spirit in human beings, an aspect that is represented by the soul. The

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[228] Unrecorded interview with Hassan. Casablanca, 18 September 2010.

[229] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 Augustus 2010.

body, on the other hand, represents the wordly dimension. According to Younes, God wants people to find a balance between these two components in their lives. To accomplish such a balance, the soul has to be attuned until it is right. There are different ways and tools to nourish the soul. He gave me the example of *dhikr*. Music can be another tool to influence the soul. According to Younes, music affects both body and soul: 'If the music is bad (morally), you will feel this immediately; the soul weakens and the physical aspect becomes stronger. With good music it is exactly the other way around.'[230]

Different cultures tend to locate emotions in particular body sites or organs (Jenkins & Valiente 1994: 174). Younes' explanation echoes the centrality of the heart as an organ of spiritual reception in the cultivation of piety within Sufism, which I have described in Chapter Four. This centrality of the heart has been noticed in other studies as well. Charles Hirschkind for instance describes the heart as 'the organ of both audition and moral comportment' (2006: 38). The condition of the heart can be improved through, for instance, ethical sonic practices (ibid.:10), but it also 'can be impaired (…) through the repeated performance of sinful acts' (ibid.: 37). In her study on Moroccan *gnawa* music, Deborah Kapchan similarly points to 'the metaphor of "hearing with the heart" [which] is grounded in the Sufi notion that active listening is related to, and may transform, the moral being' (2007: 43).

The heart is thus the gateway which can open up the soul to spiritual transformation. Ethical music fascilitates this process. *Munshidin* consider *anashid* 'good' music that can transform the soul by touching the heart. *Munshid* Khalid explained how according to him this connection between the heart, the soul, and *anashid* operates: 'Islamic songs touch the heart and soul of Muslims, (but) before an *unshuda* talks to the soul, it speaks to the heart.'[231]

Fitra

My interlocutors all asserted a belief that the heart innately desires to move closer to God. This is seen as a natural disposition, present in every human being. *Anashid* are believed to have the capacity to (re-) awaken and develop this natural tendency of the heart towards the divine. Othmane, a young *munshid* from Casablanca explains:

> We have a text in the Qurʾan which says that every person is born with faith, and loves to listen to people of God, and loves to listen to the Qurʾan. Even a foreigner who is not Muslim (…) [who] listens to the Qurʾan (…). It's magic. Because it's the nature of men. They remember God, they remember their creation, they remember

[230] Interview with *munshid* Younes. Rabat, 1 January 2012.
[231] Interview with *munshid* Khalid. Casablanca, 29 January 2012.

> their origins. That's why they listen, even when they do not understand [the words], because it is something which everyone already has inside of him.[232]

What Othmane describes as 'faith being the nature of every man' refers to an Islamic notion known as *fitra*; the innate inclination of every human soul to worship one God. Muslims believe that Islam is the religion God has intended for humanity. However, during the course of life one's *fitra* can become sidelined or repressed. Yet, it is believed the natural tendency of the soul can be restored (Esposito 2003: 87). The singing of *anashid* is a means to re-establish or re-awaken the *fitra* in listeners. Because music has the power to speak to the soul through the heart of the listener, it has the ability to summon people to return to their natural inclination as a Muslim, that is, to restore the *fitra*.

Akhlaq: bringing ethical dispositions into action

Munshidin perform *anashid* not only to make people stop and reflect upon their own lives, they also seek to convert the attained spiritual transformations into actual action. In Islam, the relationship between spiritual dispositions and ethical behavior in daily practice is referred to with the term *akhlaq*. *Akhlaq* is often translated as a combination of ethics, morals, and good conduct, or as the *Oxford Dictionary of Islam* describes it:

> True faith shows itself in appropriate conduct. In fact, true faith and good behavior are considered to be inseparable—faith without good deeds is without value, and good deeds without faith are not possible (Esposito 2003: 75).

As this lemma shows, Muslims believe that virtuous conduct follows from spiritual development of the heart. A purified heart is what undergirds moral behavior and ethical conduct, as the heart is able to distinguish between reality and illusion, right and wrong, and truth and falsehood. The process of the cleansing of the heart and spiritual transformation can be brought about through the repeated deployment of certain thoughts, feelings, and actions. This will bring the heart in a certain disposition to open itself to the divine. One way in which this is done is by inducing sentiments in the listener associated with certain virtues, like kindness, patience, or calmness. Ismail Balouche spoke to me about the impact of repetition on the heart and thus on a person's religiosity. For instance he hopes that hearing his music over and over will induce calmness in the hearts of his listeners. He made a telling comparison of the impact of repeated behavior and ideas on the heart of a person with burning a CD:

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[232] Interview with *munshi*d Othmane. Casablanca, 3 November 2011.

> Religion and your heart, it is like burning a CD. (…) If during your life you are ingrained with the same things over and over again, and at the end of your life God plays your CD; what will He hear?[233]

In accordance to Ismail's statement on the religious implications of ingrained behavior, listening to 'good' music can evoke feelings and thoughts that attune the heart towards God, and results in good behavior, but listening to 'bad' music could corrode the heart. *Anashid* is considered good music, which imprints on the heart sensibilities that develop and orient it towards good conduct.

The spiritual transformation sought after by the *munshidin* is thus attained by cultivating certain sentiments in the listener through their musical practices. In the divine-human relationship in Sufism, sentiments play a central role in the transformation of the soul (See also Shannon 2004 and Kapchan 2007). These sentiments concern the experience of desirable inner states, like pious fear (*taqwa*), awe and humility before God (*khushuʿ*) (Mahmood 2012: 228), or *ihsan* (a deep sense of spirituality).[234] But these also involve outward responses, such as crying. Both the experience and the expression of such sentiments are believed to induce ethical dispositions in the listener and are often invoked with the rationale to put these dispositions into practice. In this way *anashid* are believed to move a listener not only to pious thoughts but towards actual moral conduct (Hirschkind 2005: 9, 68). This makes it easier to understand a statement of a band member of Salsabil when he states: 'Our music has the purpose to make good Muslims.'

Artists' perspectives on music as a morally ambiguous power

As described in the introduction to this thesis, the relationship between Islam and music is surrounded by ambiguity. The potentially seductive and dangerous power atributed to music in Islam created reserved attitudes towards music. The transformation of the genre of *anashid* from an austere performance with light percussion into an elaborate set of musical practices covering diverse contemporary styles, including pop music, fast-paced rhythms, and various musical instruments has revived debates on the permissibility of music in Islam among singers, audiences and religious scholars alike.

Anashid artists are very much aware of the ambiguous reputation of music in Islam as they are often criticized by the public. In particular, artists who include musical instruments and popular music styles, such as rap or *shaʿbi* into their repertoire, are faced with disapproval. Ismail Balouche told me about people denouncing his music, because they think it is not correct according to Islam:

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[233] Unrecorded interview with *munshid* Ismail Balouche. Nador, 9 August 2010.

[234] Within Sufism the notion of *ihsan* refers to a continuous awareness of God's presence guiding the believer through his/ her internal and external world (Esposito 2003: 133).

> There are people who do not like (..) that I sing with music [meaning with melodic instruments]. They believe it's not right with music (...) it should only be with words without music (...). There are people who call me on the telephone who [say]: "You sing with music, it's *haram*, it's forbidden!" I find that complicated.[235]

Despite the fact that the performers are convinced of the permissibility of music, because of its ambiguous status in Islam, they do feel the need to justify their use of it in *anashid*. To legitimize the use of melodic instruments and dancing rhythms, artists give different reasons: religious texts and scholars, the content of the lyrics, and *da'wa*.

Religious texts and scholars

Many singers legitimize their musical practices by referring to religious scriptures, Islamic scholars or television preachers allowing musical practices under certain conditions, and also sometimes to viewpoints of Islamic movements. A member of an *anashid* band from Berkane explained to me how scriptures, television preachers, and Islamic movements have influenced the band's musical choices in including melodic instruments into their repertoire:

> There is no single *hadith* that says music is *haram*. It was al-Qaradawi who gave the green light. Shaykh Yassine [the leader of al-'Adl wal-Ihsan] also recently wrote a book in which he addresses the issue of music. It says that musical instruments are allowed, that ultimately it's about the topics addressed.[236]

'It's the words that matter'

Another idea that was commonly mentioned by the artists I interviewed was that music is allowed in *anashid* because the genre's primary focus lies on the topics addressed in the lyrics. When I first met *munshida* Khadija in November 2011 at the house of her uncle Hassan in Casablanca, she told me about the gender-mixed *anashid* choir she participated in, which had recently been set up by her uncle. She also told me about her newest musical endeavors. She had just started rehearsing songs by Katie Perry, Céline Dion, and Gregorian chants. I was very surprised, as I had never met a Moroccan *munshid* or *munshida* who practized these styles of music, and considered them permissible for *anashid*. Khadija said that there were people who criticized her for doing this, but according to her there was no problem, because the words of the songs were clean (*kalimat naqiyya*).

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[235] Interview with *munshid* Ismail Balouche. Utrecht (The Netherlands), 28 October 2009.
[236] Interview with *anashid* band. Berkane, 13 August 2010.

I asked many *anashid* artists how they felt about the criticism they receive for using music in their *anashid*, and most of them replied like Khadija, that there is no danger in any kind of music, as long as the words are 'clean.' Kamal Shabat, one of the *munshidin* I worked with from the northern Rif area, explained it to me like this:

> For me music is not *haram* because there are words which are really good. There are lyrics that talk about the father, the mother and the Rif, these are things which are very good.[237]

Hicham Karim commented on the use of music in a similar way:

> (…) musical instruments are not *haram* but rather it has to do with the words. If the words are bad (…) it is *haram*.[238]

Both Hicham and Kamal indicate that the problem with the use of instruments in *anashid* lies not so much in the music, or the use of musical instruments, but in the lyrics. These should be 'clean' or 'good.' The lyrics should concern messages, topics, ideas, and feelings that are in accordance with Islamic values. This goes for songs that convey explicit Islamic messages, but also for music that avoids vulgarity and insulting speech, and shows respect for Islamic modesty guidelines (Jouili 2012: 402). This may explain why Khadija had no problem singing particular songs by Katie Perry or Gregorian chants. Although these songs do not refer to Islamic topics, and neither the origin of the genre nor the performer is Islamic, the songs are not in contradiction to Islamic values. The content of the lyrics is believed to be a crucial element, which defines the music as either licit or illicit, not the music itself. Several *munshidin* explained this reasoning to me by making a comparison between musical instruments and a glass. Like Najib did:

> You spoke about (…) what is *halal* in music and what is *haram*? There are some people who say that the saxophone, flute, cello, double-bass, *ʿud*, and *qanun* are all *haram* and there are some people who say it's *halal*. There is a difference of opinion. But you can compare it to a glass. The instrument is like a glass. If you pour wine, [or] whiskey in it, it is *haram*. If you pour water in it, it is *halal*.[239]

A similar comparison was sometimes made between instruments and a knife, like by Hicham Karim:

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[237] Interview with *munshid* Kamal Shabat. Al-Aroui, 6 August 2010.
[238] Interview with *munshid* Hicham Karim. Kenitra, 22 August 2010.
[239] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 August 2010.

> (…) they are only instruments, they do nothing wrong. For example, the knife, we can use it in the kitchen to make salads, peel the vegetables and so on, this is *halal*, but if we use it in a negative way it becomes *haram*. You [i.e. any person] are the one who plays the role; the same case with the instruments, you can use them in a *halal* way, in the case of religious songs and songs which have good messages, or in a *haram* way.[240]

Both the comparison of music to a glass and to a knife reveals that artists see music as a powerful instrument. However, the nature of this power is not intrinsically bad or good, it is just powerful, it can both do good and cause harm, depending on the moral disposition of the person using it.

Daʿwa

Daʿwa and the cultivation of virtuous Muslims is an important motivation for the artists to perform *anashid* (see above), but was also put forward in the legitimization of the use of music: the end, promoting Islam, justifies the means, i.e. using music. First of all, artists justify using the appeal of music for the purpose of *daʿwa*, so they can more easily spread Islamic messages to a wide audience. Like the band leader of Salsabil explained to me:

> Yes I do music and I transmit to the audience what I want, and they will perceive it easily, and react and live with it.[241]

Several *munshidin* indicated that listening to music (with Islamic messages) is a much more accessible and enjoyable way of gaining knowledge about Islam than, for instance, consulting scriptures or religious scholars. They also indicated it helps them to attract young Moroccans to a 'proper' Islamic life. In the words of Ismail Balouche: 'Once people are attracted to the rhythm, the melody and the beauty of the voice, they will try to understand the words and seek to apply the messages of the songs in their own lives.'[242] Especially *anashid* using rap rhythms, hiphop beats, or templates of pop music are intended to make the Islamic message more attractive (particularly to youngsters).

The use of music is also meant to prevent people from being tempted by music with 'immoral' lyrics. Many artists argue that people will listen to music anyway. Therefore they feel it is better to create music with good words themselves as a substitute for mainstream music they consider morally harmful. As Hassan explained to me when he spoke about performing music at Islamic weddings:

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[240] Interview with *munshid* Hicham Karim. Kenitra, 22 August 2010.
[241] Interview with the *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 11 January 2012.
[242] Interview with Ismail Balouche. Utrecht (The Netherlands), 28 October 2009.

> People are used to listen to festive music and singers in weddings, so we try to make *anashid* but with music, while [at the same time] sending out a [Islamic] message (...).[243]

In a similar way, Salsabil's bandmember is convinced that it is better to provide Islam-inspired music, than make no music at all. He also takes weddings as an example: 'to have a wedding without music is impossible (....) [without the presence of *anashid* bands] the hosting family will bring other groups that use music with very immoral lyrics.'[244]

Tajdid

The increasing use of a wide range of musical styles and instruments in *anashid* performances was considered a positive development by the artists, and often referred to as *tajdid*. *Tajdid* means 'renewal'; in an Islamic context, it is interpreted as 'Islamic renewal' or 'revival,' referring to the renewal of Muslim faith and practices. The term is particularly often used in the context of modern Islamic movements indicating a renewed commitment to Islamic values and practice as a way to realize progress and development (Esposito 2003: 312).

The term *tajdid* frequently came up when artists explained their use of music (i.e. melodic instruments) in *anashid*. It was used then to refer to the capacity of *anashid* to revive and renew Muslim faith and practices. But it was also used to indicate the renewal of the genre of *anashid* itself, giving the genre a sense of modernization. The prevalence of the term *tajdid*, indicated the prevailing discourses about modernity and progress, when artists explained the use of music in contemporary *anashid*. In interviews artists would emphasize the denunciation or resistance to music (instruments) by the public as convictions and beliefs from the past. Kamal Shabat, for instance, explains:

> People used to say that *anashid* should be done without music; *anashid* with voice only (...) no music, no violin, no piano. I am talking about the past, not now (...). In the past, those who rejected this domain, they used to call it *haram*, *haram*, *haram*! Now, thank God things have changed (...). Now there is Sami Yusuf who has recorded his songs with a very good orchestra. Now, thank God, there are people who love *anashid*, and love the *munshid* more than the musician who is singing ordinary songs.[245]

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[243] Personal communication with Hassan. Casablanca, 2 December 2012.
[244] Interview with members of the *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 11 January 2012.
[245] Interview with *munshid* Kamal Shabat. Al-Aroui, 6 August 2010.

In this interview fragment, Kamal Shabat implies that the use of instruments in *anashid* is something good, a progressive development. He even implies that *anashi*d, because of its embrace of instruments, has become a musical genre that is even listened to by a larger mainstream public.

This synthesis of Islam with discourses of progress and modern development was central in narratives legitimizing the use of music in *anashid*. It also strongly echoes a notion brought forward by JBA's shaykh Abdessalam Yassine, 'Islamizing modernity,' which he describes in his book with the same title (Yassine 1998). In this book, Yassine, encourages people to accept what he calls the 'positive' aspects of modernity but reject its 'negative' aspects, such as secularism and materialism (Yassine 1998: 49-50). According to him, progress should be measured by spiritual development, not only material development (Aksikas 2009: 106). *Anashid* is a practice promoting spiritual development of the human soul. The use of music in *anashid* is legitimized through a similar desire to embrace modernity in an Islamic way. The incorporation of different music styles, rhythms, and instruments is meant to present a modern image.

In the previous section we have seen that *munshidin* choose music in order to live their musical passion within a religious framework and because of music's transformative power. They see music as a powerful tool to convey Islamic messages because they believe it affects the thoughts and emotions of their audience, making them susceptible to receive Islamic messages. They also see music as a morally ambiguous power, whose use needs to be explained and handled with care. But what do they actually do to achieve the opening and cleansing of the heart, and the refiguring of the moral dispositions and conduct of their audiences? In the next section I will focus on the musical practices they employ during their performances to invoke this divine reality.

Musical practices: evoking and controlling emotions

> Karima: So I am going to sing you a piece of *anashid*,
> and we will watch the effect of this *anashid* on you.
> [Karima sings a piece of *anashid*].
> Karima: And…did you feel this.. ? How did the song feel to you?
> Nina: It is very…you have a beautiful voice, and I like the melody as well.
> Karima: And if you understood the meaning of this *anashid*, you would cry; because it is the love of the Prophet.[246]

Like Karima, many *munshidin* and *munshidat*, after a concert, did not ask me what I thought of the concert, but rather what I felt and whether I cried: 'And?…

[246] Fragment of interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.

did you cry?' they would ask me hopefully. The physical and emotional reactions of the audience were something they always hoped for and received with much joy.

One of the main objectives of *anashid* performers is to produce particular emotional responses among their audience to achieve a moral reconfiguration within their audience. *Munshidin* use specific performance techniques to conduct an Islamically correct musical performance, but also to influence the inward dispositions of the audiences. This corresponds to Deborah Kapchan's findings who, in her study on *gnawa* music in Morocco, notes that practices aimed at the moral transformation of human beings: 'involve a particular configuration of the senses, as well as a repertoire of emotions (…) associated with them' (2007: 43). With *anashid munshidin* try to evoke specific kinds of emotions so as to draw listeners closer to God, while other emotions are avoided or severely controlled because they are deemed to be closer to carnal desires. I will address four domains of musical performance techniques which the singers believe to be important to both heighten and control the emotional state of their audiences: musical rendition, stage performance, song lyrics, and behavior towards the audience.

Musical rendition

During my fieldwork I attended a total of sixteen *anashid* concerts of five groups and eight solo artists. As the ethnographical example at the beginning of this chapter shows, the musical practices performed by *anashid* artists, are diverse. Most *anashid* groups have become proficient in different musical styles, which they perform, depending on the context and preference of the host. *Anashid* nowadays can range from austere performances consisting merely out of mere voice accompanied by light percussion, to *anashid* accompanied by synthesizers, drum-computers, and melodic instruments. The concerts I attended were sometimes confined to sober *anashid* with calm rhythms on Islamic themes, *amdah* (songs of praise to the Prophet and his family), *ibtihalat* (supplications to God) alternated with *duʿaʾ* (invocations). At other times the *anashid* comprised exuberant music in Classical Arabic styles like *muwashshah* or Moroccan popular music styles, like *shaʿbi*, Amazigh, *gnawa*, or songs by Nass Al-Ghiwane, but with adjusted arrangements and lyrics. This musical versatility provides *anashid* artists with a wide variety of possibilities to invoke various sentiments in their listeners.

To strike the right chord with the audience the performers employ different musical practices. One of them is free improvisation, which can be both instrumental and vocal. An improvisation mostly precedes the actual musical composition. An instrumental improvisation is called *taqsim* and in *anashid* it precedes the vocal part of a composition. A vocal improvisation, called *mawwal*, is a much used singing technique in various musical genres. This is a kind of melismatic

singing where multiple notes on one syllable are sung. Such improvisation forms an important musical element to achieve emotional effects. When singing a *mawwal* in *anashid*, the lead singer of an *anashid* band uses this specific style of vocal ornamentation, with or without instrumental accompaniment to engage the audience emotionally in the songs performed. But as in *anashid*, the voice (*sawt*) takes a central place in the musical performance, the larger part of the improvisations in *anashid* consists of *mawwal* (pl. *mawawil*) and not *taqsim*. In the performance of *mawawil*, and in the vocal performance of *anashid* in general, voice effects on the microphone, mostly in the form of an echo, are added to further intensify the emotional impact (Touma 1996: 97-99).

Generating emotions is also sought after through carefully selecting musical harmonies. Some artists told me how essential it is to use the right *maqamat*. A *maqam* (pl. *maqamat*) is a melodic scale used in traditional Arab music (Racy 2003). *Munshida* Karima, for instance, told me the artists carefully pick the *maqamat*, because different *maqamat* invoke different sets of feelings: 'There are *maqamat* that invoke feelings of happiness. When the *maqamat* are well picked, the audience will have a good time and accept the message more easily.'[247]

To direct the emotions evoked through musical practices towards religious interpretation, singers apply different practices. They carefully select the instruments they use in their performances. In traditional *anashid*, no melodic instruments are used because these are believed to be prohibited in Islam. Yet, in contemporary *anashid*, musical instruments are used increasingly often, depending on the band, the setting, and the preferences of the host. Nevertheless, wind and stringed instruments like the *nay* or a violin are still hardly ever used, since these instruments in particular are believed to evoke carnal desires and chase away the angels. Remarkably, synthesizers are frequently used in *anashid*, probably because they integrate various sounds of diverse instruments, without actually having to use the instruments in an on-stage performance. To ensure a religious reading of the music performed, *anashid* performers also alternate the musical practices with recitations from the Qurʾan or saying prayers (*duʿa'*). But they also actively avoid certain musical practices. As I described above, a *munshid*, and especially a *munshida*, should at all times avoid singing in a seductive way because it is believed it could lead to sinful situations and cause *fitna*. The style of singing of a *munshid*(*a*) should be 'correct.' It is thus important that a *munshid* uses what is called a modest voice. This means that the volume of the singing should not be too loud, and no inciting exclamations should be made, like moaning or sighing, as these sounds are believed to lead to sexual arousal.

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[247] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.

Stage presentation

The second important domain of musical performance practice *munshidin* employ to heighten and control the emotional state of their audiences is their stage presentation. On stage the performers try to embody Islamic virtues on stage through aesthetic performance techniques, such as bodily postures, movements, and dress. Much importance is attached to restraint and control of the body on stage so as to correctly channel the mobilized emotions towards religious interpretation and experience. Therefore, stage performances are carefully choreographed both on the level of body movements and dress.

In stage performances of *anashid*, artists mostly stand or sit still in a line in a steady upright posture. Exuberant body moves like dancing, armswaying, or moving the hips are not allowed as these are believed to evoke sexual feelings and incite indecent behavior among the audience. Body movements are mostly confined to subtle gestures like hand movements. *Munshidin*, for instance, often point the index finger in the air, symbolizing the unity of God (*takbir*), or lay a hand on the heart, emphasizing the inner state of the singer of being deeply touched. Sometimes, a singer may hold his hands in prayer position. These gestures aim to instill pious feelings within the audience, and ensure a religious reading of the musical performance.

The face, and in particular the eyes, are crucial to *anashid* performances as well. Like the body movements, looks are modest and contemplative. Such looks can include the casting of contemplative looks to the sky, looking downward, closing the eyes, or crying. These all are supposed to contribute to the creation of a contemplative spiritual atmosphere and to reflect the inward state of the singer. The looks and body movements are also meant to produce a similar sentiment within the listeners. Remarkably, in the performances of the two female *anashid* groups I attended, the women did not make any bodymovements whatsoever. There were no facial expressions, nor did they make hand gestures or cast contemplative looks.

Next to bodily movements and facial expressions, the artists should be well-groomed, and modestly dressed. When performing as a band, all the members are dressed in the same attire. Men are dressed in the same suits and matching ties, while women wear matching headscarves and covering dresses in the same colors. The majority of *anashid* artists and groups wear suits instead of *jellabas* (I will address the reason for this choice of dress later on in this chapter). Overall, the performance is restrained and harmonious.

Lyrics

The lyrics sung also serve to maximize religious sentiments. Many lyrics are meant to provide a glimpse of God's presence. Therefore, not only the music, and stage presentation, but also the words should be 'clean,' meaning that they

should not address topics or words associated with immoral behavior, such as romantic love, sex, alcoholism, or drugs and make people reflect about their lives. The words in *anashid* should always be correct and relevant, either to individual ethics or to public morals; they should incite the listeners to reflect on personal ethics, and encourage them to perform religious acts. Under no circumstances, can the words be opposed to the Islamic religion.

All artists indicated that the most important element in conveying the Islamic message to the listeners are the lyrics (*al-muhimm al-kalimat*). The lyrics in *anashid* have different origins. Bands often use lyrics of existing spiritual songs from religious poetry or famous *anashid* artists, like Abu Ratib or Rachid Gholam. The song can then be entirely covered by an *anashid* band, both on the level of lyrics and melody. Some groups only use the lyrics of an existing song and change the melody. There are also groups who write their own music and lyrics, or who set their own lyrics to existing melodies of famous songs, like songs by Umm Khalthum.

The topics addressed in *anashid*, are very diverse. There are songs, which are closely related to the divine and intend to make Islamic concepts such as Allah, the Prophet, Judgement Day (*yawm al-qiyama*) and Paradise (*janna*) palpable to the audience. Many such themes are mostly addressed in religious poems set to a melody, *madih nabawi* (songs of praise glorifying the Prophet), or *ibtihalat* (vocally ornamented supplications from the *munshid* to Allah), or songs from Sufism, like the 'Qasida al-Burda,' a famous poem praising the Prophet. But there are also examples of self-written and composed songs like 'Kun maʿa Allah' (Be with Allah) by Rachid Gholem or 'Ya Rabbi salli ʿala Muhammad' (Oh Lord, pray for Muhammad) by the amateur *anashid* group Al-Nur. Because of their highly religious content, these songs are always sung in classical Arabic.

There are also *anashid* which serve as guidelines or lessons (*durus*) about moral conduct in daily life and focus on the qualities and characteristics a good Muslim should have, like patience, constraint, modesty, and humility. Numerous topics are addressed in which the *munshidin* offer advice, warnings, and guidance on many practical subjects to their audiences, such as how to relate with family members or how to dress, like Ismail Balouche's song with the title 'You Look so Good in that *Jellaba*!'[248]

[248] Unrecorded interview with anonymous expert on *anashid*. Rabat, 18 October 2011.

You look so good in that* jellaba*!	
You look so good in that *jellaba* When you wear it with a *hijab* The clothing of Muslim women Who like to cover. Thank you our Muslima That you may be happy, *insh'allah* You don't spread your beauty around *Masha'allah*. You are the one who believes in God And the prophet Muhammad God will reward you with His goodness *Insha'allah*. Verse Your clothing is long It covers your entire body You leave nothing visible my sister What happiness for you. I saw Muslim women wearing *hijab* It made me very happy I make *du'a'* for them with my heart My eyes are filled with tears. Verse	She who wears a *hijab* is better than she who does not One follows God, the other the devil and earthly life. Have patience, my God Do not listen to him [the devil] How should it go for you If you would die in that way? Verse To love the earthly life increases your bad deeds This [life on earth] will not last forever Do not live astray but look for God. The one who is meant for you God will bring him to you What is written on the forehead Nobody will be able to erase. Verse The times we live in my sister, it's not important Everything is upside down Who will remain to think about God?[248]

Besides lyrics referring to personal moral comportment like this song about wearing the *hijab*, there are *anashid* on topics which address social and political topics held relevant to Moroccan society or to the *umma* in general. Examples are social problems like family ties, drug abuse, matters of social injustice like corruption and poverty, or political themes, such as the Palestinian cause. The

[249] Lyrics by Hafid Balouche, translated from Tarifit by Bouchra Yahya.

bandleader of the Casablanca-based *anashid* band Salsabil explains: 'For example, Allah has forbidden alcohol, smoking and drugs, and in a *nashid* you address the sufferings of the addicted (…), the dangers of tobacco and so on (…). Each song has messages to convey.'[250]

Anashid thus cover a wide range of wordly and other-wordly topics. These are all equally considered to convey a message about Islam. The lyrics mostly seek to remind the audience of Muslim ethics (*akhlaq*), even when they contain no explicit references to Islamic topics, such as God and the Prophet. As a band member of Salsabil points out:

> (…) we believe that Islam is not only about Allah and His prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Islam deals with all matters of life and morals (*akhlaq*) [like] economics, politics, and everything. So, our art deals with all aspects of life (…) we can talk about the mother and the relation between family members and all these things. All the social subjects we consider it Islamic ones. So our art is an Islamic one.[251]

This interview fragment shows that whether the ideas expressed in the lyrics revolve around themes referring to Islamic subjects or to topics that reflect political consciousness and commitment to social justice, they all have a religious meaning to my interlocutors. The interview fragment also resonates with the remark made by the vocal performer of Sufi-inspired music Marouane Hajji, whom I introduced in Chapter Four, when he speaks about music with a message, which is *multazim*, engagé (pp. 137-138). Virtuous music providing a moral alternative to mainstream musical entertainment deemed immoral does not necessarily need to have a religious content in order to be accepted within religious frameworks. In this line of thought, songs about social problems or political issues are considered to be just as Islamic as supplications to the Prophet, because they are considered to be part of the same ethical project.[252] Similarly to what Jouili has noted on *halal* arts by Muslim communities in Europe, *anashid* in Morocco can be conceptualized as '(…) part of a larger effort to help Muslims foster, sustain, and refine the ethical sensibilities conducive for an Islamic way of life' (Jouili 2012: 402).

Munshid Najib explained to me why *anashid* can be religious without talking about religion, by sharing with me his view on the relationship between religion and politics in Islam:

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[250] Interview with the *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 11 January 2012.

[251] Interview with the *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 11 January 2012.

[252] This line of argumentation is based on, and further elaborated in my contribution to the book *Islam and Popular Culture* (Eds. K. van Nieuwkerk, M. LeVine & M. Stokes, 2016).

> (…) in Europe you have a separation between religion and state. Political life stands apart from religion. In Islam, religion includes the political, social, economic, and cultural spheres; everything. And also the world and the hereafter, [both] the material and spiritual spheres.[253]

This all-encompassing view of Islam, expressed both by the solo *anashid* performer Najib, and by the bandmember of the *anashid* group Salsabil, resembles the notion of *din wa dawla*, the union of religion and state, which I have described in the introduction of this dissertation. According to Eickelman and Piscatori, the belief that Islam incorporates all aspects of life is led by '"Orientalist" assumptions that Muslim politics, unlike other politics are not guided by rational, interest-based calculations' (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 56). The narratives of vocal performers of *anashid*, who conceptualize *anashid* as part of a larger all encompassing project of Muslim ethical engagement, resemble this imperial discourse about Islam and politics (Hammoudi 1993: vii-viii in Nicholas 2014: 392), as do contemporary discourses on Sufism. I will come back to this observation in Chapter Five.

Intersubjective emotions between artists and audiences

The aesthetic techniques I described above are not just a mere toolbox artists draw on in order to influence the emotions of the audience. The artist's own inner state is equally implicated in the establishment of a religious experience. Hassan once told me that for an *anashid* concert to be succesful, the love between the artists and the audience has to be activated.[254] In the same way, several artists told me how during a performance they seek to achieve harmony between their feelings and those of the audiences. To achieve this harmony and be able to communicate religious sentiments to the audience, the performers not only use several on-stage actions, but have to be truly involved emotionally themselves. Karima explains this by comparing the artist to a mirror:

> You have to use all capacities for *anashid* to succeed, so that the audience will understand their own religion. *Anashid* that touch the heart and feelings (*ihsas*) give the best results for the audience. The way you sing plays a very important role in this. If I, for example, would sing about Judgement Day (*yawm al-qiyama*) the audience has to be able to feel the words in order to understand them, according to the way of singing of the artist (…) Therefore, as a vocalist you have to reflect emotions, like a mirror (…) you always have to sing with feeling. But which feelings,

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[253] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 August 2010.

[254] Unrecorded interview with *anashid* connaisseur Hassan. Casablanca, 2 December 2011.

> that depends on the occasion. A wedding is not the same as a concert (…) There are also *anashid* that make you cry. Sometimes when I sing, even I cry.[255]

Like Karima, the Rabat-based former *munshid* Ali tells me that it is very important for performers of *anashid* to live through and genuinely feel the words they sing, in order to be able to transmit the meaning of the words to the audience. According to Ali, this also means comprehending fully the words which are sung:

> A singer has to understand the lyrics, to feel the words (…) this improves the quality of the rendition of a song. (…) he lives with the words.[256]

Sensing the words is thus crucial for performers to be able to truly understand the value of a message of a song. They have to truly feel the words in order for the audience to feel it with them. This cannot be simulated.

To be able to feel the meaning of *anashid* whilst performing, the *munshid* should sing with the right intention (*niyya*) and faith (*iman*). This is not so much an aesthetic performance to be presented on stage, but a sense of self-awareness of the *munshid* while singing. His or her inner being and state of mind are believed to bring about a spiritual atmosphere. To come to this stage a *munshid* needs to be a virtuous role model. In fact, besides talent (*muhiba*), a proper intention (*niyya*) and good moral character (*akhlaq*) of the performers were often mentioned as requisites for a musical performance, both on- and off-stage.

The innermost feelings of the performers as well as their ethical disposition are considered highly important to enable the audience to reach a sensory understanding of the words sung. Several elements in the stage performance (modest appearance, the use of voice, body and eye movements) help to communicate and transfer their inward state to the audience. But what is more, these performances are not only a reflection of the inner state of the performer, but actually produce an intersubjective religious experience between the audience and the artist. A couple of days after I attended an *anashid* concert by *munshid* Khalid on the occasion of the birthday of the Prophet (*'id al-mawlid*), in a *dar shabab* in Casablanca, he invited me to his home. Over tea he referred back to his performance. He pointed out the emotions he felt when he was singing the words of a song:

> Khalid: Did you see me yesterday when I was crying? (…)
> Nina: I did not see that, I was a little bit far from the stage.

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[255] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.
[256] Interview with *munshid* Ali. Rabat, 19 September 2010.

> Khalid: For a moment when I was singing, I cried.
> Nina: Why?
> Khalid: It is called *khushuʿ* (awe, humility before God), do you understand *khushuʿ*? (…) The words have an intimate relation with Allah, it raises the soul (…) and speaks to the heart (…) you live in another world. I lived with these words, that's why I cried.

As this interview excerpt shows, the inward state of the artist is signaled to the audience through embodied practices on stage, in this case through crying. This can be spontaneous or intentional, as is the case with *munshid* Hicham Karim. He told me how he employs his facial expressions to bring the audience in the same emotional state as himself:

> I want the audience to feel exactly what I feel when I am singing. (…) I want them to feel precisely what I feel. For this purpose I use my facial expressions, for example my smile, to transmit my feelings onto the audience. That's music. They have to be able to enjoy the music from the beginning until the end and taste (*dhawq*) the sweetness (*hilw*) of the spirituality.[257]

Part of the success of an *anashid* performance lies in the ability of the artist to deliver *anashid* in a sincere and sensitive way, so that the audience can feel the songs and be touched by them. Through embodied performance practices, like crying or smiling, artists signal their inward state while simultaneously seeking to direct the audience to follow the singer's experience of the music.

The establishment of such an intersubjective experience of emotions between artists and audience during a musical performance, brings to mind the concept of *tarab*. This Arabic word has no exact equivalent in English, but it is commonly translated as 'ecstasy' or 'enchantment.' *Tarab* has been studied by both anthropologists and ethnomusicologists (Danielson 1997; Frishkopf 2001; Hirschkind 2006; Racy 2003; Shannon 2003) and can mean different things. *Tarab* is a term which refers to the intersubjective dynamics between audience and artist within a sort of merging between music, performance, and emotions (Racy 2003: 6). One of the definitions Racy uses to describe *tarab* is: 'the musical affect per se, the extraordinary emotional state evoked by the music'(ibid.). It can be seen as a heightened emotional state evoked through a musical experience, in which the listener gets completely carried away by the sound and the meaning of the music (Danielson 1997; Frishkopf 2001). Secondly, *tarab* refers to specific Arabic musical (primarily vocal) traditions associated with such heightened emotional states, in particular Arab classical music, rooted in the pre-World War I musical

[257] Interview with *munshid* Hicham Karim. Kenitra, 22 Augustus 2010.

practices of Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean Arab world (Racy 2003: 4). Thirdly, *tarab* refers to an interaction between performer and audience, what Charles Hirschkind calls an 'affective fusion' (Hirschkind 2006: 36). The artist employs particular musical skills, like pronunciation, vocal improvisation, and diction, in order to develop a feeling of enchantment among the audience. The listener reacts to the music by expressing emotions through gestures and exclamations. This can culminate in a synthesis between audience and performer. The performer develops *tarab* in the performance and the listener, while at the same time the performer needs the excitement of the audience to reach *tarab*.

Anashid performers build on this specific tradition of evocation and response to emotions in musical listening and experience, using specific aesthetic performance techniques to deeply move the listener. The emotional effect brought about among the audience is gauged through specific ways of listening and reacting to the performance. However, the *munshidin* encourage a specific expression of emotions among the audience, which is much more restrained and far less elated than in the traditional *tarab* musical practices.

The aesthetic performance techniques used in *anashid* serve to evoke a wide array of emotive states, from piety to social awareness and political consciousness. However diverse and different these emotions might seem, the performers all categorize them as spiritual. Aesthetic performance techniques are also used to control and sometimes even completely avoid less desired emotional states of excitement. These mostly concern states of arousal, generally associated with fast-paced rhythmic music styles, where sexualized movements, gestures, and dancing are common practice (Haddad 2009; Kapchan 2003). As *anashid* over time has included a wide diversity of contemporary popular music styles, the need to control the experience of the emotions of the audience through restrained body movements and modest dress of the performers has increased. With the modernization of the genre, explicit ethical stage performances might increase further.

Artists' perspectives on the place of *anashid* in the Moroccan public sphere

Besides their motivations and perspectives on music, *anashid* artists also shared their ideas and experiences of various problems they faced in the pursuit of an artistic career. They linked these problems to political and social wrongs in Morocco in several ways. In this section I will discuss the artists'perspectives on the place of *anashid* in the Moroccan public sphere. Firstly, general complaints were made about the state's cultural politics, such as a lacking support of art and spaces for cultural expression. This critique was indeed shared by musicians of other genres as well (Salois 2013). In interviews artists expressed their ideas of how the Moroccan state gives little importance to art and artists, and Morocco

generally lacks a 'star culture.'[258] One *munshid*, for example, regularly expressed his frustrations about the indifference towards art and the lack of opportunities for singers in Morocco by saying that even if Brad Pitt would happen to walk through the streets, people would not care or even turn around.[259] Another criticism concerned the high amount of corruption in the music industry. Four *munshidin* remarked that one needs connections and sometimes even to pay in order to appear on Moroccan television.

Although criticism on national cultural policies is also expressed by artists of other musical genres, *munshidin* felt particularly disadvantaged. In contrast to the encouragement of the previously underground Nayda artists and the longtime marginalized Sufi music groups, which have been given wide access to state television and official events, *anashid* have barely been taken up by Moroccan mainstream media, government-sponsored venues, and official music distribution channels. As *munshid* Ali told me:

> [The] regime (…) dedicates space to rappers and all, to Western music, to Moroccan popular music, music that is not spiritual. But (…) it's not enough (…). They do not follow the things that are happening in the domain [of *anashid*]; it moves, but no importance is given to it in the media, they do not follow it. (…) There isn't much, youngsters do not hear many spiritual songs on the television and the radio. We do not hear it much, there isn't any. Not much importance is given to this type of singing. Except for Ramadan, with Ramadan there are plenty of concerts and all.[260]

As Ali noted, exceptions for the broadcasting of Muslim religious music are made during national religious celebrations, such as during the month of Ramadan. However, these concerts primarily focus on Sufi music. At the time of my research, *anashid* are only rarely presented in national media, and when they are, they appear in programs revolving around national folklore and cultural heritage. The religious national radio- and television channel *Assadissa*, too, broadcasts Muslim religious music, but mostly focuses on traditional Sufi music. Yet, since the leader of the PJD, Abdelillah Benkirane, won the parliamentary elections in November 2011, there seems to be a slight increase in attention for *anashid* in the national media.

The fact that *anashid* is only presented in the national media, in a religious context, is not enough for some *munshidin*. They also seek specific recognition for their artistic abilities, and do not want to be lumped together in a restricted and government controlled niche of merely religious music. As the 40-year old

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[258] Informal conversation with *anashid* performer Mohammed. Salé, 18 November 2011.
[259] Fieldnotes, 3 August 2010.
[260] Interview with *munshid* Ali. Rabat, 19 September 2010.

Casablanca-based *munshid* Younes stated: '[In Morocco] religious songs exist only in Ramadan, I refuse that, I am an artist of all seasons.' Moreover, several *munshidin* complained that the religious channel only shows mediocre artists who are not socially committed.'[261]

The little space provided to *anashid* on official stages was a common source of frustration among artists. They attributed this exclusion to the state's discouragement of 'Islamism,' as the pious music genre is generally associated, and believed to encourage, 'Islamic fundamentalism.' According to many of the vocal performers of *anashid* I worked with, the increasing stigmatization of Islamic movements and Islamism has pushed artists of *anashid*, and the genre in general, in the black books. Vocalists often recounted how their attempts to perform were cancelled at the last moment by the opaque workings of the *makhzen*, like:

> I have done concerts on TV, and there was a camera which is recording the concert, but they have not broadcasted on TV. People have not seen this concert why is that? Until they created *Assadissa*, the Mohammed VI channel, then they started showing some. The Mohammed VI channel has also recorded some of my songs, but it stays only in this channel. But the other channels, *Al-Magharibiyya* and *2M*, they bring Syrians and Egyptians (performers), but why not us? When we go to Syria they ask us: you have great artists why do we not see you in TV? Why that is? I do not know! This is politics.[262]

There were even artists who claimed to have been banned or forbidden to perform in the public sphere because of their (alleged) affiliation to Islamic movements. Rachid Gholam, for example, claims to have been prohibited to perform in Morocco since 2005 and he ascribes his several arrests to his public membership of the JBA.[263]

According to *munshid* Mohammed the genre's association with Islamism, and specifically with the illegal JBA, has tainted the reputation of Islamic singing. He particularly blames Rachid Gholam for having polluted the Moroccan *anashid* market, as he publicly declares his loyalty to the JBA. According to Mohammed this has cut down opportunities for other Moroccan *anashid* artists, whether they are affiliated to an Islamic movement or not. He feels that the increasing monitoring of Islamic movements by the Moroccan authorities has driven

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[261] Unrecorded interview with *munshid* Younes. Rabat, 1 January 2012.

[262] Interview with *munshid* Walid. Rabat, 21 August 2010.

[263] This was mentioned by Rachid Gholam on all of our meetings: 17 September 2010, 5 May 2011, 13 February 2012, 13 December 2012. See also: Rachid Gholam chanteur d'Al Adl Wal Ihsane: «Je suis interdit au Maroc et dans des pays arabes ». Yabiladi.com. Retrieved from: http://log.ma/post/94724/rachid-gholam-chanteur-d-al-adl-wal-ihsane-je-suis-interdit-au-maroc-et-dans-des-pays-arabes, accessed on 7 August 2016.

anashid bands into the domestic sphere, and forced them to play at weddings and funerals, for relatively low fees, restraining possibilities for further professionalization of the genre and its artists. Generally, *anashid* performers expressed feelings of exclusion, stigmatization and marginalization, as well as resentment towards the Moroccan state. A frequent statement I heard in several interviews was: 'The Moroccan state does not like *anashid*.'

In order to bypass these problems and create better perspectives for a successful career, Moroccan *anashid* artists have built networks abroad. Ismail Balouche, Rachid Gholam and also Hicham Karim perform in Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Some of the *munshidin* I spoke with claimed to know several *munshidin* who because of the above reasons, had moved to other countries, such as the Moroccan singer Abdessalam Hassani who settled in Egypt. Others changed to a different musical genre as they felt discouraged by the lack of support in Morocco.

Anashid artists believe that the marginalization of *anashid* in the public sphere is not only a means to restrain the visibility (and audibility) of Islamic movements from the Moroccan public sphere, but a deliberate attempt by the Moroccan state to discredit Islamic movements. As Rachid Gholam puts it:

> The Moroccan regime wants to convey an image of Islamists as if they were people who are obscurantist and radical (...). People say that Islamists are people who are against ethics, they do not understand culture, they are against art and every human principle.[264]

Moreover, *munshidin* relate the government's restraining of *anashid* from the public sphere to the political shortcomings of the Moroccan political system: a lack of religious and political freedom. As *munshid* Najib stated:

> There is no space to perform, for instance on festivals or on television and things like that. (...) Even on television there is no democracy, on the radio there is no democracy.[265]

Furthermore, *anashid* artists belonging to the JBA showed very critical attitudes towards the popular musical entertainment supported by the Moroccan state in the media and in festivals. In their eyes, this is a conscious attempt to withhold *anashid* from national media but also to offer bread and games for the masses, in order to keep the people ignorant and distract them from social and political wrongs. Najib continues:

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[264] Interview with Rachid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.
[265] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 August 2010.

> Here in Morocco, politicians do not like religious songs (…) if you give them *shaʿbi*, he [a politican] will tell you it's great (…). They [religious songs] have messages, and the *makhzen* does not like messages. [They] want citizens to stay ignorant, and *shaʿbi* encourages alcohol and drugs.[266]

Several *munshidin* even claim that the Moroccan political system suffers of a lack of Islamic morals and actually opposes 'true Islam' altogether. As *munshid* Samir stated:

> They [the *makhzen*] are Muslims on paper only (…) people are saying there is no God but Allah [but] Islam is something else. Morocco is a secular country. For example we are forbidden to appear on TV.[267]

Likewise Najib recounted:

> They [the *makhzen*] fight against all that has an odor of Islam in it. The organizers don't like anything that is Islamic. There is a kind of war against everything Islamic (…) They are afraid of Islam. (…) when you want to sing an *anashid* (…) you're doing Islamic evangelization (*daʿwa*), you're reviving Islam (*tajdid*). And the point is that they do not want an Islamic revival. They want you to stay asleep. And in their politics they're constantly stealing and robbing.[268]

In my fieldwork, especially JBA affiliated *anashid* performers explained the lack of attention given to *anashid* by state regulated media platforms as part of a broader censorship strategy to reject opinions that are in opposition to the state's interests, as well as an overall rejection of ethics and morals.

Criticism on music festivals

The critical stances *anashid* artists took towards Moroccan state politics became particularly apparent when the artists discussed the organization of the numerous state regulated music festivals, held every summer throughout the country. All performers of *anashid* I spoke with were critical towards these festivals. Their criticism was expressed with much ambiguity, however. In their wish for artistic recognition, they expressed their ambition to perform on some of these official stages. Yet, at the same time, they were very skeptical about the intentions of the festivals and its organizers. A major target of critique was the opaque funding and management structures. The festivals are thought to be

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[266] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 August 2010.
[267] Informal conversation with *munshid* Samir. Rabat, 9 September 2010.
[268] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 August 2010.

implicated in political games, corruption, and nepotism. As I have shown in Chapter Three, many annual festivals are funded by state-owned companies and from the King's personal budget. The enormous amounts of money, involved in the organization of the festivals are considered a waste of public funds, which ought to be put to other uses, like proper education and medical care.[269] Najib said:

> The problem lies with the people who organize the festivals. They do not organize the festivals because of culture or to propagate culture, but they organize them in the first place for economic motives.[270]

Karima referred to the music festival Mawazine. This festival has been subject to significant criticism among various sections of Moroccan society. The festival, which is considered the showpiece of King Mohammed VI, takes place every year in Rabat, and is presided by his personal secretary, Mounir Majidi. *Munshida* Karima commented on the controversial festival, which according to the secular progressive Moroccan Francophone weekly *Telquel* involves over a 100 million dollars (Telquel 2011, no 425):

> Each artist is brought in with unimaginable, extraordinary amounts of money (…) I am totally against [the festival], because we are in a country which has poverty, unemployment, and they set up these kinds of festivals, with billions of dirhams.[271]

Apart from being a waste of public funds, the music festivals are also condemned by the *anashid* artists as they believe they encourage immoral behavior among the audiences. The use of alcohol and drugs, the Westernization and moral decline of Morocco's youth, as well as distracting high school and university students preparing for their final exams, which take place in the same period, were mentioned as immoral elements associated with the festivals. Moreover, the musical performances offered on many of the festival stages do not correspond to what my interlocutors saw as the values of Moroccan culture and identity and, more importantly, they regarded the festivals to contravene Muslim ethics. In 2010, Morocco's main Islamic party, the conservative Party of Justice and Development (PJD), unsuccessfully tried to arrange an interdiction in the Moroccan parliament against inviting Elton John, as his presence and perfor-

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[269] See also a very critical text about state sponsored music festivals: "Les festivals au Maroc, un gaspillage à grande échelle." The text appeared anonymously in the weekly *Actu Maroc* (20 July 2010), but interlocutors told me it was by the hand of Nadia Yassine (daughter of the late Abdessalam Yassine). Retrieved from: http://www.actu-maroc.com/curabitur-convallis-laoreet/

[270] Interview with *munshid* Najib. Casablanca, 1 Augustus 2010.

[271] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.

mance would incite homosexuality among the audience. The invitation of other artists, such as Shakira and Kylie Minogue, has also been criticized for their sexual provocation and the bad name they would give to women. The alleged immorality of such performances was also addressed by Karima:

> Shakira gives a bad image of women. In Islam women are valued, it is not accepted that a woman sings almost naked in front of all those people, with that kind of voice, and that kind of songs, with those words (…) We Muslims cannot accept this kind of singing. I could never let my daughter watch this kind of singing.[272]

Another much criticized festival among *munshidin* was the Festival of Sacred World Music in Fes. Most *anashid* artists I interviewed felt entitled to a place in this festival as it centers on 'sacred music.' The fact that they are not invited, is mentioned by them as painful evidence of their exclusion from the official public sphere. This further increases the resentment towards the Moroccan state. The festival is often denounced by the artists for its elitism and exclusionary atmosphere, but also because of corruption scandals and political interests. Moreover, *munshidin* criticize the recent inclusion of wordly contemporary popular music styles, such as *shaʿbi* music, in the festival, since they believe the festival has now entirely lost its spiritual aura. Karima feels this very strongly:

> At the start, this festival was truly spiritual. There were groups, singers [who were] truly spiritual, music without words, truly spiritual. You would feel something truly spiritual. But later on, at least that's what I think, this festival has become a *safqa*, a business, it became a project which had a relation with tourism. There are financial interests (…). So they invited singers who have no relation with spiritual music. Moreover, the tickets are very expensive, they aim exclusively at tourists, the percentage of Moroccans [visiting the festival] is very small.[273]

As this interview excerpt shows, the festivals and their organizers are believed to be associated with corruption and greed and a materialistic mind set. This is put in contrast to spirituality, for *munhsidin* believe that the organizers' focus on money makes them forget about God.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have given a general historical development of *anashid* in the Muslim world and paid specific attention to its development and current existence in Morocco. The state's political agenda to counter 'radical' Islam and

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[272] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.
[273] Interview with *munshida* Karima. Fes, 25 November 2011.

promote 'moderate' Islam has set off a multitude of state-approved musical activities. These governmental cultural policies have curtailed the artistic leeway of *anashid* performers in public space and their opportunities to develop their artistic skills, as their musical practices are associated with 'Islamism.' Despite the increasing popularity of *anashid* among a lower and middle-class religiously conservative audience, the contexts in which the music is produced and performed is quite limited and concerns mainly domestic settings and semi-public spaces. Nevertheless, *anashid* artists have managed to create parallel structures for their music and messages, in domestic settings, social media, and abroad.

The musical practices used by the *anashid* performers in this study range from calm and sober *anashid* with merely voice and some modest percussion, to cheerful *anashid* with various melodic instruments and energetic rhythms. The lyrics sung, address both wordly and non-wordly topics. The recent embrace of a wide range of contemporary popular music styles into the genre of *anashid* has broadened the freedom of artists to promote Islam and fun without harming public morality. These musical practices serve as a form of *da'wa*, to get Islamic messages across to a wide audience, as well as to benefit the development of piety of the performers themselves. Yet, where some *anashid* communicate messages that encourage ethical behavior in different areas of life, other *anashid* provide a mere licit form of musical entertainment that does not contravene Islamic ethics.

Despite the popularity of *anashid* in Morocco, there is still much debate about the use of music among artists and their audiences. Especially about the legitimacy of certain musical instruments and the staging of female performers. None of the artists I spoke with were opposed to music, but all of them assigned an intrinsic power to music. They also believed that this power, if handled carefully, can have beneficial effects on the soul of the listener. But when handled carelessly, music's power can harm the listeners' moral disposition and society.

Most *anashid* artists regard the mainstream musical entertainment presented on satellite and national television as morally harmful, because they believe it glorifies materialism and promiscuity. The artists believe that these types of entertainment impair the morality of Moroccan society, preventing its citizens from reaching spiritual fulfillment. Some of the *munshidin*, specifically those affiliated to the JBA, even see the state encouraged entertainment as a deliberate instrument to numb people in order to uphold the current political system, with which they disagree. They create and encourage Islamically correct music as a counterbalance to what they believe are immoral forms of musical entertainment. With these musical forms they wish to ultimately redirect and reorient their listeners 'in accord with models of *Islamic* moral personhood' (Hirschkind 2001: 640).

The production of moral alternative forms of musical entertainment, can be regarded as a subtle way of resistance (Lughod 1990; Scott 1985). By offering substitutes of what they see as immoral musical practices, they try to counter the risk of moral depravation that satellite media and state sponsored entertainment are thought to encourage. This does not only revolve around the messages conveyed in the song lyrics, but also about the style of singing and performing, which engages the audiences into moral messages affectively. Their musical practices serve to produce sentiments that are opposed to the sentiments facilitated by the 'immoral' musical entertainment.

This cultivation of religious sentiments through Islam-inspired music has political relevance. By creating 'correct' art and presenting it as as a moral alternative to 'immoral' art, the artists not only seek to reconfigure the moral dispositions of their listeners, but also to achieve an ethical transformation in society at large. Their music thus plays an important role in educating their audiences but also in constructing a morally correct society. As Hicham Karim stated:

> I do not sing just for the purpose of singing, or just for spending time. No, no. We sing because we have a goal in life. I think music organizes a person's life, and serves the world, and it helps in the construction of good societies.[274]

Hicham Karim voices it very aptly, *anashid* are part of a broader societal project. The wish to get people onto the straight path is directly linked to the wish to create an alternative society, in which religion serves as a moral compass for social and political consciousness. Through religious songs that seek to uplift the morals of its listeners and bring about transformation in thinking, feeling, and behavior, performers strive to realize an ethical transformation in their listeners, and ultimately in society at large.

In the pursuit of changing the moral orientation of society through Islamic songs, the *munshidin* play a key role. They employ specific aesthetic performance techniques to both generate, but also to manage and control the powerful emotions evoked within the listener and guide them towards experiences of the divine (Meyer 2006: 21). The entire performance is aimed at directing individual listeners towards inner moral sensibilities and produce shared religious experiences among the audience. These performance techniques are meant to affectively engage their listeners into an ethical realm, which can serve as the basis for the making of what Birgit Meyer also calls, an 'aesthetic formation' (Meyer 2009). As such, *anashid* as a musical (and thus an embodied) practice, forms a site for the cultivation of religious sentiments, moral sensibilities, but also for

[274] Interview with Hicham Karim. Kénitra, 21 August 2010.

the formation of religious subjectivities and a moral community, led by Islamic values. (Asad 2003; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005: 139; Meyer 2006, 2009).

The performers are crucial in the process of creating affective religious subjectivities and moral communities. By using specific musical performance techniques, the vocalists not only provide ethical guidelines for the audience how to properly respond to the music, but they also form a sensorial informed parallel discourse, disjunctive with official state narratives about 'moderate' 'liberal' Islam. Such a discourse resonates with Charles Hirschind's notion of the 'counterpublic' where sensibilities are created, separate from the public sphere's national narratives disseminated through state media (Hirschkind 2006: 117). The performance of *anashid* can be further analyzed with James Scott's notion of 'everyday resistance' (1985), describing how people with little influence defy hegemonic systems in implicit ways. The performance of *anashid* in the domestic sphere, implicitly challenges the state's 'public transcript' of a 'moderate,' 'liberal' Islam, which is musically proclaimed on the state sponsored festival stages. However, it is not only in the setting, that the resistance takes place. In *anashid*, religious sentiments are generated that are meant to serve as a basis of ethical engagement and to inculcate a broader societal awareness. This creates a viscerally based religious-ideological framework, which stands in dissonance to the sensory experiences official state discourse offers with the staging of Sufi music. *Anashid* are thus part of a larger ideological project: one that wishes to promote pious sensibilities in search for a different kind of political ethos and the formulation of alternative forms of citizenship in which Islam serves as a moral compass (ter Laan 2016).

6 “An artist of all seasons”

Artists moving across the domains of ‘Sufi’ and ‘*anashid*’ music

‘[In Morocco] religious songs exist only in Ramadan, I refuse that, I am an artist of all seasons.’ [275]

[275] Interview with *munshid* Younes. Rabat, 1 January 2012

Fieldnotes

5 September 2010, – During the month of Ramadan *munshid* Walid invited me to attend a music jam session he was organizing together with a friend in a private house. This was a good opportunity for me to finally see him perform live. Until then, I had only watched his performances on videos posted on YouTube of his concerts in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. He doesn't perform on public stages in Morocco, he told me, due to his 'problems with the *makhzen*.' In the late afternoon I arrive together with Walid at the house where we are seated by the host in a salon where we share the *futur* (the breaking of fast during Ramadan) with some musicians who had arrived early. After the *futur*, a *darabuka* and *ʿud* player take their instruments out and start jamming while Walid joins them with improvisational lines. Later a *qanun* and a *nay* player enter the salon, and join in. The musicians are merry and there is a loose atmosphere. After a while the men head for the mosque for the *tarawih* (extra prayers performed during Ramadan after sunset) prayer. When the men return, we move to a large salon one floor up. There are large round tables with chairs and an audio engineer is setting up professional audio equipment. More musicians arrive, taking a seat in a large circle. I see several violin players, a cellist, taking place next to the *qanun* and *nay* player.

Many of the musicians are professionals of the first hour, and do not seem to be involved in a scene of religiously-inspired music. The cello player is a paid musician working in the royal orchestra. The *qanun* player is a respected musician who plays in several classical Arab orchestras. Only the *darabuka* player performs in several *anashid* bands and is a member of al-ʿAdl wal-Ihsan, but he tells me he also sometimes performs in bands playing popular Moroccan folk music. Walid tells me he knows these musicians indirectly through these music jam sessions, which serve to build networks. These are useful when one needs instrumentalists, for instance, or gigs.

The music performed that evening seems quite different to me from the videos of Walid's concerts I saw on YouTube, which consist mostly of *anashid* with voice and percussion, but no melodic instruments. This evening, Walid sings songs with many melodic instruments from the classical Arabic repertoire as well as Andalusian music and *melhun*. I ask various people present at the jam session what they think of such a music party with melodic instruments during the holy month of Ramadan. Some of the guests tell me they see no problem, but others are not so sure; during Ramadan, one cannot make a lot of music, especially not with all these instruments. Walid responds laconically to my questions: 'There is no problem, because we do not sing anything vulgar.' A couple of days after the music jam session, I tell a friend about the evening. His response is interesting: 'As soon as there is a violin and a *nay*, I can tell you for a fact, these people are not Islamists. My father (who is not an Islamist), a *fqih*,

never tolerated a *nay* in the house, it is a very sensitive instrument. It is believed that a *nay* chases the angels from the home.'[276]

Introduction

In the previous two chapters I have described the structures and concomitant political discourses of the two large domains for the production and staging of Islam-inspired music in Morocco. The first domain consists of platforms embedded in official nationalist narratives and state structures in which 'Sufi-music' is emphasized. The second domain is a cultural niche whose infrastructure of production, performance, and audiences stands close to Islamic activist movements, Islamic charity groups, and conservatives. Along with a description of the infrastructure of both domains, I also laid out a picture of the musicians and their musical practices within these two domains.

Yet, the fragment of my ethnographic field notes above illustrates, I also encountered numerous situations in which the confines of these settings were less clear. While the cultural and political representations of the field for Islam-inspired music in Morocco signal a separation in actors, styles, infrastructure, and audiences labeled as either 'Sufi' or '*anashid*,' in the course of my fieldwork it turned out that artists and their musical practices did not always stick to this compartmentalization. Several artists in my research showed great flexibility of performance style within their musical field, and some even crossed the performance settings of a 'Sufi' and an '*anashid*' music scene. In this last chapter I will describe the ways in which some artists move across the two music scenes in terms of labeling, settings and networks, and styles of performance, demonstrating that these two fields are not opposed but relate to each other in a dissonant way. I will end the chapter by discussing how artists either benefit or suffer from this dissonance.

Labeling

A significant way in which the artists navigate within and between the two musical domains is by the flexible application of different musical labels when presenting their music and themselves to the outside world. It was quite hard to figure out the exact kind of genres and sub-genres the artists performed, since the labels they used to refer to their music kept changing along with the context and settings of performance. This applied to performers of *anashid* in particular. They could present themselves as an artist of *anashid* one day, and a performer of *amdah* or *sama'* the next day, or later they would refer to their music as *inshad dini*, or Sufi music, or even more generally, as spiritual, Arab, or Islamic music. For example, in the first interview I had with Rachid Gholam he characterized

[276] Drawn from fieldnotes, 5 September 2010.

his songs as spiritual singing,[277] while in another interview he denounced the term 'spiritual' and stressed his music was 'simply Arab music.'[278] In one interview Hicham Karim referred to his music as Arab music,[279] but later on he called it spiritual music.[280]

Other *anashid* performers showed less flexibility in the labeling of their musical practices. Khadija and the members of *anashid* band Salsabil, for instance, showed a clear resistance to calling their music 'Sufi.' The bandleader of Salsabil explains why he rejects this label:

> (O)ur vision is not like the Sufi vision [which entails] just [the] love of God and [the] Prophet and all that it is spiritual. Islam deals with all matters of life, for example, the national cause, the problems of youth, drugs…everything.[281]

Munshida Khadija even referred to the state-directed Sufism as *bidʿa* (a heretical innovation).[282] Yet, many other performers of *anashid* did occasionally use the label 'Sufi,' when referring to their own musical practices. Inversely, I have met no performers of Sufi music who used the term *anashid* to refer to their musical practices. Most of them did not want to be associated with *anashid*. They commonly stressed that the genre of *anashid*, unlike *inshad sufi* (Sufi hymns), is un-Moroccan, Oriental in style (*sharqi*), coming from 'outside,' and being foremost political, whereas Sufi music is typically considered to be an authentic part of the Moroccan cultural heritage and national identity. Yet, sometimes, they used the word *inshad*, but only in the combination *inshad sufi*.

Particularly artists who performed *anashid* in the small cultural niche for religious entertainment provided for conservatives and people affiliated with Islamic movements, show ambiguous ways of referring to their musical practices, but also to their own role as performers. In principle, the majority of performers of both *anashid* and performers of Sufi music refer to themselves as *munshidin*. As I have explained before, the term *munshid* has a strong religious connotation and is used for performers of Islamic songs at large (Waugh 2005). Nevertheless, occasionally I heard artists disclaim the term *munshid* and use the term *fannan* (artist) instead. This occurred principally among *anashid* performers who wanted to dissociate themselves from either 'Islamism,' or from a categorization of their music as merely religious. Some of them believe their association to an Islamic movement, or the confinement of their musical practices to a religious niche,

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277 Interview with Rachid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.
278 Interview with Rachid Gholam. Amsterdam, 5 May 2011.
279 Interview with Hicham Karim. Kenitra, 22 Augustus 2010.
280 Interview with Hicham Karim. Kenitra, 30 Oktober 2011.
281 Interview with the bandmembers of the *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 11 January 2012.
282 Informal conversation with *munshida* Khadija. Casablanca, 9 December 2011.

impairs and limits possibilities to develop their artistic career and to access a broader artistic field. To get rid of the negative connotations tied up with *anashid*, some artists disassociate themselves from an explicit religious terminology, and use more general terms, such as 'Arab music,' or 'spiritual music,' instead of *anashid*, and *fannan* (artist) instead of *munshid*. Moreover, employing such flexibility of terminology allows artists to use a wider range of contemporary popular music styles with melodic instruments and energetic rhythms, while simultaneously distinguishing their musical practices from worldly, profane music.

Settings and networks

A second element of traversing practices between the two musical domains concerns the settings and networks in which artists perform. As I have demonstrated in Chapter Five, *anashid* bands mainly perform in domestic settings. However, so do some Sufi groups. On the street outside my apartment in Rabat, I sometimes spotted small groups of so-called 'popular' Sufi brotherhoods, mostly Hamadsha and ʿIssawa, musically accompanying a bride with entourage on her way to a wedding, or playing at a wedding. The participation of Sufi brotherhoods is prevalent in festivals for sacred music during the summer months. Outside the festival season they conventionally perform their ritual music at weddings and circumcision celebrations and thus take part in the same setting as *anashid* performers.

The other way around, *anashid* performers have little access to the stages that stand close to state structures. Nonetheless, this does happen once in a while. Nawal was one of the few *anashid* artists I met who managed to mount such a stage. She is a member of the JBA, and performed in different *anashid* ensembles. She also trained her voice in opera singing. In 2009, she participated in the opening act of festival Mawazine in Rabat where she sang in a Moroccan choir working with Ennio Morricone to perform *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly*. She had been asked to participate through a teachers' course of music she was following at the conservatory of Casablanca. Despite the objections of the JBA and her personal objections to the immorality of the festival, she participated anyway on a personal basis. She told me it was for her own personal experience, and to 'actually learn something about music,' which she thought was impossible otherwise, due to the low level of the music education in Morocco. [283] Another case was Rachid Gholam, who for years had his own cultural program on one of the national radio stations, *Casa FM*, and performed in 2003 at the festival of Rabat, the forerunner of Mawazine festival. In the latter case, he told me, this

[283] Unrecorded interview with Nawal. Rabat, February 2012

was due to a lack of attention of the national intelligence service.[284] *Munshid* Khalid, who is also affiliated to the JBA, differs from the customary 'dark- suits-and- ties' *anashid* style. He chose to perform his *anashid* in an Andalusian style. He performed several times on national television. The first time was in 2003 in a program broadcasted by the state subsidized national television channel *2M* in a *tajwid* competition, which gained him access to other performances in the national media later on. However, he tells me he prefers to keep his affiliation to the JBA quiet.

Another interesting setting where the cultural and political boundaries of the two musical domains seem to fuse are the youth community centers (*dyur shabab*). Several *anashid* performers indicated to me that these youth community centers are one of the few public spaces where they express themselves artistically. As I already explained in Chapter Five, the *dyur shabab* provide an important arena for *anashid* artists to start their careers. Yet, *dyur shabab* are owned by the state and managed locally through municipal councils. This did not prevent performing artists, theater groups, or other entertainers affiliated to Islamic movements to present their art there. I was not able to find out why these state-owned establishments were not so closely monitored with respect to the groups and activities using them. A possible explanation is that the artists performing there do not flaunt their affiliation to an Islamic movement when performing, or that the Moroccan state uses *dyur shabab* as state-controlled pockets of free artistic expression.

Sometimes networks also tend to converge. These can consist of artists' networks belonging to Islamic movements and performers active on state-regulated music stages. Many music groups for instance, both *anashid* and Sufi, hire professional artists, who play in various bands of different genres across and even outside both domains, like the *darabuka* player and the cellist from the royal orchestra who attended the music jam session with Walid. Hamdi, a 30-year old vocalist from Fes, is an accomplished performer of sacred chants from Sufi and Christian traditions in the Arab world, who has performed several times at the Fes Festival of World Sacred music. Yet, he told me he was sometimes hired by members of *anashid* bands to teach them vocal skills.[285] In terms of mingling networks, performers of state-regulated music stages are mostly sought after for their professional skills by networks of *anashid* artists, and not the other way round.

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[284] Interview with Rachid Gholam. Casablanca, 17 September 2010.
[285] Informal conversation with Hamdi. Fes, 9 April 2011.

Performance styles

The on-stage practices and performance styles of both music scenes, too, sometimes overlap. I regularly witnessed artists switching between performance styles of the *anashid* or the Sufi cultural field. For example, typically *anashid* artists wear dark suits and matching ties, while Sufi-oriented groups wear a *jellaba* typical of their brotherhood. This kind of attire is also very much like the national traditional clothing for men; a white *jellaba*, yellow *babouche*s and a red *fez*. However, during my fieldwork I noticed that the dress code typical for a specific music field can vary.

Anashid performers sometimes appear in traditional Moroccan costumes. As I mentioned earlier, Khalid performs his *anashid* in a style close to Sufi and Andalusian music. He told me he consciously chose to specialize in songs of the Moroccan patrimony because he wanted to popularize this type of music, which normally is only listened to by the Moroccan bourgeoisie. When he selects songs from the Andalusian repertoire, he leaves out those songs speaking about romantic love, and only performs the ones which are *multazim*. During his shows he wears a white *jellaba*, yellow *babouche*s and a red *fez* because, as Khalid points out 'I am known for [the use of music of] our heritage (*turath*) (...) I should be Moroccan in my presentation.' [286] This explains why during Khalid's performances, the stage is dressed up in conventional Moroccan style with traditional attributes associated with Sufi-oriented and Andalusian music, like Oriental rugs and tall standing copper incensory holders. This style has become Khalid's hallmark within the Moroccan *anashid* music scene. Khalid also tells me that he can wear a suit on stage as well, but Sufi disciples cannot. He gives an example of the ʿIssawa Sufi brotherhood:

> (...) ʿIssawa, in their presentation [on stage], [they] wear [a] *jellaba*, because they are Moroccan, so they should be like Moroccans in their presentation. It is impossible for an ʿIssawi to put on a suit, it is just impossible.

Khalid further explains that artists who wear suits are oriented towards musical styles from the Middle East (*sharqi*), not Moroccan patrimonial music.[287] Yet, I did encounter a couple of Sufi-oriented artists performing in suits. Some successful Sufi performers, especially when performing solo, appear in suits. For example, Marouane Hajji, the acclaimed young performer of innovatory Sufi music, which he successfully presents on national festival stages as well as abroad, wears predominantly traditional religious garments. However, when he participated in the TV talent show *Munshid al-Shariqa* in the United Arab

[286] Interview with *munshid* Khalid and his wife. Casablanca, 29 January 2012.
[287] Interview with *munshid* Khalid and his wife. Casablanca, 29 January 2012.

Emirates in 2007, he gave an *anashid*-styled performance in which he sung a *nashid* without instruments, wearing a dark suit and a matching tie.[288]

Similarly, Hamdi alternately wears a suit or traditional religious garments, like a *jellaba*. He explains why:

> It depends on where the performance is and on the repertoire. If I perform sacred songs solo and the performance is in a religious place, like a church, I wear a more religious or traditional costume, which radiates tradition. When I perform classical or traditional Arab music with other (accompanying) musicians who do not wear a *jellaba*, I wear a suit, for the harmony of the group.[289]

Notably, in this conversation, Hamdi stated that he recently started to wear more often a suit instead of a *jellaba* during his concerts because he wants to avoid to be linked to Islam. He is careful to wear the suit in a different style than *anashid* bands, for instance never wearing a tie with the suit, or putting on jeans instead of trousers, in order not to be associated with Islamic activist groups.

The *anashid* band Salsabil, which is affiliated to the royalist and pro-government Islamic activist organization al-Tawhid wal-Islah (Movement of Unity and Reform /MUR), also holds a quite flexible attitude towards costumes worn during performances. They mostly wear dark suits and matching ties but are not in disfavor of sometimes alternating their costumes with a *jellaba*. In an interview, one of the band members explained that the context of performance was a decisive factor in what costumes to wear:

> [The suit] has a meaning; we want to be more open, this also affects the public. It also has to do with financial problems, unfortunately. It is not [that] we do not like a *jellaba*; on the contrary, we are proud of the Moroccan *jellaba* and the Moroccan dress in general. But regarding to the activities that we are doing, they really demand a suit, which is modern. Most of our activities, about 70%, require us to have a modern suit. We do not have any problem with a *jellaba* (…) [but] there are people, for example, who have, let's say Francophone thinking, when they see *jlaleb* they do not like it. [The band] tries to reach that person who is very far from our thinking and orientation, [we] try to come closer to him. If [we] wear [a] *jellaba*, that communication between [us] and him will not be very effective. (…) Also (…) Moroccan young people who are influenced by rap music, they consider the group that wears the traditional clothes…they do not like it (…). When they see a group with *jlaleb*, they [will] think that it is a Sufi group, it is a group of *amdah* and so on,

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[288] Performance of Marouane Hajji on *Munshid al-Shariqa*, 2007 in a suit https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56LLD6u2PAs, accessed on 7 July 2016.

[289] Telephone interview with Hamdi, 24 May 2016.

> it is not professional, it is not for us; it is not for young people. We have nothing against *jlaleb*, but just to reach as many spectators as possible we wear the suits.[290]

In the above quote, the member of Salsabil points out that they prefer to wear a suit instead of a *jellaba* because suits are cheaper, but also because they believe suits symbolize modernity; this value, they believe, is important for rendering their music and message appealing to young Moroccans.

Besides the switching of dress codes between *anashid* and Sufi performers, there was another ambivalence with the discursive categorization of '*anashid*' and 'Sufi' on the level of on-stage practices. The descriptions musicians gave of their musical practices did not always correspond to the musical practices I observed while attending their concerts. *Anashid* artists who advocated the use of melodic instruments in Islam-inspired music, often solely performed a cappella or were accompanied by a single percussion instrument, at most using a synthesizer (although these were only used in *anashid* and never in Sufi music). Sufi groups stuck more to a fixed repertoire of musical instruments, although in some performance settings musical instruments were used and in others not. However, their performance practice tended not to be incongruent with their description of it or their point of view on using melodic instruments in their concerts. Moreover, some disciples would at times also participate in Andalusian orchestras as a vocalist or percussion player, or even participate in projects with rock or hip-hop musicians. This indicates that the choice of whether or not to use melodic instruments in performances of Islam-inspired music, is not only defined by the artists' attitudes regarding the combination of Islam and music, but also by the context of the performance, as well as the preferences of the commissioning host. This also indicates that artists can move from one musical genre to another (cf. Stokes 1999: 3-4).

Commonalities and differences

The crossing of boundaries between the two musical fields sketched above, leads to an exploration of commonalities and differences of the artists' backgrounds, their motives, their performance practices, and their perspectives on music and Islam, as well as on the Moroccan state cultural politics.

Career development

The development of the career paths of both artist groups show strong similarities. The majority of the artists, whether dedicated to the *anashid* or the Sufi genre, indicated that they came from conservative religious families, who encouraged them to use their vocal talents for the performance of Islam-inspired

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[290] Interview with *anashid* band Salsabil. Casablanca, 29 January 2012.

music. As for artists active in the Sufi domain, most of them learned to use their voice in the *zawaya* and the mosque. The majority of *anashid* artists I interviewed learned vocal skills within the context of Islamic movements, and also mosques. They all mentioned listening to audio tapes of Oriental singers as an important part of their learning process. Both groups underlined the need to learn musical skills, gain experience, and establish networks and a reputation as professional artists. According to them these were crucial elements to gain access to concert stages and build a successful artistic career. Within both groups there are solo artists with a background in music ensembles. However, vocalists playing at state-regulated stages never indicated in interviews that they had a background in Islamic movements, but instead, they claimed to come from *zawaya*-affiliated circles. Artists from both groups indicated that the choice for Islam-inspired music had been a personal struggle of weighing religious regulations against a love for music.

Stances on music and Islam

All artists referred to an inherent force in music, capable of moving the body and evoking powerful emotions. These capacities were often described both in terms of stirring the senses, and in terms of its spiritual and moral effects. Most of my interviewees see music as a site through which moral virtues can be both awakened and jeopardized. If played and performed in an ethically appropriate way and context, and with 'clean' words, music can bring the audience in the proper mood, making them susceptible to the messages conveyed.

Music's appeal to the senses was also brought forward as a reason why, in comparison to religious texts or sermons, it is the most effective way to communicate ideas about Islam; ethical musical practices can offer a direct access road to those sentiments, through which believers can sense the divine. Because of the belief that music affects the emotional state of both performers and their audiences, artists use specific musical practices and performance techniques in order to generate, channel, and control powerful emotions within the listener, with the purpose to cultivate religious sentiments and piety in the hearts of their listeners. Sufi artists carefully select what parts of their musical rituals they display as a means to protect their sacred heritage from their non-adept audiences, but also to protect them from the potency of the ritual music. *Anashid* artists try to control music's power through specific performance techniques which should channel the power of music in the intended direction, while simultaneously steer the audience's reactions to it.

Objectives and motivations

Anashid artists and artists performing on state-regulated stages for Sufi music are led by several common incentives. Firstly, they all consider their musical practices an important part of *daʿwa*, because they see music as an potent method to involve the public in the message of Islam. Many singers see their songs as a way to bring their audiences (back) in touch with their religiosity. Artists advance *daʿwa* as the main reason why they believe entertaining people with music in staged settings does not conflict with Islamic principles. This reasoning can take different forms. All artists believe music is an important way to popularize Islamic messages among youngsters, especially as these songs are thought to provide an alternative for 'immoral' forms of musical entertainment. Moreover, the songs contain many religiously tinted messages, which are meant to prevent people from getting into sinful situations. In this sense the songs are seen as a form of Islamic education (*tarbiya*). In particular, lyrics of some anashid proffer advice and rules of conduct how to behave and face the challenges and temptations of everyday life. Additionally, in contrast to Sufi performers, anashid artists explicitly indicate that besides inculcating piety within themselves and their listeners, they also use music to create a broader societal awareness by addressing political and/ or social issues in their lyrics. *Anashid* artists sometimes even produce music that explicitly highlights social wrongs in their lyrics. This became particularly apparent during the massive protests in 2010/ 2011, instigated by the 'Arab Spring.' As the JBA joined the February 20 protest movement, some anashid artists affiliated to the JBA, started to participate in the protests by using their music, which contained lyrics explicitly criticizing the Moroccan political system (Ter Laan 2016). The Sufi performers I interviewed never addressed social wrongs in the words sung.

A second shared motivation to use music was to counter negative representations of Islam. However, the way in which they do this, and what they say differs. Sufi *munshidin* mainly restate the festivals' message, namely to counter 'radical Islam,' and present the 'friendly face of Islam.' Sufi-oriented musicians who perform on the state-regulated stages also frequently claim that they use Islam-inspired music to attract the attention of youngsters in order to divert their interest in Islamic issues from more 'radical' tendencies. Artists from the *anashid* domain equally claim that their music serves to improve the reputation of Islam as open, tolerant and peaceful, but additionally indicate they also use music to give Islamic political movements a more positive image. Their music is meant to show that Islam and Islamic movements are not austere and radical, but can be fun and lively as well. This counters the idea of these movements as being 'fundamentalist.'

A difference in the musical promotion of an open and tolerant Islam, among my interviewees of both domains, is that Sufi artists frequently refer to the

traditions of the Moroccan patrimony, especially the religious co-habitation of Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the period of al-Andalus. By contrast, *anashid* artists, in their narratives and musical performance practices, hardly ever refer to a sense of national pride or the Moroccan cultural patrimony. In their discourses they rather stress modernity and a transnational orientation toward the *umma*.

Internally, the *anashid* artists differ in their point of view depending on their affiliation to Islamic activist groups. For example, those affiliated to the pro-monarchy Islamic movement of al-Tawhid wal-Islah do not explicitly address the Moroccan patrimony in their discourses and performances, but are not opposed to national traditions either. Artists in al-ʿAdl wal- Ihsan are rather focused on the *umma*, and not so much on the Moroccan nation.

Performance practices

The differences between the two scenes lie foremost in the performance practices; the musical style and the aesthetic techniques used in the stage presentation. Most *anashid* performances draw from a *sharqi* music style, and the male singers wear suits. Performers of a Sufi repertoire perform ritual music traditions derived from Sufi orders and display emblems of the traditional Moroccan heritage in the use of instruments and rhythms as well as in their stage presentation. Although some *anashid* performers might draw from a Sufi repertoire like poetry or *ibtihalat*, they would never use this to invoke trance, considering this to be heresy (*bidʿa*). Sufi performers on the other hand, never perform socially or politically engaged songs with lyrics concerning, for instance, Palestine, nature, family relations or social injustice. What they have in common is that both *anashid* performers and Sufi music groups make use of an innovated repertoire, making it more accessible to youngsters and non-adept listeners. In the case of Sufi groups, the reworking is never made on the level of lyrics, but on that of the musical arrangement, as is the case with the music group Ikhwan al-Fann, led by Marouane Hajji.

In both scenes interaction with the public is highly valued. How this occurs depends on the context. Compared to the Sufi performances on festival stages, *anashid* performances can appear quite static, and the audience is expected to respond to the music in a controlled way. Sufi performers who perform on festival stages carry out elaborate bodily movements to mimic a sense of trance, while simultaneously meeting the requirements of delivering an entertaining show. The audience of Sufi performers might equally respond energetically to the performance. In the Sufi performance more emphasis is put on the act itself (such as reaching a state of trance), whereas performers of *anashid* highlight the content of the songs. The fact that Sufi-oriented artists perform for predominantly non-Muslim audience, may partly explain why they put much more

emphasis on the performance, since the majority of the audience does not understand Arabic. *Anashid* artists play for Moroccan Muslim audiences alone; their emphasis lies on understanding and rendering of the words sung, and on establishing a moral realm.

Perspectives on Moroccan state cultural politics

Not all artists directly criticize the Moroccan political system, but musicians within both groups express a critical attitude towards the state's cultural politics. The state is blamed in particular for the poor artistic climate in Morocco and for insufficiently supporting art, culture, and young Moroccan artists. All artists complained to me about the bad choice of priorities by the state, which according to them, spends too much money on international stars from abroad and pays little attention to the support of high quality musical education of local artists and culture. At the start of my research I expected that performers of Sufi-inspired genre would not criticize the state in their narratives as their stages are provided by state agents. However, some of their views about the Moroccan state correspond to the criticism of Moroccan politics articulated by *anashid* performers. Of this latter group, artists affiliated to the JBA usually express more general criticism in an overt way about the Moroccan political system, linking it to social wrongs in Moroccan society.

The resistance of Sufi artists to Moroccan state cultural politics is more indirect, and predominantly oriented towards simultaneously accomodating and circumventing constructed meanings of Sufism by the state and festival organizers. As I have argued in Chapter Four, managing sacred knowledge through carefully selecting the rituals displayed, as well as retaining its religious meaning by carrying Islamic rituals preceding their concerts, can be seen as 'hidden transcripts' (Scott 1985), delivered on-stage in the guise of dominant conventions and styles of performance of the festivals. These on-stage performances of hidden transcripts, create spaces through which artists are able to retain control over spiritual knowledge, their own religiosity, and give leeway to assign their own meaning to their musical practices.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have demonstrated how artists navigate between the two domains for Islam-inspired music by drawing on various musical labels, styles, practices, and performance techniques. The performers differ with respect to access to state sponsored stages, meaning of songs, musical style, politics and national identification, and presence in the public sphere. Yet, they also share on-stage aesthetic performance techniques, labeling practices, networks, as well as artists' religious objectives, and ideas regarding music's potency. This partial overlap of the two musical domains is not entirely mutual. *Anashid* can strongly

resonate with Sufi musical traditions, yet, Sufi artists are less inspired by *anashid* artists. Despite the overlap of the two domains on various levels, the settings for performance remain quite separate. It is highly unusual for *anashid* artists to perform on state-sponsored stages because they have limited access to them. Sufi artists, however, do perform at family celebrations in domestic settings outside of the festivals' season. Yet, they would never perform together with an *anashid* ensemble.

The crossing over of musicians between practices and networks tied to the two domains for Islam-inspired music, indicates that these domains are not only opposed but also interrelated. The musical practices and narratives of the artists do not always align with the binary framing of 'Sufi' and '*anashid*.' Instead of two opposing distinct musical domains, there is a complex dynamic of ambiguity and tension, like the disharmonious sound of a dissonant musical discord. Therefore, I propose to see these fields, not as opposed, but rather as connected in a dissonant way. Firstly, because the musical practices do not entirely match the prevailing political discourses about Islam. Secondly, because there is a discrepancy between the musical identities vocal performers project to the outside world and their actual musical practices and artistic lives.

Hegemonic discourses about Islam and music and unequal power relations underly these dissonances. Here I refer back to Martin Stokes' proposal to see musical-genres not in terms of separate cultural fields, but rather as reflections of larger underlying ideological discourses (Stokes 1999). Building on Stokes' idea, the partitioning of the highly differentiated Moroccan field for Islam-inspired music into a field for *anashid*, associated with 'political Islam,' and a field for Sufi music, linked to an officially approved version of 'moderate' Islam, reflects discourses about Islam, present in the Moroccan political landscape. Although the artists do not simply follow this ideological binary framing of Islam-inspired musical practices, it does affect the realities of artists' musical lives in terms of access and career development. The ideological binary favours performers of Sufi music, and limits the possibilities for *anashid* artists to perform their repertoires on state-sponsored stages.

Musical practices employed by the vocal performers diverging from this dichotomy can be seen as a strategy to relate to hegemonic discourses in a way that gives agency within the state controlled field for Islam-inspired music. The mastering of different styles of music and the malleable marking of musical identities among *anashid* performers through dress, performance practices, or self presentation, grant them a flexibility needed to cater to different sections of the market for Islam-inspired music. This provides them a certain leeway to maneuver within the structures of the field for *anashid* and sometimes for Sufi music, curtailing their exclusion from national media platforms. In turn, Sufi artists have trained themselves in different musical styles, ranging from *dhikr*,

to *melhun* and Andalusian songs, to be able to fit into various formations of 'spiritual singing' demanded by the recent surfacing of government-sponsored platforms promoting musical traditions of the national patrimony of Morocco. The artists' adaptation of Sufi rituals to a context of tourism, publicity, and national cultural politics reveals relations of dependency between the artists and macro structures, but it also maximizes the possibilities of contracts as well as an enlarged radius for the spread of Islamic messages.

Yet, not all performers cross over boundaries of musical styles and fields. There are also many who stay within the confines of the two musical fields. Whether the performers stay within or move across the confines of these musical domains, many of them are led by a certain degree of pragmatism. They use the stages and infrastructures to their own demand, be it the cultivation of piety, the development of their careers, the highlighting of a self-selected musical identity, or finding the best platform to convey their religious (and ideological) messages to a wide audience. Whether or not they (directly or indirectly) counter or confirm hegemonic discourses about Islam, their practices and narratives relate to the hegemonic discourses regarding religious identity and cultural politics as represented by state structures. The choices musicians make, such as dress, body postures, what song lyrics are sung and in which setting, can both counter and validate (in a public or hidden way) these larger ideological constructs.

Conclusions

In this thesis I have examined how vocal performers of Islam-inspired music in the production, staging, and performance of their musical practices interact with political discourses about Islam in Moroccan society. Three interrelated dimensions were central: the infrastructures through which performances of Islam-inspired music come into being, the musical practices employed, and the perspectives and experiences of the performers regarding Islam and music, as well as their views about Morocco's state cultural politics vis-à-vis Islam and music.

At first sight, the production, staging, and performance of Islam-inspired music in Morocco seems to be divided into two different domains. On the one hand, there is the official state-regulated stages, which predominantly concentrate on Islam-inspired music connected to Sufism. This domain mainly attracts people from the French-educated Moroccan elites, but also many foreigners. On the other hand, there is a rather covert cultural niche for *anashid*, a genre of pious musical entertainment, which is performed outside state-sponsored stages, mostly in domestic settings. This scene is oriented towards conservative Muslims and people affiliated to Islamic activist movements. The description, analysis, and comparison of these two musical domains across the three interrelated dimensions, has led me to four main conclusions.

The first conclusion is that despite the binary division of Islam-inspired musical practices, the musical domains of *anashid* and 'Sufi' music are neither oppositional nor completely covering one particular discourse on Islam. Rather they are ambiguous and fluid, and can be seen as dissonant. Following the trajectories of the various musicians within both scenes, at first shows and confirms a dual image. But taking a closer look, we find that not all musicians only move within the infrastructures of an *anashid* or Sufi musical field. Their self-presentation, networks, and performance practices show a disparity with the binary representation of the two musical domains. Objectives, intentions, musical forms, and experiences are shared and expressed across the boundaries of 'Sufi' and *anashid* musical domains. The fact that there are different fields for Islam-inspired music in Morocco, while artists performing on those stages do not always move along the boundaries of these two musical domains, reveals that the division of the field of Islam-inspired music into an *anashid* and a Sufi domain is for a great deal discursive.

This brings me to the second conclusion of this thesis, that the sectioning of the highly differentiated Moroccan field for Islam-inspired music into two domains of 'Sufi' and *anashid* music is strongly affected by the broader religious and political landscape of Morocco, and primarily reverberates discursive constructions regarding a 'moderate' and a 'radical' Islam. Due to its strong association with 'Islamism' in public discourse, *anashid* is often associated with Muslim supranational orthodoxy, and religious severity, while Sufi music is typically connected with national heritage, religious tolerance, interfaith dialogue, and a universal sense of spirituality.

After 9/11, many Muslim majority countries were encouraged to rehabilitate and establish 'non-fundamentalist' local traditional practices associated with 'popular Islam' in the fight against 'radical' Islam. In the case of Morocco, the French colonial invention of a 'Moroccan' Islam was revived (Burke III 2014; Hammoudi 1997: 101). The former colonizers' notion of 'Moroccan Islam,' with its emphasis on local traditions, reappeared in official state discourses regarding 'moderate Islam.' The term was reformulated in particular within a framework of religious reforms and national antiterrorism policies. Since the events of 9/11, and especially after the Casablanca bombings in 2003, the monarchy and the state have been leading actors in regaining and orchestrating the control over religion in the public sphere and constructing a national non-fundamentalist 'Moroccan Islam' as part of its participation in the global 'war on terror' (Silverstein 2012: 332). In this discourse, the state emphasizes Sufism as the local and friendly face of Islam, and present orthodox interpretations of Islam as a form of foreign extremism.

In the state's endeavor to expel 'radical' elements from Moroccan society, music and especially music festivals have become a powerful tool in the construction of a notion of a 'moderate' Islam. By actively encouraging and presenting certain musical styles and artists as a counterweight against the rise of various 'radical' Islamic movements in the country, the Moroccan state tries to strengthen its own position as guardian of the religious field and counter Islamic activist organizations who question the religious legitimacy of the monarchy, while promoting the nation as a 'moderate' and 'liberal' Muslim country to the international community. The state-supported stages dedicated to 'sacred' and 'Sufi' music also provide a platform on which the Moroccan state attempts to influence a new group of artists, who are meant to sustain and embody this national official discourse of religious 'moderation.' Meanwhile, Islamic *anashid* are dismissed as artistically inferior products of a 'radical Islam,' and are to a great extent kept out of the official stages for Islam-inspired music. The division of Islam-inspired musical practices, thus largely follows from the hegemonic discourse of the Moroccan state regarding the fight against 'radical Islam,' and the propagation of Morocco as a 'moderate' Muslim country.

Interestingly, various Islamic activist organizations, who are categorized as 'radical' by the Moroccan state, are equally using music to strengthen their faith and to promulgate their Islam as 'open' and 'modern.' They see themselves as 'moderate' Muslims, and make use of musical practices to demonstrate this. These Islamic activists are themselves highly critical of the state-supported festivals, as well as of the official discourses about Islam and politics in Morocco. Compared to the Islamic movements, and the Moroccan state, the Sufi brotherhoods that participate in the state-sponsored music festivals, show a rather ambivalent attitude towards the public performance of their musical rituals. They do support the state's message of Sufism as the banner of 'moderate' Islam and use these stages to perform *da'wa*. Nonetheless, they also feel an uneven dependency on the state for the survival of their brotherhoods. Moreover, a fair share of disciples believe that the recontextualization of their musical rituals in state-sponsored stages, could harm their own religiosity and taint the mystical insights of their specific brotherhood.

Behind the surface of this discursively constituted image that divides Islam-inspired music into a domain of '*anashid*' and 'Sufi' music, significant continuities and mutual influences thus emerge. Neither the musical practices, nor the experiences and narratives of the artists and their political ideas match this polarized image. Both Sufi and *anashid* artists seem to strategically select which style, musical labels, and on-stage practices they choose to employ. Such decisions are for a large part, determined by a combination of commercial, political, and religious considerations, as well as the demands of festival organizers, Islamic movements, the audience or the host, and the setting of performance.

This musical flexibility displayed by the vocal performers can be interpreted in terms of agency and resistance, which is the third conclusion of this thesis. The diverse musical skills employed by the musicians resonate, in a sense, a Bourdieusian understanding of agency. Bourdieu (1984) pays attention to the ways in which social actors try to influence their own position in a particular field by displaying and accumulating symbolic capital relevant for that specific field. Being musically versatile increases the artists' chances in the commercial market, maximizes the career opportunities available to them, but it also enlarges the reach of their religious messages. They can mobilize this 'musical capital' within and sometimes across both musical fields.

The appropriation of, and switching between, different musical styles and identities by performers of *anashid* as well as of Sufi music, can also be seen as an indirect form of resistance dissonant to hegemonic discourses of the state about Islam. Whereas Gramsci claims that subaltern groups tend to accept the dominance of the ruling classes through cultural representations that justify dominant ideologies (Quintin Hoare 1971), Scott argues that indirect forms of

resistance enable subaltern groups to question the cultural hegemony of a dominant group off-stage (Scott 1985, 1990). Through hidden transcripts unequal power relations are challenged in a covert way by making use of practices and narratives of dominant discourses (ibid.). Such 'hidden transcripts' which subtly question the 'public transcripts' of hegemonic discourses, can also be discerned in the musical practices and narratives of the performers of Islam-inspired music I worked with. In the case of *anashid* artists, their flexibility in musical styles and identities first of all curtails their exclusion from the state-controlled public sphere. As such, their dissonant musical practices can be viewed as a strategy to reduce and bridge the distance to the hegemonic discourse. This flexibility also stands in the way of a strict distinction between *anashid* versus Sufi music, linked to state politics' classifications regarding national and religious identities. As for the Sufi artists, they try to evade indirectly the strong influence of the state and the market on the constructed meanings of Sufism. They manage sacred knowledge through a careful selection of the rituals they display, while they retain their religious meaning by carrying out purification rituals and prayers before and during their concerts. In this way, they act out a hidden transcript both on-stage and off-stage.

These are all acts through which individual performers and groups create spaces within dominant narratives and discourses, which enables them to retain control over their own religiosity and the meaning and impact of their musical practices. The musical practices of the artists thus both affirm, challenge, and bridge the boundaries between a Sufi and an *anashid* musical domain. The dissonances between the artists' musical practices and the hegemonic discourses about Islam, reflect the tensions present between artistic ambition, religious zeal, ideological objectives, and commercial incentives, with which the vocal performers deal, each in their own way.

Despite the musical flexibility of artists' musical practices and narratives across the two musical domains, the music continues to be represented into two contrasting spheres, both by organizing structures, and by artists. This indicates that there *are* differences between the two different domains for Islam-inspired music, mostly in terms of infrastructure, but also ideologically. In contrast to many *anashid* artists, Sufi artists do not relate their music to a form of ideological activism and oppose the use of Islam for political purposes, but they do advocate religious tolerance and spirituality. Also, musicians active on the state-supported stages hold a position of privilege and dominance over the *anashid* artists. This explains why *anashid* artists may adopt Sufi-inspired musical practices, and not the other way round.

The musical flexibility and ambivalence is not the only form of agency available to the artists. The expression and formation of religious sentiments through music equally engenders a particular form of agency. This brings me to

the fourth and final conclusion. Both Islamic activist movements, Sufi brotherhoods, and the Moroccan state draw on music as an important means through which religious sentiments and political power can be manifested and mediated.

As I have demonstrated, music is a key arena where competing ideas about Islam and citizenship in Morocco are constructed and challenged. Variously positioned actors use music to render people susceptible to messages about Islam and try to control the interpretative frame of Islam-inspired musical practices. The Moroccan monarchical state purposefully uses music as a remedy to counter the potential appeal of 'extremist elements' in society, as well as safeguard its control over the political and religious field. Islamic movements in turn, use music to counter their 'fundamentalist' reputation, gain access to the state-controlled public sphere, as well as to attract new (young) members and address matters of social justice. Sufi brotherhoods use music to reach closeness to the divine through trance, to secure the survival of their brotherhood, and attract people to Islam. All these stakeholders use musical performances to attain these objectives because of its ability to evoke emotions and its capacity to influence the inner being of the listener.

Within these complex dynamics, the vocal performers are involved in the co-shaping and resignifying of these particular discourses through their musical practices. They attribute a power to music to affect the inner dispositions of the listeners and mediate religious experiences through the senses. In line with Birgit Meyer's notion of sensational forms, I have analyzed Islam-inspired musical practices as a 'sensational form that makes the transcendental senseable' (Meyer 2006: 9). By using music, the vocal performers in my research seek to make this divine dimension palpable to their audiences and themselves by managing music's power in such a way that they can employ it as a resource to cultivate religious sentiments, without stirring improper sensations.

These religious sentiments have political importance. Both Sufi artists and performers of *anashid* are committed to use music with the purpose to let people reflect on their own lives and move the listeners towards proper moral thoughts and conduct. They believe Islam-inspired music can facilitate the cultivation of ethical sensibilities in their listeners. For many artists, these ethical sensibilities are the foundation for creating a moral community. This resonates with the notion of 'aesthetic formation,' which addresses how shared aesthetic forms have the capacity to bind people affectively to religious experiences, ideas, and each other (Meyer 2009: 21). Similarly Islam-inspired music can function as a site for the making of subjectivities and communities, not only because music plays into existing fields of representations and shared symbolic systems, but also because of its sensory power and its potency to induce shared affective experiences in people. The sentiments generated by the performers are invoked through the use of specific musical performance techniques that simultaneously speak to the

senses, as well as through symbolic modes of representation, like dress, or gestures and song lyrics. However, what techniques are used, the contexts in which these practices are staged, and the content of the messages conveyed differ.

Within both the field for *anashid* and Sufi music, religion and politics are intertwined through music, though from a different angle. Sufi music is used by the state to affectively engage an audience in a nationalist narrative of a 'moderate' Islam, which draws connections between national cultural traditions, international anti-terrorism policies, the monarchy, and Sufi spirituality. Islamic activist movements use *anashid* to persuade their audiences of alternative ideas about an Islamic society. In each domain, musical practices are used to produce a range of sentiments that underpin and fashion subjectivities tied to a particular political ideology regarding Islam and citizenship. Yet, the musical practices and narratives used by vocal performers resist a simple classification of a hegemonic Sufi discourse, versus a counter-hegemonic *anashid* discourse, in complex ways, overtly and covertly. Musical flexibility, the creation of parallel spaces of music production, and the deliberate formation of religious sentiments are examples of the subtle ways in which the artists are able to acquire room to maneuver in a field that is strongly determined by the power of the *makhzen*. This creates a sharply dissonant image, in which religious sentiments induced by the musical practices can be at once, accommodating and unsettling to state-oriented Islam.

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Glossary

adhan	call to prayer
ʿadl	justice
ahwash	Amazigh type of collective dance, which includes rhythmical dance, poetry, and music, associated with the south of Morocco
ahidus	similar to *ahwash* but associated with the region of the Middle Atlas
al-ala	alternative term for Andalusian music, it literally means 'the instrument' or 'the tool'
akh (pl. *ikhwan*)	brother(s)
akhlaq	ethics, morals, good manners
ʿalim (pl. *ʿulamaʾ*)	scholar(s)
Amazigh (pl. *Imazighen*)	term referring to the original inhabitants of North Africa, also known as 'Berbers'
amdah	see *madih*
amir al-muʾminin	Commander of the Faithful, Prince of the Believers (traditional title of caliphs)
ʿaqiqa	sacrifice of an animal after the birth of a child
ʿars (pl. *ʿarasat*)	wedding
ʿawra	parts of the body of a Muslim that are required to be covered, private parts
ʿayta	traditional type of Moroccan folk sung poetry
babush (D. *babouche*)	Moroccan leather slipper
baladi	Egyptian folk music
baraka	divine blessing, grace
bayʿa	oath of allegiance to a leader
bard	cold
bendir D.	circular frame-drum
bidʿa	(illicit/ heretic) religious innovation
bled al-makhzen D.	territory of the central power of the sultanate
bled al-siba D.	territory outside the central power of the sultanate
bsat D.	old form of Moroccan comic folk *theater*
darabuka	goblet-shaped clay hand-drum

darija	Moroccan Arabic
dars (pl. *durus*)	lesson
dar shabab (pl. *dyur shabab*)	neighborhood youth community center(s)
daʿwa	invitation (to turn to Islam)
dawla	state
dhawq	taste
dhikr	remembrance of God, repetition of the 99 names of Allah
din	religion
duʿaʾ	invocation, supplicatory prayer
duff	hand frame drum
fajr	morning prayer in Islam
fann	art
al-fann al-hadif	purposeful art
fannan	artist
faqir (pl. *fuqaraʾ*)	literally 'poor'; in Sufism the word refers to disciples
fas	red felt hat with black tassel on top; *fez*
fatwa	legal pronouncement issued by a religious specialist
fikra (pl. *afkar*)	idea(s), thought(s)
firqa (pl. *firaq)* (D. *fraqi*)	group(s)
fiqh	jurisprudence
fitna	disorder, rebellion, seduction
fitra	according to the Qurʾan, the original state in which humans are created by God
faqih (pl. *fuqahaʾ*) (D. *fqih*)	expert(s) in Islamic law
fusha	Modern Standard Arabic
futur	breaking of the fast (during Ramadan)
ghinaʾ	music, literally 'singing'
gnawa (music)	ritual trance music created by the Gnawa
guenbri (D. *guembri, gimbri*).	three-stringed bass lute-tambour used in *gnawa* music; also called *hajhuj*
hadif (f. *hadifa*)	with a purpose, purposeful
hadith	accounts of sayings and deeds of the Prophet
hadra	trance-invoking ritual within Sufism
hafla	party
hajhuj D.	see *guenbri*
hal (pl. *ahwal*)	a certain stage in the trance condition
halal	religiously allowed

halqa	literally 'circle'; traditional Moroccan folk theatre where the spectators gather in a circle around the performer(s) in public space
haram	religiously forbidden; against the *shariʿa*
hasanat	religious rewards for the hereafter
hashuma D.	shameful; disgrace
hayat	life
hijab	female head cover
hilw	sweet(ness)
hubb	love
ibtihal (pl. *ibtihalat*)	vocally melodic ornamented supplication(s) to God
ʿid al-kabir (D. *ʿid le-kbir*)	feast of sacrifice
ʿid al-mawlid (D. *ʿid l-mulud*)	birthday of the Prophet
idhaʿa	radio
ihsan	beneficence, performance of good deeds
ihsas	feelings
ijtihad	in Islamic law, independent or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Qurʾan
ʿilm	knowledge
iman	faith
inshad	see *nashid*
inshaʾallah	God willing
iqaʿ (pl. *iqaʿat*)	rhythm(s)
irhabi	terrorist
jadid	new
jamaʿa	association
janna	paradise
jedba D.	a state of trance
jihad	exertion, usually for religious purposes
jellaba (pl. *jlaleb*) D.	traditional Moroccan long loose-fitting outer robe with long sleeves and a hood
jinn (D. pl. *jnun*)	supernatural beings, both good and bad
kalima (pl. *kalimat*)	word(s), lyrics
kamenja D.	European-style violin played vertically
khfif (f. *khfifa*) D.	light, soft
khushuʿ	awe, humility before God

khwanji	a pejorative label attributed to people associated with Islamism; literaly meaning 'of the brotherhood,' deriving from Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood.
lahn	melody
lila D.	night, ritual night ceremony
madhhab	school of Islamic law
maʿlem D.	Gnawa ritual leader. Leads the *lila* ceremony
maʿruf	known, famous
madih nabawi (pl. *amdah nabawiyya*)	songs of praise glorifying the Prophet
maghrib	sunset; evening prayer; Morocco
makhzen D.	Moroccan socio-political system of power division centered around the monarchy
maqam (pl. *maqamat)*	system of melodic modes used in traditional Arabic music
marbut (marabout) (pl. *mrabet*) D.	Muslim hermit or saint, specifically in North and West Africa
mashaʾallah	what God has willed (expression of joy, praise, or awe)
mashriq	eastern part of the Arab world
matqish bladi D.	do not touch my country!
mawwal (pl. *mawawil*)	vocal improvisation(s)
medina D.	city, town
melhun D.	traditional Moroccan genre of sung poetry
mellah D.	walled Jewish quarter in a Moroccan city
mihrajan (pl. *mihrajanat*)	festival(s)
mughanni	singer
muhafidhin D.	pious, religiously devout
mawhiba (D. *muhiba*)	passion/ talent
majmuʿa (pl. *majmuʿat*) (D. *mujmuʿa*)	group(s)
multazim (f. *multazima*, pl. *multazimun/multazimat*)	religiously committed
muʾmin (f. *muʾmina*, pl. *muʾminun/muʾminat*)	believer
munfatiha	unrestricted

munshid (f. *munshida*, pl. *munshidun/munshidat*)	religious chanter
muqaddim	guardian of a local *zawiya* and representative of a Sufi shaykh
muqriʾ (pl. *muqriʾun*)	reader(s) of the Qurʾan
murid	disciple in a Sufi brotherhood
murshid	guide, teacher (spiritual)
mushkila (pl. *mashakil*)	problem(s)
mawsim (pl. *mawasim*) D.	annual popular-religious rural celebrations in honor
musim	of regional holy men and women
musiqa	music
mut/ mat D.	death/ dead
muwashshaha (pl. *muwashshahat*)	medieval Andalusian poetry
nabi	prophet
nafs	self, in the sense of ego
naqiyy (f. *naqiyya*)	clean
nashid (pl. *anashid*)	chanting, reciting, or melodic vocalizing. traditionally refers to vocal hymns without the use of melodic instruments
nay	long, open-end blown reed flute
niyya	right intention
al-Nur	The Light
pasha	governor of a provincial territory
qaʾid	tribal commander/ governor; *caïd*
qalb	heart
qanun	zither
qraqeb D.	metal castanets used in *gnawa* music
qubba	dome-shaped shrine for a saint
rabab	fiddle
raqs	dance
ray D.	popular musical style originating from Algeria; *raï*
reggada D.	type of Moroccan folk music from the northeastern region of the Rif
risala	message, letter
ruh	spirit, soul
rayyis (pl. *rwaïs*) D.	leader(s), travelling musicians from the Souss region, bards
riyad (D. *ryad*)	traditional Moroccan house with inner courtyard
safqa D.	business

al-sahwa al-islamiyya	the Islamic Awakening
al-salaf al-salih	the righteous pious ancestors
salat	prayer
samaʿ	literally 'listening,' but also a form of mystical audition within Sufism, during ritual listening and reciting of Sufi poetry
sawm	fasting
sawt	voice
saz	long-necked lute used in Ottoman classical music
sabib (D. *sbib*)	string
shaʿbi	popular festive music
shabab	youth, youngsters
shariʿa	Islamic law
sharqi	Oriental, from the Orient
shikhat D.	Moroccan female dance performers
shirk	the sin of polytheism or idolatry in Islam
sharif (pl. *shurafaʾ*, D. *shorfa*)	noble, highborn, a title for people claiming genealogical descendance from a local saint, a charismatic figure or the Prophet himself.
siyasa	politics
skhun (f. *skhuna*) D.	hot, warm
stambeli D.	the cult and music played during ritual trance and healing sessions by descendants of sub-Saharan slaves in Tunisia
subuʿ	the celebration for a seven-day-old baby
sumʿa	one's reputation in society
sunna	recordings of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, source of Islamic law
sura	chapter, subdivision of the Qurʾan
suq	market
tajdid	renewal
tajwid	Qurʾanic recitation
takbir	the exclamation *Allahu akbar* (God is great)
Tamazight	the Amazigh (Berber) language
taqsim	instrumental improvisation
taqwa	pious fear
tarab	enchantment, musical ecstasy
tarbiya	education
Tarifit	language of Amazigh community of the Rif region
taʿrija	tambourine
tariqa (pl. *turuq*)	Sufi order, literally 'path' or 'way'

tasawwuf	Sufism
Tashelhit	variation of Tamazight, spoken in South West of Morocco
tarawih	extra prayers performed after the *maghrib* prayer, during the month of Ramadan
tabl (D. *tbal*)	large bass drum
tawhid	the oneness of God
thaqafa	culture
turath	heritage, patrimony
talib (pl. *tullab*, D. *tolba*)	student(s)
ʿud	pear-shaped stringed instrument similar to a lute
ughniyya	song
ukht (pl. *akhawat*)	sister(s)
ʿulamaʾ	religious scholars, see *ʿalim*
umma	worldwide community of Muslim believers
umsiyya	evening, concert, same signification as French *soirée*
unshuda	see *nashid*
urg	electric organ, synthesizer
watan	homeland, nation, country
wazifa	litany consisting of various recited formulae during collective *dhikr* sessions
wuduʾ	ablution
yawm al-qiyama	judgment day
zar	spirit possession rituals with roots in the Horn of Africa
zawiya (pl. *zawaya*)	Sufi lodge(s)
ziyara	literally 'visit,' a form of pilgrimage to a marabout's tomb

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Summary

How can music shape ideas regarding Islam and citizenship? This dissertation focuses on Islamic musical practices, cultural politics, and religious citizenship in Morocco. It analyzes how contemporary forms of Islam-inspired music interact with political discourses on Islam in Morocco in two domains: state-sponsored stages for Sufi music, and non-state-sponsored stages for *anashid*, Islamic songs, generally associated with more orthodox interpretations of Islam.

These political discourses about Islam come into being within a broader context in which globally, an increasing distinction is made between a so-called 'moderate' and a 'radical' Islam. These are not neutral terms, but ideological constructs, which resonate colonial discourses and form part of international political agendas and antiterrorism policies. This study's focus on Morocco complements existing research that critically analyze these notions (Mahmood 2006; Mamdani 2002, 2004, 2005; Zemni 2006). Influenced by the US launched 'War on Terror' and in response to current debates on Islam, many Muslim majority countries promote an image of an Islamic heritage that is peaceful and encourages interfaith dialogue. A tool through which such discourses on religious 'moderation' is represented and (re)formulated is music.

Morocco is one of the countries which use music as a means to portray its nation as the birthplace of a 'moderate' Islamic heritage. After 9/11 and the attacks in Casablanca in 2003, the concern over Islamic activist movements in Moroccan society grew. Through the introduction of antiterrorism policies and religious reforms, the King and the Moroccan government tried to regain control over the religious and political field. In order to present Morocco as 'moderate,' the Moroccan government and particularly the monarchy stimulate certain local forms of Sufism and sponsor cultural activities. These include prestigious international music festivals where a diversity of Western and Oriental musicians are presented, next to young Moroccan artists who previously were excluded because of their politically sensitive lyrics. There are also stages that specifically focus on Sufi culture and music.

In contrast to many socio-cultural studies on Islam and music, which mainly focus on audience reception, this study concentrates on the practices and perspectives of the artists. The question guiding this thesis is: how do musical practices and perspectives of vocal performers of Islam-inspired music interact

with political discourses about Islam in Morocco? Three interconnected dimensions were employed to unravel this question: 1) The infrastructures in which the production and staging of Islam-inspired music take place, 2) the musical practices employed, and 3) the perspectives of the performers regarding Islam and music, and towards Morocco's state cultural politics. I describe these three dimensions within two domains for Islam-inspired music commonly distinguished in Morocco. On the one hand there is the domain of official state-supported stages for 'sacred' and Sufi music, predominantly intended for a Moroccan elite and foreign tourists. On the other hand there is the domain for Islamic songs known as *anashid, which enjoys less* publicity than official cultural representations of Islam, and are mostly performed in domestic settings. The exploration of these two musical domains provides insight in the interaction between musical practices, religion, and politics.

Research methods and theoretical framework

The empirical data, which form the heart of this study, were collected during thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in the period from September 2009 until March 2012, mainly in the areas of Rabat, Casablanca, Fes, and a short period in the surroundings of Nador. I conducted this research primarily among vocal performers of Islam-inspired music and attended their musical activities, such as concerts and rehearsals. The majority of my observations took place at music festivals or family celebrations in domestic settings, like weddings. Next to observations, I conducted qualitative in-depth interviews and carried informal conversations with the artists, about their engagement with different sets of stages, how they deal with the effects of cultural politics, commerce, and about their ideas on Islam and music. Beside the artists, I also spoke to people indirectly involved with the artists' musical activities, such as family members, band managers, politicians, people from the audience, and members of Islamic activist movements. Next to interviews and observations I also analyzed audio recordings and song lyrics.

Theoretically, I argue in ***Chapter One*** that an analysis of both a symbolic and an affective dimension of music is required to understand the relation between music, religious experiences, and power. Most socio-cultural studies of music in relation to politics and power analyze music mainly as a symbolic vehicle of collective identities and power relations.

This perspective is strongly based on models of symbolic representation in the creation of meaning. This angle, however, does not reflect the experiences of my informants, who believed there's an 'intrinsic' power to music, with the ability to influence the thoughts and feelings of the listener. In order to demonstrate that music is a symbolic as well as a sensorial form of power when it comes to the expression and formation of collective identities, religious sentiments,

and power relations, I use recent anthropological approaches that emphasize the relevance of the senses, the body and emotions within the political field (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; Meyer 2006, 2009, 2012). I apply these approaches to Islam-inspired music in order to shed light on its interaction with political discourses about Islam in Morocco.

Islam-inspired music and cultural politics in Morocco

Music is not only used by the state to promote Morocco as a 'moderate' Muslim country, it is also instrumental in the justification and reproduction of power of the national political system. In ***Chapter Two*** I describe the religious and political landscape of Morocco from a historical perspective. I show how these landscapes are intertwined through the person of the King, who is both head of state and state religion, through his claim to descendancy of the Prophet. This entanglement is also expressed in esthetic forms and symbolic repertoires used to justify and reaffirm the political and religious power of the state institutions. The omnipresent display of these cultural representations in public space indicates the crucial influence of the Moroccan state on the definition of symbols and rituals of national identity. Within these cultural representations, music is an important element, through which religious and political power is manifested, mediated, and legitimized.

In ***Chapter Three*** I explain how, from the French protectorate (1912-1956) until the current rule of king Mohammed VI, the intertwinement of politics and religion has influenced the use and meaning of musical forms in Morocco. Over the last thirty years, the influence of globalization has become increasingly visible within the Moroccan public sphere. The events of 9/11, the arrests of heavy metal artists on charges of Satanism, and the Casablanca attacks of 2003 have caused Moroccan society to rethink and reformulate its cultural-religious values and national identity. The music stages supported by the King are pivotal places for the display of national discourses of Islam and national identity. These stages embrace Western values of modernity and democracy, while simultaneously confirming the traditional Moroccan system of political power. However, the Moroccan state is not alone in the use of music in the formulation of political discourses on Islam. There are also other actors who use music to convey their own visions about Islam.

Sufi and *anashid* artists

Chapter Four explores two state-run music festivals for Sufi music: the Festival of Sufi Culture and the Festival of Sacred World Music. These large scale festivals, both held annually in the city of Fes and aimed largely at foreign tourists, construct notions of a 'moderate' Islam and link it to Sufism and nationalist discourses through music. The festivals present Sufism both as a part of the

Moroccan national heritage and of a broader universal spirituality, which embraces several religious traditions. Disciples of different Sufi orders are invited to perform their musical rituals on these festival stages. The transferral of musical rituals, originally meant to evoke religious experiences, to large scale festival stages with an international audience, brings about fundamental changes on the level of form, function and meaning of the rituals, as well as the religiosity of the musicians. Yet, the disciples, who in some cases have evolved into professional artists, are not merely passive victims of the politicization and commercialization of their rituals. They themselves use these festival stages to promote their specific Sufi order, to convey Islamic messages among a wide audience, and also to earn an income. Remarkable are the ways in which some disciples try to keep control over the meaning of their rituals and their own religiosity. They for instance carefully select what rituals to disclose to the audience, or they conduct religious cleansing rituals before and during their staged performances.

Chapter Five focuses on the domain of *anashid*: an a-capella vocal music form, sometimes accompanied by percussion, with an Islamic message. Over the past twenty years, this vocal tradition has developed into a popular music genre covering a wide variety of musical styles, artists, and audiences in the Middle East, Asia, and the West. Under influence of the Islamic revival movement, *anashid* were introduced in Morocco in the 1980s and initially gained popularity within universities, where Islamic activist movements were active. In the 1990s, the genre extended to domestic settings to adorn family celebrations, such as weddings and circumcisions in an Islamic way. Nowadays, there are countless *anashid* groups in Morocco that perform in the domestic setting, but also in semipublic spaces such as cultural associations, youth community centers, and gatherings of Islamic activist movements. Next to providing morally acceptable entertainment within an Islamic context, *anashid* also seek to educate audiences how to lead an Islamically correct lifestyle.

Despite the growing popularity of *anashid*, this form of Islam-inspired music is largely kept from the official stages for religious music, because of its strong association with 'Islamism.' Therefore, *anashid* artists perform mostly outside of state-controlled stages for cultural expression, such as family celebrations, community centers, and concerts abroad. The *anashid* artists show a critical stance towards Morocco's state cultural politics. They consider the preference for Sufi music and international artists immoral and a waste of public funds. Many of them frame their own musical practices as a form of resistance. By providing 'correct' musical forms, they campaign against 'the moral decay' and political injustice, these festivals represent to them.

This resistance is not only reflected in the lyrics but also in the ways in which the songs are performed. *Anashid* artists deliberately use specific performance

techniques like rhythms and body postures in order to embody and invoke pious sentiments on the one hand, while on the other hand avoiding unwanted emotions, steering the audience towards a desired religious experience. Such an exchange of emotions between the artists and the audience also has political relevance. The performances seek to establish religious sentiments within the artists and their audiences – religious sentiments that are meant to express and constitute a shared longing for an alternative virtuous society, governed by Islamic principles.

Towards a perspective of dissonance

Comparing the domains for Sufi music and *anashid* music offers insight in the complex relations underlying the Moroccan field for Islam-inspired music. In ***Chapter Six***, the last chapter of my thesis, I show that although the two domains might seem separate on an ideological and organizational level, we are not dealing with two clear-cut homogenous fields in which artists passively adjust to the wishes and definitions of the state. As we have seen, the state-sponsored stages form a platform where the Moroccan state tries to influence a new generation of artists embodying a new direction of religious moderation, whereas the Islamic *anashid* are certified as cultural products of a 'radical Islam,' and are mainly kept from the official stages.

The analysis of the musical practices and experiences of the artists within these two domains however shows that neither the music, nor the artists, nor the underlying religious sentiments, or political ideas fit into this polarized image. Reality turns out to be quite ambiguous. The artists within both domains do not merely adopt the dominant discourse of the domain. They strategically use music to express their personal attitude towards religion and politics, creating their own discourses on Islam and citizenship. Moreover, some artists turn out to perform within both domains. Both Sufi and *anashid* artists make strategic choices what styles and musical labels they use. These choices are largely determined by religious, commercial and political considerations, but also expectations of festival organizers, Islamic movements, audiences, and the state play a role. The two domains are thus not mutually exclusive; there is a connection, but one that grates. Therefore, I propose a perspective of in which we can recognize that instead of two opposing musical domains, there exists a complex dynamic of ambiguity and tension; like a dissonant chord, which produces friction.

This leads to four ***Conclusions***. 1) The distinction between a non-Moroccan foreign 'orthodox' sphere of *anashid* music versus an officially approved national domain of 'moderate' Sufi spirituality is mainly discursive. 2) This discursive distinction reflects in particular the nationalist discourse of the fight against 'radical' Islam and the propagation of Morocco as a 'moderate' Islamic country.

3) The flexibility and ambivalence as a practical outcome with which artists deal with the binary distinction between the two musical domains, can be seen as an indirect form of resistance. Their pragmatic flexibility provides them with a leeway to deal with the material implications of the dominant discourses of the field for Islam-inspired music, which is strongly dominated by the Moroccan state. 4) Within both domains music is used to create religious sentiments, which serve as a basis for notions on Islam and citizenship.

In short, this study demonstrates how different forms of Islamic music are connected with broader ideological constructs because they both represent and cultivate religious sentiments. Moreover, the music serves on the one hand as a vehicle of political messages, and on the other hand (and simultaneously) as an instrument for individual artists to establish religious sentiments –religious sentiments meant to serve as a basis of ethical engagement in order to insert a broader social awareness within their listeners and in society at large.

Nederlandse samenvatting

Dissonante stemmen
Islamitisch geïnspireerde muziek in Marokko
en de politiek van religieuze sentimenten

Hoe kan muziek gestalte geven aan denkbeelden over islam en burgerschap? Dit proefschrift brengt in kaart hoe hedendaagse vormen van islamitisch geïnspireerde muziek en politieke constructies over islam in Marokko op elkaar inwerken. Daarbij worden twee muzikale domeinen bestudeerd en met elkaar vergeleken: staatsgesteunde podia voor soefimuziek en niet-staatsgesteunde podia voor *anashid*, islamitische liederen doorgaans geassocieerd met meer orthodoxe geloofsstromingen.

De politieke constructies over islam in Marokko komen tot stand binnen een context waarin wereldwijd steeds nadrukkelijker onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen een zogenaamd 'gematigde' en een 'radicale' islam. Dit zijn echter geen neutrale termen, maar noties waarin koloniale vertogen doorklinken en die onderdeel uitmaken van internationale politieke agenda's en antiterrorismebeleid, waarbij een 'gematigde' islam de voorkeur heeft boven een 'radicale' islam. De focus van dit onderzoek op Marokko vult bestaande studies aan die deze noties kritisch onder de loep nemen (Mahmood 2006; Mamdani 2002, 2004, 2005; Zemni 2006). Onder invloed van de door Amerika geïnitieerde 'War on Terror' zijn verschillende moslimlanden zich nadrukkelijk gaan profileren als 'gematigd.' Onderdeel hiervan zijn specifieke vertogen over islam en burgerschap, waarbij de islam wordt gepresenteerd als een vredelievende religie, die interreligieuze dialoog en tolerantie stimuleert en diepgeworteld zou zijn in een islamitisch cultureel erfgoed. Muziek is een van de instrumenten die gebruikt worden in de constructie en verbreiding van dit beeld.

Marokko is een van de landen in de islamitische wereld die muziek gebruiken om de natie te portretteren als bakermat van een 'gematigd islamitisch erfgoed'. Na 9/11 en de aanslagen in Casablanca in 2003 groeide de bezorgdheid over islamitisch-activistische bewegingen in de samenleving. Door invoering van antiterrorismebeleid en religieuze hervormingen hebben de koning en de Marokkaanse staat getracht de controle over het religieuze en politieke veld te verstevigen. Om Marokko neer te zetten als 'gematigd' stimuleren de overheid

en het koningshuis bepaalde vormen van soefisme en ondersteunen ze bepaalde muzikale activiteiten, waaronder prestigieuze internationale muziekfestivals met een breed scala aan Westerse en Oriëntaalse muzikanten, onder wie ook jonge Marokkaanse artiesten die voorheen werden uitgesloten vanwege hun politiek gevoelige teksten. Ook zijn er podia opgericht die zich speciaal richten op soeficultuur en -muziek.

In tegenstelling tot veel sociaal-culturele studies over islam en muziek die zich vooral richten op de receptie van muziek, stelt deze studie juist de praktijken en perspectieven van de artiesten zelf centraal. Daarbij stel ik de vraag hoe de opvoering van hun muzikale praktijken georganiseerd is, hoe die praktijken door hen gebruikt en ervaren worden, en hoe zij interageren met bredere politieke vertogen over islam. Om deze vragen te beantwoorden kijk ik naar drie met elkaar samenhangende dimensies: 1) de infrastructuur waarbinnen hun optredens tot stand komen, 2) de muzikale praktijken die de artiesten gebruiken, en 3) hun perspectieven ten aanzien van islam en muziek, en de Marokkaanse cultuurpolitiek. Ik beschrijf deze drie dimensies voor twee contrasterende muzikale domeinen: het domein van de officiële staatsgesteunde podia voor 'sacrale' en soefimuziek voornamelijk gericht op een Marokkaanse bovenklasse en buitenlandse toeristen, en de niche van de *anashid*, islamitische liederen die van de officiële podia geweerd worden vanwege hun associatie met 'islamisme,' en meestal in huiselijke settings worden opgevoerd. De verkenning van deze twee muzikale domeinen heeft als doel inzicht te geven in de wisselwerking tussen muzikale praktijken, religie en politieke dimensies.

Onderzoeksmethoden en theoretisch kader

De onderzoeksgegevens, die het hart vormen van deze studie, zijn verzameld tijdens dertien maanden etnografisch veldwerk in Marokko gedurende de periode van september 2009 tot maart 2012 in met name Rabat, Casablanca, Fes, en een kortere periode in de omgeving van Nador. Het veldonderzoek vond met name plaats onder artiesten van islamitisch geïnspireerde muziek. Het merendeel van hun muzikale praktijken observeerde ik op festivals en tijdens feestelijke aangelegenheden in huiselijke kring, zoals bruiloften. Ik nam ook diepte-interviews af en voerde informele gesprekken over hun omgang met en ideeën over verschillende podia, de effecten van cultuurpolitiek en commercialisering, en hun visies op islam en muziek. Behalve met de artiesten sprak ik ook met mensen die indirect bij hun muzikale activiteiten betrokken waren, zoals familieleden, bandmanagers, mensen uit het publiek, politici, toeschouwers en leden van islamitische bewegingen. Daarnaast heb ik ook groepsinterviews gevoerd met muziekensembles en geluidsopnames en songteksten geanalyseerd.

In ***hoofdstuk een***, laat ik zien dat een analyse van zowel de symbolische als affectieve dimensie van muziek nodig is om de verbanden tussen muziek,

religieuze ervaringen en politiek te begrijpen. In de meeste sociaal-culturele studies van muziek in relatie tot politiek en macht wordt muziek vooral benaderd als een symbolisch voertuig van collectieve identiteiten en machtsrelaties. Deze benadering is sterk gebaseerd op modellen van symbolische representatie in de totstandkoming van betekenisgeving. Deze invalshoek doet echter onvoldoende recht aan de beleving van mijn informanten, die menen dat muziek een intrinsieke kracht bezit die mensen zintuigelijk prikkelt en daarmee hun gevoelens en gedachten kan beïnvloeden. Om aan te tonen dat muziek zowel een symbolische als een zintuigelijke vorm van macht is wanneer het gaat om de expressie en vorming van collectieve identiteiten, religieuze sentimenten en machtsrelaties, baseer ik mij op recente antropologische benaderingen die het belang van de zintuigen, het lichaam en emoties binnen het politieke veld benadrukken (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; Meyer 2006, 2009, 2012). Deze pas ik toe op islamitisch geïnspireerde muzikale praktijken om de wisselwerking met politieke denkbeelden ten aanzien van islam in Marokko inzichtelijk te maken.

Islamitisch geïnspireerde muziek en cultuurpolitiek in Marokko

In Marokko is het veld van religieuze muziek sterk gepolitiseerd omdat religie de kern vormt van het politieke staatsbestel. Muziek wordt niet alleen gebruikt door de staat om Marokko als een gematigd moslimland te promoten, maar ook om bestaande politieke machtsrelaties te rechtvaardigen en reproduceren. ***Hoofdstuk twee*** beschrijft het religieuze en politieke landschap van Marokko vanuit historisch perspectief. Ik laat zien hoe deze landschappen met elkaar verstrengeld zijn via de persoon van de koning, die afstamming van de Profeet claimt. De Marokkaanse staat oefent een cruciale invloed uit op de definitie van symbolen en rituelen van nationale identiteit. Muziek is daarbij een belangrijke vorm om officiële culturele representaties te communiceren, en religieuze macht te manifesteren, mediëren en legitimeren.

In ***hoofdstuk drie*** laat ik zien hoe, vanaf het Franse protectoraat (1912-1956) tot en met het huidige bewind onder koning Mohammed VI, de verstrengeling van politiek en religie sterke invloed heeft uitgeoefend op de manieren waarop verschillende muzikale vormen in Marokko gebruikt zijn en betekenis hebben gekregen. De laatste dertig jaar is de invloed van globalisering steeds zichtbaarder geworden in de Marokkaanse publieke sfeer. De gebeurtenissen van 9/11, de arrestatie van heavy metal artiesten op verdenking van satanisme, en de aanslagen in Casablanca in 2003, hebben ervoor gezorgd dat de Marokkaanse samenleving zich ging herbezinnen op haar cultureel-religieuze waarden en nationale identiteit. De koning is een belangrijke speler in de ondersteuning van muziekpodia die officiële vertogen over islam en nationale identiteit tentoonspreiden. Deze podia omarmen Westerse symbolen van moderniteit en democratie terwijl zij tegelijkertijd het Marokkaanse politieke machtssysteem

bevestigen. Behalve de Marokkaanse staat zijn er echter ook nog andere actoren die muziek gebruiken om hun eigen visies over islam uit te dragen.

Soefi- en *anashid*-artiesten

Hoofdstuk vier richt zich op het domein van de staatsgesteunde podia voor islamitisch geïnspireerde muziek, en beschrijft twee muziekfestivals waar 'soefimuziek' wordt opgevoerd: het Festival van Soeficultuur en het Festival van Sacrale Wereldmuziek. Deze grootschalige festivals, beide jaarlijks gehouden in Fes en met name gericht op buitenlandse toeristen, construeren via muziek noties van een 'gematigde' islam en linken deze aan soefisme en nationalistische vertogen. De festivals presenteren soefisme zowel als een deel van het Marokkaans nationaal erfgoed en als onderdeel van een universele spiritualiteit die meerdere religieuze tradities omvat. Discipelen van verschillende soefiordes worden uitgenodigd om hun muzikale rituelen op deze festivalpodia op te voeren. Sommige van hen zijn uitgegroeid tot professionele artiesten

De vertaling van muzikale soefirituelen – oorspronkelijk bedoeld om religieuze ervaringen op te wekken – naar grootschalige festivalpodia met een internationaal publiek brengt ingrijpende veranderingen teweeg op het niveau van de vorm, de functie en de betekenis van de muzikale rituelen, maar heeft ook implicaties voor de religiositeit van de muzikanten. Ondanks de politisering en vercommercialisering van hun muzikale rituelen zijn de discipelen niet slechts passieve 'slachtoffers'. Ze gebruiken deze festivalpodia om via hun muzikale praktijken hun eigen soefiorde te promoten, islamitische boodschappen onder een breed publiek te verspreiden, en ook om brood op de plank te krijgen. Opvallend is de manier waarop zij nadrukkelijk controle proberen te houden over de betekenis van hun rituelen en eigen religiositeit, door bijvoorbeeld te bepalen welke rituelen wel of niet (en zo ja, hoe) aan het publiek getoond worden, of door het uitoefenen van reinigingsrituelen tijdens en voorafgaande aan hun optredens.

Hoofdstuk vijf gaat in op het tweede domein, dat van de *anashid*. Deze traditionele a capellazangvorm met een islamitische boodschap heeft zich in de laatste 20 jaar ontwikkeld tot een populair genre met een divers scala aan muziekstijlen, artiesten en publiek in het Midden-Oosten, Azië en het Westen. Onder invloed van de islamitische revivalbeweging deden *anashid* hun intrede in Marokko in de jaren '80, waar ze voornamelijk aanhang kregen binnen islamitische studentenbewegingen. In de jaren '90 breidde het genre zich uit naar een huiselijke setting om familieaangelegenheden, zoals bruiloften, geboortefeesten en besnijdenissen op islamitische wijze muzikaal te omlijsten. Tegenwoordig bestaan er talloze *anashid*-bandjes in Marokko die optreden in huiselijke kring, maar ook in semipublieke ruimtes, zoals universiteit, culturele verenigingen en buurthuizen, en bij bijeenkomsten van islamitische bewegingen. Behalve het bieden van

fatsoenlijk entertainment binnen islamitische kaders hebben *anashid* ook als doel het publiek te onderwijzen over een islamitisch correcte levenswijze. Vanwege de sterke associatie met 'islamisme' wordt deze populaire muziekvorm in Marokko grotendeels geweerd van de officiële podia voor religieuze muziek. Daarom treden *anashid*-artiesten vooral op buiten de overheidsgecontroleerde podia, zoals op familiefeesten, in buurthuizen en tijdens optredens in het buitenland.

De *anashid*-zangers staan kritisch ten opzichte van de cultuurpolitiek van de Marokkaanse overheid. De voorkeur voor soefiartiesten en internationale artiesten wordt als geldverspilling en immoreel gezien. Veel van de *anashid*-artiesten zien daarom hun eigen muzikale activiteiten als een vorm van verzet. Door het bieden van vervangende 'correcte' muziekvormen proberen zij het morele verval, dat volgens hen door deze festivals wordt aangemoedigd, tegen te gaan. In dit verzet gaat het niet alleen om de onderwerpen van de liederen, maar ook om de wijze waarop deze liederen opgevoerd worden. *Anashid*-artiesten gebruiken bewust bepaalde technieken zoals ritmes en lichaamsbewegingen om enerzijds vrome gevoelens te belichamen en op te wekken en anderzijds ongewenste gevoelens te controleren, om zo het publiek naar een gewenste religieuze ervaring te sturen. Een dergelijke uitwisseling van emoties tussen artiest en publiek heeft ook een politieke betekenis. De religieuze sentimenten die tijdens optredens bij de artiesten zelf en hun publiek worden opgewekt, hebben niet alleen als doel een ethische transformatie bij de luisteraar teweeg te brengen, maar ook om een gemeenschappelijk verlangen aan te wakkeren naar een alternatieve deugdzame samenleving geleid door islamitische waarden.

Naar een perspectief van dissonantie

De vergelijking van de domeinen voor soefimuziek en voor *anashid*-muziek biedt inzicht in de complexe relaties die ten grondslag liggen aan het Marokkaanse veld van islamitisch geïnspireerde muziek. ***Hoofdstuk zes*** is het laatste hoofdstuk van het proefschrift. Hier laat ik zien dat deze twee domeinen op ideologisch en organisatorisch vlak gescheiden lijken, maar dat we uiteindelijk niet te maken hebben met twee eenduidig te onderscheiden homogene velden waarin artiesten zich willoos schikken naar de wensen en definities van de overheid. Zoals we reeds zagen, vormen de staatsgesteunde podia een platform waarop de Marokkaanse overheid een nieuwe lichting artiesten probeert te beïnvloeden, die een nieuwe koers van religieuze matiging dienen te belichamen. De islamitische *anashid* daarentegen worden door de overheid bestempeld als culturele producten van een 'radicale islam' en worden grotendeels geweerd van de officiële podia.

De artiesten, hun muzikale praktijken en hun politieke denkbeelden passen echter niet altijd in dit gepolariseerde beeld van de overheid. De werkelijkheid blijkt ambigu. In elk domein gebruiken de artiesten hun muziek om uiting te

geven aan hun persoonlijke houding ten aanzien van religie en politiek. Daarnaast blijken sommige artiesten op te treden in beide domeinen. Zowel soefi- als *anashid*-artiesten maken strategische keuzes welke muzikale stijlen en -identiteiten ze gebruiken. Deze keuzes worden grotendeels bepaald door religieuze, commerciële en politieke overwegingen, maar ook de verwachtingen van festivalorganisatoren, islamitische bewegingen, het publiek en de staat spelen een rol. Bovendien nemen in beide domeinen de artiesten niet slechts het heersende vertoog over, maar brengen ze ook hun eigen ideeën over islam en burgerschap naar voren. De twee domeinen sluiten elkaar dus niet volledig uit: er is samenhang, maar die wringt. Daarom stel ik een perspectief van dissonantie voor waarin we (h)erkennen dat er geen sprake is van twee tegengestelde domeinen, maar van een complexe dynamiek van ambiguïteit en spanning; zoals een dissonante samenklank die wrijving geeft.

Hieruit volgen vier ***conclusies***. 1) Het onderscheid tussen een 'niet-Marokkaans', 'orthodox' domein van *anashid*-muziek en een officieel goedgekeurd nationaal domein van 'gematigde' soefispiritualiteit is voornamelijk discursief. 2) Dit onderscheid weerspiegelt met name het nationalistische overheidsvertoog dat zich richt op het bestrijden van 'radicale Islam' en het propageren van Marokko als een 'gematigd' islamitisch land, en komt niet als zodanig overeen met de praktijken en ervaringen van de artiesten. 3) De flexibiliteit en ambivalentie waarmee de artiesten omgaan met het onderscheid tussen de twee domeinen kan gezien worden als een indirecte vorm van verzet. Met deze flexibiliteit creëren artiesten speelruimte om op verschillende plekken op te treden en om hun eigen vertogen over islam en burgerschap te scheppen, binnen de dominante vertogen van het veld voor islamitische muziek dat sterk bepaald wordt door de Marokkaanse staat. 4) Binnen beide domeinen wordt muziek gebruikt om religieuze sentimenten te creëren die als basis dienen voor diverse ideologische denkbeelden over islam en burgerschap.

Kortom: deze studie laat zien hoe verschillende vormen van islamitische muziek verbonden zijn met bredere ideologische constructen omdat ze religieuze sentimenten zowel representeren als cultiveren. Daarbij dient de muziek enerzijds als voertuig van politieke boodschappen, en anderzijds (en tegelijkertijd) als instrument voor individuele artiesten om religieuze sentimenten tot stand te brengen die vorm geven aan een breder maatschappelijk bewustzijn.

Résumé

Des voix dissonantes
Musique d'inspiration islamique
et aspects politiques du sentiment religieux

De quelle manière la musique donne-t-elle forme aux idées sur l'islam et la citoyenneté? Ce travail s'intéresse aux pratiques musicales de l'islam, à la politique culturelle et à la citoyenneté religieuse au Maroc. Nous analysons la manière dont les formes contemporaines de musique inspirées par l'islam interagissent avec les discours politiques sur l'islam au Maroc à travers l'étude de deux domaines : la scène de la musique soufie, sponsorisée par l'État, et la scène *anachid*, chansons islamiques, généralement associées à une interprétation plus orthodoxe de l'islam.

Ces discours politiques sur l'islam émergent dans un contexte plus large qui laisse apparaître une distinction croissante entre les formes d'islam prétendument « modérée » ou « radicale ». Ces termes ne sont pas neutres mais sont des constructions idéologiques ; ils font écho aux discours coloniaux, d'intentions politiques internationales et de politiques antiterroristes. Notre choix du Maroc comme terrain d'étude vient compléter des recherches existantes qui effectuent une analyse critique de ces notions (Mahmood 2006 ; Mamdani 2002, 2004, 2005 ; Zemni 2006). Sous l'influence de la « guerre contre le terrorisme » initiée par les États-Unis et en réponse aux débats actuels sur l'islam, de nombreux pays à majorité musulmane mettent en avant l'image d'un héritage islamique paisible qui encourage un dialogue œcuménique. L'un des outils permettant de mettre en scène et de formuler cette « modération » religieuse est la musique.

Le Maroc est l'un des pays qui utilisent la musique pour se définir comme l'un des berceaux de l'islam « modéré ». Les attaques du 11 septembre et celles de Casablanca en 2003 ont accru, dans la société marocaine, une inquiétude concernant les mouvements activistes islamiques. Le roi et le gouvernement marocain ont tenté, par l'introduction d'une politique antiterroriste et de réformes religieuses, de reprendre le contrôle des domaines politique et religieux. Dans le but de présenter le Maroc comme un pays « modéré », le gouvernement marocain, et particulièrement la monarchie, encouragent certaines formes locales de soufisme et soutiennent des activités culturelles soufies. De presti-

gieux festivals de musique sont ainsi organisés auxquels de nombreux musiciens occidentaux et orientaux participent ainsi que de jeunes artistes marocains qui en étaient auparavant exclus pour cause de paroles politiquement sensibles. Certaines scènes musicales sont quant à elles entièrement dédiées à la musique et à la culture soufies.

Contrairement à beaucoup d'études socioculturelles sur l'islam et la musique, qui s'intéressent principalement à la réception de la musique, notre étude se concentre sur les pratiques et les points de vue des artistes. La question qui nous guide est la suivante : de quelle manière les pratiques artistiques des interprètes de la musique d'inspiration islamique interagissent avec le discours politique sur l'islam au Maroc ? Nous avons abordé cette question en étudiant trois aspects qui sont étroitement liés : 1) les infrastructures qui soutiennent la production et la mise en scène de la musique inspirée par l'islam 2) les pratiques musicales à l'œuvre et 3) le point de vue des interprètes au sujet de l'islam et de la musique ainsi que de la politique culturelle officielle du Maroc. Notre champ d'étude est défini par les deux domaines de la musique religieuse que l'on trouve communément au Maroc. Il y a d'un côté, la scène officielle, soutenue par l'État, de musique « sacrée » et de musique soufie, qui s'adresse principalement à l'élite marocaine et aux touristes étrangers. De l'autre, la catégorie des chants islamiques connue sous le nom d'*anachid*, qui est moins médiatisée que les représentations culturelles officielles de l'islam et qui est plutôt entendue lors de représentations privées comme lors de fêtes familiales. Explorer ces deux champs musicaux nous permet d'approfondir la question de l'interaction entre les pratiques musicales, la religion et la politique.

Méthodes de recherche et cadre théorique

Les données empiriques, qui constituent le cœur de cette étude, ont été recueillies durant 13 mois d'un travail ethnographique de terrain entre septembre 2009 et mars 2012, principalement dans les régions de Rabat, Casablanca, Fès et, pour une plus courte durée dans les environs de Nador. Nous avons, en premier lieu, conduit cette recherche auprès de chanteurs interprètes de musique religieuse en assistant aux activités telles que concerts et répétitions. La plupart des observations ont eu lieu lors de festivals ou de célébrations familiales, comme des mariages. L'observation s'est accompagnée d'une série d'entretiens qualitatifs approfondis ainsi que de discussions informelles avec les artistes au sujet de leur engagement dans différents types de scènes musicales, de la manière dont ils s'accommodent des effets de la politique culturelle et du commerce ou encore de leurs idées et opinions sur l'islam et la musique. Nous avons aussi parlé avec des personnes impliquées indirectement dans les activités musicales des artistes comme les membres de leurs familles, les impresarios, des hommes politiques, des membres du public ainsi que des membres de mouvements activistes

islamiques. Au-delà des entretiens et des observations, nous avons également analysé des enregistrements audio et des paroles de chansons.

Notre hypothèse, proposée dans le ***premier chapitre***, est qu'il est nécessaire d'analyser à la fois les dimensions symbolique et affective de la musique pour pouvoir comprendre la relation entre la musique, les expériences religieuses et le pouvoir. La plupart des études socioculturelles ayant pour objet la musique dans sa relation au politique et au pouvoir ne l'appréhendent qu'en tant que vecteur symbolique des identités collectives et des relations de pouvoir. Ce point de vue est solidement arrimé à des modèles de représentations symboliques dans la création de sens. Cependant, cet angle ne reflète pas l'expérience de nos informateurs qui croient en un pouvoir « intrinsèque » de la musique pouvant influencer les pensées ainsi que les sentiments de celui qui l'écoute. Pour pouvoir démontrer la nature symbolique ainsi que sensorielle du pouvoir de la musique quand il s'agit de l'expression et de la création d'identités collectives, de sentiments religieux et de relations de pouvoir, nous nous sommes appuyés sur des études anthropologiques récentes qui soulignent la pertinence des sens, du corps et des émotions au sein du champ politique (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; Meyer 2006, 2009, 2012). Ces approches nous ont permis d'éclairer les interactions entre la musique religieuse et les discours politiques sur l'islam au Maroc.

La musique inspirée de l'islam et la politique culturelle au Maroc

La musique est utilisée par l'État pour promouvoir le Maroc comme un pays musulman « modéré » et est également instrumentalisée pour justifier et renforcer le pouvoir du système politique national. Dans le ***second chapitre***, nous décrivons le paysage religieux et politique du Maroc d'un point de vue historique. Nous montrons de quelle manière ces deux domaines sont enchevêtrés dans la figure du roi qui est à la fois à la tête de l'État et de la religion en se revendiquant de la lignée du Prophète. Les formes esthétiques et les répertoires symboliques expriment aussi cet enchevêtrement et sont mis à contribution pour justifier et réaffirmer le pouvoir politique et religieux des institutions de l'État. L'omniprésence de ces représentations culturelles dans l'espace public montre l'importance de l'influence exercée par l'État marocain sur la définition des symboles et des rituels de l'identité nationale. Au sein de ces représentations culturelles, la musique est un élément important par lequel le pouvoir politique et religieux se manifeste et trouve sa légitimité.

Le ***troisième chapitre*** montre comment, de la période du protectorat français (1912-1956) jusqu'au règne contemporain de Mohammed VI, l'enchevêtrement de la politique et de la religion a influencé l'usage et le sens des formes musicales au Maroc. Durant les trente dernières années, l'influence de la globalisation est devenue de plus en plus visible dans la sphère publique marocaine. Les évène-

ments comme le 11 septembre, l'arrestation de musiciens de heavy metal accusés de satanisme ou les attaques de Casablanca en 2003, ont amené la société marocaine à repenser et à reformuler ses valeurs religio-culturelles et son identité nationale. Les scènes musicales soutenues par le roi sont des lieux centraux pour la médiatisation des discours nationaux sur l'islam et l'identité nationale. Ces scènes embrassent les valeurs occidentales de modernité et de démocratie tout en renforçant le pouvoir politique du système traditionnel marocain. Cependant, l'État marocain n'est pas le seul à se servir de la musique pour exprimer un discours politique sur l'islam. D'autres acteurs s'en servent pour transmettre leurs propres visions de l'islam.

Artistes soufis et *anachid*

Le ***quatrième chapitre*** explore deux festivals de musique soufie organisés par l'État : le Festival de la Culture Soufie et le Festival des Musiques Sacrées du Monde. Ces deux grands festivals ont lieu chaque année à Fès et sont largement destinés aux touristes étrangers. Ils développent le concept d'un islam « modéré » et le lie au soufisme et aux discours nationalistes à travers la musique. Ces festivals présentent le soufisme comme appartenant à la fois à l'héritage national marocain mais aussi à une spiritualité universelle plus large qui embrasse différentes traditions religieuses. Des disciples de diverses confréries soufies sont invités à présenter sur scène leurs rituels musicaux. Le transfert de rituels musicaux, originellement liés à des expériences religieuses, sur la scène de grands festivals au public international, révèle des changements fondamentaux au niveau de la forme, de la fonction et du sens de ces rituels, ainsi qu'en ce qui concerne la religiosité des musiciens. Cependant les disciples, qui pour certains d'entre eux sont devenus des musiciens professionnels, ne sont pas les victimes passives de la politisation et de la commercialisation de leurs rituels. Eux-mêmes utilisent ces grands festivals pour promouvoir leur propre leur propre confrérie soufie, transmettre des messages islamiques auprès d'un large public ou encore, s'assurer un revenu. La manière dont certains disciples tentent de garder le contrôle sur le sens des rituels qu'ils représentent et sur leur propre religiosité est assez remarquable. Ils filtrent par exemple avec soin les rituels qu'ils souhaitent montrer au public ou encore, procèdent à des rituels de purification avant et pendant leurs passages sur scène.

Le ***cinquième chapitre*** s'intéresse à l'univers des *anachid* : un chant a cappella, parfois accompagné de percussions et qui porte un message islamique. Au cours des vingt dernières années, cette tradition de chant a évolué en un genre musical populaire regroupant une grande variété de styles, d'artistes et de publics au Moyen-Orient, en Asie et en Occident. Sous l'influence du mouvement de renouveau islamique, les *anachid* sont apparus au Maroc dans les années 1980 et sont d'abord devenus populaires dans les universités où les mouvements

activistes islamiques étaient actifs. Dans les années 1990, le genre s'est étendu à la sphère privée familiale en tenant un rôle lors de célébrations comme les mariages ou les circoncisions. De nos jours, d'innombrables groupes *anachid* se produisent au Maroc lors de fêtes familiales mais aussi dans des espaces semi-publics comme des associations culturelles, des centre de jeunesse ou à des rassemblements de mouvements activistes islamiques. Les *anachid* sont à la fois une source de divertissement moralement acceptable dans un contexte islamique et un moyen d'éduquer le public sur la façon de mener une vie en accord avec l'islam.

Malgré la popularité croissante des *anachid*, cette forme de musique religieuse est largement tenue à distance des scènes musicales officielles à cause de sa forte association avec « l'islamisme ». C'est pourquoi les artistes *anachid* se produisent essentiellement à l'écart des scènes d'expression culturelle contrôlées par l'État, dans un environnement privé comme lors de fêtes de famille, dans des centres culturels locaux ou lors de concerts à l'étranger. Les artistes *anachid* ont une opinion critique envers la politique culturelle de l'État marocain. Ils considèrent que la préférence pour la musique soufie et les artistes internationaux est immorale et qu'elle constitue un gâchis d'argent public. Beaucoup d'entre eux considèrent leur pratique musicale comme une forme de résistance. En donnant à entendre au public les « bonnes » formes musicales, ils font campagne contre « la décadence morale » et l'injustice politique que ces festivals incarnent pour eux.

On retrouve cette résistance dans les paroles mais aussi dans la manière dont les chansons sont représentées. Les artistes *anachid* utilisent des techniques de représentation spécifiques comme le choix des rythmes ou des postures corporelles pour invoquer certains sentiments religieux et évitent délibérément d'autres émotions, pour conduire le public vers l'expérience religieuse désirée. Ce type d'échange émotionnel entre les artistes et le public présente un intérêt politique. Les représentations cherchent à faire naître un sentiment religieux chez les artistes et leurs publics – ce sentiment religieux exprime et constitue le désir partagé d'une société différente, vertueuse et gouvernée par les principes de l'islam.

Vers une perspective de dissonance

La comparaison entre les musiques soufie et *anachid* permet d'éclairer les relations complexes qui sous-tendent l'univers musical religieux marocain. Notre ***sixième et dernier chapitre*** montre que, alors que ces deux domaines semblent séparés d'un point de vue organisationnel et idéologique, nous n'avons pas affaire à deux champs homogènes bien définis dans lesquels les artistes s'ajustent passivement aux souhaits et aux définitions de l'État. Comme nous l'avons vu, la scène musicale sponsorisée par l'État forme une plateforme grâce à laquelle l'État marocain tente d'influencer une nouvelle génération d'artistes censée

incarner une nouvelle tendance de modération religieuse tandis que les *anachid* islamiques se retrouvent estampillés comme produit culturel de « l'islam radical » et sont majoritairement tenus à part des scènes officielles.

L'analyse des pratiques musicales et des expériences vécues par les artistes au sein de ces deux champs d'expression montre cependant que ni la musique, ni les artistes, ni les sentiments religieux sous-jacents ou encore les idées politiques ne se prêtent à cette interprétation dichotomique. La réalité semble au contraire plus ambigüe. Les artistes de chacun de ces registres musicaux ne se contentent pas d'adopter le discours dominant de ce domaine. Ils utilisent de manière stratégique la musique pour exprimer leur propre état d'esprit par rapport à la religion et à la politique, créant ainsi leurs propres discours sur l'islam et la citoyenneté. De plus, certains artistes se produisent dans les deux registres. Les artistes soufis et *anachid* font des choix stratégiques en déterminant quel style de musique ils jouent et sous quelle étiquette. Leurs choix sont principalement guidés par des considérations religieuses, commerciales et politiques mais d'autres facteurs jouent un rôle : les attentes des organisateurs des festivals, les mouvements islamiques, le public ou encore l'État. Les deux domaines ne s'excluent donc pas mutuellement ; il y a bel et bien un lien, même si ce lien est grinçant. C'est pourquoi notre point de vue, plutôt que d'opposer ces deux répertoires musicaux, reconnaît une dynamique complexe faite d'ambigüité et de tension ; telle un accord dissonant qui est source de discorde.

Cela nous mène à quatre ***Conclusions*** : 1) La distinction entre une sphère de musique « orthodoxe » *anachid* non-marocaine et une sphère officielle de spiritualité soufie « modérée » est principalement discursive. 2) Cette distinction renvoie plus au discours national sur la lutte contre l'islam « radical » et à l'idée du Maroc comme étant un pays islamique « modéré ». 3) La flexibilité et l'ambivalence par lesquelles les artistes répondent à cette distinction entre les deux registres musicaux et qui en est une conséquence pratique, peut aussi être conçue comme une forme de résistance. Cette flexibilité pragmatique leur fournit une marge pour manœuvrer entre les conséquences matérielles du discours dominant sur la musique religieuse qui est très influencé par l'Etat marocain. 4) Les deux domaines étudiés utilisent la musique pour créer un sentiment religieux qui devient une base pour penser l'islam et la citoyenneté.

Pour résumer, ce travail montre comment différents genres de musique islamique sont liés à une construction idéologique plus large en ce que chacun représente et cultive un sentiment religieux propre. La musique n'est donc pas seulement le vecteur d'un message politique, mais est aussi instrumentalisée par les artistes pour faire naître un sentiment religieux particulier. Ce sentiment constitue à son tour, le fondement d'un engagement moral et inculque une large prise de conscience sociale.

ملخص بالعربية

أصوات التنافر: الموسيقى المستوحاة من الإسلام في المغرب وسياسة المشاعر الدينية

كيف يمكن للموسيقى تجسيد الأفكار بخصوص الإسلام والمواطنة؟
تركز هذه الأطروحة على الممارسات الموسيقية الإسلامية، السياسة الثقافية والمواطنة الدينية في المغرب وكيف تتفاعل مع بعضها البعض. تحلل كيف أن الأشكال المعاصرة للموسيقى المستوحاة من الإسلام تتفاعل مع الخطابات السياسية عن الإسلام في المغرب وذلك من خلال مجالين: مجال الموسيقى الصوفية وهو مدعم من طرف الدولة ومجال الأناشيد الدينية، غير المدعم من طرف الدولة، والتي غالبا ما تربط بإسلام أكثر أرثوذكسية.

أصبحت هذه الخطابات السياسية عن الإسلام ضمن سياق أوسع حيث أصبح هناك تمييز متزايد بين الإسلام المسمى بالمعتدل والإسلام المتشدد أو الراديكالي. غير أن هذه المفردات ليست محايدة، بل هي تركيبات ايديولوجية، تصدح في الخطابات الاستعمارية وتشكل جزءا من الأجندات السياسية العالمية ومكافحة الإرهاب يُفضل فيها الإسلام المعتدل على الإسلام الراديكالي.
تضيف هذه الدراسة المركزة على المغرب أفكارا جديدة لأبحاث متواجدة تنتقد وتحلل هذه المفاهيم (محمود 2006' ممداني 2002، 2004 و2005، زمني 2006).
تأثرا بالمفهوم الأمريكي "الحرب على الإرهاب" وردا على الجدل الدائر حاليا حول الإسلام، كثير من البلدان ذات الأغلبية المسلمة التي تعزز صورة عن تراث إسلامي متسامح ومعتدل. أداة يتم من خلالها تمثيل مثل هذه الخطابات عن 'الاعتدال' الديني والمتمثلة أيضا في الموسيقى.
المغرب هو واحد من البلدان التي تستخدم الموسيقى كوسيلة لتصوير أمته كمهد تراث إسلامي "معتدل". بعد أحداث 11/9 وهجمات الدار البيضاء في عام 2003، ازداد الوعي إزاء الحركات الإسلامية الناشطة في المجتمع المغربي. من خلال تطبيق سياسات مكافحة الإرهاب والإصلاحات الدينية، حاول الملك والحكومة المغربية تعزيز السيطرة على الحقل الديني والسياسي. من أجل تقديم المغرب كبلد 'معتدل' يحفز الحكومة المغربية وخصوصا الملكية بعض الأشكال المحلية للتصوف وترعى الأنشطة الثقافية. وتشمل مهرجانات موسيقية دولية مرموقة حيث يتم تقديم مجموعات متنوعة من الموسيقيين الغربيين والشرقيين، بجانب الفنانين المغاربة الشباب الذين كانوا في السابق قد تم استبعادهم بسبب كلمات أغانيهم الحساسة من الناحية السياسية. هناك أيضا المنصات التي تركز بشكل خاص على الثقافة والموسيقى الصوفية.

وعلى النقيض من الدراسات الاجتماعية والثقافية العديدة على الإسلام والموسيقى، والتي تركز بشكل رئيسي على استقبال الموسيقى من قبل الجمهور، فإن هذه الدراسة تركز على الممارسات ووجهات نظر الفنانين.
السؤال المركزي الذي تطرحه هذه الرسالة هو كيف تتفاعل الممارسات ووجهات النظر الموسيقية من طرف المغنيين المسلمين المتدينين مع الخطابات السياسية حول الإسلام في المغرب.
تم توظيف ثلاثة منظورات مترابطة لكشف هذا السؤال: 1) البنية التحتية التي من خلالها يتم إنتاج عروض الموسيقى المستوحاة من الإسلام، 2) الممارسات الموسيقية المستخدمة، 3) وجهات نظر المؤدين عن الإسلام والموسيقى، وعن السياسة الثقافية المغربية.
توصف هذه الأبعاد الثلاثة في مجالين موسيقيين: مجال مدعم من طرف الدولة في مجالات الموسيقى الروحية والغناء الصوفي وهي تستهدف في الغالب نخبة معينة من المغاربة والسياح الأجانب من جهة، والأناشيد الإسلامية من جهة أخرى، وهي غير مدعمة من طرف الدولة ومبعدة من المنصات الرسمية لكونها مربوطة بالتطرف الإسلامي ومعظمها يكون في البيوت والأماكن الخاصة. البحث في هذين المجالين يعطي نظرة عن التفاعل بين الممارسات الموسيقية والدين والسياسة.

طرق البحث والإطار النظري

تم جمع البيانات التجريبية التي تشكل مركز هذه الدراسة خلال ثلاثة عشر شهرا من البحث الميداني الإثنوغرافي في الفترة ما بين سبتمبر 2009 الى مارس 2012، معظمها في الرباط، الدار البيضاء وفاس، وفترة قصيرة في منطقة الناظور. أولا ركزت في هذه الدراسة على المؤدين للغناء المستوحى من الإسلام. لاحظت خلالها عن قرب الأنشطة الفنية. كانت معظم أبحاثي داخل اطار المهرجانات الموسيقية أو الاحتفالات العائلية في الأماكن الخاصة، مثل حفلات الزفاف. الى جانب الملاحظات، أجريت مقابلات معمقة ومحادثات غير رسمية مع الفنانين حول مشاركاتهم في الاطارات المختلفة وكيفية التعامل مع التأثير المترتب على السياسة الثقافية، التجارة، وعن وجهات نظرهم الخاصة عن الإسلام والموسيقى. وقد أجريت أيضا بعض المقابلات الجماعية مع بعض الفرق الموسيقية. تحدثت مرات إلى أناس لهم علاقة وان كانت غير مباشرة مع الأنشطة الموسيقية للفنانين، كأفراد الأسرة، مديري الفرق، السياسيين، الجمهور، وأعضاء من الحركات الإسلامية. كما أجريت مقابلات جماعية مع فرق موسيقية وقمت بتحليلات عن التسجيلات وكلمات الأغاني.
أبين في الفصل الأول أن تحليل البعد الرمزي للموسيقى والبعد الانفعالي ضروريان لفهم العلاقات بين الموسيقى والتجارب الدينية والسياسة.
في معظم الدراسات الاجتماعية-الثقافية حول الموسيقى وعلاقتها بالسياسة والسلطة، يتم

تقارب الموسيقى كوسيلة نقل رمزية للهويات الجماعية وعلاقات سلطوية.
ويستند هذا المنظور بقوة على نماذج من التمثيل الرمزي واعطاء المعنى. غير أن هذه الزاوية لا تعكس تجارب الأشخاص الذين استجوبتهم، والذين يعتقدون أن هناك قوة "داخلية" لدى الموسيقى، مع القدرة على التأثير على أفكار ومشاعر المستمع. من أجل الإثبات أن الموسيقى هي رمزية وكذلك شكل حسي للسلطة عندما يتعلق الأمر بالتعبير وتشكيل الهويات الجماعية، المشاعر وقوة العلاقات، أستخدم النهج الأنثروبولوجي الذي يركز على أهمية الحواس، الجسم والعواطف داخل الحقل السياسي (هيرشكند2006؛ محمود 2005؛ ماير 2006، 2009، 2012). أطبق هذه المناهج على الموسيقى المستوحاة من الإسلام من أجل تسليط الضوء على تفاعلها مع الخطابات السياسية حول الإسلام في المغرب.

الموسيقى المستوحاة من الإسلام والسياسة الثقافية في المغرب

نجد أن مجال الموسيقى الدينية في المغرب تم تسييسه بشكل قوي لكون الدين لب نظام الدولة السياسي. لا تستخدم الموسيقى فقط من قبل الدولة لإظهار المغرب كبلد مسلم "معتدل"، بل هي أيضا أداة لتبرير قوة النظام السياسي الوطني وإعادة إنتاجها. في الفصل الثاني أصف المشهد الديني والسياسي في المغرب من منظور تاريخي. أبين كيف تتشابك هذه المشاهد من خلال شخص الملك، الذي هو في نفس الوقت رئيس الدولة وأمير المؤمنين، لكونه من سلالة النبي. تمارس الدولة المغربية تأثيرا أساسيا على تحديد رموز وطقوس الهوية الوطنية. وتعتبر الموسيقى في ذلك وسيلة أساسية من أجل التعبير عن التمثيلات الثقافية الرسمية ومن أجل إظهار السلطة الدينية والتوسط فيها والمصادقة عليها
في الفصل الثالث أشرح كيف تم تداخل السياسة والدين وما هو تأثيره على استخدام ومعنى الأشكال الموسيقية في المغرب ، وذلك منذ الحماية الفرنسية (1912-1956) حتى الحكم الحالي للملك محمد السادس.
على مدى السنوات الثلاثين الماضية، أصبح تأثير العولمة جليا بصورة متزايدة في المجال العام المغربي. لقد سببت أحداث 11/9، وإلقاء القبض على فناني موسيقى الهيفيميتال بتهمة عبادة الشيطان، واعتداءات الدار البيضاء عام 2003 إعادة التفكير وإعادة صياغة قيمها الثقافية الدينية والهوية الوطنية في المجتمع المغربي. المسارح الموسيقية المدعمة من الملك هي أماكن محورية لعرض الخطابات الوطنية للإسلام والهوية الوطنية. هذه المسارح تحوي قيم غربية للحداثة والديمقراطية، بينما في الوقت نفسه نجد بقوة تواجد نظام مغربي تقليدي للسلطة السياسية. ومع ذلك، فإن الدولة المغربية ليست وحدها من يستخدم الموسيقى في صياغة الخطابات السياسية في الإسلام. بل هناك أيضا غيرها من الجهات الفاعلة التي تستخدم الموسيقى للتعبير عن وجهات نظرها الخاصة حول الإسلام.

الصوفية وفناني الأناشيد

الفصل الرابع يستكشف مهرجانين للموسيقى الصوفية تديرهما الدولة : مهرجان الثقافة الصوفية ومهرجان الموسيقى المقدسة العالمية. يقام هذان المهرجانان على نطاق واسع سنويا في مدينة فاس و يهدفان بشكل كبير إلى استقطاب السياح الأجانب، لإعطائهم صورة عن مفهوم الإسلام "المعتدل" وربطه بالتصوف والخطابات القومية من خلال الموسيقى. تقدم المهرجانات التصوف باعتباره جزءا من التراث الوطني المغربي وروحانية عالمية أوسع نطاقا، والتي تضم العديد من التقاليد الدينية. والدعوة موجهة إلى معتنقي الطرق الصوفية المختلفة لأداء طقوسهم الموسيقية في هذه المهرجانات. وأصبح بعضهم فنانين محترفين.

تجلب التحولات في الطقوس الموسيقية، التي كانت أصلا تهدف إلى استحضار التجارب الدينية، إلى حفلات على نطاق واسع مع جمهور دولي، تغييرات جوهرية على مستوى الشكل والوظيفة ومعنى الطقوس، وأيضا تدين الموسيقيين.

إن المغنين المتصوفة الذين في بعض الحالات قد تطوروا إلى فنانين محترفين، ليسوا مجرد ضحايا عاجزين عن التسييس وتسويق شعائرهم. هم أنفسهم يستخدمون هذه المهرجانات من أجل تشجيع طرقهم الصوفية الخاصة بهم، لنقل رسائل إسلامية بين جمهور واسع، وأيضا لكسب الدخل. ومثيرة للانتباه هي الطرق التي يتعامل بها بعض المغنين في محاولة لإبقاء السيطرة على معنى شعائرهم والتدين الخاصة بهم. يختارون بعناية على سبيل المثال من الطقوس ما يريدون الكشف عنه للجمهور، أو أنهم يجرون طقوس تطهير دينية قبل وأثناء أدائهم على المسارح.

يركز الفصل الخامس على مجال الأناشيد: الأكابيلا شكل موسيقي يعتمد فقط على الصوت البشري دون استعمال آلات موسيقية، يحمل رسالة إسلامية. على مدى السنوات العشرين الماضية، تطورت هذه التقاليد الغنائية إلى نوع موسيقي شعبي يغطي مجموعة واسعة من الأنماط الموسيقية والفنانين والجماهير في الشرق الأوسط وآسيا والغرب. تحت تأثير حركة النهضة الإسلامية، أدخلت الأناشيد الى المغرب في الثمانينات، واكتسبت في البداية شعبية في الجامعات، حيث كانت الحركات الإسلامية الناشطة في التسعينات، ودخل هذا النوع إلى الأماكن المحلية في الاحتفالات العائلية، مثل حفلات الزفاف والختان بطريقة اسلامية.

في الوقت الحاضر، هناك عدد لا يحصى من فرق الأناشيد في المغرب التي تؤدي في أماكن محلية، ولكن أيضا في الأماكن شبه العامة مثل الجامعات، الجمعيات الثقافية، والمراكز المجتمعية للشباب، والتجمعات من الحركات الإسلامية الناشطة. الى جانب توفير ترفيه مقبول أخلاقيا ضمن سياق إسلامي، تسعى الأناشيد أيضا إلى تثقيف الجمهور كيف يقود أسلوب حياة صحيحة شرعا.

وعلى الرغم من تزايد شعبية الأناشيد، يتم ابعاد هذا النوع من الغناء الإسلامي إلى حد

كبير من المسارح الرسمية للموسيقى الدينية، بسبب علاقته المقرونة ب "الإسلام الراديكالي". لذلك، نجد فناني الأناشيد في معظم الأحيان خارج المسارح التي تسيطر عليها الدولة للتعبير الثقافي ونجدهم في أماكن مثل الاحتفالات العائلية، والمراكز المجتمعية، والحفلات الموسيقية خارج الوطن. يظهر فنانو الأناشيد موقفا حاسما تجاه السياسة الثقافية المغربية. يعتبرون تفضيل الموسيقى الصوفية والفنانين العالميين شيئا غير أخلاقي ومضيعة للأموال العامة. وكثير منهم يأطر ممارساته الموسيقية كشكل من أشكال المقاومة. من خلال توفير الأشكال الموسيقية الصحيحة المبدلة ، يقومون بحملة ضد "الفساد الأخلاقي" والظلم السياسي الممثلة في هذه المهرجانات.
لا تنعكس هذه المقاومة فقط في الكلمات ولكن أيضا في أساليب أداء الأغاني. يستخدم مؤدو الأناشيد عمدا تقنيات محددة للأداء مثل الإيقاعات وكيفية الجلوس والتعبير الجسدي من أجل تجسيد واستدعاء المشاعر والجمالية من جهة، ومن ناحية أخرى تجنب المشاعر غير المرغوب فيها، وتوجيه الجمهور نحو تجربة دينية مرغوب فيها. ولمثل هذا التبادل بين الفنانين والجمهور أهمية سياسية أيضا. وتسعى العروض لإقامة مشاعر دينية بين الفنانين وجمهورهم - المشاعر الدينية التي تهدف إلى التعبير عن تشكيل شوق مشترك لمجتمع فاضل، تحكمه المبادئ الإسلامية.

نحو منظور التنافر

تقدم المقارنة بين مجالي الغناء الصوفي والأناشيد رؤية في العلاقات المعقدة الكامنة في مجال الموسيقى المستوحاة من الإسلام في المغرب. في الفصل السادس، الفصل الأخير من أطروحتي، تبين لي أنه على الرغم من الانفصال بين المجالين على المستوى الفكري والتنظيمي، نحن لا نتعامل مع حقلين غير متجانسين يخضع فيهما الفنانون بطريقة غير إرادية لرغبات وتعاريف الدولة. كما رأينا، فالمسارح التي ترعاها الدولة تشكل منصة حيث تحاول الدولة المغربية التأثير على جيل جديد من الفنانين يجسد الاتجاه الجديد من الاعتدال الديني، في حين يتم الاجماع على أن الأناشيد الإسلامية منتجات ثقافية من "الإسلام الراديكالي"، وهي تبعد عن برامج المنصات الرسمية.
من خلال تحليل الممارسات والخبرات من الفنانين في هذين المجالين الموسيقيين يظهر أنه ليست الموسيقى، ولا الفنانين ولا المشاعر الدينية الأساسية، أو الأفكار السياسية لا تتناسب مع اطار صورة السلطات المستقطبة. تبدو الحقيقة غامضة شيئا ما. الفنانون في كلا المجالين لا يتبنون الخطاب السائد. يستخدمون استراتيجية الموسيقى للتعبير عن مواقفهم الشخصية تجاه الدين والسياسة، وخلق الخطابات الخاصة بهم عن الإسلام والمواطنة. وعلاوة على ذلك، فان بعض الفنانين نجدهم ضمن كل من المجالين. فنانو الغناء الصوفي وغناء الأناشيد لهم خيارات استراتيجية عن الأنماط الموسيقية التي يستخدمونها وبأي شكل. ويتم تحديد هذه الخيارات إلى حد كبير بسبب الاعتبارات الدينية والتجارية والسياسية، وأيضا توقعات منظمي المهرجانات، الحركات الإسلامية،

الجماهير، والدولة تلعب دورا في ذلك. إضافة إلى ذلك فلا يقتبس فنانو المجالين النقاش السائد فحسب، بل يقدمون أفكارهم الخاصة عن الإسلام والمواطنة.
وبالتالي فلا يستبعد هذان المجالان بعضهما بعضا. هناك اتصال بينهما غير أن هذا الاتصال صعب إلى حد ما. لذا، أقترح منظورا نستطيع من خلاله التعرف على أنه بدلا من المجالين الموسيقيين المتعارضين، هناك دينامية معقدة من الغموض والتوتر. مثل صوت النشاز، الذي ينتج عن نوطات غير متجانسة.
وهذا يؤدي إلى أربعة استنتاجات. 1) التمييز بين مجال "التشدد" غير المغربي المتمثل في الأناشيد مقابل مجال وطني معتمد رسميا من الروحانية الصوفية «المعتدلة» وهو استطرادي في المقام الأول. 2) يعكس هذا التمييز بشكل خاص الخطاب القومي لمكافحة الإسلام "الراديكالي" واعطاء صورة عن المغرب كبلد إسلامي "معتدل" ولا يتماشى مع أعمال الفنانين وتجاربهم. 3) المرونة والتناقض في تعامل الفنانين مع التمييز الثنائي بين المجالين الموسيقيين، ويمكن أن ينظر إليها على أنها شكل غير مباشر من المقاومة. تمنحهم هذه المرونة الواقعية طريقة للتعامل مع الآثار المادية من الخطابات المهيمنة في مجال الموسيقى المستوحاة من الإسلام، الذي تهيمن عليه بقوة الحكومة المغربية. 4) وفي كلا المجالين تستخدم الموسيقى لخلق المشاعر الدينية، والتي تخدم كأساس للمفاهيم عن الإسلام والمواطنة.

باختصار، توضح هذه الدراسة كيف ترتبط أشكال مختلفة من الموسيقى الإسلامية مع بنيات فكرية أوسع لأنها تمثل وتزرع مشاعر دينية على حد سواء. وعلاوة على ذلك، فان الموسيقى تستخدم من ناحية كوسيلة لإيصال رسائل سياسية، ومن جهة أخرى (في وقت واحد) كأداة للفنانين الأفراد لإقامة المشاعر الدينية التي تعبر عن وعي مجتمعي أوسع.

About the author

Nina ter Laan was born in Hefshuizen, the Netherlands, on February 12, 1979. She graduated in 1997 from the Stedelijke Scholengemeenschap in Zutphen, after which she studied one year of Graphic Design at the Art Academy in Arnhem. In 1998 she entered the Radboud University Nijmegen obtaining her master's degree in Cultural Anthropology in 2003. During her studies she was member of the editorial board of *Raffia*, a journal on Gender, Emancipation and Feminism. For her master's thesis, she studied activist painters within the Amazigh (Berber) movement in Morocco. The results were published in an article in *ZemZem*, a Dutch journal on the Middle East, North Africa and Islam. In 2009 she commenced her PhD-research at the Department of Islam Studies of the Radboud University Nijmegen, within the framework of the NWO research program 'Islam and the Performing Arts in Europe and the Middle East.' For her PhD she conducted fieldwork in Morocco, interviewing vocal performers of Islam-inspired music. While working on her PhD thesis she was an editorial staff member of *ZemZem*, published several articles in the field of cultural anthropology, and presented her findings at national and international conferences. In 2013 she started working as a lecturer at Leiden University at the Department of Cultural anthropology and in 2015 at the Department of Middle Eastern studies at Leiden University. Currently she is working as a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Religious studies at Utrecht University.

This dissertation focuses on the role of Islam-inspired music in the construction of political ideas concerning Islam in Morocco. Central to this study are the musical practices and experiences of Muslim vocal performers. Based on thirteen months of anthropological fieldwork among artists in Morocco, two domains for Islam-inspired music are distinguished and analyzed: state-sponsored stages for Sufi music and non-state-sponsored stages for *anashid*, Islamic songs generally associated with 'islamism.' Dissonant Voices demonstrates that the distinction between these two domains primarily reflects a nationalist state rhetoric, focused on fighting a 'radical' Islam and propagating Morocco as a 'moderate' Islamic country. The artists, their musical practices, and their political ideas do not always coincide with this polarized image of the state. Driven by commercial, religious, and political incentives they make strategic choices of musical style and identity. The book further shows that artists from both domains use music to generate religious sentiments – religious sentiments meant to serve as a basis of ethical engagement and political thought.

Nina ter Laan studied Cultural Anthropology at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. This book is her PhD-thesis, which she completed at the Department of Islam Studies at the Radboud University. She is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Utrecht University.